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ABSTRACT
This thesis has considered the theoretical and practical underpinning of SSR
and NATO's role in its application within two countries of the Western Balkans.
It began by reviewing the extant literature on SSR and then analysed NATO's
evolution and how it developed its role in assisting countries with reform of their
security sectors in the aftermath of the Cold War. Unlike organisations such as
the UN and EU, NATO does not have a formal policy and conceptual framework
for Security Sector Reform (SSR) but uses a range of interlocking programmes
that have evolved over time. The thesis examined critically NATO's
interventions in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo and how that role
transformed from being a security provider to one of advising and mentoring on
reform of the security sectors. A comparative analysis was then conducted of
the cross-case data presented in the two case studies.
The research has reinforced the reality that different actors with different
agendas will inevitably complicate an already challenging situation in post-
conflict and post-authoritarian countries. It became evident that national
agendas within the North Atlantic Council also influenced the Alliance's ability to
support SSR in the two countries studied. Through a combination of both
primary and secondary research the study has established that NATO still
managed to add considerable value to these reform processes and has the
potential for doing so in the future in other countries. There were limitations to
its approach and these have been highlighted. At times NATO's contextual
understanding of the situation on the ground was weak and its use of political
soft power to encourage the reforms in the countries studied was eclectic but,
ultimately, it has had a measure of success in its endeavours.
The research has generated a framework of factors for NATO to use when
considering current and potential SSR engagements. As NATO becomes more
deeply involved in projecting stability through SSR support after a decade of
war fighting, this list of factors could have international significance.
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“It is all very well trying to create a secure environment – as we have in
Kosovo – but if that environment isn’t sustainable over the long term,
then the blood and treasure we expend is wasted. That is where work on
security sector reform and democratic control of the armed forces,
among many other things, comes in."
NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow1
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
During the past twenty-five years the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
has used its position as the predominant security Alliance in assisting countries
reform their security sectors, not just in Europe but further afield in both the
Middle East and Central Asia. In view of the importance of Security Sector
Reform (SSR) to these various missions, it seems intriguing that NATO has
never developed a formal doctrine or policy framework for the concept. One
scholar has suggested that whilst NATO has embraced SSR, it has been in the
manner of Molière’s Monsieur Jourdain, where it speaks “…the prose of SSR
without actually realising it." (Haglund 2008:110) Notwithstanding the lack of
any doctrine on SSR, several scholars and practitioners have suggested that
Alliance still appears to have had a measure of success in its endeavours. (eg
Law 2008:14-15; Maxwell & Olsen 2013:99; and Yost 2014:13-18) This would
seem to suggest that this is a suitable subject for further and more detailed
research.
This introduction seeks to set out briefly the research context for the inquiry,
covering NATO's adaptation in a changing security environment, the emergence
1
Speech at International Security Forum Geneva on 13 June 2016 entitled: “An Alliance For
Our Times: NATO and its Partners in a ‘World Disrupted’.” Emphasis added. (NATO 2016)
2
of the SSR concept and some preparatory remarks on NATO's approach to
SSR. The research question and aim are clarified and they are followed by the
research objectives and the significance of the study. The historical context for
the Western Balkans is provided through a brief historical review of the region.
Finally, the Chapter concludes with the organisation and structure of the thesis.
RESEARCH CONTEXT
Security and a Changing Security Environment
The denouement of the Cold War brought about immense change. Previously
rigid strategic viewpoints were revised. Defence budgets were dramatically cut
across Europe. In his original article, The End of History (1989) Fukuyama
grappled with some of the political changes and, with the collapse of
communism, predicted the passing of the 'Hegelian dialectic'2 where:
"... history culminated in an absolute moment -- a moment in which a final,
rational form of society and state became victorious." (1989:2)
Subsequent events in the Middle East and a resurgent Russian Federation's
interventions in Georgia and Ukraine have shown that this rather Utopian view
had definitely not come to pass. Nonetheless, as Kaplan (2004:110) argued,
the end of the Cold War called into question the way international security was
provided and, in particular, the future role of NATO. In the early 1990s scholars
struggled to obtain a better intellectual understanding of the new security
environment and the sources of insecurity. Keohane suggested that the new
security environment, where the terms ‘risks’ and ‘challenges’ replaced the Cold
War term ‘threats’, helped to explain the transformation of NATO (2002:107).
In time, it became clear that soft security was as important as hard security, and
a clear understanding of the environment could only be achieved if a holistic
and interdisciplinary perspective of security was taken. (eg Clarke 1993:xi-xii,
Picciotto 2006:8-9 and 15, and Renner 2006:112) This acceptance of a more
2
Kaplan (2004:109), amongst others, used this term.
3
holistic approach to security (and insecurity) sowed the intellectual seeds for
NATO's subsequent evolution as a security provider, as well as the over-arching
approach to SSR.
A key change that also became apparent during this period was the perception
of security and its link to development. Previously “... the terms ‘defence’ and
‘security’ were nearly synonymous.” (Trapans 2002:21) A focus on territorial
defence with large standing armies, a single predominant threat, and hard lines
of confrontation epitomised the geo-strategic situation during the Cold War. This
has ceased to be the case. For many countries around the globe, "...security is
primarily measured in non-military terms and threats to security are non-military
in nature.” (Donnelly 2004b:27) Both Edmunds (2006:1063) and Omand
(2010:19) noted this shift away from collective defence to a broader sense of
security allied with governance. A contributor to the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s thinking and policy papers3 from the
late 1990s onwards, Alan Bryden, has also emphasised the linkage between
security and governance. (2008:68-69) This has translated into a generally
agreed recognition that security is essential for sustainable development
(Duffield 2007:8), which has been reflected in the approaches of both politicians
and scholars For example, in 2004, the UK’s Secretary of State for
Development said at a conference: “... development without security is not
possible; security without development is only temporary.” (Benn 2004) This
security-development nexus has also been echoed by Chalmers (2008:2):
"In the post-Cold War world, the close interdependence of security and
development agendas is even more apparent. Two-thirds of the countries least
likely to meet the UN's Millennium Development Goals for poverty reduction have
experienced armed conflict during 1990-2005. This correlation is not surprising.
Conflict has direct and often highly damaging consequences for economic and
3
Strictly speaking it is the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) that is responsible
for development and SSR issues. The OECD DAC comprises thirty member-states including
the majority of the largest development funders. The IMF, World Bank and UNDP also have
observer status on the DAC. For the purposes of simplification, however, the term used
throughout this thesis will be OECD rather than the full title of OECD-DAC.
4
human development. Some of the most severe development reversals of the last
three decades […] are a result of long and damaging wars."
Events at the World Trade Center in America on 9 September 2001 marked yet
another change in the perception of security. Michael Howard (2008:248-249)
argued that this attack "... was in some ways even more epoch-making than the
development of nuclear weapons." He suggested that there was a sudden
realisation that a small determined group, with none of the usual resources, and
owing no state its allegiance, could significantly harm the most powerful nation
in the world, and effectively end the 300 year 'Westphalian Epoch'. In reality the
epoch was already being challenged not only by so-called humanitarian
interventions like that into Kosovo in 1999 (effectively setting a limit on non-
interference within sovereign states), but also by countries voluntarily ceding
elements of sovereignty to join multi-lateral organisations like NATO.
Howard also argued that great power rivalry would seem to be less threatening
than hitherto and, with rather more prescience, that whilst the security threats
posed by small states with ill-defined borders and ethno-nationalist tendencies
(eg Nagorno-Karabakh) were still possible, it seemed to him that the largest
cause of insecurity was:
"... from the inability [or lack of willingness] of weak states to exert control either
over their own citizens or over highly volatile regions where no effective writ
runs; and this weakness creates threats of disorder with which traditional
military power has shown itself ill-adapted to deal." (2008:251-252)
Not only is Afghanistan such an example but Somalia, Yemen and Syria are
also centres of insecurity created in part by al-Qaeda4 and now by Daesch.5
This does not necessarily support Huntington's Clash of Civilizations theory
(1997), but could be more directly attributable to the existence of failed and
4
See: Beyond Af-Pak: The War Against al-Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia, dated 19 April 2010.
Available at: http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/node/17006 [Last Accessed 5 July 2016].
5
Daesch is an Arabic acronym for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which
Western governments now tend to use. (In full: al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham).
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failing states and the globalisation of threats. (Coker 2002; Dannatt 2009:7;
Hoeffler 2010:2-3) In defining state failure/fragility, Stewart and Brown (2009:2-
4) differentiate between three dimensions that are all linked causally: authority
failures; service entitlement failures; and legitimacy failures. Security and
insecurity have a direct impact in all three areas.
The spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) has been a security
concern for a number of years and, as evinced by the UK's 2010 Strategy
Review and NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept, these concerns have only
increased in the past decade. The continuation of North Korea's ballistic missile
programme has also caused concern well beyond its regional neighbours.
Other non-conventional threats from terrorism, inequality, cyber-attacks,
transnational crime, piracy and energy supply remain the focus of attention of
both nations and multinational organisations.
Events in Saharan Africa and the Middle East should also be noted. Since the
Second World War democratic, constitutional regimes have appeared at regular
intervals in most areas of the globe but with the notable exception of these two
regions. As the widely respected American Historian, Rashid Khalidi, points
out:
"All that has seemed to thrive in recent years in this vast zone of undemocratic
governance stretching from the Atlantic to the Caucasus and the frontiers of
Pakistan and Afghanistan have been autocracies, kleptocracies, absolute
monarchies, and other forms of despotic and authoritarian rule, some covered
with the fig-leaf of sham 'democratic' forms." (2009:159)6
Although the so-called 'Arab Spring' has been stuttering along for several years
now, Burnell argues that it is still too early to be certain how events will unfold in
these regions. Nonetheless, perceived and real failures of legitimacy, services
6
He does note the exceptions of Turkey and Israel, although he suggests that they too have
their limitations. Indeed, the rising tide of Syrian refugees in Turkey in 2015, a resumption of
the fighting with Kurdish separatists and the increasing authoritarianism of the state do not bode
well for democracy in that country.
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and authority will ensure that the threat of instability remains present in these
areas for the foreseeable future. (2013:852-853) For several years now
uncontrolled migration has supposedly been at the top of the European Union's
(EU) policy-making agenda (Ceccorulli 2009) but the 2015 migrant flows from
the Middle East through the Western Balkans route would seem to have
demonstrated the EU's impotence to manage the situation.7 The EU's concern
was originally focused on whether security and stability within the Union could
be assured if there was insecurity at its edge. More recently it has shifted to the
security implications of Daesch members being inserted into the flow of
refugees and to the ability of member states to accommodate the numbers
currently arriving in countries like Greece and Germany. These types of
security threats have variable geometry and are not always open to rational
methods of resolution.
Alongside some of these asymmetric threats, perhaps the most intriguing
development in the security environment since 2008 has been "... the return to
big power politics ..." (Lindley-French 2015:128) First, Russia's brief conflict
with Georgia, its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent 'non-linear'
support to pro-Russian rebels in Eastern Ukraine have all served to create a
palpable sense of unease on the fringes of Europe. The shooting down of
Malaysian Airlines MH17 over Eastern Ukraine in July 2014 has only
exacerbated tensions. (Ibid:127-134) The Baltic states have long viewed the
Russian Federation as their paramount threat and thus their support for NATO's
Article 5 guarantee has been unswerving. Second, China's aggressive
reclamation of land in the South China Sea has caused concern amongst all of
its neighbours, not least Japan and the Philippines.8 The American strategic
shift in 2010 to the Asia-Pacific region has been well documented and, in large
7
The European Security and Defence College has been an honourable exception within the EU
when it published a handbook entitled Migration – How CSDP Can Support (Biscop & Rehrl
2016) that sought to capture some of the key ways that the EU could tackle and coordinate its
responses to the migration issue.
8
New York Times, What China Has Been Building in the South China Sea, dated 27 October
2015. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-has-
been-building-in-the-south-china-sea.html?_r=0 [Last accessed 25 July 2016].
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measure, has been in response to the latter two strategic concerns. (Yost
2014:368-370)
In bringing this brief review of the new security environment to a close, it is
worth referring to Freedman (2010:247-250), who suggests that there are three
overarching variables in this new security era: international order and stability;
state security; and justice and equity. The priority and balance of effort
depends upon the worldview of individual actors and over time. Hence in
Europe the focus seems still to be on international order, where concerns in the
US on homeland security would seem to be on state security, whereas both
Europe and the US have an increased focus on human rights, both as a result
of civil rights activism as well as an increasing focus on 'human security'.9
Picciotto (2006:8-9) believes that it is the toxic mixture of failed states,
inequalities, terrorism and humanitarian crises where the security providers will
now need to focus their attention. Events on the borders of Russia and in the
Pacific might well contradict that view, but only time will tell. The next section
briefly examines the main Western security providers but with an emphasis on
NATO.
Security Providers
With the ending of the Cold War, there were many commentators on both sides
of the Atlantic, who declared that NATO had lost its raison d'être as a security
provider. (De Santis 1991:51; Delors 1994) They looked to multilateral
organisations like the UN and the Western European Union (WEU) as the
natural successors to NATO in a multi-polar world. UN peacekeeping missions
rose sharply in the early 1990s and the success (albeit with limited objectives)
of the UN-mandated mission to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991 seemed
to put the seal on the new arrangements. In 1992 the member states of the
WEU agreed to undertake, when authorised by the EU or the WEU, the so-
called Petersberg tasks, which were "... military tasks of a humanitarian,
9
'Human security' will be covered in more detail in Chapter 2.
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peacekeeping and peacemaking nature." (European Commission 1992) These
were designed to be at the more benign end of the security spectrum with
NATO still holding responsibility for peace-enforcement and collective defence.
(Whitman 2004:433-434)
Of course world events were much more complicated than that. During the first
Gulf War in 1990-91 the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’ drew heavily upon
NATO members and NATO doctrine. This led Kaplan (2004:112) to suggest
that "NATO's virtual representation in the Gulf War reinvigorated the alliance
and pointed to roles that it might occupy in the future. In other words, a case
may be made for the war serving as a life preserver for the alliance." Within a
few short years the UN then became bogged down in Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH)
and had to request NATO air power and then again for NATO to enforce the
Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) at the end of 1995. In addition, as Garnett points
out:
"The 1990s have taught us [...] that international politics, like life, is one [...] thing
after another. No sooner has one conflict evaporated than our attention is
focused on new sources of tension - in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union,
the Balkans, the Middle East, and parts of the Third World too numerous to
mention." (1996:3)
NATO took all these in its stride and began a period of transformation that
remains ongoing. As former-NATO Secretary General George Robertson
opined "... [b]ehind this transformation lay the conviction that NATO was not just
a temporary Cold War creation designed by necessity to deter Russian
power."10
Perhaps the most noteworthy aspects of NATO's changing role as a security
provider has been its transformation from a static and geographically limited
military tool to being a global projector of force with both hard military tools and
10
Foreword to Asmus 2002:xvi.
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soft political tools (Shea 2010:15-33), not just willing to respond but ready to act
pre-emptively if required. An inherent aspect of this transformation has been a
reliance on different partners from around the world from South Korea, to
Australasia, to Argentina. (Edström et al 2011) During a discussion on the
'Comprehensive Approach' in 2010, a NATO panel of experts postulated that:
"... [it] is not about hierarchy but about recognising that security has military,
political, economic and social dimensions. It follows, therefore, that building
security will often require working with an effective mix of partners to piece
together the diverse elements of a single shared strategy." (NATO 2010f:22)
The removal of the existential threat of the Cold War has posed many questions
about NATO's future role as a security provider. Whilst the Alliance's
interventions since 1990, in BiH (1995) through to Libya (2011), would suggest
a continued willingness and a readiness to act, the implicit question of 'what
next' still remains. (Laity 2012:53-58) The experience that NATO has gleaned
from its role in assisting SSR might help, at least in part, to answer that
question. Certainly its assistance to the PfP members on the fringes of Europe
could be improved by gleaning the lessons from its support to countries in the
Western Balkans over the past twenty years.
The EU's aspirations in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) and in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)11 are well
documented.12 For the purposes of this study it is sufficient to acknowledge the
growing breadth and depth of the EU's contributions. It still remains broadly
under the terms of the Petersberg tasks that were subsumed from the WEU at
the Amsterdam Summit in 1997 but its reach is now global. The EU's and
NATO's cooperation within ‘Berlin Plus’ has also achieved much success,
although it has not been flawless. (Collantes & Juncos 2011:141-142) NATO
has transferred two tactical missions to the EU: in the Republic of Macedonia
(Operation CONCORDIA) in 2003 and BiH (Operation ALTHEA) in 2004. A
11
Formerly European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
12
For example, see: Whitman 2004 and Rieker 2013.
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number of lessons were identified from the former and a number were then
successfully incorporated into the field for the latter mission. (Rambke & Keil
2008:270) Nonetheless, cooperation between the two organisations at the
political/strategic level in Brussels remained, and continues to remain
problematic. (Lindley-French 2015:125; Yost 2014:255-256)
A notable feature of the past decade has been more active cooperation
between a variety of security providers. Not just that mentioned above between
NATO and the EU, but also NATO's assistance to the African Union (AU) in
Somalia,13 and the UN, NATO and EU in Afghanistan (Williams 2009:80-89).
Scholars are also looking at how partners like the EU and Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) might cooperate in both traditional and non-
traditional security fields (Rees 2010). Although the AU and ASEAN are
mentioned above, there are a number of other security organisations at both the
regional and sub-regional level where cooperation has increased, but space
and the limitations of the study prevent a more detailed treatment of their
activities.
For some years there has been a realisation that most threats are transnational
in nature and that state actors are generally unable to address them alone,
even at the regional and sub-regional level, so cooperation and collaboration is
essential. It is a point that is made most forcibly by Jones et al who stated that:
"... neither regional nor coalition-based arrangements have yet shown that they
alone can handle the scale and complexity of sustained, major security
challenges without wider international engagement - as demonstrated by NATO's
struggles in Afghanistan, the European Union's laborious deployments in Congo
and the Central African Republic, the inaction of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) on Myanmar, or the African Union's limited capacity in
Sudan and the Horn of Africa." (2009:33)
13
NATO, NATO and the African Union Boost Their Cooperation, dated 8 May 2014. Available
at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_109824.htm?selectedLocale=en. [Last Accessed 4
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Specifically, the costs in both political and resource terms are normally too
much for unilateral action. Furthermore, there is an undeniable air of legitimacy
when allies act in concert, although as the political fallout from the coalition-of-
the-willing intervention in Iraq in 2003 demonstrated, there will always be
dissenting voices. Reaching agreement on both the threats and the appropriate
responses between individual stakeholders may pose difficulties, but one only
needs to look at the success that a regional organisation such as NATO has
had in establishing strategic partnerships with disparate countries like Japan
and Qatar14 in order to see a growing trend in the future. They should therefore
not be treated as a desirable activity for the NATO Alliance but an essential one
that serves its interests to best effect.
In summary, most individual nation-states do not have the political clout nor are
they able to afford the expense both in terms of finance or capability to act
completely independently in the security arena. In addition, the issue of
legitimacy looms large over any military intervention. It can thus be averred that
formal regional and sub-regional security organisations still have a major role to
play in countering the threats of the new security era and managing the risks.
NATO remains at the forefront of these organisations with its core
competencies and capital unmatched by any other in the security field. Its
experience in supporting the reform processes in a variety of different countries
has also been widely acknowledged.15 The next section deals briefly with
reform of the security sector both as a means of development as well as a
means of countering the security threats and managing the concomitant risks
outlined earlier in this Chapter.
The Emergence of the SSR Concept
This section will now discuss the emergence of the SSR concept. It was Nicole
Ball (1990 [Original1988]), who first identified the need for a more holistic
14
NATO, Partners, dated 11 November 2015. Available at:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/51288.htm [Last Accessed 4 July 2016].
15
For example, see Jazbec (2007) and Shea (2010).
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approach to development assistance within the security sector. The United
Nations Development Program (UNDP) took this a stage further in 1994 and
began to link the notions of democratising societies and good governance to
human security programmes. (UNDP 1994) This chimed with the civil-military
relations approach developed in the 1950s-1970s, which focused on the need
for civilian direction and overall control of the armed forces (Chuter 2006:3) and
which formed a major plank of the early 1990 reforms in Central Eastern Europe
(CEE). (Forster et al 2002:1-15; Forster et al 2003:19-20) In the mid- to late-
1990s the SSR agenda finally emerged from the shadows in both the
development and security policy communities with an acceptance that there had
been a "... widening and deepening of the concept of security ..." (Hänggi
2004:4) This was accompanied by a burgeoning recognition of the linkages
between security and development. (Edmunds 2001:15) This security-
development nexus has been discussed earlier in this Chapter16 but it is worth
recalling Ball's (2010:29) observation:
" Somewhat surprisingly, the development assistance community, which had
consistently avoided addressing issues related to security, and frequently
justice, for much of the post-1945 period, came to champion the concept of
SSR."
Whilst this development and governance strand was the major factor in the
creation of the SSR concept, there were two other lines of evolution that formed
its genealogy:
 the adoption by the OSCE of its 'Code of Conduct', which expanded the
need for democratic control beyond the armed forces to include other areas
of the security sector such as the intelligence services, the police and
similar organisations (OSCE 1994); and,
16
See section ‘Security and a Changing Security Environment’.
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 the change in thinking about security from one that was primarily state-
centric to a more people-centric approach (Kaldor 2007; Fell 2006; Welch
2006) as well as the increase in participatory poverty surveys that
consistently identified security (and more specifically insecurity) as a
significant concern for poor people. (Narayan 2000a:155)17
These various lines of evolution have spawned a succession of definitions of
SSR that tended to reflect the worldview and interest of the originators. (Law
2007:17) A fuller analysis of the definitional debate will be included in Chapter
2 but for the purposes of this introductory Chapter, it is sufficient to draw
attention to the work of the OECD and its 2007 definition of the objective of SSR
that has achieved a measure of currency amongst scholars, policy-makers and
practitioners (eg Beswick & Jackson 2015:161; European Commission 2016:2;
and Mayer‐Rieckh 2013:8-9):
“The overall objective of international support to security system reform
processes is to increase the ability of partner countries to meet the range of
security and justice challenges they face, “in a manner consistent with democratic
norms, and sound principles of governance and the rule of law”, as defined in the 
DAC Guidelines on SSR. SSR helps create a secure environment conducive to
other political, economic and social developments, through the reduction of
armed violence and crime.” (OECD 2007a:21)
Given the relatively recent birth the concept of SSR, it is hardly surprising that
there has been some disagreement over both the constituent elements of the
security sector as well as the term SSR itself. (Sedra 2009:2; Schroden &
Norman et al 2014:168-170) Security 'System' Reform is favoured by the
OECD (2007a) and Security 'Sector' Reform is favoured by others (eg Council
of the EU 2005). There are also those, particularly in Africa, who view the term
‘reform’ as insulting and prefer ‘transformation’ or ‘development’, thus SST or
SSD. (Ball et al 2004:5-7; Cooper & Pugh 2002:6-7) Nonetheless, there is a
17
The World Bank's research under the mantle of the 'Voices of the Poor' was especially helpful
in showing that physical insecurity was a significant barrier to the reduction of poverty.
14
general acceptance that these various definitions cover much of the same
elements. For the purposes of this study the term used will be 'SSR' in order not
to become overly distracted by an arcane debate on taxonomy.18
It was in the latter half of the 2000s that the underlying principles for supporting
SSR (eg, local ownership, good governance, holistic approach etc)19 were
linked to specific areas of activity and then to specific instruments. There are
still outstanding challenges relating to such areas as, inter alia, the role of
capacity building (Nathan 2004), the difficulties of instilling local ownership
when there is little local understanding of security concepts (Nathan 2007;
Bendix & Stanley 2008a), introducing Whole of Government Approaches (WGA)
(OECD 2007c),20 the critical interface between SSR and stabilisation operations
and their associated inter-dependencies (Fitz-Gerald 2010), and, perhaps the
most difficult of all issues, the thorny question of how to measure success in
SSR. (Sedra 2009:5-6)
Notwithstanding the transition of OECD's guidelines on SSR and Governance
(OECD 2005a [Original 2004]) to the more operationalised Handbook on SSR -
Supporting Security and Justice (OECD 2007a), there have been significant
concerns over the translation of SSR policy into practical reform programmes
and the way some donors still provide 'train and equip' programmes under the
cloak of SSR. (Chuter 2009:1; Sedra 2009:2) This has led to a genuine
concern over the lack of precision in applying the SSR concept in the field. The
UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) 2009 White Paper
(DFID 2009) and Mark Sedra's edited volume on the future of SSR (Sedra
2010) have helped develop further understanding of the concept and practice of
SSR, but, as Ball comments, it is still a "... work in progress." (2010:36)
Nonetheless, there does appear to be an increasing coherence amongst the
18
In so doing, the research is following the example of the United Nations in UNSCR
2151(2014): (UN 2014).
19
Along the lines of the 'Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness' (OECD 2005c) and the 'Accra
Agenda for Action' (OECD 2008f).
20
Originally published on-line: (OECD 2006a)
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major Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) 21 that support SSR. This issue,
the principles of SSR, the definitional debate, and some of its current
implementational challenges will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 2.
In summary, SSR remains an evolving and to some extent a contested concept,
although it would appear to have immense potential for informing choices for
both donors and for the countries undertaking the reforms. One of the major
IGOs supporting the conduct of SSR is NATO and the next section provides a
brief overview of its activities in this area.
NATO and SSR
NATO has been in constant flux since 1990. Its tasks have increased
exponentially and a major area of continuous activity has been in the field of
SSR. NATO has played a major role in supporting SSR initiatives and
programmes, particularly in the Central and Eastern Europe and the Western
Balkans. (Law 2007:3-7) It has used the Partnership for Peace (PfP)
programmes in order to encourage reforms in governance for 'partners'22 across
the complete spectrum of their governments. In particular, the Membership
Action Plan (MAP)23 has been used to prepare countries for membership of the
Alliance by encouraging them to drive forward their own reform agenda. (Law
2007:14; Morffew 2007:11-19) More recently NATO has been assisting the
Government of Afghanistan in developing and reforming various elements of its
security sector.24 The results of this latter intervention, which has been
21
Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) are generally defined to be “permanent bodies that
states create to address matters entrusted to them and which result from international
agreement between states.” (Archer [2011] 2014:1-34 and Law 2007:1 and Footnote 1)
21
Archer specifically rules out those organisations that have been established to make a profit, so
this thesis follows this approach.
22
The term 'partner' has a specific meaning within NATO: allies refers to the 28 (soon to be 29)
full members of the Alliance; partners are those with an alternative relationship such as
membership of PfP or other formal relationship. A full list is at: NATO, Partners, dated 11
November 2015. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/51288.htm [Last Accessed 4
July 2016].
23
Under the guidance of NATO's International Staff (IS) in Brussels. See Appendix 5 for a list
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24
The former NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) assisted reforms for both the
Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. The residual mission, Op RESOLUTE
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conducted with an on-going counter-insurgency operation, would appear to
have been less successful than those in Eastern Europe. (Haglund 2007:117-
118; Barley 2008:52-57; and Yalçinkaya & Arıkan 2009:73-76) It is not entirely 
clear, however, whether this is due to the lack of a Euro-Atlantic perspective,
different levels of governance, cultural variations, the ongoing counter
insurgency, a lack of coherence between the SSR mission and the stabilisation
mission, a fundamentally different temporal framework or, as is suggested by
Schroeder et al, that the SSR concept has limited applicability outside the
‘OECD-world’. (2014:228) It is certainly an area where further research is
needed.
There also seems to be an interesting policy dilemma within NATO as it assists
countries with their reform agendas. As Morffew explains:
“NATO’s aim is to promote democratic control, transparency, the rule of law,
accountability and informed debate, and to reinforce legislative capacity for
adequate oversight of security systems. Partners are encouraged to seek advice
on SSR through the many PfP tools currently in use.” (2006:12)
It has thus developed a series of thematic programmes, which offer practical
handrails to partner countries but these have evolved in a rather ad hoc manner
rather than as a strategic thread. (Haglund 2008:110-117) Nonetheless, all of
these types of reform fall neatly with the OECD SSR framework. (OECD
2007a:20-23) During the past decade most ministerial or Heads of State and
Government (HoSG) meetings have publicly endorsed the priority of defence
and security sector reform,25 but a policy framework on SSR has eluded the
Alliance so far. This is in stark contrast to other IGOs such as the EU (Council
of EU 2005, EU 2016), the UN (UN 2008, UN 2013), and the OSCE (OSCE
1994 and 2016), which have developed their own conceptual approaches and
guidelines.
SUPPORT, provides training and mentoring assistance. Further details are contained in
Chapter 4.
25
For example, NATO 2008 [paragraphs 31-32], 2011 [paragraphs 25-29, 33-35, 43] and 2014
[paragraphs 92-96].
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Limited attempts have been made by NATO to develop such a concept, but
there has been no consensus amongst the Allies for this approach.26 NATO’s
contributions to defence and security reform in, for example, the Western
Balkans have gained praise from scholars (eg Caparini, 2004:166-168; Jazbec
2007:76-78; and Collantes & Juncos 2011:135), but these contributions have
tended to evolve in an eclectic fashion. The closest that NATO has come to a
policy on SSR is the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB)27
initiative that was announced at the Wales Summit in 2014:
"Today we have decided to launch a Defence and Related Security Capacity
Building Initiative to reinforce our commitment to partner nations and to help the
Alliance to project stability without deploying large combat forces, as part of the
Alliance's overall contribution to international security and stability and conflict
prevention. The Initiative builds upon NATO's extensive expertise in supporting,
advising and assisting nations with defence and related security capacity
building." (NATO 2014:Paragraph 89)
Again, this is an initiative without any detailed substance of what it entails.
Whilst this ‘constructive ambiguity’ might have some benefits at the political
level in Brussels, it would seem to be a recipe for confusion at the field level.
Notwithstanding this lacuna in official policy for SSR, there is still a concomitant
and marked reluctance within NATO HQ Brussels to tackle the issue because of
the perceived political sensitivities. It could reasonably be argued that NATO’s
role in assisting SSR (or the DCB) could still be enhanced if it was tackled in a
more holistic manner and in concert with appropriate international partners,
although the evidence to support such a claim would need to be adduced during
this thesis. It is apparent that there are continuing, but informal discussions in
26
NATO's IS explored drafting a policy paper in 2007 and this is covered in more detail in
Chapter 4. See section entitled: 'NATO's Attempt at Producing a Policy on SSR'.
27
It is worthy of note that even the abbreviation focuses on the word 'defence' rather that
broader security issues that the initiative is designed to address.
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NATO on the role of SSR,28 both in NATO HQ Brussels and also in their other
HQs, but this would not appear to be matched by much public debate.
In summary, since its early reform work in Eastern Europe and the Western
Balkans, NATO's activities have expanded to include what is traditional SSR as
well as non-traditional SSR (as part of so-called 'stabilisation and
reconstruction' activities). As a result, SSR now provides both a policy and
programmatic rationale for NATO's current and future activities, but the Alliance
lacks any overarching conceptual or strategic framework that guides its actions
in this area. In parallel, the phenomenon of SSR is itself still suffering from its
own challenges. (Egnell & Halden 2010; Wingens 2016) For these reasons a
study analysing NATO's experience in support of SSR would seem to be
extremely timely.
RESEARCH PROBLEM
Focusing the Research Question
As explained earlier, the concept of security has changed considerably since
the end of the Cold War, and so has NATO and the way it conducts its
business. It has transformed from a defensive, geographical limited military
alliance to the world's pre-eminent collective security alliance that projects
power far beyond the Euro-Atlantic region. It has assisted a raft of countries in
reforming their security sectors. NATO still has a collective defence role but also
provides core competencies and expertise that no other such security
organisation possesses. Some twenty-five years after first assisting countries
from Eastern Europe with their process of reform and two decades after
intervening in the Western Balkans, NATO has developed a variety of
programmatic and thematic reform processes but has not overtly linked them to
the holistic approach of SSR. Neither would NATO appear to understand fully
28
Gleaned from interviews with senior NATO officers, Naples. Interviews N2, N3, N4.
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the linkages, priorities and inter-dependencies that accrue in post-authoritarian
and post-conflict SSR.
Although there has been some comparative analysis of NATO’s approach to
SSR with other IGOs (eg Law 2007) and some detailed analysis of NATO’s
work in a single country (eg Maxwell & Olsen 2013), there has been little
substantive comparison of NATO’s support in different countries, so that the
similarities and the differences can be analysed in a meaningful way.29
Whether the successes (and failures) of the countries of the Western Balkans in
reforming their security sectors has been directly as a result of NATO’s role or
due to some other factor, and whether the same strides would have been made
if the EU had acted alone in the absence of NATO are all open questions.
Similarly, given that SSR is so context- and temporally-specific, is it possible to
take experience from one country at one time and apply it elsewhere? The
answers to these questions would not seem to be clear-cut.
The issue is further complicated due to two further factors that will need
analysis. First is the contested nature of SSR and the lack of concrete
examples of success and application of good-practice. (Egnell & Halden
2009:48; Wingens 2016:116) The second is the somewhat diffuse nature of
NATO. The actions of NATO can be attributed to its existence as an IGO with
its own institutional persona, but it can also be attributed to individual member
states that may be following domestic practice or diktat under the NATO flag, or
even consultants who are employed by NATO. These institutional issues give
pause for thought.
Nonetheless, the tools that NATO has used throughout a region like the
Western Balkans have been broadly the same and they seem to have worked
(Morffew 2007; Caparini 2004; and Jazbeć 2004) but further evidence of this 
would need to be adduced. It should be possible to identify the role NATO
29
An exception is a recent research thesis that examines NATO’s role in influencing reforms in
states from the former USSR and provides a comparative analysis of Armenia and Georgia.
(Dzebisashvili 2016)
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played in assisting SSR in individual country contexts, and then, by conducting
a comparative analysis, it may be possible to fill the gaps in our current
understanding and knowledge. Certainly a study that analyses NATO's role in
assisting with SSR and evaluating that experience would be exceptionally
timely, and may be able to inform NATO approach to its future strategic policy
and its resultant engagements.
Further discussion on these points and the overall approach to the research
strategy will be considered in more detail in Chapter 3. It would now be
appropriate to consider the research question for this thesis.
The Research Question
Blaikie suggests that there are three main types of research questions: 'what',
'why' and 'how'. In general terms, the 'what' questions demand a descriptive
answer, which is aimed at describing the characteristics and patterns of social
phenomena; the 'why' seeks causes or reasons for such patterns; and the 'how'
questions are concerned about change through the delivery of interventions and
practical outcomes. (2000:60-65) He deliberately limited the number in order to
focus the mind of the researcher but he clearly acknowledged that other
scholars had other ideas. For example, Yin (2009:8-9) proposed seven
questions, although his 'how many' and 'how much' questions could be
considered a refinement of a 'what' question.
Taking the above explanation and applying it to this particular study, SSR is still
a contested concept and thus it needs to be examined critically. There is some
academic research into NATO’s role in SSR but, as an organisation, NATO has
no conceptual framework or set procedures for SSR.
This would seem to suggest much more than exploratory research and without
rehearsing the discussion on the study methodology in Chapter 3, it would be
sufficient at this stage to state that this is an analytical study. The research
question would therefore need to be consistent with that overall thrust of such a
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study. Thus, one could start from a description of 'what' role has NATO played
in support of contrasting post-authoritarian and post-conflict countries
conducting their SSR programmes; and then be more analytical in order to
explain 'why' some of these interventions seemed to work whilst others did not;
and, finally, one can speculate intelligently on 'how' this understanding of its
recent experience could be used to inform similar engagements in the future.
(Blaikie 2007:7-8)
For both practical and theoretical reasons it would also seem appropriate to
place boundaries on the research study and thus make it more manageable.
Given that NATO has supported reforms in all the countries of the Western
Balkans, and that there is sufficient variety of context and progress, it would be
possible to limit the study geographically to the Western Balkans. The
contextual nature of the SSR would, however, also probably limit the application
of any lessons from the Western Balkans to similar countries within the Euro-
Atlantic area. Therefore, the scope of this study should also be limited to
focusing on countries in the Euro-Atlantic region, where there is a prospect of
membership of the NATO Alliance. NATO's first direct involvement with SSR in
the Western Balkans was with BiH at the end of 1995 and this support has
continued throughout the Region since then. Thus it would be appropriate to
limit the timeframe of the study to the period 1995-2015.
This leads to the following research question:
"What lessons can be drawn from NATO’s experience of supporting SSR
in the Western Balkans (1995-2015) and can they be used in order to
inform its approaches to current and future SSR engagements?"
Research Aim
The aim of this research is therefore to:
22
"Undertake an analytical review of NATO's experience of supporting SSR
in the Western Balkans (1995-2015) in order to inform its approaches to
future and current SSR engagements."
Research Objectives
The objectives for the research are:
1. To examine critically the modalities and protocols associated with SSR;
2. To use models of academic theory to analyse critically the role NATO has
played in supporting SSR in the Western Balkans;
3. To understand where these engagements have worked and to identify
the limitations of NATO’s approach using a framework of SSR good
practice; and,
4. To draw lessons from the experience of these interventions, which could
be used to inform NATO’s approach to current and future SSR
engagements.
Having identified the research objectives, it would now be appropriate in the
next section to link these to the significance of the study.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
The SSR literature is growing in size but, as discussed earlier in this Chapter,30
the concept is still evolving and there remain differences in understanding of the
concept by different actors. (Wingens 2016:109) This study therefore seeks to
provide an update on the definitional debate, which includes the latest OSCE
(OSCE 2016) and EU (EU 2016) principles and guidance for SSR. The
30
See section entitled: ‘The Emergence of the SSR Concept’.
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researcher is not aware of other scholarly work covering these latter two
conceptual frameworks.
Although NATO's Heads of State and Government documents and summit
declarations consistently emphasise the importance of SSR to its current
missions and tasks, there is little formal policy on the subject and even less
specific guidance. (Haglund 2008:110; Maxwell & Olsen 2013; Busterud
2014:13) There is, however, much written on individual thematic programmes,
which offer practical handrails for the practitioner but no policy framework.
The academic literature dealing specifically with NATO's role in SSR (as
opposed to security assistance) is not extensive and, to date, there is no
empirically based research that seeks to draw together any analysis of its role
supporting individual countries of the Western Balkans with SSR in a
comparative manner. This research is therefore original and will provide a
clearer understanding of the reform issues encountered by NATO and the
countries being supported, as well as the efficacy of NATO's interventions. It will
then identify the implications for NATO's future engagements that will flow from
the 2010 Strategic Concept. (NATO 2010b) This research will inform both the
Alliance's policy and practice and will assist NATO in producing a coherent and
workable approach to future engagements and possible improvements to
existing ones.
THE WESTERN BALKANS
Whilst the starting point for the research question is NATO's intervention in the
Western Balkans in 1995, it is inevitable that historical events will have
conditioned the political, cultural and security situation that faced the countries
of the region as well as NATO.31 Even the salient myths from the past have
31
Business studies are replete with references highlighting the need to understand the
environment and most corporate and strategic analyses will start with some form of analysis of
the environment and link it to the organisation’s capability, culture and the expectations of the
stakeholders. (Johnson & Scholes 1993:17-20) Similarly, there is considerable scholarly
research into the importance of context in understanding the environmental factors that
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resonance today. It was therefore appropriate that a brief historical section on
the Western Balkans should be included in this Introduction.
The aim of this section is therefore to provide a broad historical canvas to
situate the more detailed coverage in the case study chapters (Chapters 5 and
6) that begin with the conflict in BiH in1992. Although this section is delivered in
a broadly chronological fashion, there are swathes of history and geography
that are barely mentioned,32 but certain key themes are dealt with in more
detail.
First, the researcher needs to provide clarity on the geographical term used in
the research aim: the Western Balkans. Glenny highlighted some of these
difficulties when he referred to the Balkans as 'Turkey-in-Europe' (1999:xxiii).
The Encyclopaedia Britannica (Danforth 2015) suggests that the term 'Balkans'
includes all the countries that emerged from the former Yugoslavia, as well as
Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Moldova and Romania, although even this definition
comes with caveats. Contemporary usage of the neologism 'Western Balkans'
normally covers ex-Yugoslavia and Albania, and is the definition generally used
by NATO,33 and thus the definition used in this thesis.34
On 28 June 1989 Slobodan Milošević spoke at the celebration of the 600th 
anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Polje. Nearly one million people heard his
speech, which drew heavily upon the imagery of the battle, as he stoked the
influence SSR interventions, framing reform processes and understanding possible outcomes.
These include historical, geographical, ethnic and political factors, to name but a few. (Hänggi
2004:1-2; Ashdown 2007; Zoellick 2008; Colletta & Muggah 2009; Autesserre 2014) These are
particularly relevant when conducting the comparative analysis in this thesis in order to
understand better the similarities and differences of the case studies.
32
For example, such areas as the mountainous topography that has had such an impact on
communications and trade, and the demography of the region including the substantial rural
peasantry. For such detailed analysis historiographies written by Mazower (2001) and
Anscombe (2006) provide excellent reference material.
33
Definition found in JFC Naples 2080.1/OJS GXD/06 dated May 2006. Copy held by
researcher.
34
Since both Slovenia and Croatia have joined the EU, they have been excluded from the EU
definition of the 'Western Balkans'. For example see the European Commissioner for Trade:
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113477.pdf. (Last Accessed 26
March 2014).
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fires of nationalism and warned of the battles to come (Silber and Little 1997:71-
2):
"The Kosovo heroism does not allow us to forget that, at one time, we were brave
and dignified and one of the few who went into battle undefeated. ... Six
centuries later, again we are in battles and quarrels. They are not armed battles,
though such things should not be excluded yet." 35
The death of the Serbian leader at the battle, Prince Lazar, and the
consequences of the defeat, have been the subject of many historical ballads.
Folk singers played an important role in Serbian life under Ottoman rule in
maintaining a sense of Serbian identity, so the 'martyrdom' of Prince Lazar
offered both a vision of Serbia's "past as well as of its future."  (Anzulović 
1999:11) It also cemented the link between the Serbian Orthodox Church, the
Serbian state, and the Serbian identity, as well as the Serbian fixation with the
'holy land' of Kosovo.36 (Ibid:23-26; Judah 2008:23-25; and Kaplan 1993:38-40)
It is a sentiment that has been echoed by a recent Serbian Foreign Minister,
Vuk Jeremić, in a 2010 interview with The New York Times: 
"This place, Kosovo, is our Jerusalem; you just can’t treat it any other way than
our Jerusalem.” 37
The Ottomans spent some 600 years camped in various parts of the Western
Balkans. The ebb and flow of conquest and retreat reached its zenith at the
gates of Vienna in 1529, where Suleiman the Magnificent was defeated.
Ottoman rule was at times harsh but, in general, was remarkably liberal.
Christians and Jews were permitted to practise their religions. Although this
varied according to location and time period, there is no real evidence of a
concerted attempt at Islamicization. Scholars like Malcolm (2002:51-69) and
35
Also quoted in Judah (2009:163-4).
36
St Sava is credited with establishing these linkages in the thirteenth century.
37
See: The New York Times, Recasting Serbia's Image, Starting With a Fresh Face, dated 15
January 2010. Available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/16/world/europe/16jeremic.html?_r=0. (Last accessed 26
March 2014)
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Sugar (1977:45-6) contend that most conversions were done willingly,
particularly in BiH and Albania. As Judah points out:
"... it was the way the Turks ran their empire that gave [... the Orthodox...] church
a chance to survive. The millet system left to the local Christian leaders and the
Jews many prerogatives of governance and taxation under the umbrella of the
Sultan. Though Christians and Jews were in all respects second-class subjects,
they were regarded as 'peoples of the Book'. Anybody who converted to Islam
became a first-class subject and could then hold public office and prosper in the
system." (2009:44)
The 17th and 18th centuries in the Western Balkans were punctuated by regular
conflicts. For the most part they were initiated from without, by the Habsburgs,
the Venetians, the French and the Russians, all waging war against the
Ottomans with varying degrees of success. (Anscombe 2006:7) There were
also a series of internal revolts, but for the most part these had less to do with
ethnicity or religion and more to do with over-taxation by the ruling elite.
(Malcolm 1998:117-119) The first serious internal revolt was led by the Serb
Djordić Petrović38 in 1804 and his forces succeeded in liberating virtually all of
the Belgrade Pashalik.39 After a few years of autonomy, eclectic support from
the Russians, and another uprising in 1815 led by Miloš Obrenović, the Serbs 
were eventually granted the status of an autonomous province in the Ottoman
empire and Serbian chiefs were given the right to collect taxes. (Glenny 1999:8-
22)
By 1868 Croatia had become a Hungarian protectorate within settled borders.
(A map from the period is at Map1.1 below.) At the Congress of Berlin in 1878
the great powers of Europe attempted to redraw some borders within the
Balkans in order to counterbalance Russia's growing influence in the region.
This included Austria-Hungary taking over Bosnia and subsequently
Herzegovina, although most of the Ottoman administrative structure was kept in
38
Also known as Karadjorje (Black George), who founded the first short-lived Serbian dynasty.
39
A pashalik is a regional administrative area of the Ottoman empire normally under the
jurisdiction of a Pasha.
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place.40 Bulgaria was cut back in size but the real loser was Macedonia, which
was returned to the Ottomans. The country is strategically placed at the centre
of the Balkans, with a mosaic of different faiths and culture. That it has a
national identity is not in question, although whose identity it was and from
whose roots they descended, continues to be debated:
"To this day scholars have sought to answer the Macedonian question, the
unyielding philosopher's stone of Balkan nationalism." (Glenny 1999:156-7)
1
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Map 1.1: Western Balkan Historical Maps
(Source: New York Times Available at:
http://www.pixelpress.org/bosnia/context/yugo1815.GIF.html [Last
accessed 19 August 2016].)
The Berlin Congress was also a disappointment for Serbia. A map from this
period is at Map1.1 above.  As Anzulović points out: "Like other countries that 
re-emerged as sovereign nation-states in the 19th century after a long period of
foreign domination or political fragmentation, Serbia displayed a strong
expansionist trend." (1999:2) With its westward expansion into Bosnia denied
40
Bosnia was not fully annexed until 1908. (Glenny 1999:288-290)
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for the time being, it looked south towards Macedonia and Kosovo, which had
been allocated to the Ottomans. Meanwhile Montenegro was allowed modest
territorial gains but most importantly an outlet to the Adriatic Sea. (Glenny
1999:148-9)
There are three key themes to draw from this period of Balkan history: first, the
role of the Great Powers in drawing borders with a logic that did not necessarily
make sense on the ground; second, the frustration of national identities stored
up problems with future irredentist claims; and finally, the expansionist
tendencies of Serbia and its impact upon its smaller neighbours. These themes
played their part again in the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the conflicts in the
Western Balkans of the 1990s, as well as the subsequent reform processes.
The early 1900s saw a succession of alliances in the Balkans, with all the Great
Powers competing for influence in a region that had started to follow its own
inclinations. Indications of this were evident in the restlessness of the Kosovo
Albanians as well as the stoking of Serb nationalism in BiH by Serbia. The
success of the Albanians in resisting diktats from Istanbul demonstrated a
weakness of Ottoman authority, which was fully exploited by Montenegro,
Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece in the First Balkan War. Macedonia was the
setting for much of the fighting and Mazower succinctly summarises these
events:
"In the First Balkan War of 1912-13 Ottoman power in Europe vanished in a
matter of weeks. Serbia and Greece were the main victors, both acquiring huge
new territories. Bulgaria won much less, and was soon even worse off after she
declared war on her former allies in the Second Balkan war and was defeated by
them. An independent Albania was recognised by the Powers, and defended
against its hungry neighbours. The biggest loser in many ways – apart from the
Ottoman Empire – was Austria-Hungary, which now faced a successful and
expansionist Serbia." (2001:110)
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Success on the battlefield merely prompted Serbia to look westwards again at
Austria-Hungary, and thus also BiH and Croatia.  As Anzulović (1999:91) 
explains: "... the destabilisation of that multinational empire became the most
urgent goal of Serbia's foreign policy." This was the situation when the Serbian
dissident, Gavrilo Princip, fired the bullets that killed Archduke Franz Ferdinand
in Sarajevo on 28th June 1914. There were many who held Serbia directly
responsible for these events.41 Whilst debate over the motives for the
assassination that ultimately led to the First World War still continues today, the
British Foreign Secretary in 1914, Edward Grey, suggested:
"The world will presumably never be told all that was behind the murder of the
Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Probably there is not, and never was, any one person
who knew all there was to know." 42
Notwithstanding Serbia's subsequent surprise at being the subject of a
declaration of war by the Austro-Hungarian Empire one month later, serendipity
played its part, and by 1918 the Serbs had become the dominant partner in the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which was created at the end of the
First World War. The unification was founded on a "... notion of Serbo-Croat
linguistic unity propounded by Croat 'Illyrianists' in the 1830s and ..." included
Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia.” (Djokić 2003:4-5)  It was renamed the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929 and survived in that form until German and
Italian occupation in 1941. The dismemberment of Yugoslavia was then warmly
welcomed by Kosovo Albanians, as it meant an end (at least pro tem) to
Serbian hegemony. (Cviic 1991:15-16)43 The occupation also allowed Croatia,
under the leadership of Ante Pavlić's Ustašas, to annex the whole of BiH and 
form an independent state. The fascist Ustašas soon became deeply unpopular
within Croatia, however, due to the atrocities they committed, and support soon
began to ebb towards the Communist leader, Josip Broz Tito. (Cipek 2003:78)
41
Subsequent testimony from the co-conspirators, their obvious radical nationalist Serbian
views and the fact that the assassination took place on the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo
Polje, all supported this view without being totally conclusive.  (Anzulović 1999:91-92; Glenny 
1999:303-305; Malcolm 1994:154-155)
42
Quoted in Dedijer 1967:18; and Glenny 1999:304.
43
 The author's name would normally be spelt Cviić, but he has chosen to anglicise it to Cviic. 
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Soon after the Axis invasion Serbian Četniks, under command of the Royalist 
General Draza Mihailović, and Tito's partisan forces attempted to unify their 
resistance efforts in Serbia, but due to the incompatibility of their long-term
objectives they soon began fighting each other. Ultimately, this resulted in the
Četniks reaching an informal understanding with the Axis forces and reducing 
resistance to a minimum. The logic being to preserve Serbia from further
damage. (Cviic 1991:18-20) This approach soon became apparent to the
British government and materiel support switched to Tito's partisans. (Maclean
1975: 348-353 & 436-437) The military success of Tito's forces during the
Second World War led to a seat at the victors' table and a second attempt at a
united Yugoslavia.  Nonetheless, reprisals against Četniks, Ustašas and 
dissidents against the Communist takeover continued well beyond the war
years until 1948. The lack of any reconciliation process stoked long-term
resentments and ultimately sowed the seeds for conflict in the 1990s. (Lowe
2013:248-265)
The Yugoslav constitution of 1946 brought together six republics in a
federation44 that had both the right to self-determination and the right of
succession. (Pavlowitch 2003:65) They were: BiH, Croatia, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Serbia (with autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo), and
Slovenia. (See Map 1.1 above.) After the ideological split with the USSR in
1948, Yugoslavia went through a gradual process of decentralisation and
devolution that "... encouraged association of nationality with territory." (Ibid:66)
This process was continued with the 1974 constitution, when the provinces of
Vojvodina and Kosovo gained near equal status to the republics, much to the
chagrin of Serbia.  (Cviic 1991:65)  This was a perceived slight that Milošević 
was to 'rectify' with catastrophic results for Kosovo, when he stripped both
provinces of their autonomy in 1989, and by so doing "... controlled three out of
44
Normally known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) or just FRY.
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eight votes in the Federal Presidency ... turning Yugoslavia into Serbo-Slavia."
(Glenny 1999:626-9)45
There are many theories about the ultimate collapse and fragmentation of
Yugoslavia but it would seem to be a complex amalgam of causes. The death of
Tito certainly played its part for during his life he achieved "... a finely tuned
balance of power between the federal republics." (Djokić & Ker-Lindsay 
2011a:6) Others argue that "... zero-sum nationalism ..." had an impact.
(Radošević 1996:81)  Another argued that "... by the mid-1980s the chickens of 
the 'crisis of identity of contemporary Yugoslav society' (Golubović 1987) had 
come home to roost." (Vejvoda 1996:251) And yet more point to the rise to
power of Milošević in 1987 and his irredentist nationalism.  (Pond 2006:10-15)  
One of the more persuasive arguments, however, is put forward by Woodward
in her 1995 book Balkan Tragedy. Notwithstanding strong trade links with the
West and relatively free movement of labour, Yugoslavia still maintained its
command economy, which was less adaptive than its Western counterparts.
"By 1979 Yugoslav foreign debt was at crisis proportions... " (Woodward
1996:159), unemployment was rising precariously reducing demand for foreign
workers in countries like West Germany and thus also reducing remittances to
the Yugoslav economy. By the mid-1980s it was clear to both Slovenia (with its
strong economic ties to Austria) and Croatia (with his prosperous tourist
industry on the Dalmatian coast) that they may be better served economically
being outside the Federation. (Cviic 1991:70-74)
All these factors ultimately led to plebiscites in Slovenia (December 1990) and
Croatia (May 1991) that voted overwhelmingly for independence.46 A number of
serious clashes occurred between Croats and Serbs in Western Slavonia in
May 1991 and included incursions into Croatian territory by the JNA.47 Slovenia
had undertaken a six month moratorium on any unilateral action after its
plebiscite. In the absence of any progress towards a constitutional settlement
45
Glenny's quote is taken from: Silber & Little (1995:66).
46
Macedonia's plebiscite was in September 1991 after the ten-day war in Slovenia.
47
JNA - Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija or Jugoslav National Army
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with Yugoslavia, Slovenia declared independence on 25th June 1991. This was
followed by a ten day military action initiated by the JNA against Slovenia that
ended with a ceasefire negotiated by a European Troika.48 Once they had
withdrawn from Slovenia, the JNA returned its attention to Croatia, which had
also declared independence on 25th June. The JNA drove non-Serbs out of the
areas they had captured, although the Croats were putting up fierce resistance.
These operations intensified during the latter part of 1991 until a ceasefire was
eventually signed on 2 January 1992. (Crampton 2002:248-253) This set the
scene for the unthinking drift to war in BiH in 1992.
It is impossible to provide much detail in this short historical review of the
Western Balkans. Nonetheless, the review has sought to provide a flavour of
the region, as well as presenting some recurring themes that not only led to the
disintegration of Yugoslavia but have also influenced today's political and
security contexts of the two countries that are studied in Chapters 5 and 6 . By
so doing it has removed some potential areas of historical duplication in those
individual chapters. The themes that will be taken forward are:
 Historical borders that did not necessarily make sense on the ground;
 A lack of any reconciliation process after the communist rise to power in the
1940s, which stoked long-term resentments and ultimately sowed the seeds
for conflict in the 1990s;
 The expansionist and irredentist nationalism of Serbia and in particular its
President, Slobodan Milošević, and the impact upon Serbia's smaller 
neighbours;
48
The success of the Troika's attempt to create a ceasefire led the Luxembourg politician,
Jacques Poos, to suggest that: 'The hour of Europe has come.' (Rupnik 2011:18) The
subsequent impotence of Europe in stopping the conflagration from spreading has immortalised
those words.
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 The crisis of identity in contemporary Yugoslav society, which stored up
problems for future irredentist claims; and,
 The political and social impact of zero-sum nationalism;
That concludes this section and it is now time to turn to the structure of the
thesis.
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
The thesis follows a broadly conventional structure of eight chapters with three
main stages of analysis. Chapter 1 introduces the study and sets the scene for
the remainder of this doctoral thesis. It provides the broad research context by
briefly highlighting key elements of contemporary security, then the background
and genesis to the phenomenon of SSR, and NATO's approach to them both. It
presents the research problem within geographical and temporal limits and is
followed by the research objectives and the significance of the study. The
historical context for the Western Balkans is provided through a brief historical
overview of the region. Finally, it sets out the structure of the thesis.
Chapter 2 starts with a detailed discourse on where this treatise is situated in
terms of the discipline within the scholarly literature. It then reviews the
literature pertaining to the evolution of the SSR discourse, in particular the role
played by IGOs in clarifying the definitional debate, and provides a critical
analysis of the concept. It develops an analytical framework to evaluate
NATO’s role in supporting SSR. The final section provides a body of theory in
order to view the findings of the case studies. It draws upon literature from
policy-makers, academics and practitioner spheres, as well as a body of 'grey'
literature. The research methodology is set out at Chapter 3. It describes the
various philosophical approaches and methods available to the researcher, and
evaluates the most appropriate for each stage of the study. It then offers
justification for the choices made including the case studies.
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Chapter 4 briefly outlines the evolution of the NATO and the role the Alliance
has played in support of post-authoritarian and post-conflict countries
conducting their SSR programmes, as well as the tools that it has used.
Chapters 5 and 6 seek to understand how NATO has contributed to SSR in the
two country case studies using an analytical framework and then identifies
common and divergent patterns and characteristics. Together these chapters
form the first stage of the main analysis.
The second stage of the main analysis is contained in Chapter 7. It is a
comparative analysis of the cross-case data collected on NATO’s role in SSR in
order to gain an understanding of the patterns and characteristics of the
interventions and thus to identify how this experience could be used to inform
NATO’s future engagements. Finally, Chapter 8 contains the conclusions,
areas identified for further research, and recommendations.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF SSR LITERATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF AN ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK
“Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better that the
Arabs do it tolerably well than that you do it perfectly. It is their war,
and you are there to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also,
under the odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as
good as, perhaps, you think it is.”
"Twenty-Seven Articles", Arab Bulletin,1917 - T. E. Lawrence1
INTRODUCTION
As explained in Chapter 1, SSR is still a new concept and notwithstanding the
growth of literature on the subject, there still appear to be differences in its
theoretical understanding, as well as concern about its application in the field.
This review therefore seeks to provide a critical analysis of the extant literature,
taking into account particularly the definitional debate and the role played by the
SSR-relevant IGOs. The literature will include that produced by policy-makers,
academics and practitioners, in conjunction with a body of 'grey' literature. The
review will enable an analytical framework to be developed, which will be used
in subsequent chapters to analyse NATO’s role in supporting in SSR. In
addition, a body of theory will be adduced for subsequent use.
In detail, this Chapter comprises seven discrete but inter-related, elements.
First, there is an analysis of where this thesis sits within scholarly discourse and
discipline. Second, following on from the discussion of the emergence of the
SSR concept in Chapter 1, there is a review and analysis of the building blocks
1
Lawrence, T. E., ‘Twenty-Seven Articles’, Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917, No 15. See website:
http://telawrence.net/telawrencenet/works/articles_essays/1917_twenty-seven_articles.htm
[Last Accessed 23 February 2011.]
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that formed the genesis of the SSR concept. Third, there is a substantive
analysis of the definitional debate surrounding SSR and the role played by the
SSR-relevant IGOs in developing SSR frameworks. Fourth, this then leads to
the development of an analytical framework that will be used in the subsequent
analysis of NATO’s support to SSR. Fifth, the individual characteristics of SSR
that are contained in the framework are then analysed in detail and in addition
some theoretical models are adduced. At the end of this section there is a brief
review of the current debate on SSR. Sixth, the theory of institutionalism is
reviewed as a precursor to it being used in subsequent chapters to understand
better the role of NATO in supporting SSR in the Western Balkans. Finally, a
brief set of conclusions seek to draw together some of the overarching threads.
WHERE IS THIS TREATISE SITUATED WITHIN SCHOLARLY DISCOURSE
AND DISCIPLINE?
This section aims to provide a detailed analysis on where this thesis is situated
within scholarly discourse and discipline. By so doing it is intended to define the
core focus of the subsequent literature critique.
The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) describes social science
as "… the study of society and the manner in which people behave and
influence the world around us." 2 It expands this definition by suggesting that it
also:
"… tells us about the world beyond our immediate experience, and can help
explain how our own society works - from the causes of unemployment or what
helps economic growth, to how and why people vote, or what makes people
happy. It provides vital information for governments and policymakers, local
authorities, non-governmental organisations and others."
2
ESRC – Shaping Society. Available at: http://www.esrc.ac.uk/about-us/what-is-social-science/
[Last accessed 27 June 2017].
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The New Dictionary of the Social Sciences (Duncan Mitchell 2008:191) expands
this understanding to include, inter alia, "… the study of […] the forms of
organization(s) …" The study of NATO's experience in supporting SSR in the
Western Balkans would thus seem to fall squarely within this academic field but,
given the broad range of disciplines within social science, there is an inevitable
need to be more specific.
As discussed in Chapter 1,3 NATO has undergone immense change over the
first seven decades of its existence. Much of the recent literature on NATO has
focussed on this process of transformation and the organisation's ability to
survive as the pre-eminent global security provider. One such example is
Kaplan's NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance (2004).
Whilst acknowledging NATO's success, some scholars, such as Kashmeri in his
NATO 2.0: Reboot or Delete? (2011), argue that the Alliance's future usefulness
will depend upon accepting a reduced and more focused role, through handing
much of the day-to-day, lower risk security roles to the EU. Others, such as
Thies in his book Why NATO Endures (2009), and Yost in his NATO's
Balancing Act (2014), focus on the ways in which NATO, as a treaty-based
alliance, has overcome the myriad of challenges through a combination of a
strong trans-Atlantic relationship and the ability of democracies to adapt to
changing circumstances. Given this focus on political behaviour and policy at
the international and national levels, as well as the relationships within the
Alliance and with other international organisations, much of this literature would
seem to be situated firmly within the field of political science and, in particular,
within the sub-set of International Relations (IR).
Unlike the study of NATO, the discourse surrounding SSR is more difficult to
place accurately within a single body of scholarly literature. This is for a variety
of reasons. First, SSR is a relatively new concept and its body of literature and
theory is still developing. (Chuter 2006; Ball 2014) Second, it is an intensely
practical subject that until recently has relied heavily upon empirical observation
3
See sections entitled: ‘Security Providers’ and ‘NATO’.
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of what works in the field by practitioners, as evinced by the OECD handbooks
(in particular OECD 2005a, OECD 2007a, OECD 2009b and OECD 2011), as
well as several DCAF multi-author volumes such as Bryden and Hӓnggi (2004), 
Law (2007), Hӓnggi & Scherrer (2008) and Bryden and Olonisakin (2010).  
Many of these publications were designed to influence policy and practice,
rather than an attempt to develop a specific and independent theory of SSR per
se. The fact that they directly contributed to the formulation of SSR policies by
the EU (EU 2005; EU 2006; EU 2016), UN (UN 2008; UN 2014) and the OSCE
(OSCE 1994; OSCE 2016) would suggest a measure of success in their
endeavours.
Nonetheless, there are some scholars in the field of development (eg Jackson
2011:1817-1819) and state-building (eg Chandler 2006: 1-8 and 191) who
argue that the support of SSR by international actors often undermine
sovereignty and local ownership of a state, as well as skewing concepts of
accountability and wider governance. Thus issues of local ownership and
governance should be included in the discourse and will be analysed further at
a later stage in this Chapter. Finally, SSR draws upon many other interleaving
disciplines such as strategic studies, security studies, peace and conflict
studies, as well as the study of national security strategies.
There is one additional field of study that need to be mentioned in this
discussion. The practice of SSR owes a significant debt to management theory
and particularly managing change through organisational analysis and
organisational development (OD), with its emphasis on a "… planned process of
developing an organization to be more effective in accomplishing its desired
goals …" (Shaffer 2000). Inter alia, OD includes a holistic approach, which
addresses individual and collective capacity building, as well as the need for
bespoke solutions. These are precisely some of the principles that lie at the
heart of SSR (OECD 2007a) and are issues that will be addressed in more
detail later in this Chapter.
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As discussed in Chapter 1,4 the increasing importance of governance systems
within the SSR concept and the political nature of SSR support situates the
literature specifically within the field of political science. The linkage between
security and development in the SSR concept are key to its understanding and
will be explored in more detail later in this Chapter.5 The debate, however, lies
beneath the umbrella of political science and between the sub-sets of IR and
public policy, as well as the inter-disciplinary fields of management, strategic
studies, security studies, development, peace and conflict studies and national
security strategies. Given this diversity, it would seem to be clear that SSR
could sit comfortably within a number of different inter-disciplinary fields
depending upon the precise focus of the study.
As the focus of this thesis is on NATO's experience of supporting SSR within
the Western Balkans, this narrows the academic field more specifically to either
security studies or, its sub-field, strategic studies.6 Traditionally the referent
object in strategic studies has tended to be the nation state and providing
security from, inter alia, inter-state armed conflict. This sub-field would also
include the study of security IGOs, such as NATO, but this study is much more
than just about the use of military power. The broadening of the security
concept that was discussed in Chapter 1,7 and the inclusion of ‘human security’
as a key tenet (Mutimer 2007:89-94) of SSR, would suggest that this treatise is
much broader in scope than just strategic studies. The researcher would
therefore argue that it should be placed in the multi-disciplinary field of security
studies.
To conclude this section, this thesis on NATO's experience of supporting SSR
within the Western Balkans is broadly situated within the social sciences and
primarily within political science, and more specifically within the sub-sets of IR
and public policy. It also draws upon several inter-disciplinary fields but
4
See sections entitled: ‘Security and a Changing Security Environment’ and ‘The Emergence of
the SSR Concept’.
5
See section entitled: ‘The Security-Development Nexus’.
6
This linkage between security studies and strategic studies is drawn from the definitions
contained in Collins (2010:2).
7
See section entitled: ‘Security and a Changing Security Environment’.
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specifically the field of security studies. This would seem to fit the core focus of
the study and is consistent with the expertise of the researcher’s host faculty.
THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF SSR
Following on from the discussion of the emergence of the SSR concept in
Chapter 1,8 this section will further analyse three discrete but inter-related
building blocks that formed the genesis of SSR: the OSCE ‘Code of Conduct’,
the debate surrounding ‘human security’ and the ‘security-development nexus’.
OSCE 'Code of Conduct'
The OSCE was the first IGO to broaden its perspective of the security sector
focus beyond the military in its Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of
Security (OSCE 1994). The ‘Code of Conduct’ established inter-state and intra-
state norms of behaviour, which laid the foundations for the democratic control
of armed forces. It set out the desired destination in terms of robust and
democratic civil-military relations, which was then underpinned by the measures
necessary to reach that destination.
The norm-setting standards inherent in the 'Code of Conduct' sought to achieve
this Westphalian goal of distinguishing between the roles of the military (for
dealing with external threats) and for the police (dealing with internal threats). It
was thus a significant and ground-breaking departure. Whilst it drew upon the
"Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and the Helsinki Document 1992"
(OSCE 1994b:1), it also provided much greater leverage to ensure democratic
compliance. It viewed the integration of the intelligence services and police into
civil society as a normal democratic process9 underpinned by the concepts of
accountability, civil control and transparency. (Ghébali 2008:2-6) The literature
would suggest that it formed the early foundation for thinking on SSR (eg Law
8
See section entitled: ‘The Emergence of the SSR Concept’.
9
One slightly surprising omission from the original list was border guards (see Hills 2002),
although the issue was subsequently addressed in practice.
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2007:12; Myshlovska 2007:30-31) and it is a view that has been echoed by the
OSCE itself:
“[The Code of Conduct] provides the basis for a range of SSG/R principles,
such as a comprehensive approach to security beyond military perspectives,
ensuring accountability through democratic control, and the need to design the
security sector in an effective and efficient, as well as accountable and
transparent, manner.” (OSCE 2014:10)
The role played by the ‘Code of Conduct’ has been progressively subsumed by
more recent framework documents on SSR, especially from the OECD (eg
OECD 2007a) and the UN (eg UN 2008), but is still well-regarded
internationally10 and has undoubtedly influenced current normative thinking on
SSR. (eg OSCE 2016:18-19)
Human Security
Another key influence on SSR has been the recent focus on human security.
Chapter 1 introduced the idea of a contemporary move away from conflict
between warring states to conflicts more closely associated with instability and
state fragility; intra-state rather than inter-state. Kaldor has been extremely
influential in this debate. She began to use the term 'new wars' in the 1990s
when she was co-chair of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly (HCA) and was a
frequent visitor to places like Nagorno Karabakh and BiH. By 'new wars' she
meant those conflicts that often took place in the context of state and societal
disintegration. Where battles rarely took the form of set-piece manoeuvre but
rather deliberate and sustained violence against the civilian population with the
aim of instilling fear, creating dominance or ethnic cleansing. (Kaldor 2007:2-5)
This state of affairs is recognised by Brzoska (2006:1) and by Smith in his
seminal work, The Utility of Force:
10
It has also been a model for codes of conduct in other parts of the world such as in West
Africa with ECOWAS. See: Ebo 2007a:162-163.
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"War no longer exists. Confrontation, conflict and combat undoubtedly exist all
round the world. [.....] None the less [sic], war as cognitively known to most non-
combatants, war as battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a
massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs: such war no longer
exists.” (2005:1)
This change in the focus of conflict has prompted a concomitant shift in people's
perception of security. Most scholars would argue that this shift began in the
mid-1990s, not just with the introduction of the OSCE’s ‘Code of Conduct’ but
with the publication of the 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP 1994). A
look back in time would suggest, however, that the seeds of human security
were probably sown during President Roosevelt's 1941 'State of the Union
Address' when he argued that there were four fundamental freedoms that
should be enjoyed by all: freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom to
worship, and freedom of speech.11 The UNDP attempted to reframe the debate
and argued that "... for too long [security] has been interpreted narrowly: as
security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national
interests in foreign policy or as global security from a nuclear holocaust. It has
been related more to nation states than to people." (1994:22) The report
specified the main components of human security: "freedom from fear and
freedom from want."12 It then proceeded to list seven main categories that
comprise the threats to human security: economic, food, health, environmental,
personal, community, and political. (1994:24-33) Whilst there is still some
debate about how broad this concept of security should be, there is general
consensus along the above lines. (Wulf 2004:1-2)
The period 1991 to 2000 has become known as the decade of 'humanitarian
intervention': a term that can best be articulated as "… military intervention in a
state, with or without the approval of that state, to prevent genocide, large-scale
violations of human rights (including mass starvation), or grave violations of
11
Roosevelt, Four Freedoms Speech, dated 6 January 1941. Available at:
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrthefourfreedoms.htm [Last accessed 4 April
2016].
12
In line with Roosevelt's ideas.
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international humanitarian law." (Kaldor 2007:17) With the ending of the bi-
polar Cold War there was a much greater readiness to use military force to
preserve life, end oppression and prevent ethnic cleansing. The establishment
of a safe haven in Northern Iraq in 1991 began a shift away from the principle of
non-intervention in the internal affairs of a state and fundamentally altered the
norms governing state relations. This change in approach informed the thinking
underpinning the1994 UNDP Report but the momentum for change was
subsequently maintained by the publication of the Report.
The growth of think tanks in the 1990s such as the International Crisis Group
(ICG) and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), as well as a
number of independent and UN appointed commissions, also sustained public
interest in such issues. Events in Rwanda in 1994, BiH in 1994-95 and Kosovo
in 1998-99 should not be ignored. Prime Minister Blair's speech in Chicago
(Blair 1999) during the lead-in to the ground invasion of Kosovo argued the
case for intervention. The 'International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty' (ICISS) under the chairman ship of Gareth Evans and Mohamed
Sahnoun took that argument a stage further for what subsequently became
known as the 'responsibility to protect.' (Evans 2008)13
It is not the purpose of this study to dwell extensively on the concept of human
security but it is worth making three additional points that link directly into
current thinking on SSR. First, like the early commentators on Civil Military
Relations (CMR), there is a concern expressed in the 1994 UNDP Report about
excessive military spending and control of the military, but the report also
highlights that the police can also be used as "... agents of repression [... and
who ...] are commonly cited as the perpetrators of human rights violations in
both Eastern and Western Europe." (1994:33) This is a point that the OSCE
addressed in their 1994 Code. Second, a key principle of human security is the
re-establishment of legitimate political authority in order for the creation of trust
amongst the population as well as some enforcement capability. "Measures like
13
UNSCR 1674 (2006) is the relevant resolution dealing with the protection of civilians.
44
justice and security sector reform, DDR, the extension of authority, and public
service reform are critical for the establishment of legitimate political authority."
(Kaldor 2007:187)14 And finally, there is a recognition in Smith's (2006:267)
'war amongst the people', as well as Kaldor's (2007:190) principle of regional
focus, that there is a fluidity to people, trade, events and politics that transcends
single states and demands regional approaches to security. Everything is
interdependent. An act of violence against a village in southern Kosovo will
have an impact in Albania and Macedonia. A Taliban attack on a NATO convoy
in Pakistan has an impact on NATO forces in Afghanistan. All three ideas have
informed SSR thinking.
Although the founders of the UN supposedly gave equal weight to the state and
to the people, in reality most action tended toward the former. The pendulum
began to swing in the other direction at the latter stages of the 1990s, especially
with events in Kosovo, and led increasingly for security to be viewed through a
human security lens.15 It was an approach that fed directly into the SSR
concept, not least as participatory surveys, such as ‘Voices of the Poor’
(Narayan et al 2000a, 2000b, 2002) began to identify one of the root causes of
poverty as physical insecurity. This link between development and (in)security
is developed further in the next section.
The Security-Development Nexus
The next area in the search for SSR's genealogy is the security-development
nexus that was briefly discussed in Chapter 1.16 The acknowledgement by the
development community in the late 1990s of the increasingly "... important role
that the 'security sector' plays in economic development and democratisation"
(Edmunds 2001:1) took some by surprise. Careful scrutiny of the changes to
the security environment, the mixed record of success in development, and the
14
Wulf skilfully expands this argument in his monograph at: Wulf (2006:20-40).
15
The concept of human security is not without its detractors but for a well-balanced closely
argued treatment of the subject see: Krause (2007).
16
See section entitled: 'The Emergence of the SSR Concept'.
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evolution of the democratic and governance agenda had perhaps already
pointed towards the growing inter-dependence of security and development. As
OECD said in 1995:
" The rule of law, public sector management, controlling corruption and reducing
excessive military expenditures are important issues of governance. [...] DAC
members recognise the importance of peace and security for development.
When military expenditure is excessive, it can result in conflict and repression,
contribute to instability in the region and divert scarce resources away from
development needs. [...] In this dialogue, account must be taken of the fact that
official development assistance is only one element of a comprehensive
approach to reducing excessive military expenditure and that aid agencies
should make their best efforts to achieve coherence between a policies and
other related policies." (1995:14 and 20-21)
Nonetheless, the literature would seem to suggest that there were initially two
main barriers to the acceptance of this interdependence in the late 1990s and
two main catalysts which assisted the final conversion.
The first barrier would seem to be a combination of an institutional reluctance
on behalf of the international financial institutions (IFIs) to working with the
security sector (Brzoska 2003:3; Wulf 2004:9; and Hendrickson 2005:21-22)
and their inherent adherence to pure economic theory, where:
"[B]oth organisations were dominated by neo-classical economists. In neo-
classical economic theory, which emphasises investment in productive capital
as the engine of growth and economic development, military expenditure is
considered to be pure waste." (Brzoska 2003:6)
It was only in 1999 with the publication of their policy document entitled
Security, Poverty Reduction And Sustainable Development: Challenges For The
New Millennium, that the World Bank began to recognise the need for a broader
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engagement with the security sector. (World Bank 1999; Ball 2001:45-66; and
Hendrickson 2005:21)
The second barrier was that development had previously been closely
connected with economic growth, but, as Stewart argues, this link came to be
regarded as inadequate. For example, average income "... may not be a good
indicator of many important aspects of human well being, such as people's
health, education, or security." (2006:43-44) It was the growing acceptance of
the concept of human security and the results of the participatory studies, such
as 'The Voices of the Poor' that then allowed the economic link to development
to be replaced by that to security and for those two disciplines to become
aligned more closely, both in practical and intellectual terms.
The first catalyst for change was a changing perception of governance. By the
end of the 1990s the issue of governance had entered the donor consciousness
and become embedded in the development agenda. This allowed a far broader
debate to begin on the ends, ways and means of development. Furthermore, a
combination of input from non-OECD countries (those who were receiving
development aid and had a view on its efficacy) as well as the experience of
many post-authoritarian countries in Eastern and South Eastern Europe
(adhering to the principles of democratic CMR) highlighted the considerable
benefits of tackling governance and security deficits together. (Ball 2010:32-33)
This unlocked attitudes as well as practice such that improving governance
became a fundamental plank of the SSR concept.
The second catalyst was a most explicit link between development, conflict and
security made by UK’s DFID in 1997:
" 'There were two reasons for embracing the objectives of international
development. First because it is right to do so [...] Second, because we have a
common interest in doing so [...] helping strengthen the capacity of a society to
manage conflict without violence must be seen as a foundation for sustainable
development.' Not only did poverty and underdevelopment come to be
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associated with conflict, but conflict itself, through the destruction of
development assets and social capital, was regarded as complicating poverty
and deepening underdevelopment." (Chanaa 2002:26. Emphasis added.)17
This explicit connection by the UK and DFID helped underpin the concept of
SSR. DFID then focussed international attention on this nexus between
development and security in a series of carefully planned papers and speeches
during the period 1997-1999, which then helped shape today’s SSR agenda.
(DFID 1997:67-71; Short 1998; Ball 1998:1-2; DFID 1999:1; Ball & Hendrickson
2007:10)
For example in her speech to the Royal College of Defence Studies on 13 May
1998, Short said:
" A military sector that is well cast and managed can serve the interests of all,
including the poor. A military sector that is inappropriately tasked, badly
managed and undisciplined can undermine the interests of the poor and inhibit
development - sometimes for decades. In many of the world's poorest
countries, elements within the security sector are a major cause of insecurity,
conflict and human rights abuse." (Short 1998. Emphasis added.)
This was followed by a speech at King's College London on 9 March 1999
entitled: Security Sector Reform And The Elimination Of Poverty. (Short 1999)
The talk coincided with the publication of DFID's first policy statement on SSR
and with the announcement of the creation of an autonomous unit in the King's
College to support the implementation of SSR. (Hendrickson 2009:3)
There was a groundswell of international support for DFID’s approach but it is
perhaps worth reflecting at this stage that the UK’s, and subsequently other’s
embrace of the SSR concept seemed to have been overly optimistic. The
range of different contexts, the diversity of issues that it touched upon, and the
17
The first part of this quote in italics has been taken from a DFID White Paper (DFID 1997:16)
by Chanaa and the second part are her words. As quoted in: Chanaa (2002:26).
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vagueness of the early concept, raised more questions than answers and that
meant its path to full international acceptance was uneven. (Fitz-Gerald
2006:109-113) Lessons that were identified were not learned and the lack of an
agreed taxonomy hindered its development. (Rees 2008:139-140)
THE DEFINITIONAL DEBATE SURROUNDING SSR
AND THE ROLE OF IGOs IN ITS CLARIFICATION
During the late 1990s to early 2000s the debate spawned by the use of the term
SSR taxed policy-makers, academics and practitioners alike, as they strove to
make sense of, to coin the words of Chuter, “a rather slippery concept”.
(2011:viii) During these early days there was a growing body of literature on the
subject, but still a lack of intellectual clarity on precisely what it meant. (Greene
2003:2; Donais 2008b:4-5) Scholars such as Chuter (2006:1 and 6-8) agreed
that much of the confusion with SSR came down to definitional issues. The
SSR community was, however, fully seized of this lacuna:
“Security sector reforms are a new area of activity for international
actors, and there is still not a shared understanding at the
international level of what this term means. This has limited the
debate on the subject. Assisting in the development of such a
shared understanding should be a priority objective for the
research community.” (Hendrickson & Karkoszka 2002)
This section seeks to analyse the definitional debate surrounding SSR and at
the same time explore the role of some key IGOs (namely the OECD, the UN,
the EU and the OSCE) in developing SSR frameworks that helped clarify the
situation.18
The Early Definitional Debate
18
Some scholars have also included the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) in this group. (eg Law 2007) In the interests of brevity and as
the focus of this thesis is on NATO and, in the main, Europe, these two organisations have
been excluded from the discussion.
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One of the key issues in the early definitional debate was the tendency for
donors to approach SSR in a compartmentalized way without necessarily
bringing the various strands together in a strategic manner. (eg Law 2007:19-
21) This was a view endorsed by Rory Keane from the OECD when he stated
that "... donor policy communities remain to some degree locked within their
respective thematic invisible cages, which makes coherence, coordination and
complementarity all the more difficult to achieve." (As quoted by: Sedra 2009:9)
There was a recognition by all elements of the SSR community, however, that
sustainable reform was only possible if the SSR concept embraced a fairly wide
definition. It should not be too narrow and just concern itself with defence
reform, but needed to embrace the full spectrum of thematic reforms in areas
such as border guards and justice, as well as emphasising the role of civil
society. Thus the broader focus of SSR as advocated by Ball and others
quickly gained common currency. (Ball 2001:45-66; Hänggi et al 2004:5; Ball
2010:46; and UN 2012a:34)
The evolution of this thinking is quite simple and is worth noting here. Borchert
(2003: 1-21) suggested that since its inception in the late-1990s the first
generation of SSR thinking focused on establishing new security institutions, as
well as delineating the powers of actors in the security sector and their
respective oversight mechanisms (eg Parliamentary oversight committees etc).
Key to this approach was the democratic control of armed forces and ensuring
that security legislation provided for this.
Second generation thinking consolidated previous work but turned to the
improvement of efficiency and effectiveness of security structures in order to
enhance delivery of services. (Edmunds 2002:5-9) This included not just the
operational actors such as the military and the police, but also a core of civilian
expertise to direct and oversee defence and security policy within the respective
ministries.
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The more recent, third generation thinking, took a more holistic approach and
moved towards the establishment or improvement of democratic governance
and capacity building, as well as improving cooperation amongst the various
security sector actors. (Borchert 2003:5-9) It was the focus on improving
governance, however, that really separated SSR from the concept of security
assistance that was previous practised by many donors. A diagram that
summarises these three generations has been reproduced from Borchert’s
paper and is at Figure 2.1 below:
Figure 2.1: Three Generations of SSR
(Source: Borchert 2003:4)
Although governance is not specifically mentioned in Borchert’s diagram, a
review of his paper reveals quite clearly that he believed democratic
governance to be at the heart of the SSR concept. (Ibid:6) It is an idea that
permeated all subsequent definitions and frameworks pertaining to SSR.
In drawing this discussion on the three generations of SSR to a close, it should
be noted that some contemporary scholars, such as Sedra (2010:102-116),
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have suggested that these three generational stages of orthodox SSR are really
only the first generation of thinking. These scholars argue that with the changes
currently being wrought within SSR, particularly SSR 'under fire', there is a need
to re-conceptualise the model. They refer to this as second-generation SSR. It
is a term that has gained currency (eg Muggah 2009; Fuior & Law 2014) and it
will be discussed in more detail later in this Chapter.19
Having set the scene on the debate, it would now be appropriate to turn to
actual definitions of SSR that were produced by policy-makers, practitioners
and scholars during the early 2000s. For example, in 2002 Lilly, Luckham & Von
Tangen Page suggested that SSR was the "… transformation of security
institutions so that they play an effective, legitimate and democratically
accountable role in providing external and internal security for a country’s
citizens." (2002:4) In 2003 the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands
published a report which drew heavily upon the Lilly et al definition and
suggested that SSR was:
“…the transformation of security institutions so that they play an
effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing
external and internal security for their citizens. There is a wide spread
recognition that SSR is an essential prerequisite for long-term stability
and prosperity of a country.” (Ball et al 2003:2)
Both of these definitions highlight the core focus of governance (eg
legitimacy, effectiveness and accountability) but also the role of
external security (more statist and dealing with threats from outside the
country) as well as internal security (focusing on the people and thus
human security).
The Role of the OECD in the Definitional Debate
19
See section entitled: ‘Current Debate on SSR’.
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This debate was taken a stage further in 2004 by the OECD20 when it published
a paper entitled: Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good
Practice, which had been agreed by Ministers and donor agencies in April of
that year. (OECD 2004) The following year it published the OECD DAC
Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance (OECD 2005a) which
became the authoritative version and contained both the original ministerially
agreed policy document as well as views on SSR from non-OECD partner
countries. The guidelines defined SSR as:
“… another term used to describe the transformation of the ‘security system’ –
which includes all the actors, their roles, their responsibilities and actions –
working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is
consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance,
and thus contributes to a well-function security framework.” (Ibid:20)
This 2005 paper set out the following approaches and good practice for donors
to pursue whilst supporting SSR (all references taken from the foreword of
Ibid:3):
 “To increase partner counties’ ability to meet the range of security needs
within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and
sound governance principles, including transparency and the rule of law.”
 Assist partners in creating “…[d]emocratically run, accountable and
efficient security systems [… that …] can help reduce the risk of violent
conflict.”
20
It is interesting to note that some of the individuals who assisted the development of SSR
thinking in DFID, such as Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrikson, were also involved in the
development of the OECD SSR framework. For example, see: OECD 2004:3. This would
seem to indicate that at least one of the OECD donor countries (in this case the UK) was
pushing the SSR agenda within the OECD.
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 Defines “… the security system [… in broad terms …] going well beyond
armed forces and the police [… and …] includes the civil authorities
responsible for oversight and control.”
 Recommends that “… whole-of-government frameworks and
mechanisms are needed – both in donor and developing countries – in
order to harness the range of policy and funding instruments available
into a common effort.”
 Suggests that “[p]artner ownership is critical.”
 And finally argues that “… [a]ll external actors need to have a keen
understanding of the context and history of partner countries and
carefully consider regional dynamics. This requires long-term analysis
and engagement.”
This extract effectively endorsed the centrality of governance in the practice of
SSR as well as Ball’s broad definition of the security sector. It also emphasised
the criticality of local ownership, the role of Whole-of-Government Approaches
(WGA), and the importance of context to the support of SSR. All these
characteristics will be discussed in more detail later in this Chapter.21
Based upon the 2004 and 2005 documents, the OECD gathered together a
range of development, security and SSR experts in a consultative process
known as the ‘Implementation Framework for Security System Reform (IF-SSR)
in order to operationalise the SSR guidelines on SSR. The result was the first
SSR handbook to be produced by an IGO: the OECD DAC Handbook on
Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice. (OECD 2007a)
The Handbook did not include a definition of SSR (presumably being content to
retain the one from OECD 2005a) but it did include an objective for the support
21
See section entitled: ‘CHARACTERISTICS OF SSR’.
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of SSR amongst its list of SSR principles and which drew upon the original
definition:
“The overall objective of international support to security system reform
processes is to increase the ability of partner countries to meet the range of
security and justice challenges they face, “in a manner consistent with democratic
norms, and sound principles of governance and the rule of law”, as defined in the 
DAC Guidelines on SSR. SSR helps create a secure environment conducive to
other political, economic and social developments, through the reduction of
armed violence and crime.” (OECD 2007a:21)
The Handbook then recommended that international actors should support
partners to achieve four key objectives:
 “Establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability in
the security system;
 Improved delivery of security and justice services;
 Development of local leadership and ownership of the reform process;
and,
 Sustainability of justice and security delivery.” (Ibid:21)
The final part of this jigsaw is the OECD definition of the security sector, which
is:
 “Core security actors: armed forces; police service; gendarmeries;
paramilitary forces; presidential guards; intelligence and security services
(both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs
authorities; and reserve or local security units (civil defence forces,
national guards, militias);
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 Management and oversight bodies: the executive, national security
advisory bodies, legislative and legislative select committees; ministries
of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional
authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget 
officers, financial audit and planning units); and civil society organisations 
(civilian review boards and public complaints commissions;
 Justice and the rule of law: judiciary and justice ministries; prisons;
criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights
commissions and ombudsmen; and customary and traditional justice
systems; and
 Non-statutory security forces: liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private
security companies, political party militias.” (OECD 2007a:22)
It is a broad definition in line with what was promised in OECD 2005a and in
large measure has been endorsed and replicated in other SSR frameworks.
One point to note at this stage is that NATO would not necessarily have routine
access to a number of the actors in the above list (particularly in the justice
sector) so would not necessarily be directly involved in supporting their reform.
It is an issue that will be returned to at a later stage.
It would be fair to assert that a combination of OECD 2005a and OECD 2007a
provide a most comprehensive and clear articulation of the aims and objectives
of SSR. As Jackson (2011:1811-1812) observed: “There is little disagreement
among most donors regarding these aims, even if the balance may be different 
between them.” The documents also provided a set of working principles for
support to SSR processes. (OECD 2005a:22-24; OECD 2007a:22-23) The list
is too long to be included in the main body of this thesis but a summary is
contained in Appendix 2, along with similar definitions and principles from other
IGOs’ SSR framework documents.
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In concluding this section, it would be appropriate to reflect upon four points.
First, the role of the OECD is to “… develop policy guidelines and norms with a
view to coordinating policies and good practice.” (Law 2007:9) Its role does not
extend to implementation in the field, unlike the other IGOs which are discussed
in the following sections, which have both policy and field obligations. Second,
it has clearly drawn upon a range of well-qualified experts in its consultation for
the Handbook on SSR as well as the experience of all the major donor aid
agencies. It would therefore be surprising if these IGOs were to develop
frameworks that were too different from that of the OECD. Third, it would be a
fair question to ask whether the Handbook on SSR is still relevant ten years
after its publication. Indeed a 2016 OECD survey asked member states which
documents they would refer to regarding security justice and rule of law. (OECD
2016) The majority (eg Germany, Sweden, the UK etc) specifically mentioned
the Handbook and even those that did not, such as Finland, referred to their
own development guidelines (Finland 2014:19-20), which used much of the
familiar OECD language from the Handbook. (OECD 2016a:67-71) The final
point to make is that the Handbook was originally designed for use in
development contexts ranging from the benign (including both developed and
developing countries) to countries at risk of conflict, through to post-conflict
environments. Whilst the principles of SSR would probably remain valid in
countries where there is an ongoing conflict, the methods used to support SSR,
the points of entry and the desired outcomes will be fundamentally different.22
This will be discussed later in this Chapter.
22
The final point is made as a result of an e-mail exchange dated 4 October 2017, with Dr Mark
Downes, formerly OECD staff, and now Assistant Director and Head of Operations, DCAF,
Geneva. A copy of the exchange is held by the researcher.
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The UN Approach and Framework
Having reviewed in some detail the OECD’s approach to SSR, the aim of this
section is to discuss the UN’s approach. During the mid-2000s the OECD
donor countries were active within the UN in pursuing an SSR agenda.23 The
Security Council first formally discussed SSR in 2005 (UN 2005) and then again
in February 2007 when a UNSG presidential statement tasked the UN
Secretary General to submit a report on the UN’s approach to SSR. (UN 2007a)
The UN Policy Committee then established an interagency SSR Taskforce
(IASSR-TF), co-chaired by DPKO and UNDP, to lead in this endeavour and
develop a strategic, integrated and coordinated system-wide UN approach to
SSR.24 In effect the IASSR-TF was given a mandate for both policy
development and operations connected with SSR.25 The report was duly
submitted in January 2008 (UN 2008) and included a decision to form a UN
SSR Unit (SSRU), which would take the lead for the day-to-day work on SSR
within the UN, as well as responsibility for acting as the secretariat for the
IASSR-TF.
The report served several additional purposes. First, it stressed the vital
importance of developing a coherent and holistic UN approach to SSR, which
would improve its impact in the field. There was a recognition that its previous
support to SSR had been ad hoc, as well as lacking any sense of intellectual
framework or rigour. Second, it set out the core principles that should guide its
approach to SSR. In so doing it laid a claim to play a normative role in the
support of SSR, as well as an operational role in the field. This could start with
needs assessments, through technical advice to security institutions, to a full
range of capacity building programmes. Third, it linked SSR to several other
initiatives including UNSCR 1325(2000) (UN 2000a) on the important role of
23
The thrust of a conversation with a Slovakian diplomat who was part of the ‘Friends of SSR’
at the UN in 2007. Bratislava, 6 June 2017.
24
This task was contained in a RLSOI-DPKO briefing note dated 20 August 2007. A copy is
held by the researcher.
25
See: ‘UN Peacekeeping – Security Sector Reform’. Available at:
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/security.shtml [Last accessed 5 September 2017].
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women in the prevention of conflict and the so-called ‘Brahimi Report’ on
peacebuilding (UN 2000b). The fourth, and largely unstated purpose, was to
encourage better cooperation and coordination between the mainly autonomous
departments within the UN. (UN 2011:5-6 alludes to this role.)
The UN’s definition of SSR and the security sector are contained in full at
Appendix 2. A comparison of these with those produced by the OECD reveal
three relatively minor variations. First, the UN reverted to using the term
‘Security Sector Reform’ over OECD’s ‘Security System Reform’. The
researcher could find no explanation for this. One possible reason, however, is
that when the UN refers to a ‘system’, it tends to mean the ‘UN system’. This
certainly seem to be the case in the 2008 Report when it talks about “a system-
wide approach to SSR” (UN 2008:2), a “system-wide coherence” (Ibid:15), or “a
system-wide policy for SSR” (Ibid:17). Second, although the UN’s words may
be slightly different and in a different order, the thrust is very similar. A
comparison of the key SSR terms and principles for the IGOs under discussion
is at Table 2.1. Third, whilst the UN’s definition of the security sector includes
some elements of the justice sector, it is less inclusive than that used by the
OECD. The reason for this would seem to be due to the UNDP’s traditional role
in assisting with institutional reform in the field of access to justice and the rule
of law, and its desire to retain that lead. (Ibid:8)
From its inception in 2008 the SSRU played an increasingly active role in SSR
within the UN, not least in harmonising common strands of work between the
various departments. Of particular note is the UN's contribution to thematic
areas such as DDR with the Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament,
Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), which has provided a
useful vade mecum for many field practitioners. (Ebo & Powell 2010)
Nonetheless, it took another four years for a common framework for SSR to be
agreed in the form of the UN SSR Integrated Technical Guidance Notes (ITGN).
(UN 2012b) It covers, inter alia, the UN’s approach to SSR, national ownership
of SSR, democratic governance, and a series of checklists. The language of
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the ITGN owes much to the OECD Handbook, although somewhat surprisingly
there is only one passing reference to the actual document. (UN 2012:115)
The SSRU contributed to a range of SSR related policy documents including
Defence Sector Reform (UN 2011), the UN SSR Perspective (UN 2012a), and,
of note, was the Secretary General’s report on Strengthening the United
Nations Comprehensive Support to Security Sector Reform. (UN 2013) The
report emphasised the following:
“Support to security sector reform therefore needs to be better linked to broader
political reforms that create the foundations for transformative processes such
as national dialogues, reconciliation efforts or transitional justice initiatives. In
the absence of these foundations, security sector reform is neither sustainable
nor transformative.” (UN 2013:2)
And:
“Successful security sector reform transcends activities targeting individual
components of the sector such as the police, army [… etc…]. Critically, the
Organization and Member States have come to appreciate the importance of
sector-wide initiatives that address the strategic, governance and architectural
framework of the sector.” (Ibid:2)
The OECD Handbook (OECD 2007a), the UN Secretary General’s 2008 report
(UN 2008) and the UN SSR Perspective (UN 2012) are all quite clear that for
support to SSR to be successful there is a need to link it to political processes
and to sector-wide approaches. Whilst it may therefore be surprising that the
UN repeated these assertions, it was perhaps this evidence from the field which
suggested these issues were being ignored, that prompted the 2013 document.
These shortcomings have certainly been pointed out by scholars such as
Podder (2013), Sedra (2013) and Gordon (2014).
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A final UN document that bears mentioning is UNSCR 2151(2014), which is the
first Security Council resolution on the opportunities and challenges of SSR (UN
2014). It stressed the centrality of national ownership in SSR approaches,
whilst emphasising the need for political leadership and political will on the part
of national authorities, as well as the need for the UN to take a comprehensive
approach in coordination with other IGOs, and finally that the concept of SSR is
both a technical and a political process. Thus, aside from reinforcing the main
points from the Secretary General’s 2013 report (UN 2013), it merely re-
emphasised most of the UN’s principles on SSR. This may not be considered
particularly noteworthy, except that in the environment of the UN this was not
merely an internal UN document, but one with the full political weight of the
Security Council. These types of resolution will then be drawn upon in the
future as a part of a potential political process with concomitant political
pressure.26
In concluding this section on the UN’s approach, it is clear from an examination
of their key SSR documents, and specifically the ITGN, that the UN has drawn
extensively from the OECD in framing their SSR policies and principles. There
are obviously differences of emphasis but the UN’s thrust of national ownership,
the political nature of SSR, good governance and tailored approaches to
programmes is undoubtedly the same as that espoused by the OECD. As the
UN gains more operational experience from the nine field missions with an SSR
mandate,27 their approach to SSR will inevitably continue to evolve. It would
now be appropriate to turn to the third of the IGOs involved in support to SSR –
the EU.
26
For example, UNSCR 2252(2015) and UNSCR 2290(2016) on the situation in South Sudan
both drew upon UNSCR (2151(2014).
27
See the UN SSRU website. Available at:
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/security.shtml [Last accessed 6 October 2017].
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The EU Approach and Frameworks
As the EU saw itself as a security provider with its own development agency
(International Cooperation and Development - DG DEVCO),28 it was inevitable
that it should also seek to codify its own approach to SSR. It then contrived to
develop two separate approaches: one by the Council (Council of EU 2005) and
one by the Commission (EC 2006). Both drew directly from the OECD29 (Britz
2008:83) but nonetheless there were still conceptual as well as terminological
differences between the two organisations.30 (Law & Myshlovska 2008:6-7)
These were harmonised to an extent by the Council in 2006 (Council of EU
2006) but it was still an issue that drew criticism from Spence & Fluri (2008) and
fellow authors in the book The European Union and Security Sector Reform.31
It was not until 2016 that that these anomalies were fully rectified with the
publication of the High Representative’s EU-Wide Strategic Framework to
Support SSR.32 (EC 2016)
Turning now to some of the detail, including the definitional debate, the EU’s
earliest forays into this field were through its role as a major development
donor. This changed when the EU promulgated its first European Security
Strategy (ESS) in 2003 and articulated that it had a potential role to play in SSR
as “… part of institution building.” (EU 2003:12) When the Council and
Commission produced their respective concepts on SSR in 2005-2006, they
were in harmony over the OECD’s broad definition of the SSR concept33 but
struggled, as a supposedly unitary organisation, to bring convergence between
the security and development objectives. (Doelle & de Harven 2008:39-42)
28
See the DG DEVCO website at: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/general_en [Last accessed
22 July 2017].
29
At this stage it was from OECD 2005a.
30
For example, the Council used the term ‘security sector reform’ and the Commission ‘security
system reform’
31
Note in particular the comments by van Eekelen 2008:112-115, where he criticises the
incoherence of the EU’s approach and its lack of ability to “… identify a chain of measures and
events that lead to the desired outcome of reform.” (Ibid:115)
32
By this stage there was a heavier reliance upon OECD 2007a.
33
The EU’s definitions and principles for SSR are Appendix 3.
62
The issue of cooperation with other donors, as well as partner countries, would
seem to be a recurring theme for both the Council and the Commission (Buxton
2008:36) but, again, the EU struggled with the WGA. Unlike a government,
which would normally have separate ministries dealing with SSR (ie foreign,
development and defence) with an overarching coordination body in the form
perhaps of a Cabinet Office and a Prime Minster, the EU has three pillars in
dialogue and which “… are parallel, separate and unequal structures. […] This
imbalance between the pillars in terms of integration complicates coordination.”
(Ibid:51) The point is well made as the first pillar is supranational and uses
qualified majority voting (QMV), whilst the second and third pillars have a
shared ownership of both member states and the Commission and make
decisions by unanimity. Furthermore, as Bailes comments:
“… a combination of EU inexperience with the notoriously fragmented
ownership and control of practical inputs between Council and Commission,
different bits of the Commission, civilian and military etc has resulted in
emphases within individual SSR actions that are not only partial and
unbalanced, but inconsistent from place to place.” (2011:70)
It is therefore little surprise that it took the EU so long to formulate its 2016
framework.
It is not proposed to go meticulously through the EU’s path from 2006 to 2016
but mention needs to be made of the EU’s experience of SSR missions in the
field. It has undertaken a number of missions in recent years that have had
some form of SSR dimension. These range from civilian CSDP missions that
assist with capacity building or institution building elements of the security
sector (eg police reform in Macedonia and rule of law reform in Kosovo
respectively) (Dursun-Ozkanca & Vandemoortele 2012:140) to missions that
were explicitly labelled SSR missions with the objective of reforming all the
security institutions in a holistic manner (eg DRC and Guinea-Bissau). (Faleg
2014:209) The final mission to mention is the non-executive EU Advisory
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Mission (EUAM) to Ukraine, which was launched in 2014. The EUAM mission
is:
“…to assist the Ukrainian authorities towards a sustainable reform of the civilian
security sector through strategic advice and hands-on support for specific
reform measures based on EU standards and international principles of good
governance and human rights.”34
This focus on the civilian sector is obviously at variance with the more holistic
approach to orthodox SSR but it is believed that this distinction was made to
ensure that the EU and NATO did not overlap in their respective mandates.35
It is still too early to form a judgement on how effective the EUAM is, but there is
a general consensus that most of the other missions have had mixed results.
(Faleg 2014:222-224; Pagodda et al 2014:15-17) Part of the problem would
seem to be a lack of understanding among some of the constituencies of the
SSR concept (Ibid:217-221) and part a lack of internal cohesion and coherence
within the EU. (Dursun-Ozkanca & Vandemoortele 2012:154) It was hoped that
the arrival of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2010 would
improve the situation, particularly through improved coherence of EU
stakeholders (Jayasundara-Smits et al 2016:4) but there has been only
marginal evidence of this. Nonetheless, it was one of the reasons that
prompted the High Representative to launch a ‘EU Comprehensive Approach to
Conflicts and Crises’ (EU 2013) and this has contributed to the eventual
development of the new EU framework for SSR. (EC 2016) Time will tell how
useful the framework will be.
In drawing this section to a close, it is clear that the EU, like the UN, has drawn
heavily upon the OECD framework. It seems to have suffered, however, from
34
‘EUAM Ukraine – Our Mission’. Available at: http://www.euam-ukraine.eu/our-mission/about-
us/ [Last accessed 7 October 2017].
35
This was the reason given by a member of EUAM staff in Kiev on 27 October 2014 shortly
before the mission was formally launched. The researcher was lecturing on an ESDC course in
Kiev at the time.
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both institutional incoherence as well as the inability to match mandates with
appropriate resources. The difficulties it experienced in adopting a WGA is an
example of the former (Buxton 2008:51) and the Guinea-Bissau mission being a
prime example of the latter. (Faleg 2014:214-216; Bahnson 2011:270) It also
seemed to suffer from a paucity of staff dealing with SSR in the various pillars,
which is at variance with the SSRU in the UN and its system-wide coordinating
body, the IASSR-TF. It is possible that the EU has learned lessons from its
experience and that missions such as the EUAM in Ukraine might be successful
but it is too early yet to make that judgement. Time and space preclude a more
detailed treatment of the EU’s approach to SSR except to say that it looks like a
fertile field for further research.
The OSCE Approach and Framework
The focus now shifts from the EU to the OSCE. The aim of this section is
therefore to analyse the OSCE’s approach to SSR. The OSCE has produced a
number of capstone documents directly relevant to the security sector, from the
Helsinki Final Act (OSCE 1975), its Code of Conduct (OSCE 1994)36, to its
Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures (OSCE
1999). Its key focus has long been on the democratic control of armed forces
and security sector governance. The OSCE built up experience and knowledge
in this field and it is acknowledged that these documents have provided some of
the historical underpinning of the SSR concept (eg Law 2007:12). The difficulty,
as explained by Ghebali, is that the OSCE still needed to develop:
“… an SSR agenda based on an overarching framework complemented by
operational guidelines.” (2007:133)
There had been institutional and political attempts to formulate such an
approach, but to no avail. Eventually, in 2007 under the guidance of the
Spanish Chairman, the OSCE produced a Chairman’s Perception Paper on
36
For more detail, see earlier section entitled: ‘OSCE Code of Conduct’ in: ‘THE BUIDLING
BLOCKS OF SSR’.
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OSCE on Basic Norms and Principles in the Field of Security Sector
Governance/Reform. (OSCE 2007) This provided some overarching guidance
that replicated the essence of the OECD principles and also confirmed the use
of the term ‘Security Sector Governance and Reform’ (SSG/R). Knill et al
(2015:12) point out that the room for manoeuvre by OSCE’s secretariat to
launch new initiatives is formally rather limited. Nonetheless there is always
scope for shaping events through its amanuensis and agenda setting role, as
well as its direct interaction with the rotating chair. It is less effective when one
or more member state decides they do not want to pursue a particular policy.
This may be the case with SSR, although evidence of this is scarce. One
scholar, Lewis (2011:10-11), does hint at an East-West divide as the reason for
the road block, with more autocratic states in Central Asia not wishing to follow
OSCE commitments on democratisation and human rights that form a
fundamental part of SSR.
Little further progress was made on SSG/R until June 2014, when a so-called
‘OSCE Group of Friends of SSG/R’ was formed by Slovakia, Switzerland and
Serbia. This is reminiscent of the UN’s ‘Group of Friends of SSR’ that was set
up by Slovakia in 2007 and presumably with the same intent to push an SSR
agenda by states other than the main Western powers. The first act of this
group was to chair a joint OSCE-UN conference on SSG/R in July 2014 and a
commitment by the OSCE to develop guidelines for the concept.37 The next act
was a statement by the Slovak Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister,
Miroslav Lajčak, at an OSCE Permanent Council Meeting in September 2014 
extolling the need for a more coherent approach to SSG/R.38 After the OSCE
held another conference on SSG/R in Belgrade39 in April 2015, the scene was
set for the agreement and publication of a comprehensive document in the form
37
See article: ‘OSCE and UN Co-operation in Security Sector Governance and Reform’ dated
14 July 2014. Available at: http://www.osce.org/secretariat/120943 [Last accessed 21 August
2017].
38
 See: ‘Speaking Notes of Slovak Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Miroslav Lajčak, 
at OSCE Permanent Council Meeting’ dated 18 September 2014. Available at:
http://www.osce.org/pc/123863?download=true [Last accessed 17 August 2017].
39
See OSCE Press Release dated 21 April 2015. Available at: http://www.osce.org/cio/152411
[Last accessed 17 August 2017].
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of Security Sector Governance/Reform – Guidelines for OSCE Staff (OSCE
2016).
There is now a small OSCE team dealing with issues pertaining to SSG/R,
which is embedded within the Forum for Security Co-operation Support (FSC).
The FSC is the main OSCE body dealing with the politico-military aspects of
security and provides a forum for political dialogue for diplomats from OSCE
participating States. The human resources vested in the SSG/R team are more
akin to the EU than the UN’s SSRU, so progress is likely to be modest but at
least there is a focus.
The OSCE’s detailed approach to the security sector and principles are at
Appendix 2. In a similar fashion to both the UN and the EU they have broadly
followed the guidelines in the OECD’s Handbook on SSR (OECD 2007a), whilst
quite naturally tailoring parts to reflect its position as a regional IGO. Curiously,
however, it does not suggest a specific definition of SSG/R. A review of the
2016 Guidelines echoes this lacuna. The reasoning for this decision is to be
found in the proceedings of an OSCE Focus Conference in 2013 that dealt with
several security issues including SSR (OSCE 2013):
“… the OSCE has to date refrained from formalizing a definition of SSG or SSR
in its official documents. This paper is based on commonly agreed definitions,40
which comprise the idea that SSG points to the desired normative end state of
the security sector, while SSR is the related political process aimed at achieving
the envisioned end state. SSG is understood to refer to formal and informal
structures and processes of security provision, management and oversight with
in a state. Understood in normative terms, SSG is subject to the same
standards of good and democratic governance as all other public services. For
the purpose of this paper, all activities that aim at improving SSG are
considered SSR, even if not named as such.” (Ibid:9-10)
40
Presumably from OECD and the UN.
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It could reasonably be argued that this explanation is somewhat contrived but
given the divergent political leanings of the member states this is probably to be
expected. In common with both the UN and the EU, the OSCE’s record of
supporting successful reform has been mixed. Where the leadership of a
country being supported with reforms is westward leaning with a commitment to
democratic values and good governance, then successes have been found,
even in states with a hybrid form of democracy. Where the states are
authoritarian or non-democratic, results have been poor or non-existent. A key
failure by the OSCE would seem to have been a lack of political engagement
with the beneficiary state leadership, as well as a failure by the OSCE to
promote its own vision of security with human security at its heart – all counter
to the principles of SSR and SSG/R. (Lewis 2011:51-53; Shkolnikov 2009)
In ending this section on the OSCE’s approach to SSG/R, it is apparent that the
organisation has recently made real progress with the publication of its
guidelines. Notwithstanding the difficulties of achieving a consensus on the
meaning and function of the concept, the guidelines reflect the prevailing thrust
of the OECD Handbook on SSR (2007a) with human security and governance
at the core of its approach, and away from a statist view of security. In so doing
it has harmonised its approach with the other IGOs discussed in this Chapter.
Whether this then allows the OSCE to overcome some of its political and
institutional problems in delivering SSG/R programmes in the future remains to
be seen. If it adheres to its guidelines then it should at least have a chance of
success.
Reflecting Upon The Approaches of The Four IGOs
In reflecting upon the approaches of all four IGOs to SSR, it is worth noting two
issues. First, and perhaps the most striking, is the time that it has taken both
the EU and OSCE to produce their own frameworks given that their documents
have ended up being quite similar to the original OECD framework from 2007
and the UN’s in 2008. As Law pointed out some ten years ago, it is inevitable
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that the IGOs’ definitions and frameworks will always reflect their individual
needs and concerns as independent institutions (Law 2007:17), but there has
now been a significant convergence. This should mean that working together in
the field with the other IGOs will become much easier as their approaches
should be similar. This degree of convergence of approach, however, probably
owes a debt to the normative power of the OECD, and in particular the Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2008f), as well as the legitimacy that
the OECD has accrued. As Walker argues:
“(O)nce a program has been adopted by a large number of states […] it
becomes extremely difficult for state decision makers to resist even the
weakest kinds of demands to institute the program […]; once a program
has gained the stamp of legitimacy, it has a momentum of its own.”
(1999:890)
Second, whilst the OECD framework and definitions would seem to have gained
salience, the results in the field from the UN, EU and OSCE interventions would
still seem to have been mixed. This might be because at least two of the
frameworks are new and have not yet had time to undergo the process of
enculturation. It might also be that a ‘policy-practice gap’ is still evident.
(Bakrania 2014:3) It is possible that some form of longitudinal study of these
IGOs’ activities once the frameworks have become embedded would shed
further light on their efficacy.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR NATO’S SUPPORT TO SSR
Having established some of the building blocks of SSR and the role that four
SSR-relevant IGOs have played in the definitional debate, it would now be
appropriate to address the similarities, or otherwise, of those IGOs in order to
develop an analytical framework that could be used later in this thesis.
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The definitions and principles of SSR that are espoused by the four IGOs were
drawn into a table of ‘good practice’ in Appendix 2. Inevitably a degree of
licence was taken in the capture of evolving concepts and of varying terms that
have similar meanings. Nonetheless, it was possible to distil the essence and
the results are reproduced below at Table 2.1.
Principles of SSR OECD UN EU OSCE
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Understand the context of an
SSR intervention
√ √ √ √
Political engagement is key √ √ √ √ 
Encourage local/national
ownership
√ √ √ √
Assist improvements in





























√ √ √ √
Encourage cooperation
internally and externally




√ √ √ √
Norm (and standard) settings
aligned with some form of
conditionality encourages
reform
√ √ √ √
Institutional and personal
capacity building is essential
for long-term sustainability
√ √ √ √
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Principles of SSR OECD UN EU OSCE
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Development of a national
vision through a strategic
framework (eg NSS) provides
a direction for SSR over the
longer-term
√ √ √ √
Table 2.1 Summary of SSR Principles Espoused by SSR-Relevant IGOs
(Source – Multiple – See Appendix 2)
Given the homogeneity of the results, it would seem likely NATO should be
following a similar set of practices. With just a few modifications the broad
terms above would seem to offer a good model of analysis for use when
considering NATO’s experience in support of SSR. There is an obvious degree
of overlap between a holistic/comprehensive approach with the need to
encourage cooperation. It was therefore decided to combine them within the
model.41 NATO’s role in capacity building is mainly through the norm setting
and conditionality, so those two headings should also be included under one
heading. Finally, the development of an NSS is an excellent tool for providing
direction for SSR over the longer-term but it is also a key method in establishing
local ownership. It could therefore be subsumed into the headings of both
political engagement and local ownership. This leaves the following






It is an approach that was also adopted by Law (2007:264).
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5. Holistic Approach and Cooperation;
6. Technical Issues and Skills; and,
7. Capacity Building Through Norm Setting and Conditionality.
This framework will be used in analysing the case studies in Chapters 5 and 6,
and then the cross-case study comparison at Chapter 7. Most of the key terms
have already been used in this Chapter but, in order to ensure a full
understanding of these characteristics, the next section is devoted to analysing
them individually. Inevitably there will be an element of cross-cutting in the
discussion and this will be addressed first.
CHARACTERISTICS OF SSR
Cross-Cutting Issues
Much is made of the need to address SSR in a holistic fashion (eg UN 2013:21;
Faleg 2014:149), but with such a breadth of topics, there is an inevitable danger
of analysing its characteristics in a piecemeal fashion. It is therefore worth
stating now that most of the principles of SSR are cross-cutting and thus need
to be considered at every stage. Indeed, Hendrickson describes SSR as a “…
cross-cutting governance agenda …” whilst Blair (2002:9) and Welch
(2011:251) describe the various elements as being analogous to strands of a
rope that need to be woven together in order to make it strong and sustainable.
Some elements, such as financial management within the security sector and
ensuring that gender perspective is taken (eg OECD 2007a:49 and 51), will be
mentioned throughout this thesis but are not addressed individually in this
section. This is for reasons of brevity rather than a lack of import. The aim of
this section is thus to analyse the seven characteristics that will be used in the
model to evaluate NATO’s support to SSR in the Western Balkans.
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The Context of Reform
The Handbook on SSR (OECD 2007a) is replete with references extolling the
need for donors to understand the local context through a process of
assessment and analysis (Ibid:10-11), as well as stressing the inherently
contextual nature of SSR. (Ibid:14) It also “… advocates an approach whereby
the desired outcome and the context determine the priority, nature and scope of
the programme.” (Ibid:15) The other main IGOs discussed in the previous
section would seem to echo these sentiments. (eg UN 2012a:26; UN 2012b:iii,
92-92; EC 2006:6, 8, 10; EU 2016:6-7; and OSCE 2016:7, 14, 19)
The rationale for this focus on country and regional context is quite simple.
Although the principles for SSR have been articulated by IGOs such as the
OECD, each intervention will still need to be tailored according to local and
regional factors. Those factors will range from the existence of unfriendly
neighbours (Collier 2008:51-62), the historical legacy of any previous conflict,
whether there is a peace agreement in place, the general level of security, the
maturity of the political actors, the institutional and personal capacities within
the security sector and so on. (USIP 2009:Para 1.3 and 3.3.3) This is a view
that is widely endorsed within the scholarly literature. (eg Law 2007:9)
One scholar who takes a slightly different tack is Hänggi. He uses a typology
for context, which is based on three general reform contexts and could be
useful in identifying common patterns and threads. They are a development
context (where SSR is often used as a form of development assistance); a post-
authoritarian context (for example the CEE countries in their quest for NATO
and EU membership); and a post-conflict context (such as SSR in countries like
BiH or Kosovo that have experienced recent conflict). (2004:9-15) Whilst there
is some merit in cataloguing these contexts, it would seem to be important to
add a fourth category and that would be an ongoing-conflict context. The
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) would be one such example.
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Nonetheless, as Coletta and Muggah correctly point out, all too often during
such SSR interventions the context is ignored and “[a] growing number of
practitioners are concerned that with the newly-crafted DDR and SSR hammers
every […] context is treated as a nail.” (Coletta & Muggah 2009:447) This one-
size-fits-all approach has been particular apparent in countries where there is
an on-going conflict such as Afghanistan where there is “… a penchant for
short-term approaches and lack of consideration for the long-term sustainability
of reforms.” (Sedra 2013:372)
In the second section of this Chapter, it was stated that the practice of SSR
owed a debt to management theory. In accordance with this thinking,
Clingendael (2008:2) has described SSR as a “… highly political change
process …” OD is one such method of implementing change and often uses a
set series of key stages to develop a programme. These could include: a
preliminary stage; analysis and diagnosis; agreement about the programme;
action planning; an evaluation and review; and, finally, revise the aims and
plans. (Cole 2004:212-215) The initial stages of such a schema would fit a
model of analysis in order scope the environment. Understanding and tailoring
SSR interventions according to the local context is never an easy task due to
the barriers of language, culture and societal norms. Nonetheless, it is possible
to achieve, at least in part, with a thorough assessment and analysis of
contextual factors before committing to a particular intervention.
In bringing this section to a close, it is worth mentioning that the context for
reform cannot be examined in isolation, and one of the key characteristics it
interfaces with is the political context.
Political Engagement
Assisting a country to reform its security sector cuts to the heart of a state's
security and thus sovereignty, so it is both highly sensitive and highly political.
Such reforms could lead to a redistribution of power in a country. There would
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probably be some elements of a ruling elite that will have benefited from the
previous system and they are likely to be active spoilers against any proposed
change, either individually or as institutions. (Egnell & Haldén 2010:32)
Although this is well documented, Downes and Muggah suggest that SSR
literature has not been helpful in that it only:
“… grudgingly concede[s] that conventional SSR also underplays the
chronological and often volatile evolution of security sectors historically, and the
way security services are ultimately shaped by the vested interests of elite.”
(2010:137)
Power struggles are an integral part of post-conflict countries and serve to make
complex situations more complex. Furthermore, as Podder (2013:360)
remarked, “… the introduction of ethnic politics in the security institutions […]
undermine their accountability and performance …”, which was precisely the
situation in BiH after the 1992-1995 war. The power play between ruling elites,
civil society stakeholders and security institutions must be understood and
recognised by donors, otherwise a return to violence could be the unintended
consequence. Eckhard and Gaus (2014)42 make this point very forcibly when
they criticised the international community in South Sudan for training the
Presidential Guard, whilst ignoring the ethno-nationalist tensions within the unit
that eventually led to a resumption of fighting.
But SSR is more than just about power and privileges, as it touches upon
societal values and freedoms, especially with regard to the governance agenda.
It addresses the way a country sees itself and how it wants others to see it.
Both are the business of politicians in most countries and thus very political.
Reform of the judiciary also brings its own sensitivities as it seeks to build
capacity to exercise oversight of the executive. (ISSAT 2012:11)
42
‘No surprises in South Sudan, or in the Central African Republic’ dated 5 February 2014.
http://mondediplo.com/blogs/no-surprises-in-south-sudan-or-in-the-central [Last accessed 15
August 2017].
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The importance of politics and political engagement to the implementation of
SSR is well-recognised by the normative frameworks of the SSR-relevant IGOs.
(eg OECD 2007a:28-40; UN 2012b:130-131) Including the idea in an SSR plan
and ensuring that it is applied in the field are, however, two completely different
issues. As Sedra remarks:
“While SSR orthodoxy explicitly recognizes the political nature of the process,
and there are few political environments more complex than Afghanistan’s, the
country’s SSR agenda was typically framed and approached in a largely
technical and apolitical manner.” (2013:374)
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Perhaps the most glaring deficit created by the approach described by Sedra
was an absence of local ownership. If local politicians and civil society have no
say in the reforms being pursued then they are unlikely to be sustainable over
the longer-term. This point is well made by Lawrence in the quote at the start of
this Chapter.
Perhaps the best way to ensure that SSR is fully included into the political
process is to ensure that is put onto the national agenda of the beneficiary
country. (OECD 2007a:31) This could be done through a range of activities
which would create dialogue with both government and civil society but one
particularly useful method is by developing a strategic and doctrinal framework
for a country's security sector through the medium of an NSS. This process has
to be led by local politicians and public servants, supported by civil society, and
needs to reflect their joint vision of security. (UN 2012b:123-124 and 139) It
would then allow a national consensus to be created on a range of security
issues (Qehaja et al 2013:6) and in a post-conflict environment provide a set of
priorities to inform decisions by both donors and the host nation. (Panarelli
2010:3) Given that an NSS is normally conducted every five to ten years (or
when there is a change of government), it better matches the timeline of
national development than most donor timelines.
43
This technical approach will be discussed in more detail later in this Chapter. See section
entitled: ‘Technical Issues and Skills’.
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There is a danger, however, in this form of political engagement that should be
briefly mentioned. Pursuing an NSS approach, for example, implicitly
presupposes a Westphalian model of a state, which could lead donors into
engaging just with a narrow political elite. This would ignore the people-centric
approach recommended by all the SSR-relevant IGOs. (eg UN 2012b:15 & 119)
There are many states undergoing SSR where political power is vested in local
clans and tribes, or decentralised semi-autonomous regions, rather than in
central governments. Podder addresses the tension between the dominant
Westphalian model and the reality in many regions of the world where security
on the ground is provided by a mixture of formal and informal systems that co-
exist. She describes this a ‘hybrid political order.’ (2013:356) Traditional justice
systems sitting alongside more formal justice systems in Rwanda is one such
example.44 The key is that wherever possible a bottom-up approach should be
attempted, taking into account the daily lives of people in the communities.
(OECD 2007a:31-34)
In summary, donors need to have deep and sensitive understanding of the
political context of a beneficiary country including the power vested in clans and
tribes well away from state capitals. As SSR is essential political, donors need
to engage with the political drivers of change within a country and specifically
within the security sector. “[P]olitics must be placed centre stage …” (Ball
2014:8) of any SSR intervention and, with it, political engagement across the
political spectrum. This latter point is particularly important as SSR reforms
must not “… secure the state at the expense of the people.” (Dursun-Ozkanka &
Vandemoortele 2012:15) Only by incorporating a bottom-up political approach
as well as a top-down approach can the reforms engendered by SSR be fully
owned by the people and the government of the beneficiary state.
44
See: ‘The Justice and Reconciliation Process in Rwanda’ dated March 2014. Available at:
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/Backgrounder%20Justice%202014.pdf [Last
accessed 12 August 2017].
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Local/National Ownership
Having discussed the need for political engagement, it would be appropriate to
follow up on the related issue of ownership. The concept of ‘local ownership’
has been a key tenet of the development community for many years but it
gained real prominence in the mid-1990s. The World Bank conducted
considerable empirical research into the effectiveness of aid and subsequently
highlighted local ownership as a key enabler to effectiveness. (World Bank
1995:ix-x) This support led the OECD-DAC to codify the concept (OECD
1996:9) and soon the term became enshrined in the policy documents of
development agencies such as DFID. (DFID 1997:54) Whilst its origins may
have been in the field of development, it is hardly surprising given the previous
discussion of the security-development nexus, that the principle of local
ownership has also been embraced by the SSR community. The aim of this
section is to explore what is meant by local ownership in the context of SSR, its
link to the other principles of SSR and the obstacles to its implementation in the
field.
Nathan (2006 & 2007) and Donais (2008a, 2009a & 2009b) have been key
writers in this field. Nathan suggests that the principle of local ownership of
SSR means that “… the reform of security policies, institutions and activities in a
given country must be designed, managed and implemented by local actors
rather than external actors.” (2007:4) He goes onto argue that local ownership
should not just be confined to the state but widened to include parliament and
civil society, thus creating ‘national ownership’ rather than ‘government
ownership’. (Ibid:5) Mobekk (2010b:232) counsels caution with this definition,
however, as he suggests that usage in the field often conflates the two terms,
which inevitably leads to the exclusion of the people and civil society.
Nonetheless, the term ‘national ownership’ is a term that has gained currency
(eg World Bank 2009:14; UN 2013:5) but in this thesis both it and ‘local
ownership’ are used inter-changeably.
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The major IGOs involved in the support of SSR (OECD, UN, EU and OSCE)
include the concept local or national ownership in their frameworks for SSR and
stress its importance.45 (OECD 2007a; UN 2012b; EU 2016; and OSCE 2016)
In broad terms they follow Nathan’s arguments and talk about ‘people-centred
support’ and ‘national ownership’. Whilst there seems to be consensus within
policy, practitioner and scholarly literature that local ownership is a core
principle and critical to the long-term sustainability of SSR (Donais 2008:288;
Ball 2010:38-41; and Gordon 2014a:1-2), there is also plenty of evidence of a
gap between the theory and practice of local ownership. This is particularly true
in conflict-affected areas such as Afghanistan, where local capacity is weak or
there is an ongoing insurgency. (Hansen 2008:42-54; Giustozzi 2008:220-226;
Sedra 2013:374-375) In a review of the SSR and Peacebuilding literature the
UN suggests that “… post-conflict SSR brings about an enormity of challenges
that SSR – on its own – is unable to tackle.” (UN 2012c:50) This would seem to
question the viability of orthodox SSR in conflict environments. It would also
seem to indicate that context is a key variable in the quality of local ownership
and thus having a deep and meaningful understanding of the local context
should be a pre-requisite to any SSR intervention.
Ball (2012:38) also makes a valid point when she argues that the views on
security of the so-called ‘locals’ and the donors of the aid can be widely
divergent. This tension can fatally undermine relationships. Where a donor
may recommend improved transparency and accountability, a ruling elite might
take a counter view as a means of retaining power. (Jackson: 2011:1809) If
local actors do not share the underlying democratic values of SSR, there could
be a clash between a western liberal approach and a non-liberal, possibly
traditional approach. Where does this leave the pursuit of local ownership?
In Sedra’s excoriating critique of the practice of the orthodox model of SSR and




“SSR activities were either directly imposed, with little effort to cultivate local
ownership and build political consensus, or they were advanced on the back of
alliances with particular elite constituencies, namely the Northern Alliance
jihadis and the Western-oriented technocrats, who were not representative of
Afghan society as a whole. The resultant weakness of local ownership, a key
ingredient of SSR, can also be attributed to the absence of a sophisticated and
nuanced political approach capable of navigating the complexities of this
diverse and charged political environment and adapting reforms to it. The
limited understanding of Afghan politics that informed donor political
engagement left their interventions prone to manipulation and spoiler activity by
local power brokers.” (Sedra 2013:376)
This lack of attention to local ownership was exacerbated by an absence of
accountability mechanisms which would have provided the Afghans with a
measure of ownership, a tendency on the part of donors to pursue illiberal and
undemocratic reforms that suited the needs of the donors rather than the locals,
and a focus on train and equip programmes rather than on orthodox SSR with
its strong thread of good governance. (Ibid:376-377, 384) Sedra’s criticisms
bring into sharp relief whether the orthodox model of SSR and its reliance on
local ownership is possible in a non-western country such as Afghanistan,
which is riven by conflict. It is a question that will be returned to later in this
Chapter.46
It would now be appropriate to examine how local ownership could be improved
in recipient countries. Much would obviously depend upon the context, but
Nathan (2010:29), for example, suggests that donors could provide support to
local parliamentary staff and security studies institutes in building their capacity
to draft security laws. As he says:
“The introduction of security legislation based on democratic norms is a key
component of SSR. It is a necessary condition for entrenching the rule of law,
establishing the accountability of the security services, promoting respect for
46
See section entitled: ‘Current Debate on SSR’.
80
human rights and ensuring that the durability of reforms is not dependent on a
few individuals.” (Ibid)
By assisting the local actors to understand the process but leaving them to
frame the legislation, donor support would be acknowledging local traditions
and culture, but still building local ownership. It is an approach that DCAF have
taken in a number of workshops with government officials and others from the
Western Balkans.47 Similarly, Gordon argues that integrating local community
safety organisations into SSR programmes could build ownership but such an
approach would require the state and local security organs (eg local police etc)
to be responsive to the people and be trusted by them. (2014:18)48
The actions of the international community, as a group, can also have a bearing
on local ownership in a country. Nansen suggests that
“… [w]hen international actors fail to convey a consistent and cohesive
message or to address post-conflict challenges comprehensively, local
ownership is in fact undermined. While local actors tend to perceive the
international community as an amorphous mass, they are really facing a wide
range of conflicting priorities and incompatible methodologies. […] Conversely,
a more coordinated, comprehensive approach can make better use of
conditionality to push a reform process forward in the face of potential spoilers.”
(2010:53)
The approach recommended by Nansen clearly has far wider applicability than
just local ownership and speaks, inter alia, to the avoidance of duplication and
thus more effective burden sharing, greater programmatic coherence for both
donors and recipients, plus building political will in both the international
community as well as the recipient country – both state and people. It is
interesting to note that Mark Sedwill, NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative
47
These include DCAF/ISSAT training courses and GCSP capacity building courses using
former MPs such as Peter Vanhoutte from Belgium and former Defence Ministers such as
Willem van Eekelen from the Netherlands. Eg WGA-SSR course 2-5 September 2008.
48
This is an issue that is discussed further in the context of BiH in Chapter 5.
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(SCR) in Afghanistan recognised the value of such a perspective and
persuaded NATO to adopt its own ‘Comprehensive Approach’ that addresses
all of these issues. In his view, “… the application of a well-resourced
comprehensive approach might not ensure success; but without it, we will fail.”
(NATO 2010c:1.2) It is an issue that is included in the analytical model and will
be returned to later in this Chapter.
Having reviewed the literature on local ownership, there would seem to be a
potential difficulty in judging how successful NATO has been in encouraging the
process in the case studies at Chapters 5 and 6. A further search of the
literature revealed a typology of citizen participation that has been designed by
Sherry Arnstein (1969). A copy of the typology is at Figure 2.2 below.
Figure 2.2
Eight Rungs on a Ladder of Citizen Participation
(Source: Arnstein 1969:217)
It has eight levels and seeks to delineate the extent of citizens’ power in
determining outcomes. The bottom rung equates to ‘manipulation’ with no
participation from the citizen through to ‘citizen control’ at the top of the ladder,
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where citizens have full decision-making powers. This model will be used to
ascertain the level of local or national ownership for NATO’s support to SSR in
BiH and Kosovo. It is inevitable that such a simple model will have limitations
but these will be examined in more detail in Chapter 8. The next SSR
characteristic to be analysed is governance.
Governance
Although the term governance has only been in prominence for a relatively
short time, the word itself is understood to have much older roots. Kjaer
(2004:3) suggests that the etymological origins of the word came from the
Greek word 'kubernân', meaning to pilot or steer49, and was used by Plato to
describe the design of a system of rule. This apparently led in turn to the
mediaeval Latin word, ‘gubernare’, meaning rule-making or steering. Pierre and
Peters (2000:1-2) take a more contemporary standpoint by referring to the
French word 'gouvernance' from the 14th century. In recent years it has been
hard to hear mention of SSR without the term governance being mentioned in
the same breath, but its meaning is open to interpretation. (eg UNDP 2002; Ball
et al 2004; Hänggi et al 2004; Anten 2009 and Bryden et al 2009). The aim of
this section is to clarify governance as a characteristic of SSR.
The abstract nature of governance is often difficult to explain to the layman, so it
is worth turning to the World Bank, which defines the concept as follows:
"Good governance is epitomised by predictable, open, and enlightened policy-
making (that is, transparent processes); a bureaucracy imbued with a
professional ethos; an executive arm of the government accountable for its
actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving
under the rule of law." (World Bank 1994:vii)
49
The idea of ‘steering’ is still an element of modern governance, as is suggested by the title of
Jon Pierre’s book: ‘Debating Governance: Authority, Steering and Democracy’. (Pierre 2000)
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Whilst there are multiple other meanings of governance, the World Bank’s
definition would seem to suggest that governance has two complementary
aspects: one that is state-centric and involves the behaviour and professional
standards of both the government and public servants; and the other the
normative role to be played by civil society. (Pierre 2000:3) This sense is
echoed by Hydén but he introduces an informal aspect alongside the formal
one:
“Governance is the stewardship of formal and informal political rules of the
game. Governance refers to those measures that involve setting the rules for
the exercise of power and settling conflicts over the rules.” (1999:185)
An analysis of Pierre’s two levels of governance taken from the discussion
above, would seem to indicate a rather simple duopoly. In reality, there are
multiple-levels of legislation, rules and normative standards starting with the UN
(eg UN Charter of Human Rights) at the supra-national level, the EU and NATO
at the regional level, national frameworks of laws and regulation, and local
levels of, mainly informal, frameworks. Cutting across so many different levels
is challenging and highlights the need for contextual analysis in SSR as well as
addressing the subject in a holistic fashion, not least when some of the rules at
different levels are in opposition to each other. For example, some elements of
traditional justice systems in Africa may include “… uncomfortably ‘pre-modern’
values of patriarchy, hierarchy and superstition – [… which can be seen to be
…] failing to meet acceptable standards of legality and accountability.” (DFID
2010:49) These are difficult issues because often traditional or informal
systems in the countryside will have more legitimacy than legal and
accountability frameworks created in a country’s capital. There is no simple
answer to this type of conundrum except to work with local actors in order to
build a consensus on what is acceptable and what unacceptable.
Moving from frameworks to the characteristics of governance also poses some
dilemmas. The UNDP suggests that there are nine characteristics, which are
listed at Appendix 4. The SSR-relevant IGOs include slightly different ones,
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although they are broadly similar.50 For SSR support Law (2007:19 and 34)
suggests accountability, oversight and transparency. Given the emphasis
allocated by Borchert (2003) to effectiveness and efficiency, this will also be
included in the mix. It is proposed to examine each of these characteristics in
turn.
Effectiveness and Efficiency.
The effectiveness and efficiency of security sector actors is crucial to the
delivery of security to all members of society, not just the political elite.
(Brinkerhoff 2007:5-6; OECD 2007a:33 and 36) An assessment of the sector
will highlight how effective it is and could include such questions as to whether
the actors are properly structured for their role, whether they have the correct
resources, are the right policies in place for their effective function, and whether
they are being managed correctly. Ultimately, SSR should be focused on: “…
ensuring a balance between increasing the effectiveness of security and justice
actors, while ensuring that there is appropriate governance over how that
enhanced effectiveness is utilized.” (Keane & Downes 2012:2) There are
numerous examples, however, where operational effectiveness has been
improved but the standards of behaviour and the oversight of those actors has
been ignored, which has undermined the overall impact of SSR. (Fitz-Gerald
2012:308) A case in point is ‘train and equip’ programmes that are launched
under the cloak of SSR, but which have no mandate to improve the quality of
accountability or oversight of the security actors involved. This just creates the
potential for a service that provides for the elite whilst delivering a poorer
service for the people due, inter alia, to corruption and other predatory activities.
(Chuter 2009:1, Jackson 2010:1819; Sedra 2013: 376-377 & 384)
Another source of tension in improving effectiveness and efficiency is the role
played by informal or traditional security actors. Whilst some of these groups




disadvantages of supporting neo-patrimonial approaches to justice and security,
in conjunction with the dangers of further fragmenting an already weak and
incoherent security sector. There is also the critical question of whether donors
would be able to provide support on a sufficient scale to informal actors to make
a difference. Bottom up approaches to SSR will remain important, however, in
order to ensure that security is people-centric, but a balance needs to be
achieved with the more formal structures. (van Veen 2014:3-4; Podder
2013:373-374) There are three key aspects for the donor community to
remember. First, they should strive to ensure that “… support for security-
sector capacity [… is …] linked to support for oversight and accountability.”
(Keane & Downes 2012:2-3) Second, externally-driven processes are unlikely
to work. (ISSAT 2012:8) And, third, the cost of improving laid down standards
of professionalism and legal frameworks of accountability is relatively low when
compared to building the operational capability of security actors, but its long-
term impact can be out of proportion to those costs. (ISSAT
Accountability and Transparency
Accountability connotes the provision of checks and balances that are imposed
upon all actors in the security sector, including civil society organisations.
(UNDP 2006:35) As Hyden’s definition of governance suggests, these include
both formal and informal mechanisms. The formal mechanisms can include
regulatory frameworks, oversight mechanisms, ombudsmen, chains of
command, civilian control of the armed forces, parliamentary defence
committees etc. More informal ones can include oversight by the media,
academia and ordinary citizens, although these require a relatively high level of
transparency within the security sector. Accountability also implies that security
actors are obliged to explain their actions and, should they fall outside the
regulatory framework, then sanctions can be imposed. (Hänggi 2003:16-17)
Transparency has traditionally been acknowledged as a key enabler for citizens
to make informed choices about the quality and appropriateness of government
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actions. In recent years, however, transparency has been used more
extensively to improve a range of services both in the public and private sector.
Fox (2007:667-669) has attempted to explain how some forms of transparency
are better at leveraging accountability than others. He argued that at one end
of the scale there is ‘opaque transparency’ (where institutions disseminate
information which does not really impart how they operate in practice) and at
the other there is ‘clear transparency’ (where the information provided by
institutions impart real clarity on funding, processes and policies. This can lead
to ‘soft accountability’ and a degree of what he terms ‘answerability’. This is
obviously needed if institutional change is the goal but, on its own, it does not
guarantee ‘hard accountability’ (where sanctions can be applied). For this to be
achieved there needs to be some form of intercession by other actors (for
example Parliament in the case of oversight within a Ministry of Defence).
Table 2.2 provides a rough approximation of these concepts.
Transparency Accountability






Table 2.2: Unpacking Relationship Between Transparency and
Accountability (Source: Fox 2007:669)
In conclusion Fox’s argument is that transparency and civil society’s capacity to
influence can only go so far and that for ‘hard accountability’ to take form would
include a paradigm or policy shift within the governing regime.
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This concept is interesting as it does not necessarily take account of the power
of the ballot box. In 2004 the World Bank developed a concept of “short and
long routes” to accountability. (World Bank 2004) In the “short route” citizens
are able to press for improvements in public service by engaging directly with
service providers (eg the police or the courts). In taking the “long route” citizens
use their political clout, either via the ballot box or via advocacy, to force policy
makers and politicians to achieve the same end. Of course, the citizens are
also able to try both routes at the same time. The outcome will depend upon
specific contexts, and the disposition of the service providers or the politicians
to act. (Kosack & Fung 2014:72-73) This latter point is well made and, to some
extent, can depend upon a cost-benefit calculation by both the service providers
and the politicians, either independently or individually. It therefore will also
depend upon the level of governance already prevailing within a state. DFID
has made extensive use of transparency-accountability initiatives (TAIs) over
the past ten years but there are still gaps in its application which require
unpacking in more detail. As Gaventa and McGee suggest:
“Better insights are needed into the relationships between transparency,
accountability, citizens’ voice and participation, the conditions under which they
interact positively, and what stimulates collective social action for accountability.
The connections across various TAI ‘fields’ need to be strengthened to
maximise learning. The black box of ‘political will’ that so often bars the way
between TAIs and their sought impacts requires empirical unpacking.”
(2013:25)
This seems rather open-ended but, in examining how much impact TIAs have
had, Kosack and Fung suggest, “[t]he answer, as with so many other questions
in political science, seems to be that “it depends.” Nonetheless, it would seem
a fertile field for further research.
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Oversight and Transparency
The link between oversight and transparency, like that with accountability,
reflects the cross-cutting nature of all aspects of governance. The UN would
seem to agree with this when it avers that “… [i]ndependent oversight of the
security sector is essential to ensuring accountability and strengthening
confidence in its governance …” but that it requires “… clear and transparent
channels for substantive dialogue and cooperation between oversight
institutions and statutory security sector actors.” (UN 2012b:98-99)
Oversight bodies vary according to the context but normally conform to three
broad categories: legislative accountability bodies (eg defence and intelligence
committees), independent accountability bodies (eg ombudsmen and auditor
generals), and public sector accountability bodies (eg inspector generals of
armed forces and budget monitoring units). (Ball 2004: 55) The quality of such
bodies is dependent upon such factors as the degree of independence, the
guarantee of access to resources, knowledge of security issues and access to
information about the process and policies of the security sector. (Ibid:65) The
latter requires a degree of transparency that some security organs are loath to
offer. Oversight of intelligence services and the internal affairs of prisons are
always difficult but creating such bodies as parliamentary intelligence oversight
committees and inspectors of prisons are a key indicator of the level of
governance within a state. (UN 2012b:99-100)
In summary, scholars suggest that the concept of governance covers the whole
range of institutions and their frameworks which are involved in managing a
country. It includes accountable institutions that have appropriate levels of
oversight and are transparent; ones that adhere to the rule of law and which
have a zero tolerance for corruption. In essence these are all essential
elements of a democratically accountable security sector and thus of SSR.
(Hydén et al 1999:185; Ball et al 2004; Bell & Hindmore 2009.) The key for
donors is to support reforms that strengthen capacity of government institutions
and individual actors within the executive, whilst at the same time promoting the
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agency and participation of civil society in the governing process. (Kjaer
2004:11)
A Holistic Approach and Cooperation
The OECD states that “… [h]olistic and comprehensive reform — or a system-
wide approach — is SSR’s overarching objective.” (2007a:29) This view is
echoed by the other SSR-relevant IGOs such as the UN, which emphasises the
need to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the situation on the ground in
order to avoid piecemeal reforms that foster incoherence. (UN 2012b:63-64 &
70-71) The scholarly literature would also seem to endorse this approach. (eg
Bryden 2007:81; Schnabel et al 2012:13) More interestingly, this was also
formally underwritten by IGOs such as the EU and NATO at the ‘Coherent,
Coordinated and Complementary’ (3C) Conference in Geneva in 2009.
Given the advice that practitioners should adopt a holistic and comprehensive
approach to SSR, it would seem right to unpack its meaning in more detail. It
does not mean that an SSR intervention needs to focus on everything, rather it
means it needs to be aware of what else is happening in the security sector and
the interdependency of other actors and actions. This can also be termed the
Whole of Government Approach (WGA) which is used by OECD. (OECD
2007c) SSR is a multi-connected process with a range of component parts.
For example, efforts to reform the police without engaging other elements of the
justice sector would undoubtedly be sub-optimal. Attempting to provide for
improvements to security for the people without undertaking some form of
assessment or participatory survey of the people would seem to be a nugatory
undertaking. (ISSAT 2012:11-12)
Turning to Figure 2.3 below, the holistic and comprehensive approach strives to
build an understanding of the security and justice needs of the people. A state
could then endeavour to meet those needs through an over-arching political
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strategy such as an NSS51 or a national SSR strategy. Depending upon the
needs to be met, these strategies would develop a range of thematic areas for
reform, such as defence, the courts etc. Inevitably there will be specific cross-
cutting issues such as gender that will need to be incorporated across all the
thematic areas. The strategies would also need to take account of other
reforms within SSR such as DDR and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)
control. (ISSAT 2012:12; IWGNS 2009)
Figure 2.3: SSR – Holistic and Comprehensive
(Sources: Downes & Muggah 2010:139; ISSAT 2012:11)
This is an undeniably complex process and one that benefits through
cooperation from all the actors involved – national and international. (UN
2012b:72, 98-99, 102) One of the main goals for the OECD Handbook on SSR
(OECD 2007a) was to support improved coherence and coordination within
SSR and there would appear to have been a measure of success. (OECD
2010a) Both the EU and NATO have also recognised that they were unable to
support reform efforts in isolation, and, in line with the results of the ‘3C’
conference, they developed their own ‘Comprehensive Approaches’, which
51
See section entitled: ‘Political Engagement’.
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emphasised cooperation with like-minded IGOs. (EU 2013: NATO 2010c) As
Koops explains, the cooperation between the EU and NATO has not always
been smooth and has been dogged with institutional rivalry. (2015:738-739)
Nonetheless, there has still been a degree of mimetic isomorphism, which has
aided the two IGOs’ cooperation. (Koops 2012)
It is worth reflecting for a moment on the OECD’s use of the term ‘system’ in
SSR. Throughout the core OECD documents (OECD 2005a and 2007a) there
is a consistent image of SSR as a system working within a system and a need
to look holistically in order to achieve better understanding. It is not intended to
dwell on systems theory except to say that this form of dynamic behaviour,
where one element has an impact and consequence on other elements, is
obviously not restricted to science. Moving from a bio-science perspective to a
cultural domain, Rafferty explains how:
“Hofstede describes the benefits of a holistic approach by using the metaphor of
a number of blind men studying an elephant - the resultant confusion about the
overall structure being an illustration of “the need for pooling subjective
patterns”. That is if the blind men were to share their individual insights they
may perhaps understand that it is an elephant that they are dealing with and not
a “snake, a stick, a disk, a column, a wall or a rope.” (2007:4)
Following the Hofstede analogy, it would seem entirely sensible and practical
for the SSR concept to adopt a holistic approach and encourage cooperation
with other actors. Although as several scholars have pointed out (eg Albrecht et
al 2010:81 & 85; Smith 2011:260-261) agreement to cooperate does not always
translate into concrete action due to a range of institutional and wider policy
reasons.
In summary, it should be noted that both the SSR-relevant IGOs and the
scholarly literature would seem to support the need for a holistic approach to
SSR in order to maximise impact. Similarly, no one donor or SSR-relevant IGO
92
has a complete range of tools to assist with SSR, so they also agree that it
makes sense to coordinate with other actors, both internationally and nationally.
Technical Issues and Skills
Given the breadth of issues to be addressed as part of the approach to SSR, it
is clear that a broad range of multi-disciplinary skills are required. (OECD
2007a:236) The SSR literature now firmly establishes the salience of politics
over technical when supporting SSR (eg Sedra 2013) , so it will be rare that
these technical skills will take priority but a balance of both would be required.
There are a range of technical skills that would assist the reform process. These
could include programming and planning, budgetary matters, to thematic areas
such as intelligence reform or defence reform. (ISSAT 2012:12-13) As ever, the
precise skills required will depend upon need and circumstance and will
normally be ascertained through a rigorous analysis in advance of an SSR
intervention.
There are perhaps two additional aspects to cover here: technical issues and
technical (and other) skills. First, the main SSR-related IGOs provide much
advice on technical issues that require attention. (eg OECD 2007a:236-247; UN
2012b:138-144) One of the main tools in the hands of the donors is the
programming of SSR support in aid of the national actors. Unfortunately, these
programmes tend to be short-term and overly complex due in the main to donor
funding cycles and internal political constraints. (Keane & Downes 2012:4) A
recent study into nine SSR programmes in four countries by OECD have
consolidated some of these points into four key programme enablers, which are
listed at Table 2.3 below:
Serial Key Programme Enabler What This Means
(a) (b) (c)
1 Enable programmes to
engage politically on a
Creating the ability to act quickly in
response to political developments (in
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Serial Key Programme Enabler What This Means
(a) (b) (c)
daily basis the broadest sense as well as at the
programme level
2 Increase the duration of
SSR programmes to 6-10
years
Making a political commitment to a
longer-term engagement based on
partnerships with flexible financing
3 Develop detailed longer-
term results as part of the
programme
Define only intermediate results at the
start of the programme and put a
process in place to develop longer-





Being able to respond operationally to
developments and to learn from the
experience of implementation
Table 2.3: Key Programme Enablers
(Source: OECD 2016b:11)52
It is still too early to be able to make a judgement whether donors have adapted
these enablers and, if adapted, whether they are working. Nonetheless, they
seem to address some of the issues raised by Keane and Downes (2012) as
well as other scholars. (eg Ball 2014b; Albrecht & Kyed 2015:248-260)
The second aspect is technical (and other) skills. The blend of skills required by
SSR staff dealing with national authorities are not just related to SSR. It may be
that language skills have salience or change management skills. For those staff
that are seconded to line ministries as advisors or mentors, or even heads of
IGO missions in a beneficiary country, a much deeper range of personal
experience and skills will be required. The OECD study above also provided a
typology of strategic-level skills that are required, and these are listed below:
52
Figure 2.4 is a pruned version of the original.
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Serial Category High Level Abilities Required
(a) (b) (c)
1 Personality - Resilient
- Good listener
- Trustful





3 Knowledge - Political/economy knowledge
- Relevant technical knowledge
Table 2.4 Profile for International Security and Justice Staff
at the Strategic Level
(Source: OECD 2016b:72)
Whilst there is nothing particularly revolutionary in the above typology, there
would seem to be merit in drawing upon it when analysing the skillsets of NATO
staff in the two case studies. It is also intended to draw upon an ISSAT
Operational Guidance Note (OGN)53 that provides practitioner guidance on
advising and mentoring. Competence and skill frameworks do not figure large
within the SSR literature, which is surprising given the funding related to SSR.
This would therefore seem to be an area for further research.
In summary, it is worth recalling that whilst technical issues and technical skills
will not normally have the same salience as political skills, they are still
extremely important to the success of SSR engagements. As the title of the
53
See ISSAT OGN ‘The Security and Justice Sector Reform Adviser’. Available at:
http://issat.dcaf.ch/download/1181/8973/ISSAT%20OGN%20-
%20The%20Security%20and%20Justice%20Reform%20Adviser.pdf [Last accessed 21
September 2017].
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OECD study mentioned above suggests: “More Political Engagement, More
Change Management”. (Ibid)
Capacity Building Through Norm Setting and Conditionality
This section builds upon this theme of ‘change management’ and analyses how
to build capacity in a beneficiary state through the medium of norm setting and
conditionality.
A 2015 report by DFID suggests that the literature on the definition of ‘capacity’
and ‘capacity building’ within SSR is inconsistent. (DFID 2015:10) So to begin
this analysis, it is worth referring to the OECD’s definition of ‘capacity’, which is
“… the ability of people, organisations and society as a whole to manage their
affairs successfully.” Its definition of ‘capacity building’ 54 is “… the process
whereby organisations and society as a whole, unleash, strengthen, create,
adapt and maintain capacity over time.” (OECD 2006d:12)
Capacity building has traditionally been focussed on two levels: individual and
institutional.55 The activities range from training (mainly individual where NATO
features prominently), to technical assistance (in the form of advising,
mentoring, or helping draft legislation), to the development of structures and
institutions (such as assisting in establishing the oversight and accountability
linkages between parliament and the armed forces). The latter is particularly
difficult as it plays to the power and influence structures within a country and
seeks to change behaviour as well as structure. (DFID 2015:10-12; OECD
2006d:22) In the 1990s much emphasis was placed on short-term technical
experts to transfer knowledge but this became less supply-driven and input
based to demand-driven and outcome based in the 2000s. It also
54
OECD tend to use the term ‘capacity development’ rather than ‘capacity building’, although
the latter term seems to be the more dominant in the literature and will be used in this thesis.
55
Again, the literature varies in its approach. The OECD breaks the levels of analysis down to:
individual, organisational and environmental. (OECD 2006d:13) In a DFID guidance note it
uses: individual, organisational and institutional. (DFID 2009b:5) For the purposes of this thesis
individual and institutional will be used, as this would appear to be more dominant.
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acknowledged that external actors can undermine local ownership and,
paradoxically, capacity. (UNDP 2008:23-24) Ignatieff drew attention to the
phenomenon of “capacity sucking out”, where well-qualified and educated local
actors, who are removed from important jobs in a country, and take up highly-
paid but low-value jobs with international organisations.56
The literature would seem to suggest that, notwithstanding the abundance of
policy guidance to take local politics into account and to place governance at
the heart of such capacity building initiatives, there has been a tendency to fall
back on ‘train and equip’ approaches in fragile and post-conflict countries.
(Scheye & Peake 2005a; Egnell & Haldén 2009; Sedra 2010b & 2013; van
Veen 2014; DFID 2015) Clearly there are a range of other factors that impact
upon the situation but as the OECD suggests:
“Capacity building would be ineffective so long as it was not part of an
endogenous process of change, getting its main impulse from within.” (OECD
2006d:15)
One of the most difficult issues to overcome in capacity building is how to assist
a beneficiary country identify what capacity is lacking and then how to fill it. An
implicit step in this process is to start with some form of holistic assessment to
identify the current situation in the security sector and then where the host
nation wants to be at the end of the process. Management science offers a
range of tools to conduct this analysis from ‘gap analysis’ to ‘theory of change
models’, which can be applied according to the context and inclination. (ISSAT
2012:23-31; Sedra 2010b:9-17; OECD 2012:80-81)
The whole issue of analysis is the fundamental underpinning to capacity
building. (OECD 20107a:10-12) There is a relatively standard programme cycle
that is generally followed within SSR of planning, implementing, monitoring and
evaluating. (OECD 2012:14) This was felt to be too generic, so the researcher
56
As quoted in Blease (2010:12).
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developed a six-stage approach to planning of potential SSR engagements. It is
a generic approach, not a prescriptive model, and comes with a list of possible
issues to be addressed and available management tools that might be helpful in
the analysis. The full table is at Appendix 3.
Having provided an outline of capacity building, it is now time to turn to norm
setting and conditionality. The OECD is clear that SSR should be based on
“democratic norms” (OECD 2007a:21 & 28) but it accepts that local, informal
norms might be shaped by national culture and precedent. (Ibid:51) The
OSCE’s ‘Code of Conduct’ (OSCE 1994) was a set of democratic norms (or
standards) based around the idea of democratic control of the armed forces and
one that was welcomed by the countries of the CEE in the aftermath of the Cold
War.
The SSR literature sometimes refers to ‘principles and norms’ together (eg EC
2006:4; Dursun-Ozkanca & Vandemoortele 2012:145) thus conflating the two
terms. ‘Principles’, however, “… are beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude.”
(Krasner 1983:2), whereas ‘norms’ “… are standards of behaviour defined in
terms of rights and obligations.” (Ibid) In addition a ‘norm’ can refer to
something that is a standard for a specific thematic sector or actor (eg defence),
and it is normally measurable.
Whilst the OSCE was certainly involved in norm setting, it is the EU and NATO
that have held particular sway in this field during the past 25 years. With the
end of the Cold War most of the states in CEE expressed a desire to join the
Euro-Atlantic institutions. As Law explains:
“… democratic security sector governance began to assume a central role in
conditionality for partnership and membership for institutions such as the EU,
NATO and the Council of Europe.” (2007:8)
The EU included governance for the security sector as one of the key elements
of the Copenhagen Criteria (Ibid:10), which was elaborated in 1993 as a set of
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standards for future membership of the IGO. Similarly, NATO produced the
Study on Enlargement in 1995 with same broad aim. (NATO 1995) Both
organisations elaborated on these documents over time through acquis and PfP
documents, which further clarified the set of norms and the conditionality
required to become members. There is a consensus that the aspirant countries
gained immense benefit from such documents, because they accepted the
conditionality that was on offer and changed accordingly. Taking a phrase from
institutional theory, this allowed transformation to occur and a degree of mimetic
conversion between the aspirants and the institution.
Aybet and Bieber suggest that this approach within CEE included two inter-
related processes: rationalisation and socialisation:
“Rationalisation refers to the cost–benefit analysis of the elites in the target 
state, who see that acquiring these norms will benefit their own political goals. 
Socialisation refers to the internalisation of the institution’s norms by local elites;
in a way the external norms become ‘their’ norms.” (2011:1911)
Whilst this process of transformation was relatively smooth in the CEE, because
there was an acceptance by both the political elite and the people that they
wanted membership of both the EU and NATO, other countries have been less
successful. The successor countries of the USSR, for example, have tended to
consolidate autocracy rather than democracy. (Schimmelfennig 2007:126) The
evidence would seem to suggest that countries with different historical,
geographical, social and cultural norms to those in the Euro-Atlantic region have
also reacted differently to the political conditionality offered by the SSR-relevant
IGOs. (Lewis 2011:51-53; Shkolnikov 2009) Another key factor here is that
none of the countries outside the Euro-Atlantic area have a realistic proposition
of membership of either the EU or NATO, so the lever of conditionality is weak.
Given the doubts that have already been raised in the literature about the lack
of progress in achieving democratic norms during an ongoing conflict (UN
2012c:50; Beswick et al 2011:26-27), this begs the question whether NATO and
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the EU should be attempting to support orthodox SSR outside of the Euro-
Atlantic area.
At this stage it is worth considering how support to norm setting in fragile and
post-conflict countries has occurred. Drawing upon the field of sociological
organisation theory, Schroeder et al (2014) have taken this perspective a stage
further in these countries and identified three different patterns of ‘norm
transformation’ without full internalisation. They are:57
“… ‘normative shells’, where norms and rules were adopted but not
implemented; ‘ceremonial structures’, where organizational structures
were created but remained mostly symbolic; and ‘capacity
improvements’, where the operational capacities of a security service
were strengthened without the parallel adoption of democratic security
governance standards.” (Ibid:227)
Where domestic actors have only adopted norms in a selective or ‘ceremonial’
manner, sometimes just to continue to receive aid packages, this can mask the
reality in ministries or on the ground. Schroeder et al question whether “…
donor-driven reform narratives in the field of SSR are appropriate models for
security sector transformation outside of the OECD-world.” (Ibid:228) It is a
question that will be returned to later when Schroeder’s typology will be used in
the case studies.
In summary, the literature supports the view that capacity building through norm
setting and conditionality in the CEE by both the EU and NATO have been
successful but results from other areas have been mixed. One approach that
has ameliorated the difficulty of identifying what capacity is lacking in a country
and then how to fill it, is through some form of holistic assessment such as the
six-stage approach or the development of an NSS. There seems to be a
consensus that norm setting and conditionality can facilitate change within a
57
The study was mainly on governance issues in the security sector.
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country but substantive results are dependent upon the political and cultural
context, as well as how the process is managed. These two points are
important, as despite the abundance of policy guidance to take local politics into
account and to place governance at the heart of such capacity building
initiatives, there has been a tendency to fall back on ‘train and equip’
approaches in fragile and post-conflict countries.
Current Debate on SSR
Having analysed the seven characteristics that will be used in the framework to
evaluate NATO’s support to SSR in the Western Balkans, it would be worth
discussing briefly the current debate on SSR.
The SSR concept is frequently viewed through either a peacebuilding or a
statebuilding prism (van Veen 2015:2) and this has dominated recent debate.
Both prisms have created their own canon of literature, both for and against. (eg
OECD 2008c; UN 2012c; Paris & Sisk 2008; Chandler 2010) The
peacebuilding agenda has evolved over time to a focus on post-conflict
environments and preventing a recurrence of violence. (Paris & Sisk 2009:14-
15) An implicit assumption, however, has been that peace agreements were
the catalyst for accelerated change through external involvement in creating a
‘liberal peace’. The evidence for this seems contested at best. (eg Richmond &
Mac Ginty 2014; Selby 2013) Graben and Fitz-Gerald (2013:311) raise specific
queries about peacebuilding funding’s emphasis on security ‘hardware’ which
creates a gap between its activities and the underlying principles of SSR.
Similarly, the statebuilding “… agenda is rooted in the belief that
democratization, economic liberalization and building state capacity offers the
best way out of poor governance, violence and poverty.” (van Veen op cit)
Unfortunately, results in the field have demonstrated that the focus proved to be
on the ‘hardware’ of security and improving the operational effectiveness of
armed forces and police, rather than on the drivers of conflict or the quality of
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governance and accountability. (Sedra 2013; Egnell & Haldén 2009) This led
de Guevara (2010:124) rather cynically to suggest “[t]hat statebuilding does not
bring about projected results has become common sense.” The so-called ‘war
on terror’ and interventions based on ‘regime change’ have also distorted the
agendas of both peacebuilding and statebuilding. (eg Lambourne & Herro
2009:288; van Veen 2014:2)
The current status with these agendas can perhaps best be exemplified by the
situation in Afghanistan. SSR (but in reality ‘train and equip’) has been used as
a tool for reform but it has resulted in an emphasis on security with development
a poor relation. Not only does this risk the creation of a state that lacks
legitimacy but one that is focused on regime protection rather than serving the
people. (Jackson 2010:1819)
This has a direct read-across to the debate surrounding second-generation
SSR that was raised earlier in this Chapter.58 The key point that scholars such
as Sedra (2010, 2013) and Muggah (2009) make is that there is a need to re-
conceptualise the orthodox model of SSR. They argue that they are not
rejecting the original model merely attempting to address its perceived faults. In
essence, that would be to tailor the model more for a post-conflict environment,
move away from ‘train and equip’ approaches, and place a greater emphasis on
bottom up approaches through the people rather than top-down through the
state. In reviewing the SSR concept in this Chapter, it is clear that the orthodox
model already caters and codifies these approaches. As donors and IGOs
strayed from the orthodox model in places like Afghanistan, it is perhaps not
surprising that results have been sub-optimal. Two more interesting questions
would be: first, whether the orthodox model can work whilst a conflict is still
underway; and second, how effective an OECD model can be in a culture and
context that is so far removed from the “OECD-world”? (Schroeder et al
2014:228) These would be very interesting subjects for further research into
58
See section entitled: ‘Early Definitional Debate’.
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SSR before re-conceptualising the concept and will be considered further in
Chapter 8.
For completeness, there is a need to be aware of these debates and their
affiliation with SSR. Nonetheless, the focus of this thesis is on NATO’s support
to SSR within the Western Balkans and identifying potential lessons for future
SSR engagements in the Euro-Atlantic region and for those countries that have
a perspective for NATO membership. Therefore, these issues are of interest
but not entirely germane to the research objectives.
The final section of this Chapter now turns to a body of theory in order to view
NATO’s role in supporting SSR.
INSTITUTIONALISM
As discussed in Chapter 1, NATO is one of several IGOs that play a key role in
supporting SSR in a variety of different countries and contexts. Successful SSR
manages change both at the organisational and the societal level, although the
degree of change is heavily dependent upon the domestic political and societal
context, as well as the interface with the IGO. Virtually all recent SSR
programmes have been supported by IGOs (Law 2007:3-4) and therefore it
would seem prudent to consider a key theory dealing with the work of
institutions and their relationship with the states being supported. Given that
scholars have already “… turned to institutionalism to explain the persistence of
NATO …” (Wallander 2000:706), this section turns to the same body of theory
in order to understand better the role of NATO in supporting SSR in the
Western Balkans.
The Meaning of Institutionalism
To begin it would be appropriate to identify what scholars believe to be an
institution. March and Olsen have been particularly influential in the neo-
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institutionalism debate since the 1980s (see: March & Olsen 1989) but a more
recent contribution from them suggests that:
“… [a]n institution is a relatively enduring collection of rules and organised
practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively
invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the
idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing
circumstances.” (March & Olsen 2007:159)
They proceed with their argument to explain how institutions both constrain and
empower individual actors, whilst still ensuring that they act within either laid
down institutional rules (ie formal) or institutional rules of appropriateness (ie
‘the way business is done around here’ cultural rules). Whilst it would be true to
say that there are many perspectives of institutionalism, each with their own
adherents, March and Olsen have attempted to crystallise these views in a
definition that suggests institutionalism:
“… connotes a general approach to the study of political institutions, a set of
theoretical ideas and hypotheses concerning the relations between institutional
characteristics and political agency, performance, and change. Institutionalism
emphasizes the endogenous nature and social construction of political
institutions.” (2007:160)
One final point to make here is that whilst the term ‘political’ is used by March
and Olsen, there seems to be an acceptance by scholars that this includes
IGOs such as NATO and the EU (eg Schimmelfennig 2007; Koops 2008), as
well as commercial corporations and public sector institutions (eg Kostova et al
2008; Scheuer & Scheuer 2008).
Having established a baseline of terminology, it would be prudent to discuss
briefly some historical antecedents. The study of institutionalism has a
relatively short history within social science. (Tolbert & Zucker 1996:176) Its
provenance owes a debt to organisational theory and international relations,
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and a common desire to understand what makes organisations work and why.
(Powell & Di Maggio 1991:6-7) In this seminal work on institutionalism,
DiMaggio and Powell suggest that: “Institutional theory presents a paradox […
as …] it is often easier to gain agreement about what it is not than about what it
is [… thus …] institutionalism also has disparate meanings in different
disciplines.” (Original emphasis, Ibid:1) In the light of this point, it would be
worth taking an additional definition on institutionalism which emphasises the
social and cultural construction of the theory:
“… institutionalism is defined in terms of the processes by which such patterns
achieve normative and cognitive fixity, and become taken for granted.” (Meyer
et al 1987:13)
The literature suggests that originally institutionalism comprised two strands of
institutional theory: one economic-based on concerns about efficiency and
rationality and the other sociological-based on power and legitimacy. (eg
Barnett & Finnemore 1999:702) Institutionalism can take different forms
according to scholarly inclination and discipline but it is generally understood
that there are currently three main streams of institutionalism theory: historical,
rational choice and sociological. These will now be discussed.
Historical Institutionalism
Historical institutionalism has its roots in group theories of structural-
functionalism and politics. (Welch 2011:54) It has a broad theoretical base but
one that ultimately seeks to explain political outcomes in a complex
environment. Historical institutionalists tend to examine the role of the state in
this complex environment and, rather than assuming that it is a neutral broker,
explore the way that its various institutions influence and structure the
outcomes. (Hall and Taylor 1996:6) Capoccia and Kelemen postulate a model
of institutions that is characterised by:
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“… relatively long periods of path-dependent institutional stability and
reproduction that are punctuated occasionally by brief phases of institutional
flux—referred to as critical junctures—during which more dramatic change is
possible” (2007:341)
This concept of ‘critical junctures’ is a key component of historical
institutionalism but there is still a measure of uncertainty as to what triggers the
juncture and why. (Hall & Taylor 1996:10) There is a greater acceptance
amongst scholars, however, that once the critical juncture has occurred and a
change implemented then there is a narrowing of future options as a direct
result of the decisions made during the juncture. (eg Welch 2011:54; Capoccia
& Kelemen 2007:31-342)
Rational Choice Institutionalism
Rational choice institutionalism has its genesis in economic and agency theory
and the belief that organisations are “… logically constructed by individuals who
are acting from self-interest.” (Welch 2011:54-55) Bevir and Rhodes continue
this line of argument by suggesting that its economic roots means that it:
“… presupposes that actors choose a particular action or course of actions
because they believe it to be the most efficient way of realizing a given end.”
(2001:4)
March and Olsen call this the “logic of consequentiality”. (1988:22-23) The key
question that needs to be posed, however, is who sets the boundaries of that
logic and how? As North explains “… institutions are the rules of the game in
society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape
human interaction.” (1990:3) As humans, rather than automatons, are involved
in both designing and then implementing the process, it would seem to suggest
that the rationality is only approximate and thus ‘bounded’. (Simon 1991:125-
134; Shepsle 2005:11-12)
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Through this system of rules and incentives, rational choice actors and
institutions shape behaviour by creating expectations about likely outcomes for
certain given courses of action, with the proviso that the rules are stable and are
adhered to by all actors. (Bevir & Rhodes 2001:11-13; Welch 2011:55) These
latter two points, however, might not always apply. Shepsle (2005:2-4) draws
upon a children’s baseball analogy in pointing out that the interpretation of the
rules might well depend upon the desire of a dominant authority to vary them,
such as the child who owns the baseball and glove.
Rational choice institutionalism has its detractors. For example, Green and
Shapiro (1996) are scathing about its empirical failures, although they do
acknowledge the success of collective action, where a group of individuals
coordinate for mutual benefit. (See also: Shepsle 2005:5) Ultimately, rational
choice institutionalists seek to explain patterns of behaviour linked to the
efficiency of certain courses of action.
Sociological Institutionalist Theory
The last school of institutionalism to be discussed is sociological
institutionalism. Its main thrust is towards the homogenisation of institutions
once a field59 is established. Powell and DiMaggio (1999:64) contend that “…
highly structured organizational fields provide a context in which individual
efforts to deal rationally with uncertainty and constraint often lead, in the
aggregate, to homogeneity in structure, culture, and output.” Institutional
theorists argue that this process of homogenisation occurs as a result of two
forms of isomorphism: competitive and institutional. The former only pertains
where there is a viable market, whereas the later strives for political power and
legitimacy. (Radaelli 2000:27)
59
DiMaggio & Powell (1983:147) describe an ‘organisational field’ as a recognised sphere of
organisational life. In commercial terms, this could be a group of suppliers or regulatory
agencies, or it could mean states that are members of a specific IGO such as the EU or NATO.
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Extrapolating this latter environment a stage further, DiMaggio and Powell
(1991:67) propose three mechanisms for institutional isomorphic change in a
complex political arena: coercive, mimetic and normative. It is worth unpacking
these three mechanisms in more detail by drawing upon both DiMaggio &
Powell (1984 and 1991) and Mizruchi & Fein (1999).
Coercive isomorphism occurs when an organisation is pressurised to conform
with certain formal and informal rules by a powerful sister organisation or state
and, by complying, becomes more like them. The pressures can be direct and
very explicit. For example, NATO demanded that Estonia and Latvia changed
their national legislation in order to protect the human rights of their Russian
minorities before they could be admitted as members of the Alliance. (Haglund
2007:113-114) Alternatively, the pressure can be more gentle and indirect. In
NATO’s case, the committing of national forces to NATO structures and
missions is done through a process known as ‘peer review’ where each country
is invited to meet certain manpower and force targets. Such decisions are
entirely for the member states, not NATO, but there is much gentle cajoling
amongst the members and calls upon the ‘spirit of unity and solidarity’.
DiMaggio and Powell suggest that mimetic isomorphism occurs as a response
to uncertainty. Where the best course of action for an organisation is unclear,
its leaders might well seek to imitate another, normally more powerful
organisation, which they believe to be both successful and legitimate. One of
the more notable examples of such imitation is the adoption of western
approaches to governmental change by Japan at the end of the nineteenth
century. (1991:69-70) Similarly, the desire of the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe to incorporate the values and institutions of the EU and NATO
at the end of the Cold War was a testament to the western way of life and its
perceived success and legitimacy. (Kyvelidis 2000 and Schimmelfennig 2003)
Institutional literature is replete with articles on mimetic isomorphism. Mizurk &
Fein argue, however, that this is because American sociologists have focused
on it as “… it accords with the prevailing discourse in American organizational
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theory.” The downside with this approach is that it tends to underplay the
impact of power and coercion of larger partners, especially the US, on smaller
partners. (1990:665)
The third school is normative isomorphism. This has its roots in the desire for
the professionalisation of institutions60 and thus “… to define the conditions and
methods of their work [… and …] to establish a cognitive base and legitimation
for their occupational autonomy.” (Powell & DiMaggio 1991:70-71) Capon
(2004:94) uses the example of norms to socialise consistent behaviour and
conduct amongst professional groups such as doctors and lawyers, both
individually as well as corporately. The theories of rationalisation and
socialisation also play their part, especially the latter where socialisation on the
job, particularly when underpinned through education, experience and similarity
of roles in different institutions, tends to reinforce conformity. (Powell &
DiMaggio 1991:72) This normative isomorphism is not just top down. Keohane
argues that whilst states and their norms and beliefs condition the institutions
that they belong to, for example the EU or NATO, these institutions also help
shape the preferences and power of the individual states. (1988:381-382)
SUMMARY
This Chapter has reviewed the study of NATO's experience in supporting SSR
within the Western Balkans and found that it is broadly situated within the
discipline of social sciences and primarily within political science. More
specifically it is within the sub-sets of international relations and public policy. It
also draws upon several inter-disciplinary fields within those disciplines but
seems to have the closest fit within security studies. This then has defined the
core focus of the subsequent literature critique.
The key building blocks that formed the genesis of SSR were the publication
and use of the OSCE Code of Conduct (OECD 1994) in conjunction with a
change in the perception of security. Previously the focus had been on the
60
This conforms to Borchert’s second generation of SSR as depicted at Figure 2.1.
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state but gradually this shifted to the people and the concept of ‘human
security’. (Kaldor 2007) It was an approach that fed directly into the SSR
concept, not least as participatory surveys such as the World Bank’s ‘Voices of
the Poor’ (Narayan et al 2000a, 2000b, 2002) identified one of the root causes
of poverty as insecurity, and a key element of that insecurity was predatory
state security actors.
This recognition of the nexus between development and security allowed the
two disciplines to become aligned more closely, both in practical and intellectual
terms. It also unlocked thinking on improving governance, which became a
central pillar of the nascent SSR concept. The UK’s DFID was in the vanguard
of this thinking and the early explanation of the concept emanated from the UK
and OECD. It accrued a groundswell of international support, although it is
perhaps worth reflecting at this stage that the UK’s, and subsequently others’
embrace of the SSR concept seemed to have been somewhat optimistic. The
range of different contexts, the diversity of issues that it touched upon, and the
vagueness of the early concept raised more questions than answers and that
meant its path to full international acceptance was uneven. (Fitz-Gerald
2006:109-113) Lessons that were identified were not learned and the lack of an
agreed taxonomy hindered its development. (Rees 2008:139-140)
It was the pioneering work by the OECD (OECD 2005a and OECD 200a) that
eventually brought coherence to the early definitional debate. Over time the
EU, UN and OSCE all developed their own frameworks for SSR drawing upon
the OECD for similar principles, similar definitions of the security sector, and
similar characteristics of SSR.
In reflecting upon the approaches of all four SSR-relevant IGOs to SSR (OECD,
UN, EU and OSCE), it is worth noting two issues. First, and perhaps the most
striking, is the time that it has taken both the EU (EU 2016) and OSCE (OSCE
2016) to produce their own frameworks given that their documents have ended
up being quite similar to the original OECD framework from 2007 and the UN’s
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in 2008. As Law pointed out some ten years ago, it is inevitable that the IGOs’
definitions and frameworks will always reflect their individual needs and
concerns as independent institutions (Law 2007:17), but there has now been a
mimetic convergence. This should mean that working together in the field with
each other, as well as with partners, will become much easier as their
approaches should be similar. This degree of convergence of approach,
however, probably owes a debt to the normative power of the OECD, and, in
particular, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2008f), as well as
the legitimacy that the OECD has accrued.
Second, whilst the OECD framework and definitions would seem to have gained
salience, the results in the field from the UN, EU and OSCE interventions would
still seem to have been mixed. This might be because at least two of the
frameworks are new and have not yet had time to become enculturated. It
might also be that a ‘policy-practice gap’ is still evident. (Bakrania 2014:3) In
effect, it seems that many donors are still reverting to ‘train and equip’
programmes at the expense of governance. It is possible that some form of
longitudinal study of these IGOs’ activities, once the frameworks have become
embedded, would shed further light on their efficacy.
As NATO has not developed an SSR policy, it does not have a comparable
SSR framework. The researcher therefore drew upon the definitions and
principles of the other SSR-relevant IGOs and constructed an analytical
framework, which could then be used later in the thesis to analyse NATO’s
support to SSR. There were seven characteristics of SSR used in the analytical
framework and these were examined in some detail. Reflecting upon that
analysis, there were two points which stood out. First, there seemed to be a
growing convergence of what is considered best practice within SSR throughout
the detail of the characteristics, which confirmed the prevailing view gained from
the analysis of the SSR-relevant IGOs frameworks. The second point was that
whilst the scholarly debate over the principles of SSR seemed consistent, a gap
appeared over the surprising absence of positive examples from the field of
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good practice in SSR. The reasons behind this lack of success in SSR is less
obvious and more contested. It could be, as is cogently argued by Egnell and
Haldén (2009:49-50), that donors should be more realistic in their levels of
ambition when approaching SSR. It could also be that defaulting to ‘train and
equip’ programmes meant that donors and IGOs are not adhering to the
principles and good practice of SSR. It is interesting to note a recent DFID
paper that raises this issue and poses the following conundrum:
“An important question remains as to why lessons learnt processes to date
have not led to changes in donor behaviour.” (DFID 2015:vi)
It could also be that the context of an ongoing conflict or a political environment,
which is fundamentally different to the Weberian experience of most donors or
SSR-relevant IGOs, suggest that there are an “…enormity of challenges that
SSR – on its own – is unable to tackle.” (UN 2012c:50) These are all issues
that will be returned to later in this thesis.
Whilst normally a literature review identifies knowledge gaps, it can also be
used to explore intellectual tools that can be used in the research. Several
typologies and academic models were introduced earlier in the Chapter, and the
final section adduced institutionalism as a main body of theory that might assist
in understanding better the role of NATO in supporting SSR in the Western
Balkans. Scholars had already “… turned to institutionalism to explain the
persistence of NATO …” (Wallander 2000:706) and its ability as an institution to
adapt and re-new itself. Virtually all recent SSR programmes have been
supported by IGOs (Law 2007:3-4) and institutionalism has had a role to play in
understanding how and why countries have adopted international norms and
standards. It therefore seemed appropriate to consider this body of theory.
The analysis suggested that the increase in isomorphism between the SSR-
relevant IGOs, as well as the mimetic convergence demanded by IGOs like
NATO as part of the conditionality of membership, all point to a useful fit for the
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theory within this thesis. There would thus seem to be merit in drawing upon the
theory of institutionalism in analysing NATO’s support to SSR. It is
acknowledged that there are criticisms of the theory, such as the potential
limiting impact of uniformity in mimetic and normative approaches, but these will
be discussed further after the theory has been used in the case studies.
The Chapter has made clear that there is no NATO policy or framework for
SSR. The wider body of literature on SSR and the approaches of the other
SSR-relevant IGOs have helped generate an analytical tool and this will be
used to aid the research in subsequent chapters, along with the models and
theories that have been adduced. This completes the critique of the literature





“I keep six honest serving-men
(They taught me all I knew);
Their names are What and Why and When
And How and Where and Who.”
The Elephant Child - Rudyard Kipling1
INTRODUCTION
In order to conduct an analytical study of NATO’s support to SSR in the
Western Balkans, the researcher undertook a structured review of research
methodologies and the choices to be made using a model called the ‘Research
Onion’. This model was developed by Saunders et al (2009:106-108) for
business research and was helpful in providing a methodological overview for
the researcher. At the end of the review it was decided to use the case study
method for this thesis, with interviews as the principal data collection sub-
method, supplemented by document analysis and some direct observation. It is
not proposed to follow meticulously the chronology of the ‘Research Onion’ and
the structured review here, rather it is intended to provide a brief methodological
overview and then focus on the reasons for selecting case studies as the
method and a justification for the choices made.
This chapter therefore presents the research methodology used in this thesis
and its underpinning rationale. It begins by outlining the researcher’s role in the
study. It continues with a brief overview of the research philosophy and
research approach. It then identifies the research method to be used and
justifies the choice. Next, it presents the choice for data collection and analysis
with the reasons for selection. Finally, it discusses some additional research
1
Available at: http://www.kipling.org.uk/poems_serving.htm [Last Accessed 11 July 2016].
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and methodological issues. An appropriate and useful research design is thus
incrementally built up in order to answer the research question outlined in
Chapter 1.
As in most fields of scholarly endeavour, there is a language and a conceptual
framework that is particular to social science research. As Blaikie (2007:2)
observes, however, writers "...not only use different concepts to refer to the
same basic ideas, but when they use the same concepts, they are also inclined
to give them different meanings." The terms used in this study broadly follow
the dominant literature in order to produce a consistent vocabulary, but it is
inevitable that there will be slight variations and every attempt has been made
to reconcile these anomalies.
Most scholars argue that conducting academic research demands an
understanding of research paradigms and their philosophical underpinnings in
order to develop a coherent and academically rigorous study. (Hart 1998:7)
This appears to hold true across the natural sciences as well as the social
sciences, but is particularly evident in those fields where a researcher makes
assumptions about reality or where the researcher becomes, in effect, part of
the data collected.2 This point was reinforced directly by Williams (2003:3)
when he averred that social "[r]esearch is never neutral, [...] there is always a
context."
Hussey and Hussey (1997:47) claim that the term paradigm is often used quite
loosely in academic research and thus they seek to clarify it by suggesting that
it "... refers to the progress of scientific practice based on people's philosophies
and assumptions about the world and the nature of knowledge; [and] in this
context, about how research should be conducted." The key, however, is to
recognize these variations in worldviews, whilst still deriving the methodology
and method from the purpose of the research.
2
For example, in psychology research (Mitchell & Jolley 2004:46-47) sociology research
(Silverman 1985:ix-xiii ) and business research (Saunders et al 2009:107-109).
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THE RESEARCHER'S ROLE IN THE STUDY
Before embarking on this process, it is necessary first to understand the
researcher's role in this particular study and recognize his standpoint and
philosophical tradition, as they have undoubtedly influenced both the conduct
and the results of the study. The researcher's worldview has been shaped by
his Western philosophy with its democratic and liberal ideology. This liberalism
has its roots in the classical writings of John Stuart Mill and John Locke,
amongst others, and embraces the concepts of "... enlightened self-interest,
rationality and free choice." (Scott & Marshall 2009:415) The author's view of
NATO could also have influenced the study. In the Preamble of the Washington
Treaty (NATO 1949), the Alliance espouses "... freedom, common heritage and
civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual
liberty and the rule of law ...", which chimes with the author's view of how it
should act. It is inevitable that these shared values were brought to bear when
analysing how NATO assists countries with their reforms, and thus was evident
in the data collected. The value-laden nature of the enquiry will inevitably have
determined the choices made in the methodological approach.
Slightly more controversial, however, is the prevailing Christian philosophy that
is evident within all member states of NATO, with the one exception of Turkey.
Nonetheless, the Alliance is assisting with reforms in a number of countries that
are predominantly Muslim or have a sizeable minority practising that religion.
So whilst there was probably a degree of convergence of views and ideas
between NATO and its member states, there was inevitably some cultural and
philosophical divergence3 when analysing NATO's role in Muslim countries,
which was taken into account. These include issues of identity and loyalties,
and will be taken into account using hermeneutical insights.
The researcher also has a thorough grounding within NATO and has had
practical experience of assisting countries with reform of their security sectors,
3
The process of convergence and divergence in organisations has been the subject of much
debate between scholars of neo-institutionalism (Scheuer 2008:107-137).
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so has a view on these issues. This undoubtedly influenced the data collected,
not least during interviews. Scholars generally agree that this could lead to a
research bias (Mitchell et al 2004:87-91; Saunders et al 2009:326) but there is
debate whether it should be avoided totally or accepted as an enriching
process. (Harding 1986:136-151) Certainly the researcher leaned towards this
latter inclination but he was helped by his thesis committee, who proved to be
robust in challenging the researcher's in-built heuristics and biases. Ultimately,
much depended upon the epistemological position that was taken in the study,
and, as Corbin and Strauss suggested (2008:80-81), the researcher was
prompted to "... walk a fine line between getting into the hearts and minds of
respondents, while at the same time keeping enough distance to be able to
think clearly and analytically about what is being said." The data was also
rationalised through a process of both validation and triangulation.
RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY
An academic methodology will normally be grounded within an understanding
and acceptance of one particular research philosophy. This approach has its
roots in the 'theory of knowledge'4 and the Greek philosophical traditions of the
5th and 4th Century BC, as intellectuals began to reject the supernatural and
mythical interpretations of reality, and began a search for a more logical and
rational understanding of the world and its approach to knowledge.
The research question outlined in Chapter 1 would seem to suggest that SSR is
a socially-constructed phenomenon with a reality that is likely to be viewed in
different ways by different people. A security sector is clearly observable and
its reform can be experienced, albeit not necessarily directly by the researcher,
but certainly through the eyes of others. Thus individuals will have a view of the
4
Although there are some like Woozley (1949:11-12) who argue that the term is a misnomer as
"... there is no one theory of knowledge but an immense variety of rival theories, alike only in
that they claim to deal with the same subject matter (and to deal with it better than any of their
competitors), although the exact questions which they think it proper to ask when dealing with
that subject matter may and do differ from one theory to the next." Nonetheless it is the
accepted term and therefore is used here.
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phenomenon and the nature and value of NATO's interventions. Depending on
that experience, it is likely that the judgements that will be made will be
subjective. This will be true for those that who are subjected to the reform
intervention, those who conduct the intervention, and those who observe the
intervention.
Looking to another social phenomenon, that of leadership, Grint (2010:10)
suggests that we cannot be objective in these social situations because all such
accounts are merely linguistic reconstructions, not "... transparent reproductions
of the truth ...", and thus are merely a version of the perceived truth that has "...
secured prominence". An example of this can be adduced from the
researcher's experience during an interview with a senior NATO officer. The
day before the interview the researcher provided a copy of the questions that
would be asked to the senior officer's personal staff officer to be passed to the
interviewee. The staff officer requested assistance in preparing briefing notes
for the interview. The researcher explained that such notes would defeat the
purpose of the interview in that it was the personal views and experience of the
senior officer that needed to be collected. In the event the interviewee had
some briefing notes in front of him during the course of the interview and
constantly kept referring to them. Thus the researcher formed the view that the
officer did not possess acceptable knowledge or truth about SSR interventions
in the Western Balkans but a form of truth that had 'secured prominence' from
the briefing notes prepared for him by his staff.5 The researcher included that
subjective view of the interview when he wrote up the report.
Furthermore, as explained earlier, values played a significant part in NATO's
role in SSR, as did the researcher's values in studying this role. Similarly,
where the values and cultural norms of the host country receiving the support
are divergent, then this was considered in the analysis of the data. As these
values cannot be separated, they have been included, and thus axiologically the
study is subjective.
5
The interview details are held by the researcher but are not included here in order to preserve
the individual's anonymity.
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To summarise, the position taken in this study is that SSR is a phenomenon.
The ontological position is that it is socially constructed and is viewed in broadly
subjective terms, which change with time and specifically with regard to context.
The epistemological position is that SSR has subjective meanings, but it is
reality within the individual contexts that provide acceptable knowledge and
which are of academic and practical significance, thus informing NATO's future
policy and future engagements. To that end the study has followed a broadly
interpretivist philosophy and an interpretive paradigm.
RESEARCH APPROACH6
The traditional model of sciences is to deduce a hypothesis from what is known
about a particular domain and its theoretical framework, and then test this
hypothesis empirically. Should the data match the theory, then there would be
support for the wider use of that theory. (Babbie 2004:47; Bryman 2008:9)
Thus the particular is deduced from the general. This deductive approach is
widely linked to positivism and is also sometimes referred to as the 'hypothetico-
deductive' method since it relies upon the hypothesis, prediction, and testing.
(Scott & Marshall 2009:161)
The deductive approach has its roots in Aristotelian logic that attempted to
establish the framework for "... proper scientific thinking ..." and dominated until
the sixteenth century. (Hart 1998:81-82) As with all approaches, it is not
entirely without fault. As both Bryman (2008:9-10) and Blaikie (2007:75) point
out, it is virtually impossible to conduct rigorous testing of any hypothesis
without employing a measure of inductive reasoning which relates to past
experience. Such a notion can only provide a benchmark on the basis of
inductive assumptions. Strauss and Corbin (1998:136-137) recognise this
when they suggest "... there is an interplay between induction and deduction [..]
as in all science." One could reasonably argue, however, that as long as the
6
Often referred to as the 'Research Strategy' (Blaikie 2000:100-127)
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approach is at least predominantly deductive in outlook, then it may be termed
'deductive'. It is beyond the scope of this study to dwell much more on the
deductive approach except to say that there are also criticisms of it linked to its
limitations in measuring data accurately, the rigidity of the approach,7 and the
lack of a creative element in the process. (Blaikie 2007:75-78)
Thus, the inductive approach is one whereby the researcher studies particular
situations and then seeks to identify patterns or characteristics that may point to
more universal principles (Babbie 2004:55). It was noted earlier that the
deductive approach was the traditional model for the sciences, but especially for
the natural sciences. Saunders et al (2009:126) suggests that it was "... the
emergence of the social sciences in the twentieth century ..." that led to active
swing away from "... an approach that enabled a cause-effect link to be made
between particular variables without an understanding of the way in which
humans interpreted their social world."
This desire to achieve an understanding of the meanings that humans give to
social phenomena and the emphasis on qualitative data collection has found
much favour with social scientists and thus they have been keen advocates of
the inductive approach. In addition, it is more likely that an inductive approach
will be concerned with the context of events and researchers will probably be
more inclined to choose small samples rather than the large 'n' samples
normally associated with the deductive approach.8
In selecting a research approach the researcher has already made some
choices as a result of the logic underpinning his epistemological and ontological
positions. Although the hypothesis presented earlier could form the foundations
7
In 1978 Feyerabend called for "... scientific anarchy ..." with an "... anything goes ..." approach.
As quoted by Blaikie (2007:78).
8
Most scholars focus on these two main approaches and therefore the discussion above has
been limited to them. For the sake of completeness, however, it should be noted that Blaikie
(2000:108-119; 2007:9-10) mentions the 'retroductive' approach which is linked to 'scientific
realism', and the 'abductive' approach that can be used for deriving technical concepts. Neither
of these approaches are mentioned in the Oxford Dictionary of Sociology (Scott & Marshall
2009) or A New Dictionary of the Social Sciences (Duncan Mitchell 2008).
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of a deductive approach, it seemed that the most appropriate approach for a
broadly interpretivist philosophy and an interpretive paradigm would be an
inductive approach. This was consistent with the researcher's need to gain an
understanding of the 'truth that has secured prominence' in the countries that
have been assisted by NATO and to establish a closer understanding of the
context of these individual countries' security sectors.
As explained in the earlier discussion on the researcher's role in the study, the
'insider'9 approach needed to understand the phenomenon and the 'expert'
nature of his knowledge suggested that the researcher would inevitably be part
of the research process, and this created a predisposition towards an
interpretive and inductive approach. And finally, conducting research in a social
and political environment with a potentially wide divergence of cultural and
social worldviews provided some challenges to the researcher. Some of these
were not identified until the research was underway. It was established that the
inductive approach allowed greater flexibility in adapting the research
emphases than would have been possible in a deductive manner. This
confirmed that the inductive approach had been the correct research choice.
The next section outlines the research method and justifies the choices made.
RESEARCH METHOD
Case Study
A number of scholars in the fields of social science and policy research are
advocates of the flexible and insightful nature of the case study research
method. (eg Denzin 1970; Majchrzak 1984) Perhaps the most prolific writers in
this field, however, are Yin and Stake. In the introduction to his book The Art of
Case Study Research, Stake (1995:xi) suggests that: "A case study is intended
to catch the complexity of a single case [... in order to ...] look for the detail of
interaction with its contexts." Essentially, this is to provide understanding of the
9
Whilst there may be an argument for creating some form of 'stranger' condition, there are
broader issues that would militate against such an approach.
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particular. This emphasis on understanding is a major strength of the case
study approach. (Stake 1978:6; Denscombe 2007:35-38)
In describing the logic of the design, Yin uses a two-fold definition of case
studies. He begins with the scope when he states that:
"1. A case study is an empirical inquiry that
o investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its
real-life context, especially when
o the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not
clearly evident." (2009:18)
He argues that this allows an in-depth understanding of a real-world situation
and accepts the inherent complexities and variables. The contextual nature of
SSR has already been highlighted in Chapter 2 and the need to have an in-
depth understanding of that context chimes with the scope of case studies. Yin
goes on to suggest that case studies are forgiving of situations where the
phenomenon under investigation and the context are indistinguishable and thus:
"2. The case study inquiry
o copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will
be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one
result
o relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to
converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result
o benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to
guide data collection and analysis." (Ibid)
Yin goes on to argue that case study research is an 'all-encompassing method'
that incorporates a research logic, design, method and data collection. (Ibid:18-
19) Again, the scope, breadth and holistic nature of SSR would seem to
suggest a good fit with the case study design.
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In a similar vein, albeit with a slightly different emphasis, Stake suggests that
social science case studies normally feature:
“… descriptions that are complex, holistic and involving a host of not highly
isolated variables; data that are likely to be gathered at least partly by
personalistic observation; a writing style that is informal, perhaps narrative,
possibly with verbatim quotation, illustration, and even allusion and metaphor.
[…] Themes and hypotheses may be important, but they remain subordinate to
the understanding of the case.” (1978:7)
SSR is a relatively new concept and does not necessarily fit with other research
theories and methods. Attempting to understand the support of an IGO to SSR
in a historically and socially complex part of the world like the Western Balkans
is not an easy endeavour, so a research design like case studies that capture
the complexity and intervening variables of the research, as suggested by
Stake’s interpretation, would fit the requirements of the research.
Inevitably there are criticisms of case studies. Giddens (1973) argues that case
studies lack academic rigour but, as Yin points out, whilst such criticism may be
true of case study teaching, case study research has just as much rigour as
other methods. Survey questionnaires can be incorrectly designed to include a
bias but they can also be correctly designed without a bias. The same could be
true of case studies, which need to be explicitly and carefully designed like any
other research method. (Yin 2009:14)
Perhaps the most often quoted criticism of case studies, particularly from those
scholars who are strongly influenced by quantitative research strategies, is the
concern that they provide a poor basis for scientific generalisation. (Bryman
2008:55) Indeed, Stake partially acknowledges this when he notes that the
case study method would seem to be "... a poor basis for generalization ..."
(1995:7) but he goes on to argue that generalisation is not normally the main
objective of case studies but understanding. Nonetheless, as Hays points out:
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“Generalizability, however, is quite possible when based on several studies of
the same phenomenon. In addition, readers of these case studies often use
their own experiences to give meaning to the case reports, using judgment to
enhance their understanding of the case and comparing that to similar cases
they have encountered.” (2004:219)
Using at least two case studies of NATO’s support to SSR in the Western
Balkans and then identifying lessons that might be used to inform NATO’s
approach to current and future interventions would seem to be precisely what
Hays meant. How far that the Western Balkans case studies can be
generalised to another area, such as the Caucasus, will depend on how closely
the two contexts share characteristics. In Chapter 7 the researcher provides
some generalised factors to enable NATO to test whether significant features
and characteristics are comparable. In addition, Denscombe (2007:43-44)
believes that as long as there is sufficient detail in the case studies, then the
onus is on the reader (in this example NATO staff) “… to make an informed
judgement about how far the findings have relevance to other instances …”
such as the Caucasus.
Inevitably NATO's role in assisting countries to conduct their SSR programmes
is a contemporary phenomenon and the social behaviours lie outside the control
of the study. The process comprises a complex interaction of variables (as the
quotation from Stake above indicates (Stake 1978:7)) that is inextricably linked
to the context in individual countries and regions. This blurring of the
boundaries increases the overall complexity of the study and would seem to
make most other methods inappropriate. Importantly the case study method
has the advantage of being able to draw upon a full spectrum of sources
including from 'grey literature', documentary evidence, observation, interviews,
and focus groups. The real strength of the case study method for this study,
however, is that it not only offers enlightenment on NATO's SSR interventions
but is able to indicate how the experience could be used to inform NATO's
future engagements. The contemporary nature of this study, as well as the
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predominant 'how' and 'why' form of the research question seemed to match the
case study method completely.
Single or Multiple Cases?
Having decided that the case study design is to be the research method for this
thesis, there needed to be further thought on the number of case studies. Yin
suggests that the researcher has the option of taking a single-case or multiple-
case design (2009:46-64). He sets out the following criteria that could justify a
single case:
 "Where the case represents a critical case in testing a well-formulated
theory;
 Where the case represents an extreme or unique case;
 Where the example is a representative or typical case;
 Where the example is a revelatory case; and,
 Where the example is a longitudinal case."
Turning to this study's research question, two of the above criteria were
discounted immediately. First, as explained in Chapters 1 and 2 NATO's role in
SSR does not conform to a well-formulated theory. Second, neither was the
study truly longitudinal. The other three criteria demanded more analysis.
Whilst it could be argued that NATO’s role in post-conflict and post-authoritarian
countries would seem to be similar within specific regions (for example within
the Western Balkans), they are substantially different from region to region (for
example from the Western Balkans to the NTM-I and then to the NTM-A).
Some of these differences will be as a result of individual country contexts and
some will be as a result of the nature of NATO's mission in individual countries.
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An assistance mission in Afghanistan is significantly different to a mission to
assist a potential future Alliance member. On closer inspection within the
Western Balkans, however, the type of mission in BiH is very different to that in
Macedonia or Kosovo, whilst some of the SSR support has similarities. This
would seem to indicate that one could not just take a single case and assume
that it would be entirely representative of all cases of NATO involvement either
within the Western Balkans or in other regions. Yin (2009:60-61) also
particularly stresses the analytical benefits of several cases, so in order for the
research to be useful to NATO policy-makers in informing its future
engagements, it seemed appropriate to study at least two cases.
Examining just two cases where there is a high degree of complexity and
contrasting contexts would be more powerful than just one, but potentially less
powerful than three. The researcher believed that there was robustness to the
two-case design and given the limitations on the researcher’s time and
resources, decided to opt for two country case studies. He recognised,
however, that more cases in a wider geographical spread could add more
richness to the findings and this idea is therefore taken forward in Chapter 8
when the researcher makes some suggestions for further research.10
In drawing this section to a close, it would seem appropriate to examine units of
analysis. Both Hussey and Hussey (1997:66 & 122-123) and Yin (2009:31),
amongst others, recommend a clear unit of analysis for case studies. This can
be difficult in complex studies such as this one and required definition at two
different levels. In the study of NATO’s support to SSR in the Western Balkans,
there are several ways to approach the problem. One could take the Western
Balkans as a single unit but the variations between the various countries and
the disparity of NATO’s involvement would seem to make it an unwieldy unit of
analysis. One could also take some form of thematic pan-Balkans approach
(eg defence reform or intelligence reform as NATO has been involved in
supporting both). Both of these approaches would seem to contravene the
10
See section entitled: 'PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH'.
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notion that a case study should be a ‘self-contained entity’ and have fairly
distinct boundaries which would be clear to both the researcher and the reader.
(Denscombe 2007:44-45) The best approach would seem to be reform within
individual countries. For this study then the main unit of analysis was 'NATO's
approach to security sector reform' and the embedded unit of analysis in each
case was 'security sector reform within the individual countries'.
Selection of Cases
The choice of the two countries for the case studies needed to reflect an
appropriate mixture of context with fve broad parameters. First, they need to be
mature cases of SSR support by NATO (ie more than ten years) with the
assistance still ongoing in order to gain a view over the longer run. Second,
they should be either one post-authoritarian country and one post-conflict
country, or two post-conflict countries, so that the context is more of a challenge
than merely developmental.11 Third, the two countries need to have contrasting
evolutionary paths and different stages of development in order to be definable
as separate and different. Fourth, they need to have sufficiently distinct
characteristics, contexts, and ethnic mixes, which would allow them to be
treated as individual empirical manifestations, and finally they need to
accessible to the researcher so that there is a practical availability of data.
The final test for the two case studies is that they should be relevant, contribute
to the study and feasible. In the Western Balkans, BiH and Kosovo met all the
above criteria and were therefore selected as the two case studies. A brief
review of the two countries follows below.
BiH. BiH is still in a political and constitutional time-warp since the signing of the
DPA in 1995. It is, however, a member of PfP and a participant of the MAP,
which is normally a precursor to membership of the Alliance. NATO has been
supporting the reforms of the security sector since 1996 with a measure of
11
Drawing upon Hänggi’s typology (2004:10).
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success. The armed forces of BiH are an amalgamation of the three pre-war
armies, so the basis for the reform process has been relatively straight forward,
but local politics have been a significant impediment. The three entities remain
at odds over the long-term viability and future of the state of BiH. One of the
entities (RS) still favours union with Serbia and has therefore been blocking
constitutional and security sector reform since 2006. Police and judicial reform
are widely acknowledged to have gone backwards since then. The RS has also
has blocked any aspiration of NATO membership and (like Serbia) is content to
limit its involvement to PfP membership. This has clearly heightened the
challenges facing NATO on the ground and an apparent lack of political support
from NATO HQ in Brussels and the remainder of the international community to
break the political deadlock would seem to have exacerbated the situation.
Kosovo. Kosovo is a very different proposition from BiH for many reasons.
NATO’s role in the DDR process after the ejection of Serb security apparatus
(military, police, intelligence services, prison staff, judiciary etc) in 1999 was
crucial in maintaining stability and this is widely acknowledged by the people.
With the Serbian exodus the task of creating a new security sector from scratch
was assumed by a combination of the UN, EU, OSCE and NATO. Although
Kosovo declared independence in 2008, it is still hidebound by UNSCR 1244
and the restrictions that were placed upon it in 1999. This includes a
moratorium on the creation of an army, which has posed significant challenges
on NATO’s approach to SSR. The government has made it clear that it aspires
both to PfP membership and for NATO membership, and it already has an army
in-waiting: the Kosovo Security Forces. This is a perspective that has been
endorsed by most of the population. There are still four NATO member
countries, however, who do not recognise Kosovo as an independent country
due to their own internal political situations, and thus would be unlikely to accept
Kosovo as a member state or a member of PfP in the near future. This has
posed a significant political impediment to NATO’s approach, not least any
assistance with reform. Notwithstanding this impediment, support has been
provided, although in some instances it has been suborned by individual
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member states on the ground following national agendas rather than a NATO
agenda. Nonetheless, it is possible that Kosovo will be accepted into some
form of cooperation in the not too distant future, in order to keep the reform and
development process of the security sector on track. At that stage NATO will be
well-placed to offer much more support to SSR.
Whilst the contexts of Kosovo and BiH are very different, some of the support to
SSR has been similar. How similar and how generalisable the lessons from
both cases will be covered later in the case study Chapters 5 and 6, and the
cross-case comparison in Chapter 7.
Case Study Design
Having decided on these two cases, it was then appropriate to draw upon Yin
(2009:57) and his case study model. Figure 3.2 below has been adapted to
reflect the researcher's plan for the study. Of particular note is the dashed line
that represents the feedback loop. Yin (2009:56 & 58) stresses the importance
of such a loop in the event that one of the cases did not fit the original design
and that either there was a need to reconsider the theoretical assumptions or a




































Analyse and ConcludePrepare, Collect, and AnalyseDefine and Design
Figure 3.1 Plan For Conducting Case Study Research
(Source: Adapted from Yin 2009:57)
Drawing upon the above discussion, it seemed prudent to provide a standard
framework for the case studies. Although a number of scholars provide rather
general suggestions on the format such as to tailor them according to the
audience, that they must be well organised, that they should answer the
question and so on, few provided practical suggestions. Stake (1995:122-125)
was the honourable exception and the following structure drew upon his work
and were used for both case studies:
 Introduction - an entry vignette to start developing a 'vicarious experience'.
 Historical Background - an extensive narrative description to define the
context of the country with 'relatively uncontestable data', but with some
interpretation.12
12
In the event there was an overlap in the historical background to both countries as they had
all previously been part of the SFRY, so the common aspects were combined in a short section
on the Western Balkans within Chapter 1.
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 Current security situation within the country - drawing upon all available
data this section seeks to provide the more detailed context for reform of
the security sector.
 SSR within the country - this section uses the analytical framework for
NATO’s support to SSR that was developed in Chapter 213 - and provides
the detailed exposition and initial analysis of NATO's role in the reform
process but also takes account of the interaction with other stakeholders.
Some key issues were developed, not so much for generalising beyond the
individual case, as for understanding the complexities and meanings
inherent in it.
 Discussion and Synthesis - this section presented some of the researcher's
findings and understanding about the case and then allowed the reader to
reconsider knowledge of the phenomenon and be used as a basis for
comparison between the individual cases.
 Summary - this was the closing vignette.
In bringing this section to a close, the researcher believed that the case study
research method seemed to be the most appropriate and useful way to answer
the research question. He was also comfortable with the theory and the all-
encompassing nature of case studies that effectively included research design
as well as the data capture. This latter issue will now be taken forward in the
next section.
DATA COLLECTION
Turning now to data collection, Williams (2003:64) suggests that "... for most
interpretive studies interviews will be the principal means of data collection." It
should be recognised, however, that the demand for data in the case studies
13
See section entitled: ‘ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR NATO’s SUPPORT TO SSR’.
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would not be satisfied by interviews alone and that at the very least some text
and document analysis will be required in order to increase the richness of the
results. As Gillham (2000:13) points out the "... case study is a main method.
Within it different sub-methods are used: interviews, observations, document
and record analysis ... and so on." Thus, it would appear that the research
would need more than just interviews for its data collection. This seems to be
entirely compatible with the use of case studies which actively encourages
multiple methods. It is now proposed to discuss the collection of public data.
Documentation
In order to establish the context for each of the case studies there was a need
to trawl both NATO's and the individual country's official and unofficial
documents, studies, written reports and so on. Much of this documentation was
found on the internet but some reports were shared only between NATO and
the country. Access to these documents would have been important, but it had
to be accepted that some were withheld due to reasons of confidentiality. The
'grey' literature including local newspapers and internet reports also added
richness to the overall picture. Care was taken in order to ensure that evidence
was corroborated and augmented by other sources. Thus archival records,
official documentation and scholarly research formed the first element of the
data collection for each case study.
Interviews
The second element of data collection for the case studies were the interviews.
There were three broad types of interview available to the researcher:
structured; semi-structured; and unstructured. Although some scholars are not
prescriptive on which type to use in case studies, there seemed to be broad
agreement (Denscombe 2007:175-178; Hussey & Hussey 1997:156; Stake
1995:64-67; and Silverman 2001:83-114) that structured interviews were not
particularly helpful in qualitative, interpretivist studies.
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Both semi-structured and unstructured interviews were considered appropriate
and were used in the case studies, although the former were the primary means
for the BiH and Kosovo interviews for three reasons. First, in order to ensure
that the interviews were focused and added value to the research, it was helpful
to have a broad framework that the semi-structure interview offered but still
allowed the interviewees to provide additional data where they considered it
important. Second, semi-structured interviews provided a better basis for
comparison between interviews and cases. And finally, whilst both types
required intensive effort in time and energy to compile the data and then
analyse, the semi-structured interviews were slightly less labour intensive.
Whilst this was in slight contradiction of Foddy (1993:126-152), who strongly
advocated the open-ended, unstructured approach, the practical limits on the
researcher's time and money needed to be taken into account. The NATO and
regional interviewees were more approximate to unstructured interviews. A full
list of interviews is included at Appendix 5.
The selection of individual interviewees demanded considerable reflection and
planning before the field trips. The primary requirement was for interviewees to
be taken from across the political and societal spectrum in the case study
countries, and, to ensure that the data made as much sense as possible. It was
therefore decided to make the case study interviewees a purposive sample.
The ideal spectrum of experience and knowledge was thought to be a
combination of the following:
 Government officials (a combination of political appointees and normal
civil servants or military)
 Assembly members - opposition as well as in government
 Members of various ethnic groups
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 Members of security institutes or universities
 Members of the International Community
 A mixture of those who have good knowledge from past NATO activities
and those with current knowledge
 Ordinary members of the public with no affiliations to the above
 Males and females
The researcher produced a table that reflected the categories above and then
he consulted with contacts in both BiH and Kosovo in order to populate the
table with suitable people. It was inevitable that there were limitations on who
was available during the field trips. This was overcome to an extent by the
researcher interviewing a relatively large sample on the first field trip to each
country, taking stock afterwards, and then attempting to fill some of the gaps
during a second field trip. Inevitably there was still a degree of divergence from
the ideal, but it was a limitation that had to be accepted. This is reflected upon
in more detail in Chapter 8. Nonetheless, the researcher was broadly content
with the spread of experience, backgrounds and knowledge of NATO and SSR.
The one area that was sub-optimal was the gender balance. In part the paucity
of women interviewees reflected the gender balance prevalent within the
security sector workplace and in part it was a reflection of the workplace more
generally in the case study countries. The breakdown of categories (eg
academic, military, civilian etc) for individual interviewees is contained at
Appendix 6 and the details for the BiH and Kosovo interviewees at Tables A6.1
and A6.2 respectively.
In a similar fashion the researcher produced a framework for NATO interviews
that reflected a range of experience and circumstances for NATO officials and
officers. This then included a combination of civilians, military, those at NATO
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HQ Brussels, and those in the headquarters in the military chain of command.
The detail is contained in Table A6.3 at Appendix 6.
In order to introduce a degree of triangulation, as part of the empirical data
gathering activities, the researcher decided to include three additional
interviews. The interviewees were not directly connected to the individual case
studies but were very experienced internationals who had extensive knowledge
of the Western Balkans region, the specific country contexts, as well as NATO's
role in the case study countries. Their input added much richness to the overall
findings. The detail for the regional interviews is contained in Table A6.4 at
Appendix 6.
A difficult aspect in the study was for the researcher to decide when he had
collected sufficient data from the interviews for each case study. Clearly, data
saturation will always depend upon a variety of factors including the research
discipline, the research approach, the time and resources available to the
researcher, the availability of subjects, and the common sense of the
researcher to know when enough is enough. Strauss & Corbin (2008:143)
suggested that: "Saturation is usually explained in terms of 'when no new data
are emerging'." Research on sample size and saturation in PhD studies using
qualitative interviews by Mason (2010:10) would seem to suggest that the most
common sample sizes were between 20 and 30. He also drew upon the
experience of a broad cross section of academic researchers that would seem
to "... agree that saturation is achieved at a comparatively low number [...] And
generally don't need to be greater than [...a total of...] 60 participants. (2010:11)
Mason went on to suggest that the:
"... point of saturation is [...] a rather difficult one to identify and of course a rather
elastic notion. New data (especially if theoretically sampled) will always add
something new, but there are diminishing returns, and the cut off between adding
to emerging findings and not adding, might be considered inevitably arbitrary."
(Ibid)
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In the event the researcher settled on a rough guide of 20 to 30 interviews to
begin the fieldwork. Each case study was slightly different but, interestingly,
some 22-24 interviews seemed to capture sufficient data with diminishing
returns on the final three or four interviews. The researcher then added an
additional interview for each case study in order to fill specific gaps in the data,
which meant that there were then 25 interviews for each case study.
Interviewees were taken from across the political and societal spectrum in the
case study countries, although, as explained earlier in the Chapter, in order to
ensure that the data made as much sense as possible, it was necessary to
make this a purposive sample.
In addition to the case study interviews, a focus group and another 12
interviews were conducted with NATO officials and officers. These were then
complemented by the six interviews of NATO members, who were integral to
the individual case studies.14 The focus group was conducted right at the start
of the research process and helped define some of the framework questions, as
well as some of the key issues concerning NATO's support to SSR in the
Western Balkans. It would be worth making the point, however, that upon
reviewing both the notes and the audio tape from the focus group, the
researcher did not find it quite as helpful as he would have hoped. This was
probably for two main reasons. First, the language spoken in the group was
English and there seemed to be a tendency for the native English speakers to
dominate the debate, at the expense of the non-native English speakers,
whether or not they had something pertinent to say. Second, although there
was a neutral, non-native English speaker chairing the group, the recording of
the discussion was at times too indistinct and suffered from too many people
speaking at the same time. For practical reasons the researcher decided not to
hold another focus group.
In order to prepare individuals for their interviews, the researcher sent a sample
of the framework questions and a background note on the research at least 24
14
See Table A6.3 at Appendix 6 for details.
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hours in advance. Examples of the framework questions are at Appendix 7 for
BiH, Appendix 8 for Kosovo, and Appendix 9 for the NATO and regional
interviewees. An example of the background note is contained at Appendix 10.
As far as the researcher could ascertain the two documents had been read by
most, if not all, of the interviewees and undoubtedly aided the flow of the
interviews.
It was recognised during the research, that there should ideally be a shared and
common understanding of the phenomenon and lexicon of SSR between the
researcher and the interviewee. Chapter 2 presented such a framework of
definitions and understanding of SSR. Although there were still some
contestable elements, this framework has been broadly accepted by the
development and security communities. The researcher anticipated that during
the data collection phase, it would be likely that many of those who would be
interviewed in the two case study countries (both international actors and, more
importantly, local actors) would probably not have a clear understanding of
SSR, although they would have an understanding of their view of reality on the
ground. They would therefore be able to describe the reform processes and
NATO's role in their own terms and using their own social constructs. The
situation was undoubtedly complicated by the need to conduct some interviews
through an interpreter and a number of interviews with individuals whose
English language skills would have limitations. The researcher provided some
personal views on these issues in Chapter 8.15
The analysis of the interviews posed one of the more difficult aspects of the
study due to the quantity of data that was collected. Bryman (2008:565-583)
strongly recommended the use of a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis
(CAQDAS) like NVivo and explained that whilst the researcher still needed to
code the interviews himself, the computer assumed the "...manual tasks
associated with the coding process." (Ibid:565) It was therefore decided to use
CAQDAS and Bryman's comments proved to be completely accurate. The
15
See section entitled: 'Impact of Language Skills on Accuracy of Data'.
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researcher has reflected upon his use of the system and its added-value in
Chapter 8.16
Finally, a review of the interviews listed at Appendix 6 shows that the
researcher conducted a total of 25 interviews for each case study and a total of
65 interviews overall. This would seem to fall comfortably within the parameters
suggested by Mason (2010:10-11).
Direct Observation
The third element of the data collection was direct observation. There were
opportunities for direct observation, which were complementary to the
interviews and an aid to interpretation and analysis. These were in meetings,
before, during and after interviews, as well as a number of other informal
settings, such as one diplomatic cocktail party in Pristina in 2013, which made a
particular impact.17 These opportunities provided additional information and
insights about the study and were meticulously recorded in the researcher's
field notebooks.
ADDITIONAL RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
Having outlined the data collection choices for the thesis, it would now be
appropriate to review some additional research and methodological issues
pertinent to the research.
16
See the section entitled: 'The Use of a CAQDAS System - NVivo'.
17
See section entitled: 'The New Tasks:2008-2015' in Chapter 6.
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Institutionalism
Several typologies and academic models were introduced during Chapter 2, but
a main body of theory was also adduced in order to assist in understanding
better the role of NATO in supporting SSR in the Western Balkans. This was
the theory of institutionalism. The subject has already been fully explored18 and
thus is only mentioned here for completeness.
Hermeneutics
After some reflection, particularly after his experience of the early focus group,
the researcher decided he would address some of the perceived shortcomings
in three ways. First, the researcher prepared individuals for their interviews with
background notes19 and some explanations of the terms SSR and the security
sector. Second, he conducted some content analysis using CAQDAS in order
to identify the patterns, establish the relationships, and interpret the data in a
qualitative manner. Third, he examined how best to derive second-order
constructs from the first-order accounts given by the social actors in their
everyday (non-technical) language. (Blaikie 2000:129-139) This latter
approach would seem to be congruent with the hermeneutic tradition.
Hermeneutics originated with the practice of interpreting biblical or sacred texts
but is now defined as:
"...the science of interpretation [...that...] maintains an interest in the content as
well is the form of what is being interpreted. [...] It works on the principle that
we can only understand meaning of a statement in relation to a whole discourse
or worldview in which it forms a part: of example, we can only understand (say)
the statements of monetarist economics, in the context of all the other
contemporary cultural phenomena to which they are related. We have to refer
to the whole to understand the parts and the parts to understand the whole - the
so-called hermeneutic circle." (Scott & Marshall 2009:370-371)
18
See section entitled: ‘INSTITUTIONALISM’ in Chapter 2.
19
As described earlier in this Chapter in the section entitled: 'Interviews'.
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As explained earlier in this Chapter,20 the researcher has played a role in the
study both through his own experience of the events described but also through
the analysis that he has presented in various academic papers. Given the
epistemological position of the researcher, it was believed that this would aid
the interpretation of the data. As the overall philosophical paradigm of this
study is interpretivist, it would therefore seem that a general research model
drawing, at least in part on the hermeneutic tradition, would be another
appropriate analytical approach within the case studies to add to
institutionalism.
Trust and Dealing with the Potential for Bias
The role of the researcher as an integral part of the study also posed two inter-
related but discrete factors that needed to be considered. The issue of personal
trust (Covey 2006) was a key factor in gaining the confidence of individuals to
agree be interviewed and is one that is not often encountered in the social
science literature. Given that the researcher had lived and worked in the
Western Balkans for a number of years, he had a good contextual
understanding but was also known at least by name to most of the interviewees.
This enabled a series of interesting dialogues during interviews, which moved
well beyond the usual semi-structured framework. This would probably not
have been the case for a researcher who had not had the experience of being a
practitioner in the Region. The downside is that on a very few occasions it was
possible that an interviewee said what they thought the researcher might want
to hear. Essentially this might create a situation for potential bias. This was
clearly undesirable but, as the researcher was part of the study, he was able to
make a judgement on the validity of the data and treated such interviews with
caution. For most interviewees, however, it was abundantly clear that they
were saying what they believed to be true.
20
In the section entitled: 'THE RESEARCHER'S ROLE IN THE STUDY'.
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Triangulation
This potential for bias was also addressed by triangulation. Academic
triangulation can occur in many different ways, including through the use of
different methods (probably the most common approach in social science
research), within methods, through the use of contrasting information, adopting
different theoretical perspectives in relationship to the data, as well as the use
of different investigators. (Denscombe 2008:135-137; Stake 1995:107-120)
Not only does this help in overcoming bias, but, as Yin (2009:114) points out, it
also assists in "... establishing the construct validity and reliability of the case
study evidence." This study integrated triangulation throughout the empirical
data gathering activities. For example, a number of different sources of
evidence were included within the case study. The selection of the individual
case study countries entailed some specific contrasting variables. Secondary
research was used to contrast with primary research and individual interviews
assisted in further triangulation of data. Finally, the generalisable factors to
planning SSR engagements were all shared with members of various SSR
courses.
In order to increase the reliability within a case study, Stake (1995:122-124)
recommended maintaining a chain of evidence, similar to that used in forensic
science. This should ensure that a reader is able to trace the evidence both
forwards and backwards, as well as adducing all relevant evidence including
that which is perhaps contradictory. Therefore great care was taken to achieve
transparency and accuracy with citations within the databases created by the
researcher, and the cross-referencing of documents, interviews and
observations. In addition, Hussey and Hussey (1997:173-174) recommend that
the researcher would not only need to take care that the interview data was




During the course of the study the researcher presented several papers at
various academic conferences and generated publications in order to develop
and test ideas. Whilst these were helpful to the researcher at the time, it has
also led to multiple copies of the researcher's words and phrases appearing on
the internet. In the majority of cases, however, it is relatively easy to trace
these words and phrases back to the researcher.
Generalised Factors
Once the case studies had been completed and written up, a comparative
analysis of the data from both cases was carried out in order to produce cross-
case conclusions. From those conclusions some generalised factors were
constructed, which could then be used by NATO in considering future SSR
engagements or re-assessing current ones. Finally, the strands of the
research were then drawn together along with areas that had been identified for
further research.
SUMMARY
This chapter has explained the methodological choices for the conduct of the
research and the underpinning rationale for the choices that have been made.
The position taken in this study is that SSR is a phenomenon. The ontological
position is that it is socially constructed and is viewed in broadly subjective
terms, which will change with time and specifically with regard to context. The
epistemological position is that SSR has subjective meanings, but it is reality
within the individual contexts that will provide acceptable knowledge and which
will be of academic and practical significance, thus informing NATO's future
policy and future engagements.
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To that end the study has followed a broadly interpretivist philosophy and an
interpretive paradigm, through an inductive approach. A case study design was
selected as the dominant method but with several sources of evidence in a
multi-method manner. Two individual case studies were selected with
interviews being the main data gathering sub-method and document research
and direct observation being the secondary sub-methods. A general research
model based on the theory of institutionalism was used to analyse the data.
Additional theories, typologies, and models, including the hermeneutic tradition,
were used to gain additional insights.
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CHAPTER 4
THE EVOLUTION OF THE NATO ALLIANCE
"The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in
peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to
safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their
peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and
the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the
North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for
collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security."
Preamble to the Washington Treaty - 4 April 19491
INTRODUCTION
NATO was born of necessity in the aftermath of the Second World War. It
began its existence in 1949 with the primary objective of collective defence. It
finds itself at the end of 2017, not just with the continuing role of collective
defence, but also with a raft of other political and institution building roles. This
transmogrification has not been without its problems and throughout NATO's
history Cassandra's acolytes have frequently predicted its imminent demise.2
This was particularly true at the end of the Cold War when “… theorists of the
realist tradition have clearly and forcefully predicted NATO’s demise.”
(Wallander & Keohane 2002:88) Nonetheless, nations still clamour to join the
Alliance; others wish to have some form of operational or strategic partnership;
yet more recognise the benefits of cooperation with the world’s premier security




For example, in the aftermath of the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Brussels on 2-3
December 2008. See: BBC News, NATO Disagreements Still Simmer, published on the BBC
World News Website at 13:51:15 GMT, 3 December 2008. Available at: http:
//news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/7762601.stm) [Last accessed 20 February 2011]. Also:
Shea (2010:11); Herd & Kriendler (2013:8).
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the door of the NATO Secretary General to set up such arrangements. (Herd &
Kriendler 2013:223-224)
The aim of this Chapter is to provide an overview of NATO's evolution,
particularly its approach to assisting countries with their SSR. First, however, it
is worth sharing some insights into the Alliance's genesis as the nature of its
origins continue to influence the manner it acts on the world stage today.
Second, there is a brief review of NATO's development during the Cold War.
The third section explores NATO's operations since the end of the Cold War,
both in former Yugoslavia and further afield. Next, this Chapter examines the
development of NATO's approach and policy formulation in assisting countries
with their security and defence reform and some of the institutional and policy
issues that shaped that approach. Finally, NATO’s evolution is viewed through
an institutional lens in an attempt to understand why adopting an SSR
framework was not welcomed as a common sense policy response to the
challenge of insecurity.
GENESIS OF NATO
The concept of political and military alliances is not new. Thucydides' History of
the Peloponnesian Wars provides a starting point for the art and craft of building
alliances. (Freedman 2013:30-38) Alliances have been an indispensable tool of
statecraft with the espoused aim of increasing state security. That is not to say
they have always been successful, or that one state or another has not treated
alliances as zero-sum games. Whilst academics and historians are not in
complete agreement, there would seem to be a consensus that NATO is
different from previous alliances (eg Kaplan (2004); Moore (2007); and Rhodes
(2013)) and it is worth asking the question why? One should begin by
examining the context of NATO's genesis.
The end of the Second World War saw many countries exhausted: physically,
politically and economically. During the period 1945-46 the US government still
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attempted to work with the USSR as it had during the war, but it soon saw a
pattern of encroachment. (Clifford 1985:3-4) The most noteworthy of these
were the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 and the start of
the Berlin Blockade in June 1948. These events led to a major re-assessment
by the US National Security Council (NSC) of the threat posed by the USSR
contained in a report entitled "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to
Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security". NSC 20/4 spelt out a very bleak
assessment of Soviet intent and capability:
"The will and ability of the leaders of the USSR to pursue policies which
threaten the security of the United States constitute the greatest single danger
to the U.S. within the foreseeable future [...and...] the immediate goal of top
priority [of the USSR] since the recent war has been the political conquest of
western Europe." (NSC 20/4 1948: Paragraphs 2 & 3)
After a prolonged period of consultation amongst like-minded states agreement
was reached to form an Alliance as a counter to an expansionist USSR. This
was crystallised in the signing of the Washington Treaty in April 1949 and the
formation of NATO. It signified a significant shift away from the tradition of
isolationism by the US and a similarly transformative departure “… from
centuries of loosely knit and quickly shifting alliances …” for the Europeans.
(Hellmann 2006:2)
The Washington Treaty is commendably succinct with a mere fourteen articles.
The treaty is firmly rooted in the UN Charter, including Article 5, which states
that "... an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all ..." and that following
such an attack, each signatory would take "... such action as it deems
necessary, including use of armed force ..."3 (NATO 1949) The treaty still lays
the foundation for any vision of NATO’s future. Whilst at first sight it might seem
incongruous that a 68 year-old document would have much relevance in the
3
In line with the wishes of the US Congress there is no 'automatic' obligation in Article 5 for
allies to use force, unlike the wording of the 1948 Brussels Treaty.
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current security environment, there is common accord that it does. (Moore
2007:148; Kupchan 2012) During a valedictory speech to RUSI in 2003
George Robertson claimed that the treaty was a model of 'clarity and brevity'.4
The preamble to the treaty that is quoted at the start of this Chapter specifically
states that the Alliance is "... founded on the principles of democracy, individual
liberty and the rule of law." (NATO 1949) It is these underlying principles that
have drawn new members into the Alliance and have served as the glue that
welds Allies together. This cohesion was required during the Cold War that was
to follow.
THE COLD WAR
The signing of the Treaty was, however, only the start of the process of forming
NATO. In accordance with Article 9, structures needed to be put in place for the
Allies to consult with each other and coordinate their activities. The detonation
of a test nuclear device by the USSR in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean
War in 1950 hastened this process. (Shea 2010:12; Clifford 1985:8) In 1950
NATO took over the Western Union's military structure with a military HQ based
in France. In the following year NATO appointed General Eisenhower as its first
Supreme Commander Allied Command Europe and in 1952 appointed Lord
Ismay as its first Secretary General with a permanent civil secretariat. The
creation of these political-military institutions within NATO gave physical as well
as intellectual substance to the Alliance and laid the foundations for an
organisation that began to exist separately to that of its individual member
states.
Much has been written about NATO’s adaptation during the Cold War, but it is
only intended to cover three ‘critical junctures’ that are germane to the topic of
this thesis. First, events during the period 1956-1957, including the USSR’s
intervention in Hungary, the Suez crisis, and the launching of the Soviet
Sputnik, put the process of political consultation between Alliance members
4
Apparently the team crafting the Washington Treaty were tasked to write it "… so that it could
be understood by a milkman from Omaha." See: Robertson (2008:42).
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under severe strain. This led to a growing recognition that more robust
consultative procedures must be an essential element of the way the Alliance
conducts its daily business.5 This resulted in an upgrading of the political
horsepower accorded by member states to their staff in NATO HQ Brussels and
increasing the political importance of NATO as an institution. (de Staerke
1985:161)
Second, the French president decided to withdraw from NATO's integrated
military structure in 1966 and the following year both the NATO HQ and
SACEUR's military HQ were obliged to move to Belgium. Shea argues that this
schism was all the more painful because it exposed two more fault-lines in the
Alliance. A unilateral decision was taken by the US to reduce NATO's reliance
on nuclear weapons. The unhappiness amongst some of the smaller countries
in NATO at this decision was exacerbated by a much broader concern of "...
their lack of a voice and a role in NATO's discussions, particularly in exploring
détente with the Soviet Union." (2010:13) In order to address these concerns
the Harmel Report was commissioned in 1967, which sought to address both
these issues and specifically to fulfil NATO's "... Article 2 pledges and
strengthen the sense of political community between them." (Moore 2007:14)
The Report recommended two essential tasks: first, "... to maintain adequate
military strength and political solidarity..."; whilst second, "... to pursue the
search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying
political issues can be solved." (NATO 1967. Emphasis added.) This
reaffirmed the political role that NATO was playing as an institution.
Third, the arrival of Soviet President Gorbachev on the political stage in 1985,
with his emphasis on glasnost and perestroika, changed relations between the
USSR and the US. (Kaufman 2002:9-10) Within two years an intermediate-
5
To some extent NATO had already identified these weaknesses before the events of 1956 –
1957. A panel of "Three Wise Men" was set up in May 1956 to "advise the Council on ways and
means to extend cooperation in non-military fields and to strengthen unity in the Atlantic
Community". From May 1957 their recommendations were implemented, although the new
procedures still do not prevent unilateral actions by Alliance members. For more details see:
Kaplan (2006).
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range nuclear forces treaty was signed, eliminating all such missiles and, as
NATO suggests on its website: "This is now regarded as an initial indication that
the Cold War was coming to an end."6
Indeed, the Alliance began to anticipate this change, as was reflected in the
final communiqué of the NATO Heads of State Government (HoSG) Summit in
March 1988, where they not only emphasised Alliance unity in the changing
political times (Kaufman 2002:11) but reaffirmed that they were "... confident
that the principles and purposes of our Alliance remain valid today and for the
future." (NATO 1988: Paragraph 19) This shift was also reflected in the (now
declassified) US National Security Directive 23 in September 1989 that
highlighted the changes that were taking place in the Soviet Union and it
suggested that they would allow the US "... to move beyond containment to a
US policy that actively promotes integration of the Soviet Union into the existing
international system." (NSD 23 1989:2. Emphasis added.) On 9 November
1989 the Berlin Wall fell and inexorably so did the Warsaw Pact and the
communist regimes in Eastern Europe. There was an outpouring of raw
emotion but, with the collapse of the certainties of the past, there were fresh
uncertainties to be faced by NATO and its members in the future. It was a time
of immense change and heralded the first deployment of NATO troops on
operations.
NATO's OPERATIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR
Many scholars assert that the Cold War ended with the formal dissolution of the
USSR on 25 December 1991 (eg Kaplan (2004:116) and Medcalf (2008:60).)
In reality, however, NATO had been debating and shaping its post-Cold War
role for the previous two years. Not only had the nations of the Alliance actively
supported the coalition to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1990-1991, but also
NATO HoSG had approved a new Strategic Concept in Rome on 7-8 November
1991. (NATO 1991) Whilst this new concept preserved the core function of
6
NATO, A Short History of NATO. Available at: http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html.
[Last accessed 2 January 2014.]
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collective defence,7 it also recognised the 'multifaceted and multidirectional
nature' of the new risks and "... of instabilities that may arise from the serious
economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial
disputes, faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe." (NATO
1991: Paragraph 13) The use of the term ‘risks’ appeared frequently in the
Concept.8 Wallander and Keohane (2002:108) suggest that this might reflect
NATO’s impending change in approach from a threat-based alliance to a
security management institution that deals more with ‘risks’.
It was the disintegration of Yugoslavia, however, with its tide of ethno-
nationalism that provided NATO with a reason for change. The first deployment
of combat troops proved to be crucial in reshaping the Alliance’s structure and
developing the capability to deploy and sustain combat troops on the edges of
the Euro-Atlantic area. It also showed the way in which security could be
delivered in the future, balancing both 'hard' and 'soft' power. Over time, NATO
demonstrated that it could move beyond collective defence and assist
“...countries to transition from [being] security consumers to security providers.”
(RUSI 2008:9) A combination of this ability to provide support to reform, as well
project force beyond the Euro-Atlantic region would not have been possible
with the Cold War NATO.
Conducting operations in the Western Balkans did not begin smoothly at either
political or military level. Nonetheless, the Alliance gradually became more sure
footed as it demonstrated "... a classic exercise in diplomacy backed by force
…” (Meyer 2009:253) during the bombing of Serb targets in BiH in 1995 and
then in Serbia in 1999. A more detailed treatment of NATO's role and impact in
BiH and Kosovo is provided in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis.
NATO's response to the events of '9-11' was to invoke Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty (in effect an attack on one member of the Alliance is
7
As it does today with the adoption of the 2010 Strategic Concept. (NATO 2010b)
8
The term ‘risk’ appears 29 times in the Concept, whilst ‘threat’ appears only nine times, and
then mainly referring to threats in the past.
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regarded as an attack on all members) on 12 September 2001. It was the first
and only time that the collective defence Article 5 has been used. There were
several surprising features about the declaration. First was that the North
Atlantic Council's declaration had its genesis in a telephone conversation
between two British politicians: the UK's Prime Minister, Tony Blair and the
NATO Secretary General, George Robertson. Second, it had always been
assumed that Article 5 was the means of committing the USA during the Cold
War to come to the assistance of a European Ally or Allies that had been
attacked. In this instance, the attack had taken place in continental USA and it
was the European Allies who were in support. And third, the attack was not a
state-sponsored attack but one launched by a terrorist group. (Medcalf
2008:114-119)
In the follow up to the declaration, NATO agreed to deploy five Airborne
Warning aircraft to patrol the eastern seaboard of the USA (Op EAGLE
ASSIST) and it launched a maritime surveillance operation (Op ACTIVE
ENDEAVOUR) as part of its counter-terrorism drive in the Mediterranean. This
latter operation was replaced in November 2016 by the non-Article-5 Operation
SEA GUARDIAN and apart from patrolling the entire Mediterranean and
escorting ships through the vulnerable choke points of the Straits of Gibraltar
and the Suez Canal, it has become a useful framework for military cooperation
and capacity building.9
In early October 2001 NATO began to provide some limited assistance to the
US Op ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) inside Afghanistan. (Medcalf 2008:22-26)
NATO's involvement in Afghanistan has always been contentious for many
Allies (Kitchen 2010:1) with frequent debates over resources and
responsibilities. Nonetheless, from a predominantly US mission with a
geographically limited NATO International Security and Assistance (ISAF)
mission, the Alliance's involvement grew in scope and size to 132,000 NATO
9
NATO, Operation SEA GUARDIAN. Available at: http://www.mc.nato.int/media-
centre/news/2016/nato-operation-sea-guardian-kicks-off-in-the-mediterranean.aspx [Last
accessed 25 August 2017].
151
military and civilian staff10 at its peak in 2011. It was the largest operation that
NATO had ever undertaken and required an unprecedented level of civil-military
cooperation. It has nurtured a new doctrine on stabilisation and a more whole
hearted commitment to the 'Comprehensive Approach' that was first articulated
at the Riga Summit in November 2006. (NATO 2006: Paragraph 10) The
Alliance drew down the ISAF mission at the end of 2014 and the new support
mission, Op RESOLUTE SUPPORT, has some 13,000 military and civilian
personnel, who are
"... supporting planning, programming and budgeting; assuring transparency,
accountability and oversight; supporting the adherence to the principles of rule
of law and good governance; supporting the establishment and sustainment of
processes such as force generation, recruiting, training, managing and
development of personnel."11
The majority of these supporting tasks are SSR-related. It is not the place of
this study to dwell further on them but it would seem prudent to research the
relationship between NATO's role in supporting a potential member of the
Alliance with its reform processes and countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq,
which are outside the Euro-Atlantic region. This is an issue considered further
in Chapter 8.12
From 2008 until 2016 NATO had also been conducting counter-piracy
operations (Op OCEAN SHIELD) in the Gulf of Aden in response to the threat
from Somali pirates. Initially these were escorts to the UN World Food
Programme (WFP) vessels transiting through these dangerous waters. In
addition, NATO then began to conduct deterrence patrols, which aimed to deter
or interrupt pirates hijacking ships and taking crews hostage. The operation
10
ISAF, International Security Assistance Force: Key Facts and Figures, dated 3 February
2011. Available at:
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_01/2011_02_13BBB0C1D42F4D0D886C39
0E9F14EBF3_ISAF-placemat-3Feb2011.pdf [Last Accessed 21 August 2016].
11
NATO, Operations and Missions: Past and Present - NATO in Afghanistan, updated 12 July
2016. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm [Last accessed 21
August 2016].
12
See section entitled: 'PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH'.
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gradually evolved and was closely coordinated with the European Union and
the wider international community's response to the threat. This is hardly
surprising given, for example, that some "... 25% of Europe's trade and energy
[...] transits through the Suez Canal every day." (Shea 2010:32.) In much the
same way as Op ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR had widened its remit, the Op OCEAN
SHIELD also offered training to countries in the region to develop their own
counter-piracy capacity.13
The last operation to be covered is Op UNIFIED PROTECTOR in Libya. During
a pro-democracy uprising in Libya in early 2011, there was evidence of attacks
against civilians by the Libyan security forces. The UN Security Council passed
Resolutions 1970 and 1973, which condemned the 'gross and systematic
violation of human rights' against the Libyan people by the Gaddafi regime. The
resolutions called for an arms embargo and a no-fly-zone, and it authorised
member countries to take 'all necessary measures' to protect Libyan civilians.
NATO's involvement in Libya and its surrounding region began with enforcing
the no-fly-zone and then the Alliance took over sole command of UN military
operations in Libya on 31 March 2011. There are mixed reviews of NATO's
involvement in the crisis, which seemed to have migrated from a mission to
protect civilians to "... de facto regime change." (Larsen 2013:61) The
Alliance's intervention undoubtedly helped bring the uprising to a conclusion
and Op UNIFIED PROTECTOR was ended on 31 October 2011. The twin
significance of this operation, however, is that it seems to indicate that NATO
will probably continue to operate outside Europe and so will its willingness to
support the building of accountable security structures in this part of the world.
(Yost 2014:15) Evidence of this can be found in the dialogue between NATO
and the Libyan authorities concerning the DCB initiative. (NATO 2016a)
13
The operation concluded at the end of 2016. For more details see: NATO Concludes
Successful Counter Piracy Mission, updated 15 December 2016. Available at:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_139420.htm?selectedLocale=en [Last accessed 28
August 2017].
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Taking time to reflect upon the aftermath of these various post-Cold War
operations, all of them have been followed by some form of security cooperation
that mainly involved capacity building and advice or mentoring. This would
seem to be consistent with the thrust of NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept (NATO
2010b) and the third of NATO core tasks: ‘cooperative security’. An attempt to
find a definition of the term, however, would be doomed to failure as none
exists. (Yost 2014:14-16) This may be ‘constructive ambiguity’ on the part of
the IS in NATO HQ Brussels14 or it may be a lowest common denominator
approach. The French scholar Pertusot has suggested one definition of
‘cooperative security’:
“… as an institutionalized or non-institutionalized arrangement, involving a
group of states who pursue dialogue and cooperation on a wide variety of
issues, primarily concerning security.” (2009:23)
The difficulty for both NATO and partners alike is that nobody quite knows what
assistance is on offer, or how much commitment to democratic norms is
required from the partner. Much of the assistance could fall under the rubric of
SSR but, then again, without a NATO framework for SSR there is little clarity
about what it would entail and what it would not. Is it a governance agenda as
the SSR-relevant IGOs would suggest and the majority of the PfP programmes
would support, or is it merely an extension of operational partnerships – in effect
‘train and equip’? Pertusot fears that it is likely to be the latter. (2009:37-38)
This issue will be discussed again later in the Chapter.15
It would now be appropriate in the next section to discuss in more detail NATO’s
formal approach to partnerships and cooperation including PfP.
PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION - THE REFORM PROCESS
14
As suggested by Interview N10.
15
See section entitled: ‘NATO AS AN ADAPTIVE INSTITUTION’.
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Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has demonstrated that it is more than
capable of using both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power to achieve its political and security
objectives. Its interventions in the Western Balkans, following the break-up of
Yugoslavia, helped to stabilise the region and its norm-setting agenda has
assisted individual countries to become members of PfP and then of the
Alliance itself.  (Jazbeć 2004:117-136)  The process of preparing countries to 
be interoperable with both Allies and Partners has encouraged a range of
reforms across the entire government sector. (Morffew 20106:12)
Chapter 1 presented an overview of NATO's role in assisting countries to
conduct their defence and security sector reform. The aim of this section is to
expand upon that information and to analyse critically that role since the Cold
War and its policy development within NATO.
Partnership for Peace (PfP)
With the ending of the Cold War, NATO recognised the potential for instability
and insecurity in the former Eastern Bloc, particularly with the rise of ethno-
nationalism. (NATO 1990) It was a concern that was felt on both sides of the
Atlantic, and none more so than in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Ron
Asmus (2002:13) described a panel he was chairing in Poland in June 1990,
when a Polish official asked if it was possible to join NATO and a serving Polish
General asked if US troops could be stationed on Polish soil in order to provide
security. The issue of instability on the borders of NATO was also brought firmly
into focus with the fragmentation of Yugoslavia that began in 1991. It was in
response to that threat that the Rome HoSG Summit in November 1991 agreed
a new Strategic Concept for NATO and established a North Atlantic
Coordinating Council (NACC). (NATO 1991) The latter was designed to foster
cooperation with members of the former Soviet Bloc and create a forum to
discuss defence-related issues including defence conversion. (Kaplan
2004:114-115)16
16
The NACC morphed into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in January 1997.
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The debate on how to reduce these instabilities and how to lock the countries of
Eastern Europe into a wider democratic framework fully emerged in the public
domain in the spring of 1992. (Medcalf 2008:17; and Asmus 2002:17) On 6
May 1992 in Prague, President Vaclav Havel (Czech Republic), President Lech
Wałesa (Poland), and Prime Minister József Antall (Hungary) announced their 
intention to apply for full membership of NATO. (Moore 2007:22) Few in the
West knew how to respond.
It was not until the new Clinton administration took office in early 1993 that the
possibility of NATO enlargement was actively discussed in policy circles within
Washington. Although initially there was complete deadlock, a combination of
considerable lobbying and a new US President who was favourably disposed to
enlargement saw an emerging policy consensus, both in the US and in Europe.
This consensus became evident in October 1993 when the Clinton
Administration proposed "... a new initiative designed to promote political and
military cooperation across Europe, which would come to be known as
Partnership for Peace (PfP)." (Ibid:24.) Although there was initially some
scepticism that it was a policy sop to the 'Visegrád Three'17, it became apparent
at the Brussels NATO HoSG meeting in January 1994 that active participation
in PfP would be a factor in the selection for membership. This process was
aided by strong personal support from the then-NATO Secretary General,
Manfred Wörner.18 (Asmus 2002:40-49)
This policy debate during the early 1990s should also be viewed through the
lens of institutionalism. There were three key institutional issues that
predisposed the Alliance to conceive and then adopt the idea of PfP. First, the
17
A term that was used to group together Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary after they had
met at Visegrád in February 1991 and pledged their Euro-Atlantic credentials. From the
researcher's own experience, it was noted that once the Czech and Slovak entities split
amicably in the so-called 'velvet divorce' in 1993, it was the Czech Republic which assumed the
mantle of the third member of the 'Visegrád Three'. If Slovakia is included, then they are termed
the 'Visegrád Four'.
18
Wörner was a supporter of NATO enlargement even before the NATO nations, including the
US (Hendrikson 2010:61).
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future role of NATO and continuing existence of the Alliance had been the
subject of intense debate both in capitals and in Brussels. As discussed in the
previous section,19 the move from a threat-base alliance to a security
management institution chimed with this opportunity to project stability to
Eastern Europe with NATO as the ‘agent of change’. (Yost 2014:8-10; NATO
1990)
Second, there were also those, like Daalder (1999:6-7), who recognised that the
continuing existence of NATO acted as a counter to the uncertainties of a new
and unknown security environment, so bringing a degree of continuity and
reassurance. Wallander and Keohane also argued that as states have long
invested in acquiring information in the face of uncertainly, so it would seem
apposite for them to invest in institutions that reduced uncertainty. (2002:95)
Third, there is the ‘sunk cost’ argument. Both Pertusot (2011:11) and Wallander
(2000:705-706) suggest that as institutions are expensive to create and less
expensive to maintain this might, in part, explain NATO’s continuing existence.
Wallander goes on to argue, however, that the member states must still have
wanted NATO to survive as an “… institution will not persist if it no longer
serves the interests of its members.” (Ibid) There is merit in that argument and
the existence of an integrated command structure within NATO and an extant
military doctrine proved to be invaluable as events in the Yugoslavia unfolded
and the need for military and political planning ensued. Although NATO
doctrine was predicated on Article 5 scenarios, it proved adaptable to the new
non-Article 5 environment. Similarly, the processes for consultation and
decision-making within NATO proved to be essential in facing the new security
challenges.
It was against this backdrop that NATO developed the 1994 PfP Framework
Document,20 which is the foundation document that has guided both reform in
the CEE and later NATO enlargement. It provided a series of objectives for
19
See section entitled: ‘NATO's OPERATIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR’.
20
See: http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110b.htm. [Last Accessed 23 January 2011.]
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participants, including 'civilian direction and overall control of its armed forces'
and the partnership arrangements with NATO Allies. The document "...
envisaged specific subject areas on which Allies and Partners would consult
that included, but were not limited to: political and security related matters;
defence planning and budgets; and, defence policy and strategy." (Morffew
2007:11) It also set out some international agreements that were expected to be
adhered to, including the 'Charter of the UN' and the 'Universal Declaration on
Human Rights'.
At this stage only a limited number of programmes were instituted, but these
grew in size and complexity as the NATO IS became more experienced in what
worked and what did not. Furthermore, significant change was experienced as
consultation with former Warsaw Pact Countries changed to real partnership.
As Simon argues, whilst:
"... some in CEE initially saw PfP as a palliative (no enlargement), PfP did move
non-NATO members beyond dialogue and into practical partnership. PfP
developed a framework and process; established the norm that partners should
be 'contributors' and marked a shift from purely military dialogue to bilateral
(partner and Alliance) relationships in the form of Individual Partnership
Programs (IPPs) and self-differentiation. It marked the establishment of a wide
environment of cooperation, to include the Planning and Review Process
(PARP), transparency, civil control/oversight of the military, and peace support
operations." (1999:1-2)
The programmes all used democratic norms as tools to change both behaviour
and structure. As discussed in Chapter 2,21 the CEE countries welcomed these
reforms as a means of shedding communism and becoming part of the ‘West’.
A selection of the tools and programmes mentioned by Simon are set out in
Figure A11.1 in Appendix 11, along with more contemporary programmes like
MAP.
21
See section entitled: ‘Capacity Building Through Norm Setting and Conditionality’.
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An oft spoken criticism of the NATO PfP system is that is has become so
complex that it remains impenetrable to all but the cognoscenti.22 The point is
well made and the entire system could withstand some simplification. It is not
the intention to dwell here in detail on all of these tools and programmes but to
highlight some that have had a substantial impact on the reform of Partner
countries. Others will also be mentioned during the case studies in Chapters 5
and 6. The key, however, was their preparation for accession to NATO
membership and this will be discussed in the next section.
NATO Enlargement
The post-Cold War foundation document for membership of NATO was the
1995 Study on NATO Enlargement (NATO, 1995). "This study [...] highlighted
what was expected of prospective NATO members, but it did not deal with
establishing a process to help interested countries to satisfy these requirements
or monitor their progress." (Cascone 2010:177) For example, it was felt that
NATO's assistance during the first post-1991 round of enlargement did not fully
prepare the Czech Republic, Poland or Hungary to be proficient in all areas of
Alliance work. Cascone goes onto argue that this led directly to the creation of
the MAP process in 1999, which was a roadmap that provided direction and
structure to aspirant Partners. (2010:177-178)
The enlargement of NATO began, however, in 1952 and continued throughout
the Cold War. A decision to accept a new member at that time was on the
basis of political calculation, geo-strategic interest, and common view of the
threat posed by the USSR. There is now a far greater concern that aspirant
members should add value to the Alliance, including providing troops for
NATO's operations, and not cause problems from within. The key concern was
that an alliance built on consensus needed to ensure that new members had
the same set of values as those already in the Alliance, which is entirely in the
22
This view has been echoed in a number of interviews including one with a senior NATO
commander (Interview N3) and a senior NATO official (Interview N6).
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spirit of the wording of the Washington Treaty Preamble. As a result of these
concerns, Allies have always been careful not to be too specific in defining
membership criteria. As a member of the IS, Gabrielle Cascone, explains:
"... [E]nlargement decisions [... are regarded ...] as political matters, in order to
leave its members a certain discretionary power in deciding which nations to
admit (and when to admit them) rather than tying their hands because nations
have met technical criteria." (2010:177)
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As a result of German re-unification,
the territory of the former German
Democratic Republic becomes part of
the Alliance. Although this is not
normally regarded as one of the
rounds of enlargement, the event is
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These were the first new entrants who
had been through the MAP process.
Slovenia was the first of the Western
Balkans countries to accede.
2009 Albania and Croatia Macedonia was also invited to join the
Alliance once it had resolved the
"name" issue with Greece. This issue
has not yet been resolved.
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Original citation was a 2004 NATO Public Diplomacy Division Factsheet. This is no longer






2017 Montenegro Included for completeness although
this occurred after the period under
discussion in the thesis.
Table 4.1 Accession to NATO
(Source: NATO, Member Countries, dated 30 June 2017. Available at:
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm [Last accessed 1 July
2017].)
As explained in Appendix 11, it is the MAP that is the key tool for implementing
SSR-related reforms. It focuses on five areas of reform across government.
Although this approach is not explicit policy, it would seem to acknowledge the
need for a holistic view of reform in a country, with defence reform being just
one element, and not necessarily the most important. Within NATO HQ
Brussels, responsibility for engagement with partners, including aspirant
members, lies between the Political Affairs and Security Policy (PASP) Division
and Defence Planning and Policy (DPP) Division. Although at first sight this
split might seem incongruous and result in potential overlap, the practical
outcome was that PASP dealt with the political aspects of SSR, and DPP dealt
with the more technical aspects of force planning.
A graphical representation that shows the various PfP tools and programmes
over time, and how they lead to membership, is at Figure 4.1 below:
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Figure 4.1 Support to PfP and MAP Countries
(Source: DPP Division, HQ NATO, Brussels)
Conditionality was a key plank of acceptance for NATO membership. Chapter 2
discusses the theory in more detail,24 but it would be worth reinforcing the point
that aspirant countries have a choice. They can implement the reforms set out
through the NATO norms and standards, and thus be accepted for membership,
or they don’t implement the reforms and their membership application is
rebuffed. Schimmelfennig (2007:127-129) emphasises the point that the “…
political conditionality of the European regional organizations is strictly rewards-
based.”
Whilst the PfP tools have been particularly helpful in charting reform (both
defence reform and SSR) for the aspirant members before their final
24
See section entitled: ‘Capacity Building Through Norm Setting and Conditionality’.
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acceptance as full members of the Alliance, it is worth noting that Alliance
membership is not necessarily the desired end goal. For example, Serbia has
proved to be a committed member of PfP, but it has been clear that it does not
wish to be considered for full membership.25 A number of partners in the
Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperative Initiative (ICI) have also
found these tools and programmes extremely valuable, but, in both cases, there
is no possibility of them being either members of PfP or of the Alliance due to
the geographical limitations imposed by the Washington Treaty. (NATO 1949:
Article 6) The next section deals with NATO’s attempt at producing a policy on
SSR to complement the PfP tools and programmes.
NATO's Attempt At Producing a Policy on SSR
During the early to mid-2000s there was a growing recognition within the
international community that there was a need to harmonise individual
organisation's approaches to SSR in order to create synergies and reduce
duplication. As Law pointed out, if "... there is no coordination at the policy
level, it can be a recipe for duplication, policy confusion, misuse of resources,
and so on." (2004:36) In turn this led to both the EU and the UN producing their
own policy documents on SSR. There was a similar movement within NATO.
During this period it was recognised that defence reform in isolation from SSR
was problematical. During a 2002 interview with the Chairman of the NATO-
Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform (JWGDR), Assistant
Secretary General Edgar Buckley, was very specific in including discussion of
the broader security sector reform in the meeting and not just defence.26 He
25
NATO, Relations with Serbia, updated 9 December 2015. Available at:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50100.htm?selectedLocale=en. [Last accessed 21
August 2016].
26
NATO, NATO-Ukraine Cooperation on Defence Reform, last updated 3 November 2008. The
interview was on 28 October 2002 and was for NATO-Ukraine magazine 'Novyny'. Available at:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_19697.htm?selectedLocale=en [Last accessed 21
August 2016].
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went on to add: "Defence and security sector reform is not unique to Ukraine.
Every NATO and Partner nation faces a similar challenge."27
In response to that challenge NATO HQ Brussels began to develop a policy
framework for SSR. On 28 April 2005 DASG John Colston chaired a meeting at
HQ SHAPE in Mons, Brussels, in order to take stock of the activity that NATO
was already conducting in the area of SSR. Whilst it was relatively clear that
programmes like PARP were a single political-military activity led by the Political
Security Committee (PSC) in Brussels, there was less clarity over SSR. In the
field, different military HQs had different tasks and missions. Only NATO HQ
Skopje (NHQSk) had SSR as part of its mandate. In recognition of the political
nature of SSR, COM NHQSk also had authority to liaise directly with NATO HQ
Brussels on political issues as long as he kept his own military chain of
command informed. No other military HQ had such latitude. In concluding the
meeting DASG Colston indicated that it was his responsibility to provide
overarching guidance in this area, although he recognised that some nations
were not interested in a global approach to SSR and were content to deal with
matters on an individual, case-by-case basis, such as NATO had done with
Ukraine. There was agreement that SSR advisors in the field needed to be
mixed civilian-military teams and that they were best employed at the latter
stages of post-conflict activity. Whilst troop contributing nations would produce
military personnel, HQ NATO Brussels would normally source civilian staff and
it was not resourced for this.28
The next stage of the process was an exchange of information between the
various levels of NATO HQs including another meeting between SHAPE and
NATO HQ Brussels on 6 July 2005. In the autumn of 2005 DPP Division began
27
This broadening of the reform process in Ukraine has been echoed subsequently, including
by DASG John Colston during an interview on 11 January 2006. NATO, Explaining NATO-
Ukraine Defence Cooperation, updated 4 November 2008. Available at:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_22592.htm?selectedLocale=en [Last accessed 21
August 2016].
28
The detail contained in this paragraph were the author's reflections from the meeting and can
be found in his personal notebook for 28 April 2005. (Notebook for period 9 April 2005-30
September 2005.)
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the process of seeking consensus within NATO HQ on an SSR policy by issuing
a draft paper.29 After rehearsing the background of PfP, IPAP and other tools
and programmes, the 7 September 2005 draft paper explained in conventional
terms the scope of SSR but suggested that: "NATO's involvement in SSR is
more limited than this [... definition...] would imply. As the following paragraphs
will show, NATO's aim is to promote democratic control, transparency, the rule
of law, accountability and informed debate, and to reinforce legislative capacity
for adequate oversight of security systems." (Paragraph 9) It then identified
how various PfP tools, including MAP, IPAP and PAP-DIB, have strong SSR
strands (Paragraphs 10-14). The paper summarised NATO's role in SSR by
suggesting that:
"Through its involvement in SSR, NATO has assisted Partners to adapt defence
structures and improve all aspects of the management of defence. [...] For
Partners in the MAP, NATO's involvement in SSR has been particularly
important in preparing for eventual NATO membership." (Paragraph 16)
The draft paper went through two iterations in committee before progress
stalled and in 2006 the idea was quietly dropped. In the meantime, the military
chain of command continued to work on fulfilling their part of the plan initiated
by DASG Colston with Joint Force Command (JFC) Naples developing their
own draft SSR concept30 during the latter half of 2005. In January 2006
DSACEUR appointed a military officer to be the ‘Security Sector Reform
Advisor’ to the Commander of JFC Naples31 and to set up a SSR Office to
oversee NATO's SSR activities within the Western Balkans and act as
repository for 'good practice'. The office was a mixture of both military and
civilian personnel. In January 2007 it became fully operational with its own
policy concept.32 By this time, however, the military chain of command had
caught up with the mood music coming from NATO HQ Brussels and the term
29
DPP(FPD)(22005)0114 dated 7 September 2005. Copy held by researcher.
30
JFC Naples, 3050/JS PMX/05, dated 21 October 2005. Copy held by researcher.
31
DSACEUR, SCGXD/DSACEUR/6300/SHHRX/KS/05 dated 23 January 2006. Copy held by
researcher.
32
JFC Naples, OJS PPX/SSR/2007 dated 4 January 2007. Copy held by researcher.
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SSR in everyday parlance within NATO was replaced with the 'military aspects
of SSR' and a concomitant focus on 'defence reform'. In 2009 the SSR Office in
JFC Naples was subsumed into a Military Cooperation Directorate and in
SHAPE a new Military Cooperation Division (MCD) was created in 2010.33 The
overarching term for this type of activity became known as 'Cooperation'.
As mentioned earlier in this Chapter, NTM-A was set up in November 2009. It
quickly became apparent that in order to have some measure of success, the
remit of the organisation would have to be much broader than merely the
classic US style 'train and equip' or NATO's 'military aspects of SSR'. An
analysis of NATO's webpage34 on the NTM-A's role in 'Developing Afghan
Security Forces' shows that it has a role not only in assisting the Afghan
National Army (ANA), but also the police, the intelligence services, and the
National Security Directorate. Apart from assisting at the tactical level, it also
provided support both at the strategic level of the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF), as well as capacity building and good governance at the
institutional level, including the Ministries of Defence and Interior. One of the
more unusual aspects of NTM-A's mission has been the delivery of basic
literacy courses to the ANSF. Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell, a former NTM-A
Commander, suggested that with an 86% illiteracy rate in the ANSF, individuals
were unable even to identify which were their weapons or somebody else's,
because they could not read the serial numbers. They were also unable to take
orders and pass them on to their subordinates in a coherent manner, because
they could not take written notes. Improving overall literacy was thus a key
element in improving the ANSF's efficiency and effectiveness. (Caldwell
2011:13-15) In sum, this is far broader than just defence reform. As a codicil to
33
The MCD took over from the Partnership Cooperation Cell (PCC) that was established in
1994 at the start of the PfP Programme. See:
https://militarypartnerships.org/organization/military-cooperation-division. [Last accessed 13
December 2013.]
34
NATO, Developing Afghan Security Forces. This page was available at:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_92726.htm?selectedLocale=en [Last accessed 22
January 2014]. This link has been removed and a reader is redirected to: NATO, NATO and
Afghanistan - Building the Capacity of Afghan Forces, updated 14 June 2016. Available at:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm [Last accessed 22 August 2016]. The
information contained on this new website is similar but not quite as specific as the previous
one.
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this discussion, in 2013 NATO HQ Brussels began to define key areas of
'cooperation' with all partners: one of those areas is now 'defence and security
sector reform'. The term SSR has now returned to NATO's lexicon, although
the absence of a NATO policy on SSR remains a lacuna.
It is perhaps worth dwelling for a moment on why NATO's draft policy on SSR
was abandoned and why this policy lacuna remains. One major reason is that
with many issues where there is not a common NATO view, a draft policy often
ends up being the lowest common denominator that can be agreed due to the
need for consensus.35 As a member of the IS suggested with regard to the
SSR policy: "You’ve got to come up with something that every nation will agree
to, and the danger is that once you start committee discussion, it ends up being
so watered down you end up worse off than [...being...] without one."36 The
interviewee went on to say that whilst France had been the principal stumbling
block in the past, there were other Allies that are using such issues as a lever in
the ongoing EU-NATO institutional battle. It was clear that France had taken
the view that the EU had the core competence in SSR due to its range of
political and military tools, whilst NATO should restrict its activities to defence
reform,37 which is at odds with a basic principle of SSR for approaches to be
holistic. A member of the JFC Naples staff, Jake McFerren, also commented
upon this schism when he highlighted the need for cooperation amongst SSR
actors:
"... there are nayth-sayers out there saying NATO has no role in any of this. I
firmly believe they’re wrong. There are folks in Brussels and the EU who say
that this is the EU’s role – they’re right, it is, but it’s not solely the EU’s role, just
like it’s not solely NATO’s role. [...] There’s a role for everybody here, and it’s










Whilst it would seem clear that the nations' views are very influential in NATO
policy formulation, there are some that see a more Machiavellian undercurrent.
An officer in the International Military Staff (IMS) suggested that he knew
individual members of the IS to deliberately "wind up" certain nations about an
issue, which had then caused that nation to veto that initiative.39 Although
pressed for a specific example, the individual declined to elaborate for various
reasons. In the example of the draft SSR policy, one senior official in the IS did
suggest that "... there is flexibility in not having a policy,"40 and the individual
went on to say that he had been "resisting" the creation of an SSR policy.
When asked whether there was a possibility of a policy note or concept coming
out from NATO in the foreseeable future, the interviewee stated bluntly: "Not in
my time."41 When urged for further clarification, however, the individual did not
seem, per se, to be against NATO assisting countries with their SSR. Quite the
reverse, there seemed to be a firm desire for the IS to maintain its level of
flexibility in handling SSR matters. As the senior official went on to say:
"If I could see any way in which we could write a policy that would not be
restrictive for us, and which in the whole negotiation process as it goes through
NATO committees would not be used by one country or another to restrict the
sort of things we can do in Security Sector Reform, then I would happily write
that paper, but all I can see is problems ahead if we try and do that."42
It would therefore seem that NATO is unlikely to agree an SSR policy or
framework in the near-term, but how much would that impact upon NATO?
When asked whether NATO could survive without it, another official in NATO
HQ Brussels averred that:
"[W]e can survive, of course we can, we’ve been doing it for however many
years it is, since the 1990s when the last review of Partnership for Peace took










[...But, for example...] we’ve been involved in the governance side for a long
time. If you look at what we’ve done through Partnership for Peace in a lot of
nations, a lot of it is about governance [...], but we don’t dress it up that way."43
When discussing policy development, one individual in NATO HQ Brussels
offered an interesting view by suggesting that NATO does not spend much time
on developing policy as often the preference is to try something in practice, and
then codify it afterwards. The interviewee suggested that this bottom up
approach has been quite a successful in many areas.44 This was echoed by a
DASG who suggested that NATO's role in governance and development has
undoubtedly increased as a result of the influence of NATO's Senior Civilian
Representative (SCR) in Afghanistan although "extreme care and caution" still
needed to be exercised because of NATO's red lines.45 Furthermore, as
explained by individuals in both the IS and IMS, the NATO decision to place
civilian planners in SHAPE would allow the military chain of command (with
embedded civilian expertise) to assume responsibility for some of these
governance and developmental issues inherent in SSR.46
It is worth reflecting more upon some of these issues in detail. It is clear from
interviews with members of the NATO IS staff47 the role that France has played
in blocking NATO’s policy on SSR. As mentioned earlier NATO-EU institutional
rivalry is the oft-quoted reason.48 In drawing upon principal-agent theory, Koops
seems to confirm France’s role when he suggested that:
“… France deliberately sought to keep both organisations at a distance and
prevent NATO acquiring competences in the EU’s specialisation field of civilian
crisis management. [… ] Thus, the same principal can favour one agent over
the other for national interest and organisational preference reasons, resulting








Interview N9 and N10.
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There is, however, another factor which has caused friction and created a
degree of resentment within the EU. Juncos (2007 & 2010:87-98) has drawn
attention to the way that the EU adopted a process of isomorphism in the
building of its military dimension both in Brussels (modelling the EU Military
Committee and the EU Military Staff on NATO) as well as in BiH with the
establishment of Op ALTHEA (modelled on the NATO HQ in Sarajevo). The
models were not necessarily the most efficient for the EU, but they had the
stamp of legitimacy as they had worked for NATO in the past. Welch observed
a similar effect in Kosovo, but he also highlighted a negative impact as well.
Whilst IGO institutional isomorphism in Kosovo may have a legitimising effect
the “… institutional survival mechanism creates domain similarity, which in turn
leads to competition, rivalry and confusion.” (2011:62)
The absence of a policy on SSR remains unresolved but a thaw in relations
might come about following the 2016 EU-NATO Agreement.49 This will be
discussed further at the end of the next section, which turns to DCB, a new
initiative from the 2014 Wales Summit.
Defence and Security Related Capacity Building Initiative (DCB)
The DCB initiative that was first mentioned in Chapter 1 was a definite step
forward.50 Launched at the Wales Summit in 2014 it was designed to project
stability beyond the NATO's current territory through defence and security
capacity building. (NATO 2014) Unlike most of the PfP programmes access to
NATO support is entirely reliant upon Partners requesting support and then the
suggested areas of assistance are tailored according to need and circumstance.
At the end of 2015 there were four countries that had requested such support:
49
Statement on the implementation of the Joint Declaration signed by the President of the
European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Available at:
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_138829.htm?selectedLocale=en [Last
accessed 23 August 2017].
50
See section entitled: 'NATO and SSR'.
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Georgia, Iraq, Jordan and Moldova. Whilst the support requested by Georgia
and Moldova is mainly defence related, that for both Iraq and Jordan concerns
both defence and broader security areas, so can undoubtedly be termed SSR.
A key advance in NATO's approach, however, is the explicit statement that:
"One of the key principles of NATO's DCB efforts is to avoid duplication and
develop synergies with other actors."51
It is still early days for the initiative and it is still unclear how the support in the
field is progressing, but the acceptance that NATO has this broader SSR remit
and that both civilian and military staff have a role to play, is a breakthrough.
The Alliance should be applauded for this move away from 'train and equip'
towards supporting wider security and governance reform. Nonetheless, it is
still far short of a holistic SSR policy framework that would provide a more
coherent and understandable approach. Such an approach needs to be fully
understood within NATO but also by other international actors outside the
Alliance. Currently NATO is still delivering its support to SSR in a sub-optimal
manner.
Although not officially linked in policy terms, there would seem to be a
convergence between the DCB and the 2016 EU-NATO Agreement. The latter
encourages cooperation between the two institutions and in the extract from the
agreement below explicitly mentions many of the same countries that are
covered by the DCB:
“NATO and EU staffs will foster cooperation, including on the ground, on
building partners' capacity and resilience, in particular, in the Western Balkans,
the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods, including Georgia, Republic of
Moldova, Ukraine, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.” (Op Cit)
51
NATO, Defence and Security Related Capacity Building Initiative, updated 27 June 2016.
Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132756.htm?selectedLocale=en [Last
accessed 22 August 2016].
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It is still too early to judge whether there is going to be improved cooperation
with this form of capacity building, but it does beg the question about their
combined approaches to governance and wider SSR issues. As the EU already
has a framework for SSR, NATO will either need to adopt the EU approach in
some form of mimetic convergence, or develop its own SSR framework. This
leads onto the discussion in the next section on NATO as an adaptive
institution.
NATO AS AN ADAPTIVE INSTITUTION
Thies suggests that NATO’s history has been plagued by a so-called “alliance
crisis syndrome” due to the literature’s perception of an institution in permanent
crisis, founded on what he believes to be: “… exaggerated claims based on
unexplained premises and backed by superficial comparisons drawn from the
history of the Alliance.” (2009:2-3) Many scholars would seem now to agree
with Thies’ hypothesis and, as experience after the Cold War would appear to
demonstrate, that NATO has proved itself to be a highly adaptive institution. (eg
Pertusot 2011:14; Yost 2014:1-3; Johnson 2017:3)
Akin to all institutions, NATO has its own ‘rules and rhetoric’ and ‘cultural norms’
that are built up over time. NATO HQ Brussels is a reflection of this, with its
own institutional paradigm complete with symbols, routines and rituals.52 For
example, during a field trip to Brussels the researcher observed that whilst
committee meetings organised by the IMS always began on time, the meetings
organised by the civilian IS always seemed to begin some ten to fifteen minutes
late. Presumably this was a customary routine to draw a distinction between
the two different staffs and new members would seem to be encouraged to
conform to these ritualised norms. This paradigm can impart real strength to an
institution, but it can also act as a barrier to change and then to ‘strategic drift’.53
52
For a classic organisational cultural web see: Johnson & Scholes (1993:60-63).
53
There is an interesting aspect to this supposed homogeneity, as NATO HQ Brussels, for
example, does not just house NATO staff (both military and civilian) but also the staff of member
countries, PfP countries, and consultants. Nonetheless, the majority would seem to ‘buy-in’ to
the core paradigm.
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In the event NATO underwent a process of both exogenous and endogenous
change in the post-Cold War period. An external event such as the ending of
the Cold War brought into question the need for NATO’s continuing existence
and thus threatened the institution’s survival. This ‘critical juncture’ then
allowed institutional constraints and path dependency to be relaxed and
enabled NATO to change from a threat-based institution to a risk managing
institution. Such junctures do not necessarily involve wholesale change, but
they can facilitate it. (Johnson 2017:2-4)
Similarly, internal change was needed in order to become a more operational
HQ, whilst at the same time support significant reforms in the CEE, which led to
enlargement of the institution. As Wallander and Keohane contend:
“NATO is differentiated by extensive institutionalization and an extraordinarily
high level of commitment on the part of its members, compared both to past
alignments or alliances, and to other contemporary organisations such as
OSCE and WEU.” (2002:109)
A combination of the exogenous threat to its survival, NATO’s own cultural
paradigm, and that high level of institutionalisation, helped bring about
endogenous change.
NATO’s relationship with the EU has also undergone significant change. Koops
(2012:155-156), for example, suggests that NATO has served as a model for
the EU (both procedurally with the EU’s approach to crisis management as well
as institutionally with the development of the EUMS and EUMC), as an enabler
(under the terms of the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement in places like BiH) and as a
competitor (which has reinforced each other’s identity). These views are shared
by Egger (2014:25). NATO is a classical IGO which is based on agreements
and negotiation, leaving state sovereignty untouched, whilst the EU has legal
powers and wide-ranging arrangements for pooling of sovereignty and qualified
majority voting in many areas. (Schimmelfennig 2003:87) A senior member of
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NATO’s IS suggested that NATO is able to transform in a way that the EU
cannot for broadly institutional reasons. Although the EU has law-making
powers, it has a structure that is more rigid than NATO. He noted the irony that
whilst NATO was in some ways a weaker IGO as everything had to be agreed
by all the nations, in other ways it was more flexible and thus much stronger.
The NATO Secretary General had more power than his counterparts in the EU
and both he and the NATO IS have proved themselves to be adept at moulding
and persuading the nations of particular courses of action. Politics and
negotiation, he argued, were the drivers not the rules and regulations.54
The final issue to be discussed in this section is the conundrum of why adopting
an SSR framework and policy was not welcomed by NATO as a common sense
policy response to one of the main challenges of insecurity, that of poor
governance within security institutions in partner countries. The researcher has
been unable to establish the reason to his complete satisfaction, although he
has a theory. There are three points to make. First, the idea was of course
initially welcomed and as the previous section outlined much progress had been
made. Second, when the idea of an SSR policy was effectively dropped, the
role and institutional perspective of France was quite clear. What has been less
clear in subsequent years is why the obstacle still appears to be in place. The
EU’s security and defence infrastructure has firmly established itself (Egger
2014:25-26) and, as far as the researcher can ascertain, there is little evidence
that France has been exercising any form of veto. There is much discussion
about the role of SSR in assisting countries with their reform, not least in the
new DCB initiative. The NATO Deputy Secretary General is content to use the
term, as the quote at the start of Chapter 1 of this thesis demonstrates. What
seems apparent from two interviews at HQ NATO,55 however, is that NATO
staff are reluctant to use any further political capital on a project that has
already been rebuffed once, when they believe that they can manage tolerably








cultural stasis whereby if something has been attempted and failed then it is
avoided in the future. Given this degree of path dependency, it would seem that
a new critical juncture would be required for such reluctance to be overcome.
The 2016 NATO-EU agreement might provide that impetus. Ultimately, NATO’s
approach to SSR seems to have been driven by a combination of the impact of
one nation’s views in a consensus-based institution and the internal power of
one or two influential actors within the IS.
SUMMARY
Notwithstanding the Cassandra-like predictions of NATO's imminent demise
over the years from both the media and the theorists of the realist tradition,
NATO has proved itself to be a resilient and adaptive institution. It has survived
longer than any previous such treaty and is still regarded as the world's leading
security Alliance. It is, however, much more than that. Its assistance to
countries' defence and security sector reform in recent years, as well is its
survivability, have increased its appeal. Nonetheless, there are still significant
challenges facing the Alliance both now and in the future.
This Chapter has presented an overview of NATO’s evolution from its formation,
through the Cold War to the operations that it is currently conducting around the
world. A number of these operations have evolved into some form of security
cooperation and, in many cases, support to SSR. The current difficulty for both
NATO and partners, however, is that nobody quite knows what assistance is on
offer, or how much commitment to democratic norms is required from the
partner. Is it a governance agenda as the SSR-relevant IGOs would suggest
and the majority of the PfP programmes would support, or is it merely an
extension of operational partnerships – in effect ‘train and equip’? The lack of
an SSR framework or policy is evident.
NATO’s experience of supporting reforms in CEE has mainly been directed
through PfP. The 1994 PfP Framework Document (NATO 1994) and the 1995
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Study on NATO Enlargement (NATO 1995) were the source documents and
contained tools and programmes, which have been added to over the years.
These have been highly influential in setting democratic norms of behaviour and
structure for partners to meet, as well as the explicit political conditionality that is
on offer through membership of the Alliance.
Several SSR-relevant IGOs were drawing up SSR frameworks and policies in
the mid-2000s and NATO began to do the same. A draft policy was produced,
and a small mixed civilian-military team was set up at JFC Naples to coordinate
NATO’s SSR activities for the Western Balkans. After opposition from France,
which sought to keep NATO separate from those areas which it perceived were
within the EU’s competence, the draft policy was quietly dropped in 2006 and
has never been resurrected. The only small sign of progress, however, was the
launching of the DCB initiative in 2014, which seeks to offer defence and
security capacity building to those who request it.
The final section of this Chapter viewed NATO’s evolution through an
institutional lens in an attempt to understand why adopting an SSR framework
was not welcomed as a common sense policy response to the challenge of
insecurity in partner countries. There is no clear elucidation, although a degree
of institutional stasis might be a partial answer, which could require a ‘critical
juncture’ as a change agent to fill the current lacuna. What is clear, however, is
that NATO has proved itself to be a highly institutionalised and adaptive actor
on the world stage, with considerable normative and mimetic appeal.
At the heart of this appeal are the shared and common values espoused in the
Preamble to the Washington Treaty, quoted at the beginning of this Chapter.
These helped create the NATO Alliance in 1949 and are the glue that has
sustained it through many challenges since. Although existential threats may
now be less than during the Cold War, there are many other risks and
instabilities that still need to be addressed. These include the democratic deficit
within authoritarian states and the political corruption of the rule of law both
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within and at the boundaries of the Euro-Atlantic area. A clear SSR framework
and policy would assist NATO in managing and reducing those risks. In the
meantime, there are still lessons to be identified from reforms of the security
sector in the Western Balkans, which could be applied in other Partner
countries.
The next Chapter presents the case study on BiH.
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CHAPTER 5
CASE STUDY - BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (BiH)
“Every human generation has its own illusions with regard to
civilization; some believe they are taking part in its upsurge, others that
they are witnesses of its extinction. In fact, it always both flames up
and smoulders and is extinguished, according to the place and the
angle of view.”
Bridge on the Drina (Na Drini ćuprija) - Ivo Andrić1
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1 provided a broad historical canvas for the Western Balkans and set
the scene for the seemingly inevitable conflict in BiH during the early 1990s.
The war began in April 1992 and lasted until October 1995, when a ceasefire
was successfully brokered by US Envoy Richard Holbrooke. The purpose of
this Chapter is to provide knowledge and understanding of these events and
how they have subsequently influenced NATO's support to SSR in the country.
By the very nature of NATO’s existence as an IGO the focus will tend to be at
the state level, as that is its point of entry for its support.
Following the format recommended by Stake (1995:122-125), the Chapter is
broken down into the six sections. First, there is a brief introduction. Second,
an historical and broadly chronological background of BiH from 1991 to 2015 is
presented that provides a narrative description, as well as some analysis, in
order to define the context of the country. Third, an analysis is conducted of the
current political and security situation in BiH that draws upon all available data,
including primary research, and seeks to provide the more detailed context for
reform of the security sector. Fourth, a detailed exposition and analysis of
NATO's role in the reform process in BiH is carried out, which also takes into
1
 Andrić (1994). 
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account the interaction with other stakeholders. The analysis draws heavily
upon primary research material. Some key issues are developed, not so much
for generalizing beyond the individual case, as for understanding the
complexities and meanings inherent in it. Fifth, the findings and understanding
about the case are presented thematically in this section, which then allows the
knowledge of the phenomenon to be considered more broadly in a comparative
analysis of the cross-data collected from the two case studies in Chapter 7.
Finally, there is a concluding summary of the BiH case study.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
"Bosnia cannot be understood except in its precise historical context."
Richard Holbrooke (2005)2
The Country, Peoples and Neighbours
BiH has always been a mélange of peoples, religions and culture. In many ways
that has been its charm. The confluence of Islam, Orthodox and Catholic
religions, as well as its colourful history and mountainous countryside, has been
both a blessing and a curse. Furthermore, its history has been a Janus-like
struggle between facing either east or west towards two powerful neighbours.
All the while Croatia, Serbia and BiH belonged to the same political entity, be it
within the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire or Yugoslavia, then
BiH could face both ways. As soon as Croatia or Serbia stopped cooperating or
were being pulled apart, BiH became vulnerable to the expansionist tendencies
of these neighbours. (See Map 5.1 below.)
2
Taken from Holbrooke's foreword to Chollet (2005:xv).
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Map 5.1: BiH (1995-2015)
(Source: Wikimedia. Available at:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7a/Bk-map.png [Last
accessed 19 August 2016].)
The diverse nature of BiH's constituent people is reflected in its 1991 census.
This showed3 that the country comprised: 43.5% Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims),
31.2% Bosnian Serbs (Orthodox Christians), 17.4% Bosnian Croats (Roman
Catholic). These three ethnic4 groups formed the rump of the population and
the main protagonists in the conflict that was to follow. In addition, the census
itemised 5.5% 'Yugoslavs' (with their origins from other parts of the SFRY) and
2.4% 'Others' (comprising seventeen other groups).
Precursor to War: 1991-1992
As outlined in Chapter 1, both Slovenia and Croatia declared independence in
1991. This left BiH in a precarious position. By July 1991 there was evidence
that the Serbian authorities were making secret deliveries of arms to the
Bosnian Serbs. (Malcolm 2002:225) The Serb-dominated JNA was already
3
Figures taken from: Council of Europe, ‘Report Submitted by Bosnia and Herzegovina’,
ACFC/SR (2004) 001, dated 20 February 2004. Available at:
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/3_fcnmdocs/PDF_1st_SR_BiH_en.pdf [Last
Accessed 4 December 2014].
4
As Maxwell and Olsen (2013:13) point out, within the Western Balkans there is a regional
shorthand, whereby religion and ethnicity are conflated.
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heavily involved in military operations in both Slovenia and Croatia, but, at the
same time, it had begun preparations to expand the conflict into the territory of
BiH. Troops were moved from Montenegro and Serbia into the Northern part of
BiH and by the end of the year Bosnian Serb reservists had been mobilised.
Many of these reservists were then officially 'demobilised' and placed under the
command of the Bosnian Serb, General Ratko Mladić, as local autonomous 
forces. (Silber & Little 1997:215-218; Malcolm 2002:227-230; Pond 2006:19)
In October 1991 the BiH Parliament debated whether it should declare itself
'sovereign'. It was an acrimonious and emotionally charged debate that ended
when the Bosnian Serb leader, Karadžic, led his deputies out of the assembly
building and subsequently set up a breakaway Serb National Assembly in Banja
Luka. The remaining SDA and HDZ deputies voted for the motion and in April
1992 the European Community recognised BiH as an independent state.
(Malcolm 2002:228-234; Judah 2009:198-199) Karadžic had warned that
independence would lead to war and during the period of October 1991 through
to March 1992 he set about making his prediction a reality (Crampton
2002:255): first by stepping up military actions and second by declaring a Serb
Republic or 'Republika Srpska' (RS) in the vernacular. (Malcolm 2002:232) The
scene was thus set for the chaotic and internecine struggle for the territory and
soul of BiH.
War: 1992-1995
Large scale fighting was fully underway in BiH by April 1992 and by the summer
Bosnian Serb forces controlled over 70% of BiH territory. The territorial
conquests ebbed and flowed for another two years but remained broadly of that
magnitude. Interestingly the protagonists varied from place to place. Initially
the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats were on one side and the Bosnian Serbs on
the other. At a later stage in 1993 Bosnian Croats were fighting alongside
Bosniaks in Sarajevo and against each other in Mostar.5 To complicate matters
5
The main protagonists were as follows: the Bosnian Serbs, the Army of Republika Srpska
(Vojska Republike Sprska or VRS), the Bosnian Croats, the Croatian Defence Council
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still further, many of the combatants were not conventional soldiers but irregular
forces.6 The latter were more motivated by the opportunities to kill and enrich
themselves rather than following an ethno-nationalist narrative.7 This complex
and rather confusing mosaic of forces and alliances gradually became better
organised from 1993 onwards. The US brokered a deal in March 19948
between the Bosniaks and the Bosnian Croats that allowed them to coordinate
their military efforts and focus their combined attention on defeating the Bosnian
Serb forces. (Maxwell & Olsen 2013:14-15; Owen 1996:383-384)
The reasoning behind the conflict eluded many in the international community at
this time but, for the Bosnian Serbs, it was relatively straight forward.
Independence of BiH was unacceptable as it would have meant they would be
in a minority in a country dominated by a Bosniak-Croat majority. The war in
BiH was thus both a territorial and an ethno-nationalist conflict. As Glenny
(1999:644) explains:
"The Bosnian Serb war aim was to establish control over a great arc of
contiguous territory linking up the Northern Serb rural areas. Although the
Serbs made up only a third of Bosnia's population, they sought to grab 70 per
cent of the republic's territory."
This would then allow a land corridor of Serbs along the line of the River Sava
to bridge the Krajina in Croatia across Northern BiH to Serbia proper.9 The
obvious difficulty in this aim was that it meant removing (or 'cleansing')
indigenous Bosniak and Bosnian Croat populations from their traditional
(Hrvarsko Vijece Obrane or HVO) and Bosniaks, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine or ARBiH). After the signing of the 1994
Washington Treaty (see footnote 9 below) the Bosniak and Bosnian Croat forces fought under
the umbrella of the Army of the Federation of BiH (Vojska Federacije BiH or VF).
6
A more detailed treatment of these different combatants is provided in the Final Report of the
Commission of Experts, Annex III, Para 110-124. (UN 1994).
7
Crampton (2002:259) suggests that these groups were not bound by any conventional codes
of behaviour or "...by evolved local habits of ethnic tolerance."
8
The Washington Treaty of March 1994 led to the creation of a Bosniak-Bosnian Croat political
entity titled the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) that mirrored the Bosnian Serb
entity, the Republika Srpska (RS), with both featuring in the post-Dayton settlement.
9
This was often referred to as 'Greater Serbia'. See: Malcolm (2002:229).
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homelands, which could only be prosecuted by force. The term 'ethnic
cleansing' gained currency during the 1991 conflict in Croatia10 but achieved
international prominence during the war in BiH. Initially the flight of terrorized
civilians from certain area was assumed by many in the international community
to be a result of the fighting. Malcolm (2002:246) disabuses us of this notion,
however, and argues that:
"... ethnic cleansing was not a by-product of the war. It was a central part of the
entire political project which the war was intended to achieve, namely the
creation of homogeneous Serb areas, which could eventually be joined to other
Serb areas, including to Serbia itself, to create a greater Serbian state."
Whilst the Serbs undoubtedly began the process, there were efforts by all the
protagonists at various stages to establish cleansed areas. (Pond 2006:20) The
conflict in BiH was thus of unimaginable brutality and destructiveness.11
Keohane describes the situation in BiH as a classic Hobbesian dilemma that “…
encapsulates the existential tragedy that results when human institutions
collapse and people expect the worst from each other.” (2002:64) During this
period the international community made six major attempts to bring the fighting
to a halt, including the European Carrington-Cutilero peace plan, the Vance-
Owen peace plan and the contact group plan.12 Time precludes a detailed
discussion of them all, although the 1993 Vance-Owen peace plan13 seemed to
characterise most of the mistakes in all of the plans. Whilst superficially the
plan to create ten ethnically homogeneous cantons appeared logical, in reality it
fomented ethnic cleansing, especially in the sensitive area around Vitez, where
10
Donald Forbes, a Reuters reporter in Belgrade, first used the term when he stated that: "The
aim of this expulsion is obviously the ethnic cleansing of the critical areas . . . to be annexed to
Serbia." Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1993/03/14/magazine/on-language-ethnic-
cleansing.html. [Last accessed 28 January 2016.]
11
This legacy had a direct bearing on NATO’s attempts to support SSR in a supposedly unitary
state after the war.
12
For a full treatment of these plans see: Silber & Little (1997).
13
This involved a loose confederation of ten ethnic cantons with the intention of attempting to
prevent state fracture.
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the Bosnian Croats attempted to cleanse the proposed 10th canton of Bosniaks
and thus achieve a demographic majority.14
Initially the UNHCR had been operating on its own in both Croatia and BiH but
by early 1992 it was clear that some form of military presence was required.
Although there was no peace agreement between the protagonists and very
little peace to keep, UNPROFOR was created and took on the task of delivering
humanitarian relief to civilians in BiH under a limited peacekeeping mandate.15
The US policy at this time, however, was to keep the crisis at arms-length but,
as Kaplan (2004:117) comments, notwithstanding their initial reluctance "...
[g]radually and unwillingly the United States [...and by extension NATO...] found
itself drawn into the Balkan conflict." From 1992 NATO began to enforce a no-
fly-zone, although it was not until 28 February 1994 that NATO (in fact US)
aircraft shot down four Bosnian Serb aircraft. (Yost 2014:127) Attitudes against
the Bosnian Serbs began to harden over this time, particularly in Washington,
as Serb forces began to take UNPROFOR troops hostage16 and after one
particularly nasty mortar attack in February 1994 on the Merkale market in
Sarajevo that killed sixty-nine civilians. (Smith 2006:343; Judah 2009:215-216)17
Increasingly during the period 1994-1995 the UN drew upon NATO's air power
to coerce and condition Bosnian Serb actions, albeit not always successfully, as
the hostage taking of UN peacekeepers clearly demonstrated. A combination of
events in 1995 focused the international communities' attention on a concerted
attempt to resolve the conflict in BiH. These events included the realisation
14
This view has been echoed in a number of informal conversations with Dr Bryan Watters, who
was the second in command of the first UK army battalion group to be deployed to BiH in
support of UNHCR operations in 1992-3. Further details are also contained in his excellent
'Bosnian Leadership Case Study'. Copy held by researcher.
15
For a full version of UNSCR 743(1992), see: http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u920221a.htm [Last
accessed 10 February 2016].
16
Time precludes a detailed treatment of the travails of the UN hostage taking by the Bosnian
Serb forces. For some background see Smith (2006:342-345, 356-357, 363, and 367-368).
17
Unlike the mortar attack on the Merkale Market in August 1995, the attack in 1994 could not
definitively be laid at the feet of the Bosnian Serbs. Judah (2009:216-217 and footnote 4:383)
raises doubts about the originators of the attack.
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that the authority of the UN was on the verge of collapse,18 the genocide at the
'UN Safe Area' of Srebrenica in July 1995, and the second mortar attack on the
Merkale Market in Sarajevo in August 1995.19 (Crampton 2002:264-267) The
subsequent bombing campaign by NATO against the Serbs in August and
September 1995 forced the Serbs to withdraw from Sarajevo and eventually
brought everybody back to the negotiating table. The success of NATO’s
approach was to have a direct bearing on local attitudes to the Alliance as it
began the SSR process after the war.
There was one other sequence of events in the Balkans that had a significant
impact on Serbian attitudes and willingness to negotiate. In the early hours of 4
August 1995 Croatian forces attacked Serbian Krajina as part of a well-
coordinated offensive called Operation Storm. Within days Serbian resistance
in both Croatia and western BiH had collapsed and some 150,000 Serbs had
fled from their homes towards Banja Luka in the RS. To compound matters for
the Serbian leadership, Bosniak forces had broken out of the Bihać pocket and 
by late September the Serbs controlled roughly half the territory of BiH, rather
than the 70% of two months earlier.
It was at this stage that international, and in particular US pressure, forced a
ceasefire on the ground. By then the myth of Serbian military invincibility had
been destroyed, along with the morale of their forces. (Silber & Little 1997:357-
361; Crampton 2002:266) This was then the backdrop for intense diplomatic
and military pressure on all sides to stop the fighting, which eventually led to the
'peace talks' at Dayton.
The Dayton Peace Accords (DPA)
The arrival of the Presidents of Croatia, Serbia and BiH at a small and rather
remote US air force base in Dayton, Ohio, on 1 November 1995 was the start of
18
Ashdown (2007:32) wrote, somewhat dismissively, that UNPROFOR was "... being treated as
a standing joke by all sides.”
19
This particular mortar attack was laid firmly at the feet of the Bosnian Serb forces.
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a brutal set of negotiations that seemed to include sleep deprivation as part of
its plan to conclude a deal. To arrive at this point of departure, however,
required some serious arm-twisting on the part of the US administration and a
clear desire by the international community to capitalise on the reverses
suffered by the Serbian and Bosnian Serb forces in the previous two months.
The experienced and robust US diplomat, Richard Holbrook, led the talks with
co-chairs from Europe and Russia. At the end of three weeks, a compromise
was reached and the General Framework for Agreement for Peace (GFAP) in
BiH was initialled at Dayton on 21 November and then formally signed in Paris
on 14 December 1995.20 (Kaufmann 2002:124-125; Malcolm 2002:267-269;
Maxwell & Olsen 2013:20-21) The GFAP or, as it is more commonly called, the
DPA, successfully brought the fighting to a close, but, as Holbrook wryly
observes:
"... few negotiators will have the added leverage that comes with bombing one
of the parties, and not all negotiators will be able to lock up the leaders of the
contending sides on an American military base." 21
The territorial division agreed by the parties at Dayton was 49% to the RS and
51% to the FBiH22 with Brčko District (claimed by both main parties) as an 
autonomous district and subject to further arbitration.23 The formal agreement
comprised a main chapeau,24 a military annex (Annex 1-A)25 and a raft of
subordinate annexes that ranged from the setting up of a civilian presence (the
20
A copy of the GFAP/DPA is available on the OHR website. OHR, GFAP. Available at:
http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=1252&lang=en [Last accessed 22 December 2015].
21
A quote taken from Holbrooke's foreword to Chollet (2005:xv).
22
This figure was very similar to that proposed in the Owen-Stoltenberg proposal in November-
December 1993. (Malcolm 2002:254)
23
During the last two years of the conflict international diplomats had been discussing a
territorial division of this nature and a combination of the success of Operation Storm and US
intervention left the warring parties occupying territory at roughly that split. (Judah 2009:302-
303)
24
The term 'chapeau' is used in diplomatic circles to describe an overarching cover with the real
detail in attached annexes.
25
Which allowed for the separation of the parties as well as the setting up of the NATO military
presence called the Implementation Force (IFOR). See: OHR, Annex 1-A. Available at:
http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=63245&lang=en [Last accessed 22 January 2016].
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Office of the High Representative [OHR])26 to a new constitution for BiH.27 It
was the latter annex that prescribed the complex electoral system with the
breakdown of state and entity relationships.28 The thrust of the DPA was to
create a highly decentralised country that was described as being one state,
two entities and three constituent people.29 As Maxwell and Olsen (2013:21-
23) explain:
"... the state of BiH possessed a limited range of competences and was
severely constrained in the execution of these by a system of government
designed to allow each of the three groups – 'constituent peoples' – and the two
entities to block any development that they perceived to be contrary to their
interests. The presidency of BiH comprised three persons, one for each
constituent people, and was required to function on the basis of consensus.
State-level ministries contained similar checks and balances, as did the two
houses of the Parliamentary Assembly and the various parliamentary
committees. The state-level executive body, Council of Ministers was less a
government and more an uneasy shifting set of coalitions. A similar dynamic
existed between Bosniaks and Croats within the FBiH."
The result was a weak unitary state with limited competences30 and strong
entities, which, inter alia, retained their own armies. The RS's VRS and the
Federation's VF were large conscript armies, and although the VF was
nominally one army, it had two separate chains of command that were largely
based on the former Bosniak and Bosnian Croat structures.
26
There has been much debate over the so-called 'Bonn Powers', which allowed the High Rep
to remove personnel from office who did not comply with the provisions of the DPA and also the
imposition of legislation needed to enforce the provisions of the agreement. These were not in
the original document but were included in 1997 by the PIC. See: OHR, PIC Bonn Conclusions,
dated 12 October 1997. Available at: http://www.ohr.int/?p=54137&lang=en#11 [Last accessed
22 January 2016].
27
See: OHR, Annex 4, GFAP. Available at: http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=63255&lang=en [Last
accessed 22 January 2016].
28
By including the RS as an entity, the negotiators formally sanctioned a "statelet" that had
been set up "... in order to break up Bosnia and unite it with Serbia." (Gallagher 2005:133) It
was a contradiction that continues to pose difficulties for the state of BiH today.
29
This formulation of words has been used within BiH for a number of years but here are some
recent examples: an OHR paper entitled 'The International Community (IC) approach to BiH'
and dated 13 May 2013 (copy held by researcher); van Willigen (2013); Weller & Wolff( 2013).
30
Woodward (1996:175) makes the excellent point that by creating such a weak state with few
central functions, there was little to bind the loyalty of its citizens to that state.
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NATO was given responsibility for providing the 'military presence' in the form of
the 'Implementation Force' (IFOR) to oversee implementation of the military
aspects of the agreement.31 The OHR was the 'civilian presence' with
responsibility for overseeing the implementation of civilian aspects of the
agreement.32 The overall DPA package was then underwritten by a collection
of countries and organisations, known as the Peace Implementation Council
(PIC).33
THE CURRENT POLITICAL AND SECURITY ENVIRONMENT WITHIN BiH
It is important to have a feel for events during the war in BiH and its resultant
legacy, as this continues to shape the political and security environment today.
(Maxwell & Olsen 2013:13) The war has left BiH a deeply divided society. Not
only are the scars of the war still fresh, but the battles continue. This may not be
with rifles and tanks as it was in 1992-1995, but it is still being waged by
politicians as they seek to maintain the rights and privileges for their constituent
people that were enshrined in the DPA, and very often using rather dubious
methods to do so. In modifying the Clausewitzian quotation, US analysts
Hitcher and Joseph recently described BiH's politics as "... a continuation of war
by corrupt means."34
Further to the discussion above on the DPA, it is now something of a cliché that
the agreement was helpful in stopping the fighting but had severe limitations in
building peace.35 Scholars like Weller and Wolff (2006:2-3) argue that peace
31
With just a one year mandate that eventually morphed into the 'Stabilisation Force' (SFOR).
For details of mandate see: OHR, Annex 1-A. Available at:
http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=63245&lang=en [Last accessed 22 January 2016].
32
Details of the High Representative's mandate see Annex 10 of the GFAP at:
http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-an10.htm. [Last accessed 14 December 2015]
33
Recent press releases, speeches and decisions of the PIC Steering Board can be found on a
page of the website of the Office of the High Representative (OHR). See:
http://www.ohr.int/?cat=244&lang=en. [Last accessed 15 August 2015.]
34
Balkan Insight, How To End The War In Bosnia, dated 12 February 2013. Available at:
http://edwardpjoseph.com/2013/04/08/balkan-insight-how-to-end-the-war-in-bosnia/
35
For example, see: Interviews BH10 and BH18, and Ashdown (2007:99-100). A senior OHR
official (BH19) was the lone voice amongst the interviewees in BiH, who argued that it was not
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agreements like Dayton are normally only successful when either one party has
achieved a decisive victory or both parties have fought themselves to a
standstill and are ready for a settlement. Neither case pertained in November
1995, so the DPA had the effect of freezing the conflict in time and, to make
matters worse, would seem to have rewarded those politicians and their political
parties who started the war, especially in the RS.36 This idea will be returned to
later in this chapter.
The problems of statebuilding and governance still resonate today. Carl Bildt,
the former Swedish Prime Minister, was the European co-chair for the talks at
Dayton. He raised specific concerns about the weakness of the state
institutions being created but his major criticism of the DPA was that it was too
concerned with military issues and neglected civilian governance. (Pond
2006:32) Whether this was his view at the time, or with the benefit of hindsight
of being the first High Representative in Sarajevo, is difficult to judge.
Nonetheless, many interviewees for this research indicated that the entrenched
ethnicity in the constitution has not just made BiH a weak state it has also made
it completely dysfunctional.37 It is a view widely-held by scholars and politicians
alike,38 but Lord Ashdown's comments at LSE in 2006 make the most telling
case:
"It is plain to all that Bosnia and Herzegovina must now reform the Dayton
Constitution which, though essential to the first phase of its journey from war –
the stabilisation phase, is now clearly an impediment to the second phase – the
phase of building a state. It is manifest nonsense to pretend that you can join
Europe, with thirteen Prime Ministers and thirteen full scale governments for a
nation of only 3.5 million people. It is also nonsense to claim that you can win
the loyalty of your citizens while spending 70% percent of those hard pressed
citizens taxes, just on government and only 30% on citizen's services, such as
the DPA, per se, that was the problem but the lack of political will of the politicians to make BiH
a success.
36
For example, see interviews BH8 BH18.
37
For example, interviews: BH8; BH10; BH17; BH18; BH21-N.
38
For example, see: Gallagher 2005: 132-133; Bieber 2006:49; Richmond & Franks 2009:17-
18.
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health, education, pensions and welfare." (Ashdown 2006)39
Turning to the constituent people, Bieber (2006:2) suggested that in the mid-
2000s: "A majority of Serbs and a strong minority of Croats prefer succession
from Bosnia, whereas an overwhelming majority of Bosniaks support the
continued existence of Bosnia." This has changed slightly in the past ten years
but not by much. Even in 2015 it still translates into a fundamentally different
approach to state institutions from most states. In general FBiH politicians and
bureaucrats support state institutions, whilst those from the RS do all in their
power to weaken those institutions and undermine them.40 It would therefore
be fair to suggest that BiH is a state in name only. There is little in the way of
national identity, a common culture, or a shared understanding of history. A
desire by politicians on all sides to retain the benefits of power seems to be one
of the few shared 'discursive formations' as defined by Foucault.41
The success of NATO in enforcing the DPA42 has meant that the security
situation is relatively stable, although it should not be taken for granted. For
example, Zaalberg (2014:88) states that: "The former warring parties overtly
complied with the military part of the peace agreement, but those who opposed
the agreement's political implications shifted their subversive, and sometimes
insurgent-type efforts, into the civilian sphere in 1996." This view is echoed by
39
The grammar and punctuation is a little eccentric in this extract but accurately reflects what
was written. Copy of speech held by researcher.
40
A Belgrade scholar, Sonja Biserko (2011), has contributed an interesting article to this debate
where she highlights the reasoning behind the Serbian elite's resistance to the DPA. In essence
she argues that they believe that Milosevic had to accept the peace plan in order to prevent the
total defeat of the RS but they were confident that elements of the plan would ensure that BiH
could never be a functioning state. Empirical evidence would seem to suggest that she has a
point.
41
See Peci et al (2009) for a discussion on the subject of power and discursive practices. One
counter view to that offered in this paragraph is adduced by Herović & Veil (2015), who claim 
that the success of the BiH men's national football team in reaching the 2014 World Cup
allowed, for a short time at least, a cohesive national identity through the unifying discourse of
sport. Whether it is something that could be built upon in the future is entirely another matter.
42
Several interviewees stressed the point that NATO's presence was absolutely crucial to the
implementation of the DPA.  For example, Professor Vlado Azinović (BH22) claimed that "NATO 
was the key tool [...for implementation...] at the time." For other interviews see: BH6; BH12;
and BH23.
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OHR official Peter Appleby, who said: "I always describe this place as it is now,
it’s 'transigence inverted', it’s the prosecution of war by political means." 43
Bodo Weber, an analyst with the DPC-Atlantic Initiative, supports these
assertions and makes the case that even 20 years after cessation of the
fighting, recent political rhetoric continues to inflame and polarise public opinion.
The discourse revolves around nationalist themes and threats to ethnic
communities and "... the topic of 'war' has returned to popular discussion."
(2015:1) Whilst some might find his views unduly apocalyptic, there is still a
potential for instability and insecurity that is created for political gain. As Kaldor
(2012:83) comments rather pointedly:
"In a situation where there is little to choose between the parties, where there
has been no history of political debate, where the new politicians are hardly
known, nationalism becomes a mechanism for political differentiation. In
societies where people assume that they are expected to vote in certain ways,
where they are not habituated to political choice and may be wary of taking it for
granted, voting along national lines became the most obvious option.”
This certainly seems to fit the situation in BiH with a civil society that appears
unengaged in public life and content to allow corruption to flourish in a routine
manner.  As analyst Dr Denis Hadžović points out, the people "... are not asking 
any accountability of politicians."44 Many interviewees for this research used
different words to echo similar sentiments, such as: "... the main obstacles for
Bosnia are politicians"45, or "My opinion is that everybody’s corrupted literally
from top to bottom because our Presidents choose their [...] officials who
choose their officials who [...] choose their assistants etc, etc, and everybody is
choosing from their side. It doesn’t matter, brother, sister, cousin, friend, party
member and they are keeping it like a family business."46 On arrival in BiH in










opined that the country was "... very close to the status of a criminally captured
state." More recently, Rohan Maxwell, NATO's Senior Political-Military Adviser
in Sarajevo47 neatly summarised this feeling when he stated:
"You know there are some very frustrated people out there because the
assumption is that the leadership of any rational country would want to help the
country get better, but this is not that kind of place. There’s no incentive for the
leadership here, generally speaking, to bring your country into a framework in
which things are more strictly regulated, where corruption is more difficult to get
away with."
This is therefore the political and security environment where NATO has been
attempting to assist BiH in its reform of the security sector for the past 20 years.
As the next section will show there has been considerable success but only
when the political will and the context has allowed.
NATO SUPPORT TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM WITHIN BIH
The aim of this section is to analyse the support that NATO provided to the
security sector within BiH.
Early Days: 1995-2002
Although the DPA gave IFOR full authority and control over all military activities
in BiH,48 the drafters of the document had given little thought to the building of a
new state, and in particular the creation of a homogeneous, state-level security




The 'military activities' are contained in Annex 1-A, GFAP. It is worth noting that OSCE had
the lead on Annex 1-B of the GFAP, a complementary document to Annex 1-A, entitled:
'Agreement on Regional Stabilization'. Under this mandate the OSCE was required to assist the
five parties to the DPA (BiH and its two entities, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia) in negotiating and implementing various arms control agreements.
49
Although this comment is intentionally critical, it should be remembered that peace
agreements are always going to be subject to compromise in order to reach agreement on
those issues that can be agreed given the temporal and situational context of the day.
Inevitably there will be weaknesses and ambiguities but perhaps the DPA could have been
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doctrine that expressly opposed the US military, and thus by extension NATO,
engaging in statebuilding activities. (Zaalberg 2014:88-89) 50 Thus during the
first two years of IFOR, and its successor organisation, SFOR51, NATO troops
focussed almost exclusively on dealing with military issues contained in Annex
1-A of the DPA and ignored the need for an overarching political and
governance security framework.52 This was confirmed by Sarajevo University
Researcher, Dr Damir Kapidžić: 
"During the initial phase, up till let’s say 2000 or so, the main aim of the reforms
was guaranteeing security and freedom of movement So those two things had
priority over everything else."
Despite these constraints, by 1997 SFOR did gradually become engaged in
broader reconstruction activities. For example, NATO troops assisted in the
reconstruction of roads, bridges and railways in order to improve the travel
network that had been severely disrupted during the conflict. In addition SFOR
facilitated a project called the Telecommunications Emergency Reconstruction
Programme (TERP), which was financed by the European Commission. The local
telecommunications networks in Bosnia were in large part destroyed during the
war. Whilst the Federation began to recover relatively quickly (85% recovered as
at March 1997), progress in the RS was much slower (20% by the same date).53
The political, economic and civilian infrastructure development of Bosnia was
largely dependent on a country-wide integrated telecommunications network, so
the Communication Branch of SFOR assisted the local telecommunication
companies in designing their new networks. Brigadier Gordon Hughes was the
better than it was. Some further discussion on such agreements will take place in the following
two case studies, as well as the Comparative Study at Chapter 7.
50
The prevailing view in the US at the time was that the military role was to stop the fighting and
then provide a measure of security which would enable the civilian statebuilding effort to take
place. There was a very strong perception that policing and support to the civilian reconstruction
was 'mission creep' and should be resisted.
51
The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) was given a one year mandate in the DPA (and
UNSCR 1031) and NATO subsequently agreed to launch a follow-on mission, Stabilisation
Force (SFOR) from December 1996 under the authority of UNSCR 1088. The mandate of the
former was to implement the peace, whilst the latter was to stabilise the peace. For more




E-Mail from Brigadier Gordon Hughes dated 14 March 2016. Copy held by researcher.
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Commander of NATO Communications at the time and he offered this explanation
for NATO's assistance:
"[I]n undertaking these civilian reconstruction projects we were to some extent
helping to stabilise the country, to build confidence and to set conditions for the
political dialogue to move forward, which of course in terms of Security Sector
Reform, [...] one of the most crucial dimensions is the political dimension, but
the political dimension can’t be progressed unless the conditions on the ground
are sufficient to make people feel confident that they can lead to dialogue and
they can try and make progress."54
Although the concept of SSR was still in its infancy at this time, SFOR adhered
to one of the basic tenets of SSR by focusing on 'human security' not just state
security. It patrolled the streets, helped oversee refugee returns and assisted in
freedom of movement.55 Hughes argued that all these activities were
contributing to and setting the context for the early stages of SSR and the
eventual development of concrete SSR programmes.56
It is the consensus of both scholars and those interviewed for this research, that
NATO proved to be highly successful in performing its 'primary tasks' during
these early years, from separating the parties, securing heavy weapons in
cantonments, and de-militarising the Inter-Ethnic Boundary Line (IEBL). 57 58
For example, Perdan (2006) particularly praised NATO's role in reducing the
availability of arms post-Dayton, as well as collecting arms from the local








For example, see: Kaldor (2012:197-198) and Kaufman (2002:144-145); Interviews BH9,
BH12, and BH22; and NATO (2003).
58
The IEBL is a 1,400km line that separated the Federation and the RS. Originally it had a 4
km wide de-militarised zone (2 km either side), although the line can now only be distinguished
by signposts, which are in Cyrillic in the RS and Latin script in the Federation.
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HARVEST.59 Both activities were seen as providing improved security, as well
as a better controlled security sector.
Some international organisations have been more critical, however, of NATO's
lack of progress with the so-called 'secondary tasks' such as facilitating refugee
returns and apprehending suspected war criminals. (ICG 1997:6; ICG 1997b:3
and 10-12) On the refugee returns, a senior member of the IS staff in
Brussels60 did suggest in response that both UNHCR and OCHA had a
particular antipathy towards NATO, so that might have some bearing on the
criticism. The researcher could establish no direct evidence either way, but it
should be noted that adherence to the concept of ‘human security’ would
demand that NATO treat this as a high priority. The latter point, however, is
particularly well made, as NATO did not believe that they had a mandate for
pursuing those indicted for war crimes in the late-1990s, so there was no
concerted effort in this area. (Kaufman 2002:140) Presumably this was to avoid
direct confrontation with (mainly) Bosnian Serb hard-liners, although the formal
evidence of this is rather hazy.
Notwithstanding those two issues, there would seem to be some empirical
evidence for the general success of NATO's approach,61 but it is also possible
that part of the rationale for this prevailing view was the perception that NATO
had successfully ended a war that the UN could not. More specifically one local
Bosnian commented that without the presence of NATO there would have been
no implementation of the DPA and although some of the officers and soldiers in
1995 were the same as those from the UN force, they had a completely
different structure and the different mandate in NATO. Therefore, one could not
compare the 2 organisations with “… NATO functioning smoothly and
effectively, and the UN overly bureaucratic and slow.”62
59
Perdan (2006) estimated that Operation HARVEST collected and destroyed some 22,600




For example, Reports from the UN Secretary General to the UN Security Council: UN (1996a:




From an institutionalist perspective, the perceived lack of success of the UN
does raise an interesting point about its capacity for adaptation and ‘portability’.
The latter term is used to mean the ease an institution can adapt its rules and
practices from one context to another. As Wallander and Keohane contend:
“Both ‘portability’ and its limits are illustrated by the attempt of the United
Nations to adapt its institutional arrangements for peacekeeping to the war in
Bosnia. […] But coercing belligerents was not part of the UN’s peacekeeping
repertoire, and the mission collapse over its inability to perform that function,
which was essential to achieving an enduring cease-fire.” (2002:98)
This should put some of the criticism of the UN in perspective.
Although there was no state-level apparatus for dealing with defence,63 there
was a provision in Annex 4 (the Constitution of BiH) of the DPA that assigned
responsibility to the three-member BiH Presidency to be the civilian
commanders-in-chief of the armed forces. It also allowed for the establishment
of a formal Standing Committee for Military Matters (SCMM) to coordinate
activities.64 It was this mechanism for coordination that NATO drew upon to
help enforce the provisions of the GFAP, and, in particular, Annex 1-A, and then
to initiate the process of reform.  As Hamza Višća, a former Brigadier in the 
AFBiH, explained:
"... NATO did a great job in years like ’97, ’98, ‘99 and 2000 [...] bring[ing] fifteen
members of the Armed Forces of Republika Srpska and thirty members from
two different ethnic groups, Bosniak and Croat, [...] on tailored courses in
Oberammergau and show us which [sic] kind of Armed Forces are necessary to
develop in a democratic society. And that helped us to think more about our
professional approach to our reform, less about our national feelings or





See Annex 4, Article V, Paragraph 5 at: OHR, Annex 4, GFAP, op cit.
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This use of 'soft tools' to influence the thinking and perception of the members
of the VRS and VF had already been used by NATO and the OSCE65 in
assisting the countries of the former Warsaw Pact with their reform process in
the 1990s but they had not hitherto been used as part of a reconciliation and
healing process. NATO’s use of soft power’ will be reflected upon later in this
Chapter.66 As explained earlier, SSR was still a nascent and contested concept
at this time, so the NATO practitioners in BiH relied heavily upon common
sense and a degree of maieutic skill in plotting a path to reform of the security
sector. This was helped in 2001 by the then High Representative, Wolfgang
Petrisch67, who co-opted his own two-star Military Advisor to take on the
additional responsibility for the Department for Security Co-operation (DSC)
within the OSCE Mission in BiH. The aim was to coordinate activities of the
OHR, SFOR and other members of the International Community in addressing
defence-related issues.68 More specifically this allowed activities which fell
separately to NATO and the OSCE under Annexes 1-A and 1-B of the DPA to
be dealt with holistically. It was a coordination role that subsequently fell
entirely to NATO at the beginning of 2005.
Included within the provisions of the DPA, there was one additional constraint
on the entity armies that proved particularly useful. It was the instruction to
COM IFOR to set up a 'Joint Military Commission' (JMC). As a NATO official
explained:
"The membership of that Commission [...was...] made up of all institutions in the
host nation that had a defence or a security role, and the Commander [... of
SFOR ...] was charged with basically ensuring that they did what they were
65
The OSCE drew heavily upon its 1994 'Code of Conduct' on shaping perceptions and
processes. (OSCE 1994)
66
See section entitled: ‘DISCUSSION AND SYNTHESIS’.
67
High Representative from 1999 to 2002.
68
Details can be found on the OHR website, see: OHR, Military Advisor to the High
Representative, dated 25 July 2003. Available at:
http://www.ohr.int/?ohr_archive=military-advisor-to-the-high-representative-2&lang=en [Last
accessed 4 April 2016].
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supposed to do under the Agreement and issue further detailed regulations,
directives, to them, obligatory ones using his powers under the Agreement to
make sure that the overall aim of maintaining a safe and secure environment
was achieved, and so the Joint Military Commission issued many sets of [...] so-
called instructions to parties [ITPs]. Thereby binding the host nation actors in
even more detail than they were bound by the more general provisions of
Annex 1-A, and also allowing him to [...] issue instructions that were not
explicitly mentioned in the Dayton Peace Agreement." 69
The primary actors within SFOR for dealing with the JMC and the two entity
armies were the Joint Military Affairs (JMA) office and the Faction Liaison
Office.70 The JMA facilitated much of the early thinking about defence reform
and helped set up a number of working groups under the aegis of the JMC.
(Haupt & Fitzgerald 2004:156-157) The JMC was a particularly useful tool and
by 2000 SFOR's skilful use of its mandate in compelling compliance from the
entity forces meant that: "... the ethos was one of consultation and co-operation
(however reluctant), and the international community was able to engage jointly
with BiH on these issues. " (Maxwell & Olsen 2013:25) This then led to a
broader coherence over technical military standards, mainly through adherence
to PfP norms.
By 2001 the BiH Tri-Presidency became convinced of the benefits of PfP and
decided to apply for membership. In a departure from normal practice within
PfP, the NATO Secretary General wrote to the Presidency in July 2001 and
again on 11 November 2002 outlining the specific steps that BiH needed to take
to enhance its case for candidacy. (Maxwell & Olsen 2013:29) 71 This




Little mention is made about the work of the 'Faction Liaison Office' in the histories of SFOR
or NATO in BiH but its role was vital in acting as a bridge between the entity armies, the JMA
and the JMC. (See Interview BH25)
71
Maxwell & Olsen only refer to the second letter: George Robertson, NATO Secretary General,
‘Letter to Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 11 November 2002. A copy can be found at
Section 10.2 of DRC (2003), which clearly mentions the earlier letter as well.
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armed forces, which set the scene for the Defence Reform Commissions of
2003 and 2005.
The First Defence Reform Commission: 2002-2003
As Major General John Drewienkiewicz72, a former SFOR Chief of Staff, opined:
"... by 2002 all of the 'low hanging fruit' of Dayton Implementation had been
gathered." (Maxwell & Olsen 2013:1) It was therefore inevitable that Paddy
Ashdown's arrival as BiH's High Representative in May 2002 would herald a
change of direction within the OHR, but no more so than in its approach to BiH's
security sector. One of his first acts was to coordinate more directly with the
Commander of SFOR and move his military advisor (and co-opted head of the
DSC in OSCE) "... into a unit supporting the military reform process." 73 Thus,
as Ashdown (2007:228) went on to state: "The close relationship between OHR
and SFOR [...] became the twin pillar on which my mandate was based."
Given the many and conflicting priorities for the High Representative, especially
with regards to the Bosnian economy, it is little wonder that progress in the
security sector was initially hard to find during this period. It took serendipity for
three separate events to occur that changed the entire context. The first event
was in October 2002 when SFOR, acting on intelligence, raided an armaments
factory owned by the RS government. The factory was suspected of supplying
arms and spare parts to Iraq, which was in contravention of the UN arms
embargo on Iraq at the time and, by extension, in contravention of the DPA. As
Ashdown (2006:248) explains:
"... [t]he information from [... the raid ...] took some time to be analysed. When
it did, it fully confirmed our suspicions - Orao, a state firm controlled by the RS
government was supplying aircraft spare parts and technical assistance to the
72
Drewienkiewicz was a former UK Army flag officer, who spent a number of years in BiH not
just as SFOR Chief of Staff but also as Military Assistant to the High Representative, Chief of
Implementation of the OSCE Department of Security Cooperation and Vice-Chair of the
Defence Reform Commission.
73
Ashdown opined that the US Commander of the SFOR mission was better placed to be his
military counterpart. (Ashdown 2007:228)
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Iraqi air force. [...] We knew at once that this would give us the opportunity I
had been looking for to try to push through defence reform in order to abolish
the two opposing entity armies and create a single Bosnian army under state
control."74 75
After several months of denial from the RS, NATO was able to prove
comprehensively that the RS government and its officials had actively connived
to contravene UN sanctions and, by so doing, laid the state of BiH open to UN
sanctions. In Ashdown's view there needed to be some form of political
accountability and, in the event, Mirko Šarović, the Serb member of the Tri-
Presidency, resigned his office on 2 April 2003.76  The departure of Šarović was 
complemented by the dismissal of VRS Chief of Staff, General Momir Zec, and
seventeen other Bosnian Serb officials.77
The second event was SFOR's identification of a VRS military Intelligence Unit
that was conducting electronic surveillance of both international and local
institutions. This led to the disbandment of the unit and confirmation, if any
were needed, that certain VRS units were operating outside civilian control.78
The third event was the parlous financial state of the two entity MODs, which
was unsustainable over even the short-term. This fact was recognised by most
of the local actors and proved to be a major point of leverage for the High
Representative. (DRC 2003)
74
See also Vetschera (2006:28-42) for more detail on the impact of the 'Orao Affair'.
75
There was close coordination between the High Representative, SFOR and the NATO chain
of command over Orao and the subsequent exploitation of the material recovered. Researcher's
personal notebook (7 March 2002 - 4 November 2002) - 10 October onwards.
76
 Šarović was the RS President and commander in chief of the VRS during the period in which 
the refurbishment of aircraft and sales of parts took place. For more detail on the 'Orao Affair'
see: BBC, Ashdown Clips Bosnian Serb Wings, dated 2 April 2003. Available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2909875.stm [Last accessed 13 March 2016].
77
See: Centre for Peace News Report, Bosnian Serb authorities have done 'enough' on arms-
to-Iraq scandal, dated 29 March 2003. Available at:
http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=article&articleid=11178 [Last accessed 13 March
2016].
78
See: Spacewar News Report, Bosnian Serb army unit disbanded after caught spying on
NATO' dated 14 April 2003. Available at: http://www.spacewar.com/2003-
a/030414150026.dz6122x7.html [Last accessed 12 December 2015].
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This combination of a lack of civilian and political oversight of the VRS and the
spiralling costs of both entity armies created the conditions for Ashdown and the
OHR to create a commission, in cooperation with the OSCE and NATO, to
develop recommendations and draft laws for a state-level command and control
apparatus for the entity armed forces.79 On 2 April 2003 the High
Representative announced the formation of this Defence Reform Commission
(DRC) with the explicit aim of making BiH a credible candidate for PfP by 1
January 2004.
It is worth reflecting briefly on these events. Taking a term from historical
institutionalism, this was undoubtedly a ‘critical juncture’. It created a window of
opportunity for Ashdown, as an institutional agent with real power, to unfreeze
the situation and to make available a new series of choices, of which the DRC
was just the first. It was also a clear demonstration to local politicians that
Ashdown was prepared to use the power that was available. Although progress
in supporting SSR was not necessarily contingent upon this ‘critical juncture’ (as
there may have other such junctures subsequently), it undoubtedly shifted
contextual conditions and overcame resistance from the entities.
The seasoned US diplomat/politician, Jim Locher III80, was appointed by
Ashdown as Chairman of the DRC with an official from OHR's staff, Johannes
Viereck, as his chief of staff. Viereck and other members of the international
community had been heavily involved in the months leading up to the creation
of the DRC in shaping the political environment for its formation. In particular
they had been working closely with NATO and the SCMM. In January 2003 at
the height of the 'Orao Affair' the Secretary General of the SCMM reiterated
79
As, strictly speaking, this was beyond the requirements of the DPA, Ashdown used his 'Bonn
Powers'. For full details of the OHR's announcement see: OHR, High Representative Acts to
Ensure that Military in BiH Are Under Effective Civilian Control, dated 3 April 2003. Available at:
http://www.ohr.int/?p=48712&lang=en [Last accessed 14 March 2016].
80
Locher was on the US Senate Committee on Armed Services in the 1980s and led the
taskforce that produced the Goldwater-Nichols Defence Reorganisation Act of 1986, which was
a significant reorganisation and reform of U.S. Defence structures. Laterly, he was also a
member of the US Secretary of Defence's Task Force on Defence Reform and the National
Security Study Group of the U.S. Commission on National Security for the 21st Century. For
more details see the OHR statement at the 'SFOR Press Conference of 6 May 2003. Transcript
at: http://www.nato.int/sfor/trans/2003/t030506a.htm [Last accessed 22 March 2016].
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BiH's aspiration for PfP membership to a PIC meeting in Brussels81 82 but, as
Viereck explained when interviewed, the difficulty for NATO is that it had never
had "... a country wishing to become a PfP member, let alone a NATO member,
with two Armies."83 The DRC therefore needed to address some fundamental
issues.
The process began with the selection of the Commission members, who
comprised a subtle blend of local politicians (including Tri-Presidency
representatives and the entity Ministers of Defence), heads of relevant
international organisations based in BIH (the OSCE Ambassador, the EUSR
and Commander SFOR), as well as the Director of NATO's Balkan Task Force
(DASG Robert Serry) from Brussels, the Secretary General of the SCMM, and
observers from the US, Russia and the Organization [sic] of Islamic Conference
(IOC) .84 The Russian and IOC proved particularly helpful in managing the
expectations of the Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks respectively. (Maxwell &
Olsen 2013:33) A small DRC secretariat ran the day-to-day activities with
seven working groups of mainly local actors providing the detailed expertise in
areas such as defence and parliamentary oversight.
As set out in its covering letter to the DRC 2003 Final Report85 "... [t]he
Commission established three criteria to guide its work. It agreed that its
recommendations needed to be organizationally sound, politically acceptable,
and capable of full and timely implementation." In retrospect there was a
danger that the progress made in DRC 2003 would be deemed to be inevitable





See: OHR, Declaration of the Political Directors of the Peace Implementation Council
Steering Board, dated 30 January 2003. Available at: http://www.ohr.int/?p=49200&lang=en




For a full list see: DRC (2003:iii-vi).
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Included in DRC (2003:iii).
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" My point with this is that often there is this rose-tinted view back to the Paddy
Ashdown days where the international community was all in agreement and it
was all very easy. It’s much more difficult now because we are not in
agreement. No, we had to fight tooth and nail, work very long hours and be
very clever about all we did. This was not something that we just turned over
and said right we want to do this. We fought for it, the High Rep fought for it, by
design and by his personality."
86
The political environment in 2003 continued to be extremely difficult and local
members of the DRC were normally reluctant to engage with sensitive issues
without obtaining political top-cover first. Thus Jim Locher and the DRC
Secretariat were assiduous in undertaking broad consultation before
developing fresh ideas and draft concepts, and then once the thinking had been
developed, ensuring that possible solutions were fully socialised with all the
stakeholders. (Staples 2004:35; Maxwell & Olsen 2013:34)87
As the aim of DRC 2003 was to prepare BiH for PfP membership, it was
axiomatic that NATO should be closely involved in the process, facilitate
discussion, and make some of the key judgement calls. Nonetheless, as
Viereck avers, the majority of the detailed work was still led by the OHR but with
representation from SFOR and NATO HQ Brussels:
"From my perspective, the crucial nut was cracked in [... the NATO School ...]
Oberammergau in the summer, July 2003, where we hammered out with Jim’s
fantastic skills and agreed to the concept of the new Armed Forces. And
NATO’s role in that was to basically lend us Oberammergau for that week, and
I’m sure paying for all the Bosnian participants. So they were along all the time,
NATO, but they were not leading the efforts at this point in time. [...] Of course
all the questions about, you know, would that be acceptable to NATO? [The
NATO representative...] would nod or shake his head right then so that was






NATO expected from the Bosnian authorities. So by agreeing to this concept,
[...] there was agreement to establish a Ministry of Defence at State level."
By September 2003 the DRC produced a report that contained a draft BiH
defence law, with the concomitant constitutional amendments, that created
operational and administrative chains of command. The draft legislation was
supported by background explanations and concepts. In essence the entities
retained their responsibilities to organise, train and equip armed forces through
their own entity ministries but responsibility for their deployment and for all
strategic issues was placed firmly at the state-level. The SCMM, in effect,
became the new BiH Ministry of Defence. The report also contained draft
legislation for the creation of a Parliamentary Committee, which was intended to
provide much stronger civilian oversight of the defence sector.
The final document was achieved by consensus and as Christian Haupt88 and
Jeff Fitzgerald (2004:167) point out: "Given the political dynamic and sensitive
nature of this issue, all involved had to accept painful compromises." This
consensus-based, inclusive approach ensured political support for the
legislation from all sides. Whilst members of the international community
participated fully in the debate, there was real local ownership that conformed to
the principles of SSR.89 This latter point is fundamental as NATO would have
found it virtually impossible to accept BiH's candidacy for PfP if the solution had
been imposed by the High Representative.
This hybrid approach with the continuation of entity ministries of defence was,
however, still not ideal but it was considered a good first step towards full
integration by 2007. Indeed it had been Locher's original intention to include an
88
Haupt was the Chair of the Parliamentary Oversight working group in the 2003 DRC.
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Inevitably there are dissenting voices such as Chandler (2006:123-142) about the level of
potential 'ownership' in a country like BiH, and certainly the timing and framework of the DRC
was stipulated by the OHR and international community. Nonetheless, all the decisions and
compromises were made by the local actors. Of particular note was the bold decision of the Tri-
Presidency to retire all serving general officers and replace them with officers promoted from the
rank of colonel in order to ensure there was fresh impetus to making the new structures work.
Although Locher was sounded out by the Tri-Presidency, the initiative was entirely theirs.
(Interview BH13.)
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organogram of what the structure would look like in 2007 with one single Army
and without the entity ministries.  In the event Dragan Čavić, the President of 
the RS, asked Jim Locher to remove it. He judged that it would make it more
difficult for him to sell the Report politically and this was accepted by Locher.90
Bruce McLane (2009:71), one of the NATO representatives on the DRC,
confirmed this longer-term approach when he said that: "... members of the
commission had ambitions that stretched beyond membership in PfP. [They ...]
realized [sic] that full NATO membership should be the ultimate goal. Thus the
stage [.. was ...] set for a continuation of the DRC's work." Not only did the
DRC actively support the new Defence Law through the Parliamentary process
to its adoption in December 2003, but Ashdown then extended its mandate to
the end of 2004 in order to continue assisting the BiH authorities across a range
of different issues.
In summarising the first phase of the DRC, it is perhaps worth turning to the
words of Locher himself in a 2004 article in the NATO Review:
"Initially conceived as a temporary, technical effort to draft new or amended
defence laws, the Defence Reform Commission has evolved into an engine of
continuous change addressing all the ongoing strategic, operational, and
technical issues relating to Bosnian defence reform. This process has not only
assisted Bosnia and Herzegovina in identifying, planning, and implementing
necessary reforms; it has also significantly improved coordination within the
international community."91
The Second Defence Reform Commission: 2004-2005
The new structures of a state-level MoD, a Joint Staff and an Operational




NATO Review, Reforming Bosnia and Herzegovina's Defence Institutions, Winter 2004.
Available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue4/english/military.html [Last accessed
20 March 2016].
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Radovanović,92 was then appointed by the Council of Ministers in the March.
The VRS and VF also began to downsize to the manning levels set out in the
DRC 2003 Report,93 although concerns were starting to be raised about the
efficacy and cost-benefit of continuing with conscription.
During 2004 members of the DRC Secretariat and NATO continued to support
the nascent MoD and Joint Staff, and by the end of the year all but one of the
technical benchmarks for BiH's entry into PfP had been implemented.94 What
was of more concern to Ashdown, however, was the evidence of continued
support by the VRS to indicted war criminals including General Ratko Mladic.95
(Maxwell & Olsen 2013:45) It was something that Ashdown was determined to
tackle.96
There had been considerable anticipation that BiH would be offered PfP
membership at the NATO Summit at Istanbul in June 2004. It was clear from
the summit communiqué, however, that the key decision regarding BiH was the
planned hand over of the SFOR mission to the EU later that year. (NATO
2004:3 and 80) The possibility of PfP membership was still held out to BIH, as
well as Serbia and Montenegro, once they had met the "established NATO
conditions". (Ibid:Paragraph 33) In both cases this meant full cooperation with
the ICTY.
92
 Radovanović was a Bosnian Serb and the Representative of the RS President on the 2003 
DRC, so was the ideal candidate who could assuage the continuing concerns about a state-
level ministry amongst his own entity.
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The totals were 12,000 full-time personnel, 12,600 conscripts and 60,000 reservists. (DRC
Report 2003:5)
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OHR, 27th Report by the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations (1 July 2004–31 December 2004), dated 12 April
2005. Available at: http://www.ohr.int/?p=43763&lang=en [Last accessed 1 April 2016].
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Papers leaked to the Sarajevo daily Dnevni Avaz on 30 November 2004 indicated that
General Ratko Mladic received a pension from Belgrade until 2001 as well as a Bosnian Serb
VRS pension until 2002, many years after his indictment. See: IWPR Report, Mladic on
Belgrade Payroll Years After Indictment, dated 3 December 2004. Available at:
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/165/29540.html [Last accessed 12
December 2015]. There was considerable speculation at the time that the documents had been
deliberately leaked by OHR staff in order to maintain pressure on the RS government but this
was never proven. (Researcher's personal recollection.)
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On 30 June 2004 Ashdown removed fifty-nine Serb officials and politicians for non-
cooperation with the ICTY and then another nine in December 2004. Thereafter cooperation by
the RS began steadily to improve. (Ashdown 2007:293-294)
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On 22 November 2004 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted
UNSCR 1575, which agreed that the EU could launch a military operation in BiH
taking over responsibility for most of the stabilisation role from SFOR under
Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the DPA. The EU Force (EUFOR) role97 included
training support to the AFBiH, which was to be shared with NATO.98 As part of
the 'Berlin Plus' arrangements,99 NATO agreed to continue to provide some
elements of life support to EUFOR but the major change for the successor
organisation to SFOR was taking the in-country lead for assisting BiH with
defence reform and integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. NATO HQ
Sarajevo (NHQSa) took on this role on 2 December 2004 and it continues
today.100
This change in mandate saw the orchestration of a series of complementary
activities during December 2004, including the re-launch of the DRC.
Ashdown had previously summoned Jim Locher and Johannes Viereck back to
Sarajevo in order for them to help design a new mandate for the 2005 DRC.101
This process was then unveiled and agreed at the PIC Political Directors'
meeting in Sarajevo on 2-3 December 2004102 and formally mandated through
use of the 'Bonn Powers' by Ashdown on 31 December 2004.103 In effect this
extended the DRC for another year, and formally handed the role of co-chair of
the DRC to the NHQSa political adviser, Dr Raffi Gregorian. Defence Minister
Radovanović continued as the other co-chair and the experienced Major 
97
The EUFOR mandate and roles can be found on the EASS website. See: EASS, About
EUFOR, dated 14 August 2015. Available at: http://www.euforBiH.org/eufor/index.php/about-
eufor/background [Last accessed 22 January 2016].
98
Interviews BH1 and BH7-N.
99
For a full treatment of the 'Berlin Plus' arrangements see a NATO Press Information Pack
from 2004, 'The NATO-EU Strategic Partnership' at: http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-
istanbul/press-kit/006.pdf [Last accessed 13 December 2015].
100
The mandate for NHQSa is at: JFC Naples, About NHQSa. Available at:





See: OHR, PIC SB Political Directors, ‘Communique´, dated 3 December 2004. Available at:
http://www.ohr.int/?p=44583&lang=en [Last accessed 12 January 2016].
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'Decision Extending the Mandate of the Defence Reform Commission (331/04) dated 31
December 2004. (DRC 2005:173-178)
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General John Drewienkiewicz, the High Representative's double-hatted Military
Advisor and Head of the OSCE’s Department for Security Cooperation,
continued as the Vice-Chair.
In the lead-in to the formation of NHQSa and the assumption of its new role, a
series of meetings were held within BiH in order to coordinate the new
arrangements. At one of the meetings, Ex CRITICAL HORIZON,104 in August
2004, JFC Naples announced that there would be a cap on staff levels for the
nascent NHQSa.105 This created a dilemma for the new HQ. It preserved
military posts that would comprise the NATO Advisory Team (NAT) but
removed civilian posts for some of the anticipated political work including within
the DRC. As Maxwell & Olsen (2013:47) observed in their book, John
Drewienkiewicz finessed the issue and a major proportion of the OSCE DSC
manpower was transferred to NHQSa in January 2005 in order to take on both
the politico-military work within the DRC but also within NHQSa.106
Whilst the DRC was undoubtedly the main focus in 2005, a myriad of other
strands of work were being undertaken, with NATO assistance, in other areas of
defence.
One particularly important strand for PfP membership was to ensure that BiH
was legally entitled, and had the operational capability, to deploy on NATO
missions and, as a first step, laws were amended in order to prepare for these
missions. Although such missions were not to come for a few more years, in
June 2005 the first rotation of an AFBiH unit was deployed overseas to join the
US-led coalition in Iraq.
104
Attended by the researcher. See: SFOR Informer Online, Exercise Critical Horizon, dated
August 2004. Available at: http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/172/p03a/t02p03a.htm [Last
accessed 8 April 2016].
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Researcher's personal note book 14 May 2004 - 15 November 2004. Notes from 1 August
2004. NATO’s reasoning behind the decision was pecuniary. Military staff were paid by the
nations, whereas civilian staff were paid by NATO, so it was cheaper to use military.
106
The detail of the manpower establishments, and who paid who, took a little time to catch up
but it was a classic case of pragmatism over dogma. See also interview BH12.
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Work proceeded apace on the DRC throughout the first half of 2005. Whilst
there seemed to be general agreement on the need to remove conscription,
there was considerable resistance to the removal of all ethnic characteristics
from the new Armed Forces. With characteristic initiative Raffi Gregorian, the
DRC co-chair and NHQSa Political Advisor, suggested a modified version of the
British regimental system that was used throughout most of the British
Commonwealth. He managed to secure agreement on all sides for a degree of
ethnic identification for the infantry but a common BiH identity for the remainder
of the AFBiH. (Maxwell & Olsen 2013:50-51) Lieutenant Colonel Rob
Tomlinson, the UK Defence Attaché in Sarajevo, did voice some concerns
about the regimental system:
"It was the best thing at the time to win consensus and agreement from three
warring factions, and it was a necessary step in DDR and SSR. Now if we
could do it again, I wouldn’t do it that way. I think it has reinforced [...] too many
of the negative Regimental traditions rather than what was intended to do was
build an esprit de corps amongst effectively three ethnic Armies. And certainly
when I go to their Regimental Open Days once a year, and I try and avoid them,
they are far more nationalistic than they should be and we ever hoped they
would be. So it wasn’t a mistake, it was a necessary requirement, but I would
like to see in time somehow to dilute the effect on the strength of the
Regimental system [...]. Not everyone agrees with me, they think it’s a great
system, and that’s fine, but if nothing else we mustn’t allow their Regimental
traditions to interfere with their operational and daily life."
107
Whilst Tomlinson's views are not universally held, they do chime with the
researcher's observations of the AFBiH regimental system in action over the
past ten years and also with the comments contained in a policy paper by the
well-regarded Democratization Policy Council (DPC).  (Azinović 2011:32) 
The final DRC 2005 Report was published in September of that year and




establishment with a single military force. (DRC 2005) Two pieces of draft
legislation were included in the report: a new 'Defence Law and a new 'Law on
Service'. It was recognised by most members of the DRC that both pieces of
legislation would require careful nurturing and assistance through the BiH
legislative procedures and NATO took on that task. (McLane 2009:71) Both
pieces of legislation were then passed in December 2005 and the process of
closing down the entity MoDs began the following month.
The Onset of Political Stalemate: 2006-2015
Lord Ashdown handed over as High Representative in January 2006 to a
German politician, Christian Schwarz-Schilling. The closing down of the entity
MoDs was undoubtedly the high watermark of defence reform in BiH but it also
heralded the end of activism from the High Representative, epitomised by
Ashdown, and the low-key, hands-off approach of Schwarz Schilling. Politically
this fundamental change could not have come at a worse time, as the political
order in the RS began to change. The consensus approach adopted by Locher
and Gregorian in the two rounds of the DRC was steadily coming under
pressure within the RS. As Johannes Viereck explained, the RS President "...
Čavić was under nationalist attack.  Mr Dodik was sensing that his moment had 
come and he was beefing up his nationalist rhetoric and his nationalist
standings. So he outdid an SNS President and President of the RS by
speaking even more nationalistically, and saying it was a failure of what Mr
Čavić had done [sic]."108  Čavić began to lose political support and then: 
"In what seemed a foolhardy move to some at the time, the leader of the Union
of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), Milorad Dodik, became Prime
Minister of the RS in March 2006, seven months in advance of general
elections. Cooperation from Banja Luka on previously agreed (and





Dodik consolidated his hold on power in the lead-up to the elections with a raft
of provocative and polarising comments and was ably assisted by the Bosniak,
Haris Silajdžić, in creating an atmosphere of mistrust and insecurity.  For the 
next ten years, first as Prime Minister, and then as President of the RS, Dodik
has both teased and manipulated the international community. His stock-in-
trade has been to threaten to hold a referendum on independence109 or to argue
that international efforts to improve governance or state institutions is contrary
to the DPA. There are many who would argue that the international community
has been complicit in this charade by instructing local international officials to
avoid 'provocative actions' in the chimerical hope of obtaining a 'deliverable'.110
Since 2006 there has been much talk about the move from Dayton to Brussels,
as a shorthand for the move from the post-war environment to integration within
the EU.111 Over this time the EU has implemented a much broader reform
agenda than hitherto,112 coupled with a move to close down the OHR. At a
meeting of the Political Directors of the PIC Steering Board in Brussels on 26-27
February 2008, the board set out the requirements that needed to be met by the
BiH authorities prior to the closure of the OHR. The so-called '5+2 agenda'
contained five objectives and two conditions that had to be met before such an
event could take place.113 There is an argument which would suggest that in
being so explicit in what was required for progression to EU membership, local
politicians should have every incentive to strive for them. There is a counter-
109
For example, Balkan Insight, Dodik Accused of Manipulating Referendum Issue, dated 2
April 2014. Available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/opposition-accused-dodik-of-
manipulating-with-referendum [Last accessed 9 April 2016].
110
The EU and the PIC would seem to have been particularly guilty of this approach since 2006.
For details see: Azinović (2011:11-13); Türbedar (2012:128-129); ICG (2012); Economist 
Article, Bosnia's Future, dated 17 July 2008 (Available at:
http://www.economist.com/node/11751332 [Last accessed 9 April 2016]); Balkan Insight,
Florian Bieber Blog, dated 6 March 2014 (Available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/blog/i-
am-making-a-list-i-am-checking-it-twice-identifying-the-enemies-of-rs) [Last accessed 10 April
2016]); Balkan Insight, Elvira Jukic Blog, dated 2 April 2014. (Available at:
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referendum [Last accessed 27 March 2016]).
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The titles of a number of academic papers have contained this phrase. For example, USIP
(2006) Aybet & Bieber (2011), and Majstorović et al (2015).
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This is generally referred to as 'the EU's enhanced role' in BiH.
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Full details of this '5+2 agenda' see: OHR, '5+2 Agenda'. Available at:
http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=1318&lang=en [Last accessed 24 February 2016].
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argument which would suggest that by being so explicit, the PIC has allowed
the political elite in BiH to know exactly what they have to do in order to prevent
any change in the status quo - a status quo that tends to benefit the politicians
but not the people or the country. As the OHR says on its website:
"While progress has been made in some areas, chronic disagreement among
the main political parties has produced gridlock that has prevented the full
implementation of the agenda."114 115
There was one moment in February-March 2014 when it seemed that the
sleeping giant of civil society in BiH had finally woken up. Starting in the town of
Tuzla, a group of workers protested that they had not been paid for several
months. Very quickly similar protests spread across much of BiH with similar
grievances. The focus of the dissatisfaction was a detached ruling elite and a
corrupt and self-serving bureaucracy. In a short while citizen plenums were set
up and a number of local and cantonal governments resigned. Initially it was
thought that these plenums could become a force for change in the country but,
very quickly, the ruling elite manipulated the public discourse and by the
summer the status quo had been resumed.116
For some in BiH this was a disappointing outcome and it is therefore worth
some further reflection. There are perhaps two reasons for the plenums not
living up to expectations. The first is rent-seeking. Keohane suggests that:
“People often seek to gain distributional advantages not by being productive but
by gaining control of policies in order to capture rents. […] … the institutions of





One of the objectives to be resolved is resolution of the defence property issue. This will be
covered in more detail in the next section.
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Balkans Insight, Whatever Happened to the Plenums in Bosnia?, dated 16 June 2014.
Available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/whatever-happened-to-the-plenums-in-
bosnia [Last accessed 16 June 2014].
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This is particularly true in BiH, which has two entity-level governments with their
assemblies, ministries, ministers, ministerial staff, and hangers-on; a state-level
of similar ministries and bureaucracy; a variety of police forces etc.117 A large
swathe of the working population in BiH are employed in the public sector. The
ruling elites also have considerable powers of patronage and can dispense
considerable financial largesse. In consequence, there are many in BiH who
prosper from the status quo and are therefore reluctant to undermine it.118
Second, is the power vested in the RS government and particularly in the
person of Milorad Dodik. Since taking office in 2006, Dodik has acted as a
‘political entrepreneur’ and, building upon the legacy of Radovan Karadžić, he 
has “… reformulated ethnic and political identities …” in the RS and “…
appealed to the traditional identities of the rural areas to overwhelm the
cosmopolitan identities that had begun to develop in the cities.” (Keohane &
Nye 2012:250) This appeal is grounded in the desire to unify with Serbia and
has genuine support within the Bosnian Serb population within the RS. As a
result, public opinion is easily swayed by Dodik and, in part, led to the failure of
the plenums to live up to their early expectations.
There is currently a feeling of stagnation in the country, which is felt by both
local actors and members of the international community. In rather
uncharacteristically blunt language an official in the OHR commented:119
"A brief review of the Structured Dialogue, Sejdić-Finci, the Mostar facilitation
process and the US lead Federation Constitutional reform initiative leads one to
the worrisome conclusion we are witnessing neither excessive direction or
effective transition to local ownership but more an aimless drifting whilst the
International Community exhibits a Nero like inclination to fiddle in the margins
whilst Rome burns. Can BiH accede to anything whilst it exhibits all the
symptoms of falling apart and can the International Community expect progress
117
See also Ashdown (2006) where he discusses the same broad issue and states that there






in the wake of a number of failed or failing initiatives with an intentionally
emasculated OHR?" 120
He raised a number of interesting points, which the researcher thought might be
addressed by the EU in its annual report. In reality the 2015 EU Progress
Report121 on BiH perhaps summarises eloquently the dilemmas faced by both
the EU and BiH. The document articulates succinctly some of the socio-
economic challenges besetting the country and highlights a number of areas
that require more attention from countering corruption to doing more to ensure
respect for human rights and the protection of minorities.122 Notwithstanding
some glaring deficiencies, a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA)
between BiH and the EU entered into force on 1 June 2015. What the progress
report conspicuously failed to highlight, however, were the reasons behind the
refusal to implement the 2010 Constitutional Court decision on Mostar's statute,
the failure to implement the Sejdić-Finci ruling of the European Court of Human 
Rights, and the paradox of the RS Assembly's unanimous decision to
implement all necessary reforms for BiH's integration into the EU whilst at the
same time challenging the supremacy of the state level judiciary over that in the
RS. These may seem somewhat unrelated issues when discussing SSR, but
they all add up to a dysfunctional country that seems to be a state in name only.
As a former German ambassador to BiH suggested "... with the present level of
dysfunctionality [...] full membership of the EU is unimaginable." (Schmunk
2009:30) Although Michael Schmunk made those remarks several years ago,
in the time warp that is BiH, nothing has changed. The current High
Representative, Valentin Inzko, seemed to share these concerns when he
warned UN Security Council in New York on 10 November 2015 that “...[o]ver
120
The interviewee obviously felt very strongly about these issues and he was supported to
some extent in his assertions by Interview BH10 and an internal OHR document: International
Community (IC) Approach to BiH, dated 13 May 2013. Copy held by researcher.
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European Commission, Bosnia and Herzegovina 2015 Report, SWD(2015) 214 final date 11
November 2015. Available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_bosnia_and_herze





the last 10 years, the country has not been moving in the right direction." He
went on to say that he thought progress was possible in the next 10 years if
there was the political will to deliver substantial reforms to move the country
forward and, with respect to yet another threat from the RS to hold a
referendum on independence in 2018, that the provisions of the DPA were
respected. (UN 2015) 123 Given this political context, the aspiration of full NATO
membership would also seem rather remote.
PfP Membership and Increasing Challenges to Reform: 2006-2015
Having analysed the onset of political stalemate from 2006 until 2015, it would
seem constructive for this section to examine BiH’s path through PfP
membership over the same period, to examine in detail one specific political
challenge blocking further progress to NATO accession, and finally to review
the improving operational capability of BiH’s armed forces.
PfP Membership and Standards
Notwithstanding the deepening political crisis in the country, BiH was awarded
PfP membership at the Riga NATO Summit in December 2006 along with
Serbia and Montenegro. (NATO 2006) By then BiH had improved its
cooperation with the ICTY and met the conditions laid down in both DRC
Reports, but it is likely that other political issues were also at play. Negotiations
were under way in 2006 to tackle the unresolved issue of Kosovo's future status
and there was much discussion in HQ NATO Brussels at the time that PfP
membership was intended as a 'sweetener' for both Serbia and BiH.124
123
Although outside the direct timeframe of this thesis, it is interesting to note both that BiH
submitted its formal application for EU membership on 15 February 2016 and also the
dichotomy of views between the Federation and the RS on the application. See: Balkans
Insight, Bosnia Split Over EU Membership Application, dated 16 February 2016 at:
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/eu-application-draws-mixed-reactions-in-bosnia-02-15-
2016 [Last accessed 12 April 2016].
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This issue will be covered further in Chapter 6. Although there is no official record of any
linkage, it is the researcher's personal recollection from visits to Brussels in the second half of
2006, when he was working for UNOSEK.
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BiH had been involved with a NATO Tailored Cooperation Programme (TCP)
for a few years but membership of PfP allowed it to become actively engaged
with both the Planning and Review Process (PARP) and the Individual
Partnership Action Plan (IPAP).125 These programmes are bespoke for PfP
members and include a range of governance and financial issues that go well
beyond defence and incorporate many elements of SSR. They form a pathway
for countries such as BiH to internalise the norms and procedures of NATO
and assist in the process of normative isomorphism. The researcher attended a
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence and Security in Sarajevo in 2006,
when Dr Raffi Gregorian explained to the elected members how the system
worked. He particularly stressed that the standards laid down by NATO were
those expected of full NATO members and thus were essential in preparing the
country for membership. He also emphasised the correlation between the
standards for NATO and EU membership.126
Over the next few years BiH gradually acceded to a variety of NATO standards
from security to the NATO Codification System (NCS), and then contributed to
its first NATO mission in March 2009.127 BiH made steady, if unspectacular,
progress with defence reform and in October 2009 submitted its application to
join NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP). At the meeting of NATO Foreign
Ministers in Tallinn in April 2010, the North Atlantic Council formally invited BiH
to join MAP128 but subject to one condition: that all that immovable defence




See Appendix 5 for details of these programmes.
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Personal notebook of researcher 2 October 2005 - 27 March 2006. Note on 15 March 2006.
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Key dates taken from: BiH MoD, Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of Bosnia and
Herzegovina – Brochure, dated April 2011. Available at:
http://www.mod.gov.ba/files/file/maj_2011/bosura%20eng%20mail.pdf [Last accessed 9 April
2016].
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Several observers suggest that this only happened because of the strong backing of, inter
alia, the US and Turkey. For example, see Busterud (2014:7).
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The decision to accept BiH on the MAP programme should have been a
significant fillip for defence reform within the country but the rather esoteric
issue of defence property, and who owned what, encapsulated a significant
challenge to the unitary state of BiH. There are sixty-three defence properties129
in the RS, which should have come under the control of the state MOD when
the entity MoDs were closed down in 2006. The RS government has resisted
this move and claims that they still belong to the entity. In effect the RS is now
using this issue to block any further progress of the country towards NATO
membership.130 In discussing this challenge Busterud (2014:6) draws attention
to the importance of including provision for SSR as an integral part of peace
agreements. It would also be quite reasonable to ask the question why this was
not resolved during the DRC processes, but, as a NATO official explains:
"The reason why this was not resolved in the Defence Law of 2005 is because
to have tried to get that deal in amongst the deal of transferring the Defence
competencies to State level would have sunk the whole deal. So what we did in
the Defence legislation, and we did the same for immovable Defence property,
is put in the transitional provision."131
Those interviewed for this research have all made it clear that immovable
property is clearly a political issue132 and a senior OHR official claimed that "...
resolution of State and Defence properties is the main objective to be fulfilled ..."
for completion of the '5+2 Agenda' that would see the closure of OHR.133
Two interviewees, however, pointed out that there are some practical and
operational implications for the AFBiH as well.  Brigadier Hamza Višća, who had 












"For example, we have more than fifty Barracks which we do not need, and
guarding them with more than half a thousand people today, which means if we
rotated three groups on it, close to two thousand people, mostly soldiers. We
have five thousand soldiers, two thousand armed guards which means two
thousand people are not on training and that is a problem."134
This begs the question whether these defence properties need to be guarded in
the first place.  Dr Damir Kapidžić, a lecturer with the University of Sarajevo, 
suggested that some sites probably do not but many have already:
"... been sealed, basically stripped bare and sealed. Others, where this is not
possible – for example we have this infamous bunker near Konjić, the Tito 
bunker, it’s a big complex and simply not possible to strip it bare of anything
and even in itself it could be regarded as a security issue if it were
abandoned."135
Apart from the opportunity costs that these activities consume, the defence
budget still spends approximately 80% of its resources on personnel costs.136
This leaves very little room for routine training, maintenance of current
equipment and development of new capabilities. It is a problem shared with
most of the post-communist MoDs.
Operational Capabilities and Deployments
To bring this section to a close, it is worth reviewing AFBiH's deployments and






Obtaining precise budgetary figures for BiH is difficult but this figure was quoted both by
Busterud (2014:5) and Aybet & Bieber (2011:1933) and, in the former case, came from an
interview with a member of the NHQSa NAT. A 2009 report from CSS puts the MoD personnel
costs at around 70-82% between 2004 and 2009. The report points out, however, that certain
operating costs are included in this percentage. It avers that if common practice from several
NATO countries was adopted then personnel costs would be around 50-60%. It is not possible
to judge the reliability of this figure. For CCS Report see: http://www.css.ba/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/images_docs_troskovi%20i%20beneficije%20pridruzivanja%20nato%
20eng.doc%201.pdf [Last accessed 13 April 2016].
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ability of individual NATO and PfP armed forces to be interoperable is a key
tenet of Alliance policy. In essence:
“NATO’s interoperability policy defines the term as the ability for Allies to act
together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational
and strategic objectives. Specifically, it enables forces, units and/or systems to
operate together and allows them to share common doctrine and procedures,
each others’ infrastructure and bases, and to be able to communicate.”137
One of the principal mechanisms that NATO employs is a process of
standardisation, which is then validated first on training exercises and then on
operations, the latter being particularly important for this process of institutional
isomorphism. For BiH this began first with the deployment of an Explosive
Ordnance Device (EOD) unit to the US-led coalition in Iraq in 2005 and
continued until the end of 2008. There was also one infantry rotation in 2008
but both missions were ended, so that BiH could begin support of NATO in
Afghanistan from 2009. First it was with staff officers to various HQs but then
infantry soldiers in combat roles. With the closure of the NATO combat mission
in Afghanistan, the AFBiH provided a force protection unit for the US Bagram
Base in January 2015 and then a small training and mentoring team in the north
of the country.138 Those units were still in place at the end of 2015.139
At the April 2013 PARP assessment meeting held at the NATO HQ in Brussels,
the AFBiH operational deployments came in for particular praise from several
NATO countries. Whilst the language is normally fairly diplomatic and uncritical
at these meetings in Brussels, there did appeared to be a real strength of
feeling that Bosnian troops had performed well. Certainly from talking with
individual NCOs and officers during visits to BiH over the past few years, the
researcher detected through direct observation that there was a strong sense of
137
See: NATO, Interoperability: Connecting NATO Forces, dated 6 June 2017. Available at:
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_84112.htm [Last accessed on 28 July 2017]
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Details taken from: BiH MoD, Ministry of Defense [sic] and The Armed Forces of Bosnia and
Herzegovina Brochure 2015, op cit, pp4-18 and pp44-45.
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AFBiH individuals have also been deployed on UN missions such as MINUSMA in Mali and
MONUSCO in the DRC.
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pride in the capabilities that had been honed to take part in NATO operations
and what they had achieved during their deployments. Given that all the
deployed units are ethnically mixed, there is some hope for the continued
cohesion of the AFBiH.
It is also worth highlighting the excellent performance of the AFBiH during the
torrential flooding that occurred in the region in May 2014. Some 750 members
of the AFBiH deployed to rescue and evacuate thousands of people, cattle and
materials from the flood-affected area. The MoD also drew upon assistance
from NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC)
in Brussels and this helped to ensure a coherent response from the Armed
Forces of the neighbouring countries, as well as other NATO and PfP
members.140 It was just such a natural disaster that the AFBiH had been
preparing for with PfP colleagues from Serbia and Croatia in recent years. In
the aftermath the AFBiH were also to the forefront in reinforcing flood defences,
airlifting supplies to hillside villages and opening up transport routes. The
performance of the Armed Forces was in stark contrast to the ineptitude of both
state and local governments, as bluntly described by the USAID Chief and the
US Defence Attaché from the US Embassy in Sarajevo:
"[W]e have both personally witnessed the same failure of the governments in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, at all levels, to serve the needs of citizens.
[Meanwhile ...] [t]he Armed Forces of BiH as well as many civil protection
personnel, first responders, and volunteers were courageous and active in the
immediate aftermath of the flood. The AFBiH have sustained their engagement
and are currently conducting demining, clearing roads, and repairing
infrastructure where approved."141
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For example, see: NATO, EADRCC Report No5, dated 27 May 2014. Available at:
http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_05-BiH-floods/20150302_140519-
BiH-floods-05.pdf [Last accessed 14 April 2016].
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US Embassy Sarajevo - Ambassador's Blogspot, Nečuveno/Outrage, dated 18 September
2014. available at: http://usembassysarajevo.blogspot.co.uk/2014/09/necuvenooutrage_18.html
[Last accessed 14 April 2016].
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With these words of praise for the professionalism of the AFBiH, it is now time
to turn to a detailed discussion and synthesis of the researcher's findings and
understanding of the case study.
DISCUSSION AND SYNTHESIS
The structure of this section follows the analytical framework that was
developed in Chapter 2. The first section focuses on the context of reform.
The Context of Reform
Any discussion involving SSR needs to start with the context and BiH is no
exception. Although it may be slightly artificial due to the blurring of boundaries,
it is proposed to examine the context in three parts: historical, drawing upon the
overview at the beginning of this Chapter; regional, drawing upon the current
political and security environment; and local attitudes and narratives, drawing
mainly upon data collected from interviews.
Although considerable time and space in this Chapter has been vested in
discussing this context, it is worth remembering that the seeds of BiH's conflict
in the 1990s were laid at the end of the Second World War, when “…the regime
had built into its functioning a complicated system of checks and balances to
ensure that no ethnic group became dominant; in effect, it institutionalized
ethnic difference." (Kaldor 2012:37) In the following years of communism
political challenges were not permitted and thus a "... nationalist political
discourse became the only form of legitimate debate." (Ibid:380) It is therefore
hardly surprising that ethno-nationalism took centre stage with the death of Tito.
This situation was then perpetuated by the DPA.
There is general agreement that DPA was successful in bringing an end to the
physical conflict but at the same time it imposed significant barriers to BiH
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becoming a functioning state. The political rhetoric of the RS both rejects the
existence of the DPA as well as clinging to its statutes in order to maintain a
separate identity within a supposedly unitary state. Whilst BiH has all the
trappings of statehood with a border, a flag, and an army, it also has two entities
and three constituent people142 and a Byzantine system of devolved authority.
As the German philosopher Sloterdijk argues, states are only states as long as
they convince themselves that they are.143 This does not appear to be the case
in BiH and it would seem unlikely to be the case in the future. Given this split
existence, it is a remarkable achievement that NATO144 has helped integrate
former warring parties into one army with appropriate levels of oversight and
accountability. It is clearly not perfect but, as all the interviewees for this case
study have unanimously agreed, defence reform in BiH has been the best area
of reform undertaken within BiH in the past 20 years.
In the first 'Preliminary Article' of his 'Perpetual Peace' essay, Kant145 argued
that no peace treaty is truly valid if there remain seeds within it for a resumption
of hostilities.146 Self-evidently this is still the case today in BiH with the DPA, so
there is a lesson to be learned here for the international community in designing
peace agreements that are then intended to lead to liberal statebuilding. Of
particular importance is the manner in which such a situation limits the ability of
international organisations to influence events on the ground due to the
presence of a 'negative peace' and absence of a 'positive peace'.147 This
clearly has implications for NATO's use of conditionality in BiH, which will be
dealt with later in this Chapter.148
The second part of this section now turns to the regional context. As part of
SSR’s holistic approach it is entirely consistent to look beyond the borders of a
142
These peoples do not include the so-called 'others' who are denied participation in the
power-sharing arrangements.
143
 As quoted in Ćurak & Turčalo (2012:78) 
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Or as Anzulović (1999:174) suggests rather simply: "Peace without justice is unstable".
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See section entitled: ‘Capacity Building Through Norm Setting and Conditionality’.
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country like BiH in order to understand its context. In so doing it is worth noting
that NATO has played, and continues to play, a major regional role within the
Western Balkans region and not just because it has representation in many of
the individual countries. The Alliance is able to bring together former
combatants under the NATO umbrella in order to improve regional cooperation
and thus security.  As Brigadier Hamza Višća stated:  
"If we [... say that ...] we are surrounded by our enemies something is wrong.
But if you say, ok, we have from one side, currently we have member of NATO,
Croatia. From other side we have Montenegro who will be member of NATO as
soon as possible. [...] And from the other side our neighbour Serbia who stated
[... its ...] neutrality but their co-operation with NATO is probably bigger than
ours. They also, as BiH, are members of Partnership Programme but they have
excellent co-operation with NATO, and in that sense, that means that we will
have feeling that we are surrounded by our [... allies ...] and joining NATO is
giving us the opportunity to develop [...further.]"149
Whilst many individuals in BiH may not hold such enlightened views as Višća, it 
does highlight the beneficial role that NATO can play in helping to heal the
legacy of recent conflicts through regional cooperation.150 The building of
professional relations, and a common approach to military doctrine and
procedures helps to build a degree of homogeneity that comes close to
isomorphism. One such example is the formation of the Peace Support
Operations Training Centre (PSOTC) in Sarajevo that draws military staff and
students from across the region, as well as deploying mixed mobile training
teams across the whole of CEE and South East Europe (SEE).
Dr Damir Kapidžić, a lecturer with the University of Sarajevo, pointed out that 
the peoples of the Former Yugoslavia were well used to moving around the
federation and "... setting up standards for [... the ...] military but also [...] to urge




eg Interviews BH2 and BH4.
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people here would want."151 These common standards have proved particularly
useful in responding to civil emergencies in the Region.152 During an interview
with a former UK Western Balkans Defence Attaché, Lieutenant Colonel Phil
Osment, he highlighted the number and value of these exercises involving the
various PfP members from the Western Balkans and how the cooperation has
contributed to regional stability.153
The third part of this section concerns the local attitudes and narratives which
shape the context for reform within BiH. Different ethnic groups have different
visions for the future and different narratives.154 There would seem to be four
major points to make and they are listed below.
First, as explained in Chapter 2, the initial task of an IGO like NATO (or the EU)
in approaching SSR or broader reforms in a country is to understand the local
context and local attitudes. Richard Holbrooke's quote at the start of the
'Historical Background' to this chapter is particularly pertinent. The assistance
given by the US in brokering the 1994 Washington Treaty that created the
Bosniak – Croat Federation, as well as the US funding of the 'train and equip'
programme, means that the Bosniaks and Croats are relatively well disposed
towards the US (and by extension NATO). In their eyes both have a degree of
legitimacy. On the other hand, Bosnian Serbs would claim that only they, of the
three constituent peoples, were bombed by NATO and US during the 1992-
1995 conflict, and thus were being 'punished' unfairly. (Busterud 2014:5)
Furthermore, it was the Serbs who were then bombed by NATO during the




Using the armed forces for these types of exercise has proved particularly useful for three
main reasons. First, civil emergencies such as flooding, bush fires and earthquakes tend to
have cross-border ramifications, so common standards and being able to coordinate across
borders has real practical benefits. Second, the common enemy is not another country in the
Region but the forces of nature. Third, working with neighbouring armed forces helps build
confidence that embeds stability. The policy direction for most of these civil emergency
exercises comes directly from HQ NATO Brussels, with the coordination provided by ACO








these events, but it depends upon which narrative you hear and which you
believe. There is much emotion on the part of the Bosnian Serb attitudes,
which is entirely understandable, but this influences attitudes and ensures that
there is little attempt by the RS or Serbia to analyse critically their own narrative
and compare it with others. If RS and Serbian politicians continue to feed their
own people this view of history, then it is difficult for a NATO narrative to be
heard.
Second, and related to the previous point, "... Serbia's influence on the RS
cannot be underestimated ..." (Aybet & Bieber 2011:1932) The RS takes its
lead from Belgrade in most areas, but especially with regard to NATO. Although
Serbia is a member of PfP, having been offered membership at the same time
as BiH in 2006, it has an espoused position of 'neutrality', and thus has
indicated it does not wish to become a full member of NATO.156 By rote the
government of the RS under Dodik has adopted the same stance, although as
an entity it has no official competence in this area, and furthermore all three
members of the Tri-Presidency signed the agreement to join MAP as a
precursor to becoming a full member of NATO. (Busterud 2014:6)
When the researcher challenged the BiH Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Ana Trišić Babić, about this paradox in a meeting in London, she responded in
a surprisingly positively manner.157 Not only did she suggest that there was a
need and desire for all countries in the region to be part of a strong Alliance and
thus BiH's bid to join NATO should come as no surprise. She also indicated
that over the next few elections the political landscape in the RS would change,
as there would be a new generation of voters who have had no personal
experience or memory of the war. And finally, although she is a member of
Dodik's SNSD party, she reinforced her point that even the SNSD is changing
and that Dodik will not remain in power for ever.158 How much of this was what
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Although outside the direct time fame of this research it should be noted that Dodik is now
under political pressure as a result of the collapse of the Pavlović Bank in the RS.  See: Balkans 
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she felt her audience wanted to hear, and how much was an honest
assessment, is difficult to judge. If she is correct in her analysis, then it is just
possible that the context might be changing and, if it does, then NATO will need
to act swiftly to capitalise.
The third point to note is the influence of Russia on events in BiH and in
particular the RS.159 There are some traditional links with the Serbian
population based on a combination of a shared Orthodox religion and a
perceived shared Slavic heritage. One interviewee160 argued that the Russians
provided moral and practical support to the RS, not out of principle, but for
financial advantage. He cited the examples of the purchase of the oil refinery at
Slavonski Brod161 and a network of fuel stations, as well as asserting their own
national interest by preventing another country joining NATO. Some of this
influence is also exerted by Russia through its membership of the PIC Steering
Board.162
The fourth and final point is to return to Professor Azinović's view of society in 
BiH. A main plank of Serbian mythology has been the view that they are the
'victims' of external forces, be it during Ottoman times or more recently during
the late twentieth century. As one interviewee observed, the population of the
RS has been fed for years on the propaganda along the lines of "... they’re
imputing to us a guilt that we have not deserved." This is now firmly embedded
in the psyche of the RS citizens, and to overcome this mindset would be
extremely difficult.163  Azinović, however, extrapolates this beyond the Bosnian 
Serbs to include all of the Bosnian people. He suggests that:
Insight, Dodik Probe Will Affect Bosnia Elections, Experts Say, 13 April 2016. Available at:
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/investigation-against-dodik-might-influence-local-
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"... this victimhood mentality, which sort of stipulates that they don’t have to
earn anything by working harder, excelling, but simply they deserve everything,
because they suffered so much during the war, and NATO should turn a blind
eye to our inefficiencies and other stuff and simply grant us the membership
status because we deserve it. [...] This notion of our internal victimhood simply
because of what we are, what we were, what our belief system is, is being
reinforced by our political elites."164
If he is correct, this social construct would go some way to understanding the
lack of progress with reform in the country, so the barrier to progress is not just
the Weltanschauung of the RS, but the main political parties in the Federation
as well.  What is perhaps most worrying about the Azinović's analysis is the 
implication that the BiH authorities are content to continue with an externally-led
(eg NATO) reform process without taking the necessary steps themselves to
'own' the process and move it forward.
Political Engagement
At every turn in BiH local politics rears its head and much has already been said
in the previous section. There is a general weariness and cynicism about
politics in BiH.  As Emsad Dizdarević said: “The main obstacles for Bosnia are
politics and politicians.”165 The role of Lord Ashdown and the two DRCs in
creating pressure for the reform of the military at the critical juncture in 2003
have, however, demonstrated the value of active political engagement. As the
former leader of a political party in the UK, Ashdown understood politics and
understood power. Jackson and Albrecht (2015:205) also remind us that “SSR
has to be based on a thorough understanding of power in post-conflict






It would now be appropriate to examine how NATO engages politically with BiH.
It is inevitable that it is mainly state-centric as that is the level an IGO such as
NATO operates. The IS in NATO HQ Brussels have responsibility for the
politico-military aspects for NATO's work including all the PfP tools and
programmes.166 Its personnel take the lead in directly advising BiH in the
reform processes both in defence but also in the wider reform efforts.167
(Morffew 2007:13) The IMS then provide limited military advice in this work.
The next HQ down is the strategic level military HQ (Allied Command
Operations (ACO), formerly SHAPE) and the next is the operational level HQs
(JFC Naples and JFC Brunssum). Both of these HQs are designed to conduct
military operations not SSR. They are staffed by military officers and they have
very few political staff who understand SSR. As explained in Chapter 4, for
some three years (2006-2009) there was a small mixed military-civilian team
that had a coordinating role for SSR within the Western Balkans. This was then
subsumed into a military cooperation directorate during one of a series of
manpower reviews168 and JFC Naples then lost its expertise in SSR. The next
level HQ down is the tactical HQ in BiH, which is NHQSa. One of its major
tasks is to:
"Advise BiH authorities on defence reform, including coordination of Partnership
for Peace (PfP) activities, in order to contribute to further Euro-Atlantic
integration." 169
To execute that task the HQ has a small civilian political-military (pol-mil) team,
which was originally formed from the personnel that migrated from the OSCE in
early 2005. This team advises mainly on the conceptual and wider reforms
166
See Chapter 4 and Appendix 11 for more details.
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Primarily led the PASP division and the DPP division.
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ie. One of the periodic bouts of 'downsizing' demanded by the NATO Allies.
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See: JFC Naples, NHQSa. Available at: http://www.jfcnaples.nato.int/hqsarajevo/about-
sarajevo-/nhqsa-mission [Last accessed 17 April 2016]. Note that the task only mentions
'defence reform', although the NATO website describes the task as ‘Defence and Security
Sector Reform. See: NATO, Relations with Bosnia Hercegovina. Available at:
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49127.htm# [Last accessed 18 July 2017].
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necessary to implement the PfP programmes including PARP and IPAP.170 It is
this team that provides the day-to-day contact with the BiH authorities. What it
does not do is provide political engagement with respect to SSR at a sufficient
senior level. There is a Senior Military Representative (SMR), but the
incumbent is mainly confined to dealing with the BiH Minster of Defence and
Minister of Security. Previously there had been senior political advisors, such
as Dr Raffi Gregorian, who had acted as co-chair of the second DRC, and who
provided active political engagement. That post has been amalgamated with
branch head of the pol-mil team, which downgrades the level of the political
engagement.
Informal authority has been given for NHQSa to brief both PASP and DPP in
the HQ NATO Brussels IS but it seems a rather loose arrangement and there is
certainly no guidance or SSR framework.171 This means that there is no vade
mecum for staff to consult. As Ole Hammer remarked:
"NATO was absolutely unprepared for this political type of engagement and
thought that it could manage through an ordinary military chain of command
with military officers that didn’t have any, or limited, political experience. And
this caused problems throughout the process basically because we were
supposed to be reporting through a military chain of command that did not quite
like or understand what it was that we were doing in this context." 172
Busterud (2014:7) observed that: “Some members of the NATO Advisory Team
indicated that it would be preferable if NATO HQ Sarajevo reported directly to
Brussels, […] where there is more knowledge on defense reform processes.”
This was a view that was shared by several interviewees with the researcher
during his field trips to BiH,173 although it clearly ran foul of NATO’s institutional
structure, whereby subordinate military HQs, were always obliged to operate
170
One of the roles that has proved particularly helpful to the BiH authorities has been the
team's lawyer, who has helped draft legislation that met the requirements of NATO integration




Interview BH23. Currently a member of the EU staff and a former member of NHQSa.
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Interviews BH5-N and BH7-N.
229
through a military chain of command. Turning to rational choice institutionalism,
NATO has certain rules in order to create expectations about likely outcomes.
Military commanders always take exception to issues being raised directly by a
subordinate commander or their staff with a superior HQ, thus leaving the
intervening commander ‘blind-sided’ about the issue. The rules are therefore
quite strict to ensure that it does not happen. This institutional stasis does not
take into account, however, the political nature of tasks like SSR in BiH or
indeed the lack of expertise within the intervening HQs.
Peter Appleby, an OHR official, emphasised the importance of coordinating the
political agenda but, understandably, there were difficulties for a small in-
country NATO HQ, such as NHQSa, fulfilling that role when dealing with large
bilateral actors such as the US or the EU.174 For NATO this type of political
engagement could not come from the in-country NATO HQ and thus needed to
come from Brussels. This would seem to have led to a clear and obvious gap in
NATO’s political engagement with BIH.
Local Ownership
This then brings us to one of the thornier issues in supporting reform in BiH and
that is 'local ownership'.175 Chapter 2 explored the value of using the
development of an NSS as a means of helping create local ownership. There
were two constraints on BiH in following this particular route. First, there was a
priority to reform and reduce the defence sector immediately as part of the DDR
process, and second, there was the contested nature of the state. The idea of
creating the DRCs therefore seems to have been a practical alternative that
focussed mainly on the defence sector but also included issues of governance
like oversight and its concomitant legislation. It also allowed NATO HQ




The importance of 'local ownership' has been thoroughly exposed in Chapter 3, so only the
key texts will be referred to in this section.
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defence sector and allow local actors to absorb the changes in a coherent
manner.
As discussed earlier, the timing, structure and thrust of the DRCs were clearly
initiated by the international community, and thus it was undoubtedly externally
driven reform. (Perdan 2008:262) Viewing the process through the lens of
Arnstein’s ladder of participation (1969:217), it would initially be classified as
‘manipulation’ or ‘therapy’ and certainly at the lower scale of ownership.
Nonetheless, most of the members of the commissions were local actors and
the hard compromises and decisions were made by local politicians, so one
could reasonably argue that a degree of local ownership was being created.
Arnstein’s ladder would seem to suggest, however, that it was still ‘placation’ (a
degree of tokenism) and only at best a degree of ‘partnership’ (the lowest form
of participation). The political impasse in 2006 then changed the political
context and put the reform process into reverse. The title of Dr Laurie Nathan's
seminal work on local ownership, No Ownership, No Commitment, now
summaries the essential dilemma for BiH. As ownership has waned, so has
commitment to the reform process.
Notwithstanding the strategic difficulties with reform, it is worth stressing the
positive role that NATO has played in using the tools of PfP, including PARP
and IPAP, to encourage the defence sector to keep moving in a forward
direction. Although these tools have a set framework, they are individually
tailored to BiH, and have allowed the MoD and AFBiH to continue progressing
at a pace dictated by the needs and desires of local actors. Unfortunately, there
is a natural limit to the efficacy of these programmes and to progress further BiH
would need to move onto the MAP programme. This programme is normally
(but not always) considered a step on the path to eventual membership of the
Alliance and BiH was offered this in April 2010 subject to certain political
conditions being met. This has not yet occurred, so an impasse remains.
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If the limitations of Dayton, with its ethnically-based political structure could
have been revised in the early years, then it is possible that a state building
agenda, including SSR, could have worked. Given the current situation,
however, the difficulty of creating local ownership lies:
"... in the utter absence of domestic consensus on both the need for and the
goals of SSR. This lack of [... consensus ...] is well beyond SSR and it is related
to the controversial and contested state of Bosnia statehood." (Perdan
2008:268-269)
The ability of NATO to condition or encourage local ownership in BiH would
seem to be at an end. NATO HQ Brussels and NHQSa can certainly continue
to help the country prepare for NATO membership but local politicians, and
perhaps more importantly civil society, need to take ownership of the reforms
and their outcomes. It is this lack of civil society participation that hinders
ownership and prevents the framework of governance that is in place to function
effectively.
Governance
To most people's surprise, NATO has been in the business of governance for
many years. As a senior member of the IS in HQ NATO Brussels explained,
PfP programmes are essentially "... about governance [...], but we don’t dress it
up that way."176 This is the type of 'soft security' assistance that NATO has
been providing to BiH from the early days of its presence in the country. NATO
has also worked closely with the OSCE and has drawn heavily upon its 'Code of
Conduct' (OSCE 1994), which is essentially a governance framework. There
was a spread of views amongst the interviewees with respect to the institutional
and governance framework within BiH. There are some who claimed that it was
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well,178 and finally a third group that claimed it was in place but was completely
dysfunctional.179 This divergence is probably not too surprising in that some
interviewees were probably part of the system so were relatively sympathetic,
others might have been normatively opposed to the system, and others might
just have had a lesser understanding of the overall concept.
Turning now to some of the detail, there seems to be a consensus that most of
the legal frameworks for governance, accountability and oversight are in
place.180 But, as a member of the Sarajevo the NAT points out, “… it is the
implementation, as always, that is the problem.”181 He also highlighted a lack of
understanding of what was required:
“And in terms of the Parliament I don’t get the impression that the Parliament in
this context, particularly the Defence and Security Committee, really
understands how to conduct sensible targeted oversight on a range of issues,
because first of all they haven’t got that tradition and secondly it’s too party
political. Therefore, I think the oversight process of the Parliament is pretty
weak, and the accountability and the sanctions against the executive, or the
way that the actual nuts and bolts of how you hold the executives to account
are not clearly agreed or understood or in place.” (Ibid)
This would seem to suggest that, according to Fox’s typology (2007:669), that
there is some form of institutional accountability but that it is only ‘soft’ at best
with transparency veering towards ‘opaque’. It is a view that seems to be
echoed by a local security studies institute when it suggested that democratic
control and oversight still suffer from “… a lack of capable management [… and
a need for …] policy makers to overcome the legacy of undemocratic
mentalities and procedures.” (DCAF 2012:65) Similarly, many interviewees felt
that these governance mechanisms were still not particularly effective or
efficient, although those for the security sector were perhaps better than many
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others in the country.182 Drawing upon Schroeder’s typology for hybrid
governance (2014), it would seem that there are norms and rules in place,
along with appropriate organisation structures, but without the capacity
improvements that would occur when the norms are fully internalised.
Schroeder termed this situation as ‘ceremonial structures’, which still fall short
of proper governance.
This would seem to be what most interviewees were suggesting with framework
laws and structures for good (or good enough) governance broadly in place but
without being properly enforced. Indeed, several interviewees suggested that
politicians are particularly prominent in attempting to circumvent them.183
Professor Vlado Azinović was particularly vehement about this last point when 
he drew upon Émile Durkheim's term anomie184 to describe BiH as a 'society
without norms' and that it was:
"... the last place where you can try to solve a problem by imposing new
legislation because the existing legislation and the existing laws are not being
obeyed, and it’s our political elites that actually encourage this disobedience of
law. [...] So it’s a gradual, and I’m afraid irreversible, erosion of this society
from within."185
This rather depressing assessment was followed by an assertion that most
reforms in the country had "... failed miserably so we ended up with our Armed
Forces and our Ministry of Defence being the only almost unified state structure,
something that resembles the way that things should be in a normal society in a
functioning state."186 This last point regarding the AFBiH and MoD would seem
to be echoed by the majority of the other interviewees.
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Let us move now from the more strategic areas of governance to the tactical
level within BiH. Apart from the PfP programmes, it is quite clear that the NATO
Building Integrity (BI) programme has also been helpful in focusing on
transparency and accountability in the defence and security sectors. This has
led to the PSOTC establishing its own course and exporting it as part of its
Mobile Training Teams. The new process for the selection and training of
officers was specifically designed to create a more transparent and fairer
system, and thus for it to have greater legitimacy in the eyes of the people of
BiH. That also seems to be progressing well. NHQSa has been involved in
briefing the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence and Security in BiH, and
it too has helped improve transparency within the area of defence reform.187
There have also been attempts by NATO HQ Brussels and NHQSa to reach out
to the broader civil society both to inform it about the benefits of NATO
membership and to educate it about civil society's role in overseeing the
security sector in a democratic society. Although the results of NATO's efforts
have been mixed, it would not take much to see a marked improvement.188
Before drawing this discussion to a close it would be worth going back to the
World Bank’s definition of governance in Chapter 2 and asking if BiH has that
level of governance. Notwithstanding its ‘ceremonial structures’ and the
progress made within some parts of the security sector, the answer must be no.
Furthermore, NATO does not have the influence, expertise or mandate to
support reforms in many areas of governance. The real difficulty for BiH,
therefore, is that the implementation of governance arrangements is still subject
to undue political pressures, combined with the inherent complexity of many
international organisations ‘assisting’ with the reform process. This leads to a
degree of incoherency and, without a holistic approach to tackle all areas of
187
One word of caution needs to be added here. The 2015 EU Progress Report on BiH
suggested that there had been a limited number of meetings of the committee, but the report
stated that the committee had been set up in 2015, which is incorrect. See: European
Commission, Bosnia and Herzegovina 2015 Report, SWD(2015) 214, final date 11 November
2015. Available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_bosnia_and_herze
govina.pdf [Last accessed 24 November 2015].
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This issue is discussed later in this Chapter in the section entitled: 'NATO's Reputation - Soft
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governance, significant failures will continue. In 2006 Bieber (2006:151)
suggested that “… governance in Bosnia will remain for the foreseeable future
highly complex, and ethnicity will continue to dictate the political agenda
throughout the country.” In 2013 an OHR official stated in a ‘think piece’ that:
“Most problematic are the BiH political class, with whom the IC chooses to
engage. It is a quasi-criminal “kleptocracy”, which has created its own political
reality and sustains a continuation of conflict by perverted political means.
Individuals and institutions use and abuse the legitimate instruments of
legislation and laws to achieve illegitimate and illegal financial, personal and
political advantage.”189
This hardly seems to suggest a governance framework that is working
effectively and efficiently, or one with a reasonable level of accountability and
transparency. It also begs the question as to how governance arrangements
within the security and defence sector can really work if the context within the
wider community and country is as dire as the OHR official suggests.
A Holistic Approach and Cooperation
The last theme in the previous section touched upon the incoherence of
international assistance to BiH. Chapter 2 highlighted the need to adopt a
holistic and comprehensive approach to SSR due to the interconnected nature
of the thematic strands, which included cooperation with other actors. That is
not to say that an institution like NATO should attempt to tackle every thematic
area within the security sector, but it does mean that there is a need for
cooperation with others. As Law points out:
“Some IGOs are relatively complete in terms of the spectrum of the support
they are able to offer to individual countries, from defence reform to judicial
reform. The EU and UN fall into this category. NATO, on the other hand, does
189
Unofficial OHR paper dated 13 May 2013, entitled: The International Community Approach to
BiH. Copy held by researcher.
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not have expertise in areas such as justice and policing, although it does
include norms and standards of judicial practice within the PfP framework.”
(2007:8 – 9)
Bailes (2011:65-80) suggests that the EU is probably the most complete actor in
SSR as it can act politically, financially and thematically, but she also
acknowledges the need for the EU to cooperate with others. Law produced a
table that highlighted the various fields of activity where several SSR-relevant
IGOs were active. A modified version is set out below at Table 5.1:
SSR Sectoral
Engagements
OECD UN EU OSCE NATO





√√ √√ √ √√
Gender &
security








Judicial reform √√ √√ √√
Police reform √√ √√ √√ (√)
Border services
reform




Defence reform √ √ √ √√
Good
governance
√ √ √ √
Table 5.1: IGO Field Activities
(Source: Law 2007:19 – modified by researcher. Brackets indicate some
experience. Double ticks indicate considerable expertise.)
Whilst this table presents an empirical view of the sectoral engagements, it also
shows where there is the potential for overlap and duplication. Cooperation is
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particularly important in BiH, where there is a plethora of actors, both
international and national. It was a view that Paddy Ashdown clearly adhered
to, as he was often heard saying that there is little that can be done in
statebuilding by one organisation that can't be done better with the cooperation
of others.190 It is a mantra that he attempted to put into practice as High
Representative in BiH. Not only did he chair a 'Board of Principals' meeting that
COM SFOR (and his successor COM NHQSa) attended,191 but he was also at
pains to socialise in any controversial issue with all the key stakeholders
including the Russians on the PIC Steering Board. As a senior member of the
OHR staff commented:
“The High Representative co-ordinates the international community because
that is the only thing we have. The EU can’t co-ordinate the Americans,
certainly not the Russians, and the EU also requires a little bit of co-ordination,
if you understand what I’m saying, from time to time. So in that sense it’s not a
bad thing to have this oddity of the High Representative asking people every
second week, asking these various international actors to come together round
his table and to debate the issues.”
Notwithstanding this good example, several interviewees remarked that in
general cooperation between local and international actors with reforms in BiH
was relatively disjointed.192 An official from the Ministry of Security expressed
the belief, however, that one of the reasons for the success of defence reform in
the country was that the international community were all acting in a coherent
and joined up manner.193 Although as a NATO official wryly remarked,
coordinating international actors in BiH was akin to "herding cats."194
Technical Issues and Skills
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It was reassuring from one of the interviewees for this research that in her
experience: "... [r]eform is not a technical issue, it is a political issue."195 She
was obviously correct in the salience of politics over technical, but most SSR
practitioners would also argue that technical expertise is needed in a range of
different areas, from strategy to change management to programming skills.
The political and technical skills of the NATO civilian pol-mil team in Sarajevo
has been discussed early196 but it would be worth also examining the other
section of NHQSa supporting reform in BiH.
There is a small team of military officers in a technical military advisory team,
that is more commonly referred to as the NATO Advisory Team (NAT). The
NAT provides technical military advice and support to NHQSa and the BiH
defence establishment in areas such as logistics, training and procurement.197
Both the civilian and the military teams are embedded in the MoD, so the issue
of day-to-day liaison with the BiH authorities is greatly eased.198 The key point
to note about the two teams is that their roles are meant to be complementary.
As Colonel Ole Fauske, the Deputy Commander of NHQSa in 2013,199
explained:
"...the whole scope of this is, of course, to give advice on developing and
restructuring the Armed Forces [... and the defence and security sector ...] in
such a manner that BiH may, if it so chooses, become a member of NATO."
Unfortunately, the military staff tend to be on short tours (normally in the order
of six months) and, as a senior member of the IS pointed out: "It’s just the lack
of continuity which is such a weakness."200 A member of the OSCE in BiH went
a stage further in his criticism and suggested that whilst the military officers in
the NAT may understand their individual military specialisations, they tend to
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are operating. He went on to suggest that NATO's reputation had suffered as a
result.201
These criticisms were acknowledged by the Deputy Commander of NHQSa,202
who explained that more effort was spent by nations on just filling the military
posts rather than filling them with personnel of the correct quality and
capabilities. Another senior military member of the NAT explained that NHQSa
would prefer personnel on two year tours but that "... it's very difficult really to
send someone for two years living in Butmir without the [sic] family, because
this is still considered to be a NATO operation."203
This continuity issue has been brought into sharp relief as a US-funded team of
retired military officers from MPRI204 provide similar expertise to the NAT, but
they tend to spend longer in post and have a greater depth of experience.205
This point was reinforced when a senior member of the IS, who has been
deeply involved in offering advice to the BiH authorities for a number of years,
said:
"With the rotation of military personnel through that Headquarters and the
NATO Advisory Team, the one thing I have been really keen to try and preserve
has been the civilian element of it. Essentially the guys that we took over from
the OSCE Secretariat in 2005." 206
When asked why he thought longer tours were so important, Rohan Maxwell,
the Senior Political Military Adviser in NHQSa, suggested that:
201
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Interview BH20-N. Camp Butmir is the base camp of NHQSa and EUFOR on the outskirts of
Sarajevo, and contains accommodation, feeding and recreation facilities for NATO and EU
troops.
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"In the SSR role, both relationships and knowledge are important. Advisers
need to be in post for at least a year, preferably two years. Even if an adviser is
an expert in their field, they will still need contextual experience. NATO need to
be prepared to pay for this or not bother [... assisting with SSR]." 207
This latter point is particularly pertinent, as a senior officer in JFC Naples (the
operational superior HQ for NHQSa) had questioned the value of the NHQSa
during an interview and contended that it was too large and needed to be
reduced.208 He did acknowledge, however, that the type of skill set in the pol-
mil team was not easily produced from the ranks of the NATO military and that
there was no formal training required before taking up these types of
appointment in reform.209 This training lacuna is something that NATO could
easily resolve.
There is one additional point to make with regard to NHQSa's involvement with
the reform process. Unlike most actors in the SSR field such as UNDP or
individual countries, NHQSa does not have any funding to carry out specific
projects. It either has to recommend projects to in-country embassies, such as
Norway,210 accept project ideas and funding from those embassies (such as the
PSOTC and UK),211 or lobby NATO HQ Brussels to set up some form of trust
fund (such as to assist with the demobilisation of soldiers). (Busterud 2014:13)
Capacity Building Through Norm Setting and Conditionality
The key mechanism for NATO’s support to capacity building in BiH has been




Interestingly there was an attempt to remove the pol-mil team entirely, but the IS inserted a
phrase into a document called a Periodic Mission Review (PMR) in 2011 that no changes could
be made to the composition of NHQSa without NAC approval. Giving such firm direction to the
military chain of command is a highly unusual step for the IS, but it seemed to reflect the
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neatly summarise the progress that has been made and the challenges to
come:
“Much good work has been done, but if BiH is to achieve that goal, its still-
coalescing defence establishment and its other state-level structures must
continue to develop capacity and sustain that capacity into the long term. The
population as a whole must also develop a realistic understanding of NATO,
and to that end one of BiH’s IPAP commitments is to inform and educate the
population about the PfP and NATO membership, promote the view of NATO
membership as a worthwhile goal for the country, and engage in open and frank
discussions.” (2013:79-80)
The key to unblocking progress would seem to be the resolution of the
‘immovable property’ issue that was discussed earlier.213 Rational choice
theorists would argue that too many of the political elite and the population in
the country, but particularly in the RS, do not recognise the benefits of NATO
membership as outweighing the disadvantages, thus conditionality seems to
have failed. As Keohane suggests: “… neither domestic institutions nor
prospects of economic gain are likely to provide sufficient incentives [… if the…]
loyalties of populations [… are …] divided, as in Bosnia, along ethnic or
national lines, and no state may command legitimacy.” (2002:76) It would be
worth developing this theme of conditionality in more detail.
A number of interviewees stressed the importance of conditionality in guiding
and pacing the reform process (and not just SSR) in aspirant countries. For
example, Lieutenant General Peter Pearson, NATO's Deputy Commander for
the Western Balkans and Mediterranean, suggested that:
"... joining NATO isn’t just complying with the military requirements, they’re
much wider than that, much more in the political and the social arena, and
indeed economic, but the direct answer to your question is, without NATO and
213
See section entitled: ‘Immovable Property’, Chapter 5.
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the EU setting the standards and applying the pressure, I don’t think states
would reform any way as fast as they currently do." 214
Whilst conditionality would appear to have worked reasonably well for both the
EU and NATO in Eastern Europe, the picture is more mixed in BiH. A number
of the interviewees for this research contrasted the relative success of NATO in
assisting the country with its defence reform, as compared to the rather sub-
optimal achievements of the EU with police reform.215 An official from the BiH
Ministry of Security suggested that there were several reasons for the poor
progress with police reform: first, the EU only took over the international lead
relatively recently from the UN; secondly, whilst the two armies of BiH had been
merged into one under state control, the police had more structures at all levels
after the reform than before; and, thirdly, the EU was too timid in applying its
conditionality. She summarises this assertion when she stated:
"You will remember at that time they put three requirements for Police Reform.
Firstly that all legislation related to policing in BiH should be on the State level.
That was the first. The second, no political interference in the operational work
of the Police – and I’m laughing – and the third, the Police regions should be
established according to professional standards, that means that these regions
could cross the entity lines. [...] But not one of those criteria was fulfilled, could
I say, or reached, and from my point of view the Police Reform failed. And the
European Union gave up in order to give BiH the possibility to sign an
agreement on the Association and Integration of BiH to the European Union in
summer 2008."216
Aybet and Bieber (2011:1933) suggest that “… a certain structure has to pre-
exist at the domestic level that involves domestic or local norms and institutions




For example, see interviews: BH2, BH6 and BH17.
216
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contend that in post-conflict societies such as BiH, the absence or weakness of
these structures at the state level, mean that processes of socialisation and
rationalisation are difficult to achieve. They go on to argue that NATO’s
success in the field of defence reform “… can be attributed to the use of local
triggers by a strong international leadership driven by a few skilled international
actors.” (Ibid:1934) What the international actors, including NATO, could not
overcome, however, was this weakness in local institutions and a lack of a
coherent vision of a unitary state by all political sides. This has resulted in an
impasse with the reform process since 2006. The conclusion being that in the
absence of political will and weaknesses in certain domestic structures within
BiH, attempts at conditionality are unlikely to further the reform process.
Part of the process of conditionality and emulation that was discussed above
centres around the ‘soft power’ of NATO. Keohane and Nye (2012:216) offer
the following definition of ‘soft power’ as being: “the ability to get desired
outcomes because others want what you want; it is the ability to achieve
desired outcomes through attraction rather than coercion.” NATO and its
member states have been clear in their desire for BiH to become a stable and
fully functioning member of the Euro-Atlantic community but have been less
explicit about full membership of the Alliance.217 Nonetheless, it still wields a
degree of ‘soft power’, albeit, as will be shown below, with some caveats.
As explained earlier in this chapter,218 NATO is held in high regard by many
sections of the population in BiH219 and this has translated into a 70% majority
wishing to join the Alliance.220 A number of bilateral actors in the country, such
as embassy officials, have also offered assistance to the BiH government under
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BiH population support the accession of the country to NATO, although the figure is much less
in the RS than the federation. (Copy of survey held by researcher.) Although NATO
membership is not an aspiration for many in the RS, there is still a measure of respect for the
organisation.
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the aegis of NATO,221 as it demonstrated that the assistance has been
endorsed by the Alliance and was helping with BiH's progress towards NATO
membership. NHQSa has been active in its strategic communications to
explain the benefits of NATO membership (Busterud 2014:5-6) but, it is worthy
of note, not always successfully.
Whilst a few interviewees praised their efforts,222 a disturbingly high number
were more critical. For example, an academic223 stated that "… it is very
difficult to measure the impact on ordinary citizens if we are [sic] becoming part
of NATO." Whilst a Bosnian Serb officer224 suggested that the "… campaign
for those who are pro-NATO should be more, let’s say, active and try to put in
simple language and simple words to present to the citizens of BiH what NATO
is and what the benefits of joining NATO basically are." Furthermore, a
member225 of a security studies institute opined that "… [w]hen they speak
about NATO, especially when they speak about NATO in Republika Srpska,
the only thing which connects [... them to ...] NATO and is 1999 and Belgrade.
So that’s something that you have to explain to people [... as ...] they do not
understand much [sic]." The Head of small NGO and university lecturer226
drew attention to who portrayed NATO’s narrative when he said that “... in the
past [… NATO …] also engaged local PR Agencies and they tasked them with
devising a PR campaign in order to explain the importance of all these issues,
but unfortunately these attempts fell short of achieving anything substantial.
Maybe it was because of the choice of these Agencies, the lack of expertise,
the lack of understanding, the focus of local partners simply on generating
income out of these campaigns without producing much result, but we [his own
NGO] are trying to do it in a more subtle way."
221
For example, the creation of the PSOTC and the new AFBiH officer selection process.
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There has been a need for the researcher to interpret some of these quite polite
remarks in order to extract real meaning. The general thrust of all the
comments, however, is that NATO does have a good general reputation but it is
not always sensitive to the context within BiH and could be more skilful in
delivering its narrative. It is a view that would seem to be endorsed by a
NHQSa official, who said:
"The average NATO civilian or military official is not going to be able to tell you
very convincingly what the advantages of NATO membership are. It’s [...] such
an obvious question you never ask it. So there is a lack of information, a lack of
understanding, certainly here in the public, at the political level, and even
actually within parts of NATO that should know better perhaps."227
This is clearly a lesson that NATO should recognise and address both in
Brussels and in the in-country HQs like NHQSa if it is to use its reputation for
'soft power' in assisting BiH with its capacity building. As Aybet and Bieber
(2011:1933) also commented, however, there are some difficult institutional
issues within the post-conflict countries such as BiH, which inhibit its ability to
rationalise and socialise the SSR process.
SUMMARY
The historical context and the legacy of the conflict in BiH continue to be
powerful shapers of the country and its security sector. Keohane described the
situation in BiH where neighbours fought against neighbours as a classic
Hobbesian dilemma with the country still showing the scars of the conflict’s
brutality. Although there is general agreement that the DPA was successful in
bringing an end to the physical conflict, at the same time it imposed significant
barriers to BiH becoming a fully functioning state. These barriers included a
freezing of attitudes since the conflict that would seem to have rewarded those




of weak state institutions, that inhibit its ability to rationalise and socialise the
SSR and wider reform process and, finally, a political system that has a
Byzantine-like complexity and which seems to have encouraged corruption and
patronage. Perhaps the most challenging barrier today, however, is the political
rhetoric of the RS both rejects the existence of the DPA and cling to its statutes
in order to maintain a separate identity within a supposedly unitary state.
NATO played a major role in the stabilisation of the country, but it was not until
the arrival of Lord Ashdown that real progress was made in reform of the
security and military arenas. A combination of three events created a window of
opportunity for Ashdown to press for change at what would be best described
as a ‘critical juncture’ in BiH’s history. By a combination of power and politics
he was able to unfreeze the situation within the security sector and create a
single state-level MoD and a joint set of armed forces. The role of Lord
Ashdown and the two DRCs in creating pressure for the reform of the military
demonstrated the value of active political engagement. As the former leader of
a political party in the UK, Ashdown understood politics and understood power.
The timing, structure and thrust of the DRCs were clearly initiated by the
international community, and thus it was undoubtedly externally driven reform
and using Arnstein’s ladder of participation (1969:217), it was certainly at the
lower scale of ownership. Nonetheless, the analysis suggests that as the
majority of the commission members were local actors, and the hard
compromises and decisions were made by local politicians, there was a degree
of local ownership to the process.
Defence and SSR are core elements of the cooperation between NATO and
BiH. These have been conducted through a range of PfP programmes which
have been both powerful and successful drivers of reform. NHQSa has a small
civilian political-military (pol-mil) team, which advises mainly on the conceptual
and wider reforms necessary to implement the PfP programmes including
PARP. Although these tools have a set framework, they are individually tailored
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to BiH, and have allowed the MoD and AFBiH to continue progressing at a pace
dictated by the needs and desires of local actors. In general, NATO has thus
had a significant measure of success in supporting SSR in BiH.
Nonetheless, some other areas of reform have still had mixed results. In large
part this would seem to have been due to the post-conflict context in BiH. The
establishing of local ownership is beset by a lack of domestic consensus over
BiH statehood. Whilst there has been progress with elements of governance,
there is still too much in the way of ‘ceremonial structures’. According to Fox’s
typology (2007:669), there is a degree of institutional accountability, but it would
seem to be ‘soft accountability’ at best with transparency veering towards the
‘opaque’. The comments from both local actors and international actors
regarding broader societal governance would suggest that the situation is poor.
NATO’s attempts to cooperate with others has perhaps been better than most
but overall the picture remains disjointed. The technical support provided by
NATO seems sound, although it is clear that the expertise in SSR and the local
knowledge evident in the civilian pol-mil team is far superior to that of the
military staff, who are mainly on short tours of duty and do not necessarily have
the correct SSR skill-set. In terms of NATO’s support to capacity building within
BiH, there has been a relative degree of success, but the political impasse
imposed by a lack of resolution on ‘immoveable property’ has applied the
brakes to progress. Thus, it would seem, the tool of conditionality can only go
so far in the absence of political will.
There are, however, many areas of the security sector where other
organisations have been assisting the authorities with reform, such as the EU
with police reform, where very little progress has been made. NATO HQ
Brussels has also been active in assisting the MoD and other ministries with
tackling corruption through the BI programme and there have been bilateral
programmes that have had a significant impact on transparency, such as the
selection and training of officers in the AFBiH.
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There have been some clumsy attempts at 'selling' NATO within BiH that lacked
both contextual sensitivity as well as skill in delivering a coherent narrative.
Furthermore, it is clear that engagement in such a highly political issue as SSR
needs more attention paid to training individuals from NATO who are placed
into this environment. A NATO SSR policy and framework would also greatly
assist in shaping training standards for advisors as well as providing them with
a vade mecum for reference. This would also ensure that the military chain of
command had a better understanding of the reform processes involved. The
balance of evidence from the research conducted in BiH, however, is that
NATO's involvement in the country has been good in parts, with the reforms in
the defence arena being the most successful in the country's troubled history.
There would thus seem to be a number of areas where NATO should be able to
improve its overall assistance to BiH. It would now be interesting to look at a
second case study at Chapter 6 in order to see if there are any parallels with





CASE STUDY - KOSOVO
"The Kosovo myth acquired the central position in the spiritual life of the
Serbian intelligentsia in the nineteenth century. It lived outside poetry:
among politicians, the military, scientists, professors, artists, clergy,
physicians, merchants, tradesmen, and especially among college and high
school students. It gradually became an integral part of [... the Serbian... ]
national ideology."
Vidovdan and the Holy Cross (Vidovdan i Časni Krst) - Miodrag Popović1
INTRODUCTION
The BiH case study at Chapter 5 drew upon the broad historical canvas of the
Region in Chapter 1, and so will this case study. Its purpose is to provide
deeper knowledge and a better understanding of events in Kosovo from 1995 to
2015 and to show how NATO has supported SSR in the country from 1999. It
is particularly important for that understanding to have an appreciation of the
symbolism of Kosovo in Serbian ideology and mythology, as the quote above
from Popović seeks to illustrate.  It is also worth making the distinction now that 
Kosovo did not have a security sector once Serbian forces were expelled in
1999, so NATO's role should be more accurately described as helping to
'develop' a security sector.
The Chapter is broken down into the same six broad sections as the BiH case
study. First, there is a brief introduction. Second, an historical and broadly
chronological background of Kosovo and its relationship with Serbia from 1995
to 2015 is presented that provides a narrative description, as well as some
analysis, in order to define the context of the country. Third, an analysis is
conducted of the current political and security situation in Kosovo that draws
1
 As quoted in Anzulović (1999:81) 
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upon all available data, including primary research, and seeks to provide the
more detailed context for development of the security sector. Fourth, a detailed
exposition and analysis of NATO's role in the development of a security sector
in Kosovo is carried out that also takes into account the interaction with other
stakeholders. The analysis draws heavily upon primary research material.
Some key issues are developed, not so much for generalising beyond the
individual case, as for understanding the complexities and meanings inherent in
it. Fifth, the findings and understanding about the case are then discussed and
synthesised thematically in this section. This will then allow the knowledge of
the phenomenon to be considered more broadly in a comparative analysis of
the cross-data collected from the two case studies in Chapter 7. Finally, there
is a concluding summary on the Kosovo case study.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND2
The Country, Peoples and Neighbours
Kosovo is a small landlocked country in the middle of the Western Balkans, with
some 2 million inhabitants.3 As the map 6.1 below shows, it is bounded by
three countries of the former Yugoslavia (Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia),
as well as Albania. The landmass is roughly half the size of Wales and can
2
Several of the paragraphs that follow in this Chapter draw, in whole or in part, upon articles
that have been previously published by the researcher: Blease (2010a), (2010b), (2011), (2013)
and (2014).
3
This figure is a rough estimate. Population censuses in the Western Balkans are often used as
a political tool in order to illustrate one point or another. The last relatively reliable census in
Kosovo was in 1981 and gave the population as 1.58 million of whom 77.4% were Kosovo-
Albanians and 14.9% were Serbs and Montenegrins. The next census was in 1991 and was
boycotted by the Kosovo-Albanians, although the estimate of the population was nearly 2 million
with 82.2% Kosovo-Albanians. In 2003 UN estimated the same size population but an
increasing percentage of Kosovo-Albanians. (Judah 2008:1-2) Finally, in 2011 a Kosovo
national census was conducted, which excluded northern Kosovo (north of the River Ibar and
which is mainly inhabited by Kosovo Serbs) and was partially boycotted by Serb and Roma
communities in southern Kosovo. (CIA World Factbook, dated 29 February 2016. Available at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html) [Last accessed 22 April
2016].) A 2015 rule of thumb breakdown of the population by various international agencies
suggest that the total population has shrunk and that ethnic balance is around 92% Kosovo-
Albanian, 4% Serbs and 4% others (Roma, Ashkali, Bosniak, Gorani, Turkish, and Egyptian).
For example, see: Index Mundi, Kosovo Demographics Profile 2014. Available at:
http://www.indexmundi.com/kosovo/demographics_profile.html [Last accessed 22 April 2016].
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often be found under a brown smog generated by the hugely inefficient power
stations4 to the west of the capital. The countryside is a splendid mixture of hills
and plains with huge gorges in the former, carved by fast flowing rivers, and
fertile agricultural land in the latter.
Map 6.1: Kosovo (1999-2015)
(Source: Wikimedia. Available at:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/37/Kosovo-map.gif
[Last accessed 19 August 2016].)
Although it is one of the poorest countries in Europe, the capital is home to an
eclectic and garish collection of modern glass-plated buildings and streets that
are filled with large four wheel drive vehicles with tinted windows. It is a bustling
metropolis with enormous energy. On the other hand one can see in the
countryside a young man ploughing a field with a wooden plough pulled by a
mal-nourished horse. The only difference between this scene and one six
4
A legacy of burning brown coal.
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centuries earlier, is that the Kosovar in the twenty-first century can be seen with
a mobile phone glued to his ear, talking animatedly, as he follows his horse.5
Kosovo is now dominated by its majority ethnic Albanian population. This has
occurred through the demographic changes of a high birth rate, a steady
outflow of ethnic Serbs for economic reasons, and a period of ethnic cleansing
of Serbs through both intimidation and retribution, when displaced Kosovars
returned to their homes at the end of the 1999 conflict in Kosovo. It should be
noted, however, that Kosovo's Albanians are just part of a larger ethnic
grouping that extends to all four of its neighbours.6 Although the majority of
Albanians profess to be Muslims, they have traditionally tended to wear their
religion lightly, as many of them have originated from the liberal Bektashi order
that held sway in Albania for many years.7 There is also a large community of
Albanian Catholics across the region, perhaps the most famous individual being
Mother Theresa,8 who was born in Skopje, Macedonia. It can therefore be
argued that religion does not define an Albanian. Neither is it where an
Albanian lives. Indeed, as explained in Chapter 1, historical borders tended not
to be contiguous with homogenous ethnicity, so it is little surprise that current
borders suffer from similar problems. The key, according to Judah (2008:9-11),
is the Albanian language:
"So, while language and a shared identity define who is an Albanian, be they
from Kosovo or from Albania from anywhere else, it is religion that has defined
the other nations of the Balkans."
5
A memorable image that presented itself to the researcher during a visit to Kosovo in the
spring of 2013.
6
For example, the north western region of Macedonia, the Preševo Valley in Serbia, the
Sandžak region of Montenegro and the whole of Albania.
7
The Bektashi had close ties with the Janissary corps, the elite infantry of the Ottoman empire.
The sect was more relaxed than most orthodox Muslims and acted as a bridge religion for those
Christians converting to Islam during the years of Ottoman rule in the Balkans. (A conversation
that the researcher had with the elders of the Arabati Baba Tekḱe, Tetovo, Macedonia in May 
2004.)
8
Mother Theresa was the founder of a Roman Catholic missionary order of women dedicated to
caring for the poor.
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In line with the quotation above, the Serbs draw heavily upon their religion and
as well as events surrounding the battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389. (Judah
(2009:28-32)9 These events have a meaning for ordinary Serbs today that
bears some similarity to the Battle of the Boyne for Ulster Unionists. The
mystical link between the Serbian Orthodox church and the 'holy' land of
'Kosovo and Metohija', is well documented10 and is a powerful propaganda tool
for Serb nationalism.11 Given that Serbs, like the Albanians, are spread
throughout the region12 this nationalism and religious fervour acts as a glue to
bind them together as a people.  Vuk Jeremić, the former Serbian Foreign 
Minister, articulated these ideas in an interview in 2010 when he stated:
"Kosovo has deep historical and spiritual meaning for the people of Serbia. In a
certain sense, it is our Jerusalem."13 This worldview clearly has had an impact
on events from 1995 to 2015, as the next few sections seek to illustrate.
Precursor to Conflict: 1995-1997
Chapter 1 referred to the way that Milošević had stripped both Kosovo and 
Vojvodina of their autonomous status in 1989. The impact in Kosovo was that
the Serbs:
"... increasingly played the nationalist card in the province, expelling Albanian
directors of hospitals, schools, state enterprises, and the more lucrative stores in
9
Some Kosovo Albanian commentators, such as the well-regarded Shpend Bursani, complain
that most books on Kosovo 'waste' too much time discussing the events of 1389 and its impact
on current events. He has a point but then he does not view matters through a Serbian lens, so
perhaps he underestimates its importance. See: Prishtina Insight, How the West Failed
Kosovo, dated 22 April 2016. Available at: http://prishtinainsight.com/west-failed-kosovo/ [Last
accessed 23 April 2016].
10
The 'heavenly state' of Serbia is well covered by: Judah (2009:43-47). The religious
symbolism and link to Kosovo is referred to by: Glenny (1999:11), Cohen (2001:4), Judah
(2008:18-29) and Blease (2011:180-181).
11
An example of the depth of this feeling can be found on the Serbian website, 'Crucified
Kosovo and Metohija', which is available at: http://www.crucified-kosovo.eu/, [Last accessed 10
April 2011].
12
For example, in BiH, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia.
13
The interview is at: Der Spiegel, Kosovo is Our Jerusalem, dated 31 May 2010. Available at:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,697725,00.html [Last accessed on 15 April
2011].
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cities, firing the bulk of the Albanian workforce and barring Albanian children from
Serb-run schools in what became a kind of apartheid." (Pond 2006:11)14
Whilst the lead-in to the conflict in Kosovo may not have been as bloody as that
in BiH, many would argue that it was every bit as predictable. (Malcolm
1998:353-35615, Mazower 2001:140 & Weller 2008:14) By 1995 hundreds of
thousands of Kosovo Albanians had emigrated in what was termed 'silent
cleansing' (Ibid:12) and a parallel power structure was operating in the Province
that included a shadow president, in the form of Ibrahim Rugova. His party, the
Democratic League of Kosova (LDK), advocated non-violence based upon the
model of the Polish Solidarity movement. At the time this seemed to be a
rational choice, given the carnage in other parts of the former Yugoslavia, but
the signing of the DPA in 1995 radically changed the perspective within the
province. Despite a growing expectation within Kosovo that the province would
be included as part of the peace process, the treaty was silent on the subject.
Ker-Lindsay suggests that the international community were more concerned at
the time about keeping Milošević engaged in the Bosnian peace process than 
they were in recognising Kosovo's claim to independence.16 This disappointed
many Kosovo Albanians and "... severely undermined Rugova's credibility."
(2009:143-144)
The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)17 was founded in 1993 but it took time to be
embraced by the local population. (Judah 2008:79) By the Spring of 1996
members of the KLA grew progressively more weary of Rugova's non-violent
approach and it began to increase the scale and frequency of attacks on the
Serbian security forces in Kosovo. By the start of 1998, with "... an
14
The removal of ethnic Albanians from positions of authority (or in some cases pressurising
them to resign) was particularly pertinent in the security sector as evinced in Interviews K7 (ex-
Federal Police) and K18 (ex-JNA).
15
Although Malcolm did not have the benefit of hindsight, as he published his book before the
1999 crisis, his pessimistic portrayal of events in Kosovo left the reader in little doubt as to the
potential outcome.
16
There are many commentators that suggest that Dayton was a missed opportunity for
resolving the Kosovo issue, but, as one might expect, Richard Holbrooke, the US Envoy who
oversaw the DPA, firmly refutes this suggestion and argues that resolving the conflict in BiH
was the priority. (King & Mason 2006:41)
17
In Albanian: Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK).
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inexhaustible supply of weapons ..." (Ibid:36) from neighbouring Albania,18 the
crisis had deepened significantly with KLA attacks being met with Serbian
reprisals and mounting casualties on both sides.19
Conflict and Intervention: 1998-1999
In early 1998 Germany warned of an increasing flow of Kosovo Albanian
refugees from Kosovo into the EU. (Gallagher 2005:37) At the same time the
US Envoy entrusted with overseeing the implementation of the DPA, Richard
Gelbard, made a series of confusing statements regarding US policy towards
Kosovo and the human rights violations that were taking place in the country.
This was compounded by remarks in February 1998 by labelling the KLA as
'terrorists' as a result of their attacks on Serb forces.20 His comments might
initially have had resonance in some quarters but within a few weeks, on 5
March 1998, the Serb special police attacked the family compound of Adem
Jashari, a founder member of the KLA, and killed over 80 ethnic Albanians.
This single event had a considerable impact on Western policy on Kosovo,
particularly upon key members of the US establishment. (Allin 2002:50-52)
Gelbard quickly found that he was at odds with both the US Secretary of State,
Madeleine Albright, a former refugee herself, and General Wes Clark, who had
been a key participant at Dayton and by now was NATO's Supreme Allied
Commander (SACEUR).  Clark was absolutely certain that Milošević could only 
be stopped by force. (Halberstam 2001:396)
Whilst Western policy was clearly shifting, so were attitudes within Kosovo,
where the violence at the Jashari compound “... turned an armed resistance
movement into a Province-wide insurrection.” (Allin 2002:51) The attempts the
18
The 1997 crisis in Albania occurred as a result of a collapsed 'ponzi' scheme and resulted in
over 700,000 weapons being looted from Albanian army and police armouries. For more details
see Vickers & Pettifer (2006) and Őzerdem (2003:79).
19
For a more detailed treatment of the crisis see: Malcolm (1998:652-659).
20
BBC World News, The KLA - Terrorists or Freedom Fighters?, dated 28 June 1998. Available
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/121818.stm [Last accessed 10 May 2016].
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Serbian authorities to snuff out the insurrection began to change course and
areas within Kosovo began to be 'cleansed' of Kosovo Albanians. The tide of
refugees eventually forced NATO Allies into a consensus over action. In
October 1998 authority was given for SACEUR to launch air attacks against the
former Yugoslavia should the human rights violations continue.
In the event the international community reached agreement to launch an
OSCE-led Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM)21 in the country as an alternative
to air strikes. Over the winter of 1998-1999 a degree of stability was brought to
the Province, which allowed peace talks to take place in Rambouillet, near
Paris in early 1999. After the failure of the talks, Serbian security forces
resumed ethnic cleansing and a growing tide of refugees fled Kosovo. My
March 1999 some seven hundred thousand people had migrated to the
neighbouring countries of Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro. As Christopher
Hill, the US envoy, said: “We did not go to war over Rambouillet. We went to
war because [Milošević] started ethnic cleansing.  He sent in 40,000 troops to 
intimidate the Albanians and to intimidate us.”22
Consensus for action was reached by the Allies and NATO began to launch air
strikes against targets in the SFRY in the evening of 24 March 1999. It was
anticipated that Milošević would quickly capitulate but, in the event, he did not, 
and the bombing continued for a further 11 weeks. (Brudenell 2006) Dana Allin
(2002:59-60) makes an interesting point when he indicates that Allies had only
reached agreement "... to threaten airstrikes and, if necessary, to carry out that
threat ..." but there seemed to be little thought beyond that stage and certainly
precious little appetite for a ground offensive.
Throughout the early Summer of 1999 there was frenetic diplomatic activity as
attempts were made to broker a peace deal that would end the conflict.
Eventually an agreement was arranged by the then President Martti Ahtisaari of
21
Some background on the Genesis and role of the KVM and its controversial head, William
Walker, can be found in Gallagher (2005:42-3).
22
Briefing by Christopher Hill in Ohrid, Macedonia, July 1999 and as quoted in: Allin (2002:60).
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Finland on behalf of the EU, the then US Deputy Secretary Of State, Strobe
Talbot, on behalf of the US, and the former Prime Minister of the Russian
Federation, Viktor Chernomyrdin, on behalf of Russia.23 As the UN was still not
engaged in the process at his stage, it was agreed internationally via the G8.
The deal was inevitably a compromise for all sides and it included the
deployment into Kosovo of a NATO peacekeeping force under a UN mandate. It
also involved the withdrawal of all Serbian security forces, and the detail for this
was agreed between NATO and Serbian military commanders at Kumanovo,
Macedonia, on 9 June 1999. NATO halted the air strikes the following day with
the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999)24 in New York.25
The UNSCR effectively made Kosovo a “... ward of the international
community.” (King & Mason 2006:49) NATO deployed a 30,000 strong force
into Kosovo on 12 June 1999.26
International Administration - Initial Progress and Then Stagnation: 1999-
2005
On the same day that the newly created NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) entered
Kosovo, a steady stream of euphoric Kosovar refugees followed them and then
rapidly overtook the more cautious advance by the ground troops. The
euphoria did not last long as many refugees found both their houses and
farmland laid to waste. Retribution against former Serb neighbours was swift
“... the tide of revenge went more or less unchecked in a security vacuum that
NATO military forces were unable to fill.” (Allin 2002:71) the NATO troops were
23
This process is discussed further in the section entitled: 'UNOSEK and the Road to
Independence'.
24
For ease of reading 'UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999)' will hereafter be referred to
as UNSCR 1244. (UN 1999)
25
The decision to delay resolution of Kosovo's future status, which was enshrined in UNSCR
1244, continues to haunt the international community in Kosovo. This issue will be discussed in
more detail later in this Chapter.
26
A most curious scenario took place on the same day when Russian military forces left BiH,
drove through Serbia and entered Kosovo, eventually ending up at Slatina Airport, near Pristina.
There was much controversy over who in Moscow issued the order for such a move, or whether
there was a breakdown in civil control of the Russian military. This is not for discussion here but
it is possible that that the Russian military's nationalistic perspective had an impact on the
Ahtisaari-led future status talks in 2006, which is discussed later in this Chapter. For details of
the Slatina Airport events see Clark (2002:376-403).
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trained and organised for a worst case scenario, and that was to fight against
the Serbian security forces. They were less well-prepared for peacekeeping
duties and in particular for taking responsibility for rule of law. The international
civilian presence (UN Mission in Kosovo - UNMIK) was charged with
maintaining civil law and order.27 It soon became clear, however, that the
international community's problems with law and order had only just begun with
the successful deployment of troops into Kosovo. This issue will be returned to
several times in this Chapter.
Whilst KFOR arrived in Kosovo in some force, the same could not be said of
UNMIK. The new Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG),
Sérgio Vieira de Mello, had little time to prepare his mission and arrived in
Pristina with just eight fellow UN officials.28 Tony Welch, the head of the UK's
DFID mission in Kosovo, loaned de Mello some vehicles, radios and some
office space in order to get them started. As Welch explains:
"By the end of June 1999 the number of UN officials had grown to 24 and by
September to several hundred. Few of the officials had any knowledge of Kosovo
and it was to be a year before any appreciable numbers of professionals were
deployed. Kosovo was not, at this stage, a popular mission. The lack of
electricity, heating, water, food and fuel made Kosovo an unattractive place for
UN functionaries. By June 2000 UNMIK had only 292 professional staff against
an authorised strength of 435." (Welch 2011:156)
De Mello was also only a temporary appointee. The former Head of Médecins
Sans Frontières, Bernard Kouchner, was soon selected for the permanent post
of SRSG and he arrived in Kosovo on 15 July 1999. Kouchner brought
27
Notwithstanding the point made above, in Paragraph 9d of UNSCR 1244, there is a clause
that authorises KFOR to ensure "... public safety and order until the international civilian
presence can take responsibility for this task." Unfortunately, individual national attitudes to the
military taking on policing-type roles varied considerably within KFOR's contributing nations.
Many troops were also just not trained for these tasks - the UK contribution being an exception
with their experience in Northern Ireland. As a result KFOR struggled to enforce any semblance
of the rule of law. (UN 1999:Paragraph 9d)
28
Although the possibility of setting up a UN mission in Kosovo had been mooted for some time
in New York, DPKO had been constrained in active planning by the structure and processes of
the organisation.
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admirable energy and charisma to the country but his background was almost
exclusively in humanitarian crises, and a grasp of "... Realpolitik and logistics
seemed less important ..." to him. (King & Mason 2006:51) Notwithstanding the
shortage of staff and very real lack of expertise, the initial humanitarian
challenges were broadly met in the early stages of the UNMIK mission.
Unfortunately, there were still significant gaps in rule of law, administration and
an absence of support in a whole range of other areas. Perhaps the most
notable lacuna in the first few months of UNMIK's tenure was the lack of
assistance to the local population whose homes had been damaged or
destroyed in the conflict. The KLA filled this vacuum in the lead-in to the winter
of 1999 by using their contacts in both Albania and Macedonia to secure
building materials and then organising ex-KLA members to help villagers rebuild
and repair houses for the local population. By this single act of assistance, the
leadership of the KLA demonstrated where the power lay in post-conflict
Kosovo. (Welch 2011:155-157)
The rule of law challenges in Kosovo were, for example, far greater than those
experienced in BiH. In the absence of any form of police system, KFOR was
often expected to "... substitute for civilian law enforcement and criminal justice
agencies ..." (Friesendorf 2010:93) These difficulties were exacerbated by the
lack of a clear legal framework and the time it took to train local candidates to
be police officers. This created a vacuum that allowed criminal gangs (a
number made up of ex-KLA members) to flourish and establish networks across
Kosovo and beyond. There can be little doubt that in any post-conflict situation,
a fundamental aspect of establishing a 'safe and secure environment' must be
to focus on human security, so that people feel secure. The main tool for
achieving that situation is establishing the rule of law. It is a lesson that NATO
still has to learn.
One of the great successes of UNMIK during these early years was,
paradoxically, also one of its greatest failures. The first steps towards
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constitutional democracy including the setting up of the Constitutional
Framework and the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), was a
considerable feat of politics, persuasion and, in some cases, coercion. Minority
rights were preserved and the gender balance of elected representatives was of
a higher standard than most Western countries. Unfortunately, a combination
of a closed list system of choosing candidates for the Assembly and making
Kosovo a single electoral district, meant that local politicians did not necessarily
have to interact with the population, but they did have to pay tribute to party
leaders who held enormous power. This power, however, did not extend to
ultimate authority in any given policy area, as that was still vested in the SRSG
with UNSCR 1244 retaining primacy. This emasculation rankled with local
politicians and sowed the seeds for growing frustrations, as well as feeding the
political culture of nepotism and corruption. (King & Mason 2006:116-127 &
233-236)
In the original Rambouillet Agreement29 there was a mechanism for addressing
the status issue after a period of three years.30 In line with that intent, the UN
Secretary General directed the SRSG begin a process in April 2002 to develop
a set of benchmarks that would measure progress in Kosovo.31 The then
SRSG, Michael Steiner, had already transferred a number of responsibilities to
local institutions but he clearly believe that the time for launching a discussion
on status had not yet been reached. (Weller 2008b:18) It took until the end of
2003 before the eight detailed benchmarks were agreed between both UNMIK
and representatives of the PISG in Kosovo. Within the international community
this benchmarking became known as the 'standards before status' policy.
Unfortunately, the staff in UNMIK drew up a Kosovo Standards Implementation
29
Although termed an 'agreement', it was of course not formally agreed by both parties.
30
UNSCR 1244 directs the civilian presence (ie UNMIK) to facilitate "... a political process
designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords."
(UN 1999)
31
For more background on this issue see: Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UN Doc S/2002/436, dated 22 April 2002.
Available at: http://www.unmikonline.org/SGReports/S-2002-436.pdf [Last accessed 10 May
2016].
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Plan that seemed to confuse its own authors and certainly confused the local
actors. (Ibid:19)
In a typical demonstration of mixed messages, the UN suggested that the status
issue would only be addressed once there had been a positive review of the
benchmarking standards. It was estimated that a first opportunity for such a
review could occur in mid-2005,32 but, by implication, could be some
unspecified date well into the future. Many in Kosovo strongly believed that the
country should have gained its independence in 1999 but were content to use
the initial three-year period of grace to create the institutions of government.
They were not content, however, for UNMIK, which they perceived as both
'corrupt and indecisive', to deny them their sovereignty on arbitrary grounds.
(International Commission on the Balkans 2005:19-20) As Hehir reports:
"Frustration boiled over in March 2004, when province-wide riots orchestrated
by the Kosovo Albanians resulted in nineteen deaths and the deliberate
targeting of UN and NATO personnel." (2010:10)
A number of Serbs, Ashkali and Roma were driven from their homes. "The
overall commander of NATO forces in the Western Balkans, Admiral 'Grog'
Johnson, took the unprecedented step of likening the Kosovo Albanian actions
to 'ethnic cleansing'.33 The ICG also made the quite credible claim that on "...
the night of 17 March UNMIK and KFOR came within a hair's breadth of losing
Kosovo." (ICG 2008:19)34 The weakness of both UNMIK and KFOR was clear
for all to see and as a result the UN Secretary General launched a review of the
entire operation in Kosovo led by the seasoned diplomat, Kai Eide, who at that
time was Norway's representative at NATO.
32
At the end of 2003 the routine UNMIK quarterly reports were re-structured in order to reflect
the detail of the benchmarks. See: Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, UN Doc S/2004/71 dated 26 January 2004. Available
at: http://www.unmikonline.org/SGReports/S-2004-71.pdf [Last accessed 10 May 2016].
33
See: BBC, Kosovo Clashes 'Ethnic Cleansing', 20 March 2004. Available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3551571.stm [Last accessed 10 May 2011].
34
The ICG report was a damning one on the background to the riots and the calamitous
responses of both UNMIK and KFOR, and is worth a full read.
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Although Eide's 2004 report to the UN Secretary-General focused on
strengthening the capacity of UNMIK and the PISG, he drew attention to the
need act in order to avoid dangerous stagnation. The report provided sufficient
hope for the future that following year he was asked to return to Kosovo and
focus on the possibility of launching discussions on future status. (Weller
2008B:20-21) Eide duly produced a second report which recommended that
the start of talks on the future status of Kosovo:
"There will not be any good moment for addressing Kosovo’s future status. It will
continue to be a highly sensitive political issue. Nevertheless, an overall
assessment leads to the conclusion that the time has come to commence this
process. The political process, which is now under way, must continue. Based on
a comprehensive strategy, it has provided Kosovo with a political perspective.
Kosovo having moved from stagnation to expectation, stagnation cannot again
be allowed to take hold."
35
In October 2005 the Security Council accepted Eide's recommendation and Kofi
Annan approached the veteran negotiator and former Finnish President, Martti
Ahtisaari, to be his Special Envoy for the Future Status of Kosovo. His
appointment was confirmed later that month36 and guiding principles for the
conduct of the status talks were issued by the Contact Group to Ahtisaari in
November 2005. 37 The next section analyses the role of the Special Envoy
and his team.
35
See: UN Security Council S/2005/635 letter dated 7 October 2005, Annex: A Comprehensive
Review of the Situation in Kosovo. Available at:
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kos%20S2005%20635.pdf [Last accessed 13 March 2014].
36
Ahtisaari's appointment was confirmed to the UN Security Council on 31 October 2006. See:
Letter from the UN Secretary General to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc
S/2005/708 dated 31 October 2005. Available at:
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2005/708 [Last accessed 10 May
2016].
37
Although the talks were nominally UN-led, force majeure ensured that the Contact Group
(comprising France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the UK and the US) were also
'closely engaged' in the process . See Letter from the President of the Security Council
addressed to the UN Secretary General, UN Doc S/2005/709 dated 10 November 2005.
Available at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2005/709 [Last accessed
10 May 2016].
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UNOSEK and the Road to Independence: 2006-2008 38
The United Nations Office for the Special Envoy for the Future Status of Kosovo
(UNOSEK) set up offices in Vienna39 in early 2006. By then Ahtisaari had been
able to assimilate the details of the Contact Group's guiding principles and
produced a strategy for the talks that were in line with those principles. The
Contact Group also provided a number of discussion papers to Ahtisaari in
order to stimulate (and influence) thinking on a range of issues from
decentralisation to security.40 Most of these originated from one or other of the
QUINT41 members and then passed to Russia and the two associate members
of the Contact Group, NATO and the EU, for comment.42
The contrasting, and publicly articulated, views of Belgrade and Pristina
presented Ahtisaari with a dilemma. If he, or his team of officials, presented
subjects for discussion in the early stages that pre-determined what the
outcome of the discussions would be (i.e. independence or some form of
autonomy within Serbia), it would be likely that there would be no discussion at
all. In order to get the discussions going and to create some form of dynamic
between the two parties, he resolved to tackle less contentious issues that were
not dependent upon the final outcome of the talks.43 These were termed 'status
neutral' issues and included subjects such as levels of decentralisation within
Kosovo, economic issues and minority rights. Whilst there were criticisms of
Ahtisaari's approach to the talks (Weller 2009:33; Ker-Lindsay 2012:110-113),
there was some convergence between the two parties on specific points. In a
38
Details of UNOSEK's approach to the security sector and NATO's role in the process is
covered later in the Chapter. See section entitled: 'NATO Support to UNOSEK: 2006-2007'.
39
The Austrian government offered accommodation for the team in Vienna, as well as the
services of seasoned diplomat, Albert Rohan, as deputy to Ahtisaari. Vienna was also a useful
transport hub for both Pristina and Belgrade, as well as Brussels and New York.
40
The researcher has retained a number of these paper.
41
The QUINT is a consultative group of five western countries (France, Germany, Italy, the UK
and the USA) that seek to coordinate the approaches to a range of international issues.
42
Given the anticipated scale of roles that might be performed by the EU and NATO in a post-
status of Kosovo, it was deemed prudent to include representatives of these organisations in
the discussions. This became known as the 'Kosovo Contact Group Plus' configuration
43
This approach was not laid down but was the essence of the verbal briefings that the Special
Envoy gave to his team, as recalled by the researcher and published in Blease (2013:9).
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presentation to NATO's North Atlantic Council on 17 May 2006, Ahtisaari
highlighted some of these points but he was quite clear that "... NATO must be
prepared for Kosovo's possible future independence."44
During the spring and summer of 2006 UNOSEK engaged in a number of
desultory talks with the parties both on a bilateral and a trilateral basis. The
Special Envoy also sought to engage with a number of key decision makers
around the world in order to shape the expectation for Kosovo's independence.
Notwithstanding Serbia's belief that ultimately Russia would veto any
suggestion of independence when the matter came to the Security Council,
Russia's engagement remained relatively positive until September 2006. It was
around that time that both the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, and the
then Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, became more closely involved in
the status process. (Merikallo & Ruakanen 2015:356-359)
It was also in September 2006 that a Finnish film entitled 'The Fourth Chair'
was released in Helsinki, first in Finnish and then later that month in English.
The film45 sought to document events leading up to the intervention in Kosovo
by NATO in 1999 and the subsequent removal of all Serb security forces. Whilst
broadly accurate in an historical sense, it used the narrative of the three main
negotiators to tell the story: the then President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland on
behalf of the EU, the then US Deputy Secretary Of State, Strobe Talbot, on
behalf of the US, and the former Prime Minister of the Russian Federation,
Viktor Chernomyrdin, on behalf of Russia.46 The film also showed a sharp
44
The quote is contained in Ahtisaari's presentation to the NAC. A copy is held by the
researcher. (Kosovo LNO Folder 10.)
45
The film was originally issued in DVD format and then subsequently was available on the
internet. The only traces left are: the Finnish 'Making Movies' website available at:
http://mamo.fi/the-fourth-chair/ [Last accessed 15 May 2016]; and half-way through PdF
document available at: http://ses.fi/fileadmin/dokumentit/Finnish_Documentary_Films_2006.pdf
[Last accessed 15 May 2016].
46
At all their meetings the three negotiators left an empty fourth chair at the table in order to
remind themselves of the absent fourth negotiator, Slobodan Milošević, and hence the title of 
the film: 'The Fourth Chair'. Background information: The New York Times, Crisis In The
Balkans: The Envoy Trying To Find Way Out, But The Key Is Missing, dated 29 May 1999.
Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/29/world/crisis-in-the-balkans-the-envoy-trying-to-
find-way-out-but-the-key-is-missing.html [Last accessed 15 May 2016].
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contrast between opinions in 1999 of the Yeltsin-led politicians in Moscow and
the Russian military. In the film Colonel General Leonid Ivashov expressed his
opinion that the Russian military considered Chernomyrdin as a 'traitor' for
taking part in the deal and he claimed that the military were close to mutiny over
the issue. He also highlighted the 'shame' that was felt over Russia's
'weakness' during this period.47 48
Whilst the direct involvement of Putin and Lavrov in the Ahtisaari-led process is
widely acknowledged as the main barrier to progress in Kosovo's final status,49
a deeper analysis might hint at an additional factor in the Russian thinking. At
the end of August 2006 UNOSEK shared a basic text for proposals for the
future status. At the subsequent Contact Group meeting with UNOSEK on 1
September 2006, the leader of the Russian delegation indicated that the text
acted as a solid base from which future agreement could be reached. He went
on to suggest that the early period of sovereignty for Kosovo should be limited –
effectively making Kosovo an international protectorate - but warned against
any use of the word 'independence'.50 This was worlds apart from the Russian
position when Ahtisaari briefed the UN Security Council on 22 September 2006,
which had hardened considerably.51 Whilst it is possible that the leader of the
Russian delegation in the Contact Group had not fully cleared his lines with
Moscow, this would seem an unlikely proposition. One therefore needs to look
closely at what happened in the intervening period. Indeed, there were several
members of the UNOSEK team who had expressed concern that the subject
matter in 'The Fourth Chair' and, more importantly, the tone of the film, might
prove offensive to the Russian leadership at this rather delicate stage in the
status negotiations. There is no way to prove that the film had such an effect on
developments but it is certainly a point worth pondering.
47
Researcher's notes after watching the film contained in his personal notebook from 14
September 2006. (Personal notebook 6 August 2006 to 7 December 2006.)
48
This disconnect between politicians and military would seem to be best evinced by the
Russian military's dash to Slatina Airfield near Pristina on 12 June 1999. Full details can be
found in Clark (2002:376-403).
49
For example, see Weller (2009:35-39).
50
Researcher's notes from his attendance at the meeting on 1 September 2006, contained in
his personal notebook for that date. (Personal notebook 6 August 2006 to 7 December 2006.)
51
NATO Report 22-29 September 2006. Copy held by researcher (LNO File).
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As the negotiations regarding final status stumbled on to early 2007, mainly due
to a perceived need not to interfere with hastily called elections in Serbia, a near
final text for the Comprehensive Proposals was shared with both sides in
February 2007.52 It was the first time that the parties had seen the consolidated
text and also the first time that it was clear that Ahtisaari was proposing a form
of independence, although the word never appeared in the main body of the
proposals. Neither of the parties was completely content and the contrasting
worldviews from Pristina and Belgrade then set the scene for a complete
impasse in February 2007. As Weller (2008B:54) explains "... compromises on
status would be politically very costly to those who made them [... and ...]
neither side was willing or able to depart from its perceived popular mandate."
In his covering letter to the Comprehensive Proposals that he forwarded to the
UN in March 2007, Ahtisaari summarised the situation as follows:
"For over a year, I have led the political process envisaged in resolution 1244
(1999), exhausting every possible avenue to achieve a negotiated settlement.
The irreconcilable positions of the parties have made that goal
unattainable. Nevertheless, after almost eight years of United Nations
administration, Kosovo’s status must be urgently resolved. My recommendation
of independence, supervised initially by the international community, takes into
account Kosovo’s recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and the need for
political and economic stability in Kosovo." (UN 2007b. Emphasis added.)
The UN Security Council debated the proposals but there were irreconcilable
differences in the Council with Russia (and to a lesser extent China) opposed to
any solution that was not agreed by both parties. Over the next year there were
a series of initiatives sponsored by both the UN and the EU to break that
deadlock but all to no avail. In the absence of progress through the UN, a
group of twenty-five states formed an unofficial International Steering Group
(ISG) that supported independence for Kosovo. This still left the rather thorny
52
The basic text was available from late Autumn 2006 but continued to be refined until March
2007. Various drafts held by researcher.
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issue, however, of how to finesse that independence and this is covered in the
next section.
'Coordinated Independence' & Implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan -
ICO & EULEX: 2008-2015
If the Comprehensive Proposals had been endorsed by the Security Council,
they would have allowed for a transfer of authority from UNMIK to Kosovo and
for the country (ultimately) to be fully responsible for its own affairs. An
International Civilian Representative (ICR), supported by an International
Civilian Office (ICO), would then have assisted the Kosovo authorities with this
transition.53 An EU-led rule of law mission, operating under a Common
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mandate, would have a similar role to the
ICO in the rule of law arena, except that it would also have a partial executive
and substitution role.54 It was proposed that NATO would then perform the role
of the International Military Presence (IMP) with responsibility for providing a
'safe and secure environment' until such time as Kosovo's institutions were
capable of assuming that responsibility.55 These arrangements would have
allowed UNMIK to complete its mission and be closed down along with UNSCR
1244.
The reality, however, was that without a UNSCR Ahtisaari's carefully crafted
framework had no legal context for implementation. This was where the US
government then seized the initiative. It was the US that had orchestrated the
setting up of the ISG and began finessing Kosovo's independence.56 Colonel
Bryan Watters was Commander of the British Forces in Kosovo during the first
half of 2008 and he stated during an interview that:
53
Article 11 of the 'Comprehensive Proposals'.
54
Article 12 of the 'Comprehensive Proposals'.
55
Article 13 of the 'Comprehensive Proposals'.
56
For an example of one of the US public statements, see: Reuters, Rice presses for action on
Kosovo independence, dated 17 July 2007. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
kosovo-usa-idUSN1939683920070719 [Last accessed 24 May 2016].
269
"I think it would be fair to say that the leading nation was America and it was the
American Ambassador to Kosovo who you could describe as being in the [...]
driving seat for the detail and the top level decision making as to when Kosovo
would become an independent nation state." 57
This clearly had implications for both KFOR and NATO as a whole. Events in
the political arena put COMKFOR in a particularly difficult position. Watters
went on to voice the impression that:
"The political line of operation appeared to be more isolated than I’ve known in
the past on a campaign from the military line of operation. And again this was
axiomatic possibly of the structure of KFOR within NATO and the American State
Department’s particular agenda at that time." 58
After a frenetic period of negotiation, including splits within the member states of
the EU59, the US persuaded the Kosovo Government to agree to incorporate all
of Ahtisaari's 'Comprehensive Proposals' into the law of the land (a
combination of the constitution and primary legislation). This, they argued,
would lead to the formal creation of the ISG, whose mission was to oversee the
ICO mandate of full implementation of Ahtisaari's plan and the 'supervised
independence' recommended to the UN by Ahtisaari. It would also necessitate
the Kosovo Government inviting both the EULEX rule of law mission to take up
its role and NATO to act as the IMP. These various issues were put in place
and on 17 February 2008 the 'coordinated independence' of Kosovo was






For example, see: The Guardian, Spain Exposes EU Split as US Leads Recognition, dated
19 February 2008. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/19/kosovo.serbia
[Last accessed 24 May 2016].
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the Ahtisaari Plan.60 Within a few days over forty countries had recognised
Kosovo as an independent sovereign state. 61 62
Serbia's political response to the declaration was to launch a frenetic round of
diplomatic activity to persuade other countries not to recognise Kosovo. Its
diplomacy had some effect with four members of NATO joining the non-
recognising group. The EU became a significant participant in this debate and
eventually, using the promise of possible EU membership, it was able to
facilitate direct talks between Belgrade and Pristina. These began on 8 March
2011.63 After ten difficult rounds of direct talks this then led to the signing of a
formal bilateral agreement on 19 April 2013 between Serbia and Kosovo to
normalise relations.64 65
Carnegie Scholar and former EU Director of the Balkans Task Force, Stefan
Lehne,66 suggested that the agreement was a good deal for both sides and that
"... EU conditionality proved to be an essential catalyst in the negotiations." He
did caution, however, that "[c]ontinued active EU involvement will also be crucial
to turn the short agreement on principles into a practical reality."67 The view
within Kosovo was rather more nuanced and certainly more sceptical. It ranged
60
For the declaration see: Republic of Kosovo Assembly, Kosovo Declaration of Independence,
dated 17 February 2008. Available at: http://www.assembly-kosova.org/?cid=2,128,1635 [Last
accessed 23 June 2016].
61
As at 31 December 2015 some 111 out of 193 members of the UN have recognised Kosovo.
See: http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/ [Last accessed 25 May 2016].
62
The definition of statehood can be found in the Montevideo Convention available at:
http://www.cfr.org/sovereignty/montevideo-convention-rights-duties-states/p15897 [Last
accessed 12 March 2016]. Professor James Sweeney also drew the researcher's attention to
customary international law as a test for statehood. Interview K11.
63
South East European Times, Belgrade, Pristina Launch New Talks, dated 9 March 2011.
Available at:
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2011/03/09/fea
ture-02 [Last accessed 10 April 2011].
64




The reward for signing the agreement was that the Council of the EU agreed to signing
Serbia's SAA on 28 June 2013 and Kosovo's SAA on 22 October 2015.
66
For full biography see: http://carnegieeurope.eu/experts/?fa=634 [Last accessed 25 May
2016]. He was also Ahtisaari's main senior level EU interlocutor during the UNOSEK talks.
67
Carnegie Europe, Serbia-Kosovo Deal Should Boost the EU’s Western Balkans Policy, dated
23 April 2013. Available at: http://carnegieeurope.eu/2013/04/23/serbia-kosovo-agreement-
should-reenergize-eu-s-western-balkans-policy [Last accessed 25 May 2016].
271
from a belief that Serbia had eventually achieved sovereignty over Northern
Kosovo68 to a belief that the EU created the deal in order to ensure that Serbia
would be allowed to join the organisation.69 The latter view seemed to be
echoed by an EU official who had lived in Kosovo for a number of years, when
he suggested that "... the general perception [...within Kosovo...] is that Serbia's
participation is a ruse to achieve candidate status."70 Notwithstanding these
ongoing concerns, progress continues to be made, although as Burin
Ramadani, an AAK Member of the Kosovo Parliament, emphasises, it is the
implementation of the detail of the agreement that is the key.71 72
The mandates of the various elements of the international community
supporting the newly independent government of Kosovo proved contentious
from the very start. Far from handing over its responsibilities and departing the
country quietly, UNMIK continued its existence in a semi-comatose state, with
residual responsibilities that were insisted upon by those countries which did not
recognise Kosovo's independence.73 Prima facie the ICO had the simplest task
but it was also complicated by the link to the EU and the rather improbable
situation where the ICR was also the EUSR. As Professor James Sweeney of
Lancaster University commented to the researcher:
"It was only the ICO [...] which was not status neutral, the rest were and indeed
still are, although quite how that works in practice is beyond me." 74
His bemusement centred on the fact that as the head of the ICO, the ICR, was
committed to supporting the independence of Kosovo, whilst as EUSR, the
same person was committed to being status neutral. It was a challenge that the










The talks have continued beyond 2015.
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Apart from Russia, these countries included four NATO members (Greece, Romania,




(2012:57-64), although, ever the diplomat, Peter Feith declined to describe the
situation as the imbroglio that everyone else recognised it to be.
Notwithstanding one notable lapse (Qehaja et al 2013), the ICO was able to
assist the Kosovo government in large measure and then successfully draw
down in September 2012. There was a recognition that much work remained to
be done but that it could only be achieved once the full panoply of powers were
in the hands of the Kosovo government. In terms of statebuilding the ICO was
able to argue coherently that it had been invited to complete a specific mandate,
had completed that work and then departed. (ICO 2012) 75 The same could not
be said of EULEX.
The Genesis of the EULEX mission was troubled from the start. During the
UNOSEK discussions, the EU Planning Team (EUPT) pushed hard for a rule of
law international element, separate from the ICO, and directly overseen by the
EU. This was then reflected in the 'Comprehensive Proposals', although it
caused some angst amongst the UNOSEK team, particularly with respect to the
intrusive nature of its mandate. What was clear, however, is that the EU was
more concerned about the local judiciary than the local police, and were
determined to retain some executive powers.76
The mandate for EULEX was adopted in February 200877 and the proposed
international staff consisted mainly of judges, prosecutors, police officers and
customs officials.78 It was a highly ambitious project for the EU but, as the ICG
75
With the departure of the ICO, the international community had effectively said that Kosovo
had implemented the provisions of the Ahtisaari Plan, albeit that there were still some
outstanding. The Kosovo Government then amended the constitution and remove all limitations
imposed by the plan and the superiority of the 'Comprehensive Proposals'. (Muharremi 2016:7)
This has implications for NATO, which will be discussed later in the Chapter in the section
entitled: 'Kosovo Armed Forces'.
76
NATO to NATO e-mail dated 31 July 2006. Copy held by researcher (Kosovo File - Prelim
Ideas).
77
Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008. See: EULEX Kosovo, Council Joint
Action 2008/124/CFSP. Available at: http://www.eulex-
kosovo.eu/eul/repository/docs/WEJointActionEULEX_EN.pdf [Last accessed 28 April 2016].
78
EEAS, Common Security and Defence Policy - EULEX Kosovo - EU Rule of Law Mission in
Kosovo, last updated October 2014. Available at:
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pointed out, personnel only began to deploy in numbers in September 2008.
(ICG 2008:i) To make matters worse, the main shortfalls were in the judicial
area where the EU had most concerns. Krennar Gashi, a policy analyst and
former investigative report, highlighted the absurdity of this situation:
"Kosovo has a good Police Service, solid Police Service. Very incompetent and
weak prosecution and corrupt courts. And then in 2008 we have the EU sending
two thousand international staff out of which like one thousand three hundred
were police officers, and only [...] 40 were judges and 20 prosecutors." 79
The difficulty of attracting judicial staff, as well as confusion over the mission's
mandate, has been accurately captured by Martina Spernbauer. (2010a,
2010b)80 She also highlighted the challenges of coordinating the various
elements of the mission, not least the balance between the 'Mentoring,
Monitoring and Advising (MMA)' role and the executive function. (2010:33-34)
During the period 2012-2014 the EU gradually refocused on three areas: rule of
law matters in the North81, the Pristina-Belgrade Dialogue and the potential that
Kosovo would be granted an SAA.82 A EULEX official described this change in
focus to the researcher:
"So now the focus is really on the Judiciary. The Judiciary why? Because it is
really a weak link and it is crucial for fighting organised crime and corruption
which is top priority within the EU [... T]he reason being mainly that lessons have
been learned from previous enlargement rounds and especially the experience
with Bulgaria and Romania, and to a certain extent with Croatia." 83
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/eulex-




Spernbauer argues that EULEX should be more accurately termed an SSR and
peacebuilding mission. (2010A:5)
81
Described by Dr Bryan Watters as an 'ungoverned space' in Interview K16.
82
These issues are touched upon on the EULEX website, available at: http://www.eulex-
kosovo.eu/?page=2,44,197 [Last accessed 26 May 2016]. In the event Serbia was granted an




One particular criticism of EULEX has been its lack of presence in the North of
Kosovo.84 A particularly damning ICG report suggested: "As long as Serbian
money sustains their way of life, Northerners have little incentive to
compromise." (ICG 2011:i) Harland, a former UN official, suggests that:
"As the UN drew down in the north, and its international ally, the International
Civilian Office, failed to replace it, leaving a vacuum which was often (if
sometimes reluctantly) filled by Serbia. When Pristina blocked agreement on the
operation of courts in the north, Serbia appointed judges on its own. When the
flow of electricity from the south to the north was cut, Belgrade connected the
north to the Serbian grid. When Pristina dismantled Serb mobile-phone networks
south of the Ibar, the Serbs dismantled Albanian networks in the North."
(2010:93)
It has therefore been clear that some form of normalisation was required
between the authorities in Kosovo and Serbia, and, as discussed earlier, the 19
April 2013 agreement between the two governments has been the catalyst for
that change. Results are still mixed, as EULEX and UNMIK, as well as the local
media report.85
Although the link between EULEX and UNMIK that still comes in for
considerable criticism within Kosovo, the reality is that EULEX needed some
form of legal context for its deployment. As an official from EULEX explained:
"[As...] the Ahtisaari Plan was not endorsed by the Security Council there was the
question, of how to deploy EULEX in a status neutral manner. The only way to
do it was to hook it to UNMIK ..." 86
84
For example Interview K3, although he does qualify his criticism in that he recognises that
EULEX still has to operate under a restrictive UNSCR 1244 mandate.
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For example, see: UNSC (S/2015/833), Report of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, dated 3 November 2015; and a more practical report
on the agreement recognising each respective car licences and car insurances: Prishtina
Insight, A Fool’s Errand: A Kosovar’s Journey through Serbian borders, dated 22 April 2016.




Nonetheless, security analyst Abit Hoxha highlighted a general perception in
Kosovo that when UNMIK handed over the majority of its responsibilities to the
ICO and EULEX, there was no real change: paraphrasing what he said 'same
international community; same old interfering in Kosovo's internal affairs; same
old nanny state by people who didn't understand what is happening on the
ground.'87 Whilst the sentiment may be somewhat harsh, it seems to reflect a
growing sense of frustration with the international community that was shared
amongst a number of interviewees for this research.88
Allegations of corruption within EULEX have also served to damage its
reputation89 and have hastened the call for termination of its mandate. In June
2015 a Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) meeting was organized by
European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) in Brussels to discuss EULEX's
mandate, which is due to expire in June 2016. Whilst there was a broad
acknowledgement of some positive trends, several delegates criticised the lack
of progress in a number of areas, including against high-level corruption, and
the lack of a clear exit strategy.90 Professor Jean-Paul Jacque, the author of
the March 2015 report91 into the corruption allegations in EULEX, voiced an





For example, Interviews K6, K14 and K20.
89
It is not proposed to go through these various allegations, although to gain a sense of the
issues it is worth noting two opinion pieces written by Andrea Capussela, a former official in the
ICO, who has been strident in his criticism of EULEX over the past few years. For the first, see:
The Guardian, EULEX in Kosovo: a shining symbol of incompetence, dated 9 April 2011,
available at: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/apr/09/eulex-kosovo-eu-mission
[Last accessed 4 February 2016]. In addition, in the aftermath of the publication of a report in
March 2015 into the allegations against EULEX by Jean-Paul Jacque, a French law professor,
see the second opinion piece: EU Observer, Eulex report exposes EU failure in Kosovo, dated
16 April 2015. Available at: https://euobserver.com/opinion/128343 [Last accessed 26 May
2016].
90
Although the EPLO meeting was supposedly held under Chatham House Rules, a synopsis
of the discussion appeared in: Kosovo 2.0, What Next For EULEX, dated 15 January 2016.
Available at: http://www.kosovotwopointzero.com/en/article/2025/what-next-for-eulex [Last
accessed 26 May 2016].
91
The entire Jacque report is available at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements-
eeas/docs/150331_jacque-report_en.pdf [Last accessed 26 May 2016].
92
Although outside the timeframe of this thesis, it is worth noting that in 2016 the Kosovar
Government asked for EULEX's mandate to be extended to 2018 but be limited to MMA. After
a degree of prevarication by the Kosovar Assembly, it was then approved by the legislature.
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This section has sought to provide the historical background to Kosovo with
some analysis of both events and the actions of the international community,
including NATO. More detailed analysis of NATO's role follows in the next two
sections.
CURRENT POLITICAL AND SECURITY SITUATION WITHIN KOSOVO
In order to set the context for NATO's support to the security sector in Kosovo,
this section examines the current political and security situation within the
country. As explained earlier in the Chapter, there was a complete absence of
security institutions (less for the KLA) when NATO forces entered Pristina in
1999. The presence of a guerrilla army and a wave of retribution against
certain elements of the population, but mainly against ethnic Serbs, created an
unstable and uncertain security situation. This reinforced the view within the
international community that there was a need for the development of home-
grown security institutions that could take responsibility for law and order. This
began with a DDR process led by NATO.
In the ensuing sixteen years there have been occasional spikes of violence
such as the riots in 2004 and, as touched upon earlier in this Chapter, a
simmering friction either side of the River Ibar to the north of the country. All of
these have had a political dimension. One of the spikes was just after Kosovo's
'coordinated independence'. In early March 2008 there were a series of events
that culminated in the takeover of the Mitroviča Court House by a group of 
Serbs. Although the occupation was initially peaceful, attempts by the UNMIK
police and KFOR on 17 March 2008 to clear the building, resulted in a bout of
'aggravated rioting'. As Watters explained:
See, Balkans Insight, Kosovo Assembly Extends EULEX Mandate, dated 17 June 2016.
Available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-assembly-extends-eluex-mandate-
06-17-2016 [Last accessed 21 June 2016].
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"... by aggravated rioting I mean stone-throwing, petrol-bomb throwing, steel ball-
bearing catapults, AK 47s fired directly and indirectly at KFOR and the UN and
hand grenades thrown at the KFOR and UN, UNMIK policemen, resulting in a
series of casualties." 93
The casualties included an UNMIK policeman, who died from a grenade wound,
five UNMIK policemen with life threatening injuries and eleven French KFOR
troops with serious injuries. The number of Kosovo Serb casualties is unknown
but estimated in excess of 70. Although the Court House was successfully re-
taken and order restored, some commentators and scholars have suggested
that this was a botched operation by the international community. This
perspective was encouraged by the Belgrade government, who drew attention
to the fact that it was the anniversary of the 2004 riots. (Tansey & Zaum
2009:15-17; Gow 2009:247-249)
In reality it was an operation that had to succeed, no matter the cost. Larry
Rossin, the Deputy SRSG, was unequivocal in his accusation that Serbia was
behind the violence. He claimed that several members of the Serbian Ministry
of Interior Police (MUP) had been inside the Court House.94 He also stated
that:
"It is clear to us that the violence ... was orchestrated. [...] We've never had what
we could consider a clear and unambiguous denunciation of this kind of violence





B92, UNMIK, KFOR: MUP Officers were in K. Mitrovica Court, dated 18 March 2008.
Available at: https://listserv.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A3=ind0803&L=JUSTWATCH-
L&E=0&P=3212550&B=--&T=TEXT%2FPLAIN;%20charset=US-ASCII&header=1 [Last
accessed 30 May 2016].
95
The Independent, Military Law Imposed on Divided Kosovo Town After Serb Rioting, dated 18
March 2008. Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/military-law-
imposed-on-divided-kosovo-town-after-serb-rioting-797805.html [Last accessed 30 May 2016].
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When interviewed Watters96 confirmed that there had been prior intelligence of
a coordinated plan by Belgrade to partition Kosovo along the line of the River
Ibar:
"... there was the emergence of a Serbian plan to disrupt, destabilise and then
annex Northern Kosovo, and there were a series of actions taken to take over the
key Government buildings in Mitroviča, and the penultimate building to be taken 
over was the Court House, and the final building would be the Police Station. [...]
And KFOR decided that it would prevent [...] Kosovan Serbs supported by Serbia
actually, to carry out their plan, and this involved an operation to take back the
Court House from the Serbian protesters and then reinforce the Police Station.
And there was also a coincidental visit by a senior Serbian politician on the day
that the Police Station would surrender to Serbian control, and this [... would have
...] coincided also with the disruption of the Kosovan customs posts in the North
of the country. So essentially north of the River there would [...] be absolutely no
Kosovan governmental presence and so in the wake of a failure, as Serbia would
argue, of the Kosovan Government to exercise its mandate, in order to protect
the people of Northern Kosovo, the Government of Serbia would assume a
mandate to govern that area."97 98
NATO authorities also summoned its ORF to reinforce KFOR's presence north
of the River Ibar. It was clear that Belgrade was surprised at the robust
response, not least because it undermined its claim that only the Belgrade
government could provide rule of law to that area. Nonetheless, Serbia still
wrote to the UN later that month effectively requesting partitioning along ethnic
96
Aside from being Commander of British Forces in Kosovo at the time, Watters was also Chief




It is not entirely clear who the 'senior Serbian politician' was but it seems likely that it would
have been Slobodan Samardžić, who was the Serbian Minister for Kosovo at the time and who 
did visit Mitroviča the day after the riots. 
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lines,99 although there was no recognition of Kosovo's independence as that
would have meant Serbia forfeiting its claim to all the territory of the Province.100
Events surrounding the recapture of the Court House in March 2008 still have
resonance for the current101 political and security situation in Kosovo for three
main reasons. First, the robustness of the KFOR response demonstrated to the
Belgrade government that they could not impose partition by force. Ironically
this led to serious concerns by US officials about the possibility of partition by
stealth, as evinced by a 2010 leaked US diplomatic telegram.102 Second, a
combination of US diplomatic pressure and the EU's role in brokering the
Pristina-Belgrade dialogue continues to modify Serbia's approach in the North.
The threat of violence being orchestrated by Belgrade is now far less likely than
that organised locally by Kosovo Serbs. Third, KFOR became much more risk-
averse following the drama at the Mitroviča Court House.  Watters 
acknowledges that the action had political risks at the time but he was surprised
at the lack of support for the action from France towards a French COMKFOR.
As he explained:
"... the basic problem was KFOR had become a sort of garrison organisation and
not quite prepared to face serious threats to security and freedom of movement,
and this was a serious threat, it was a strategic threat, and as a result of this the
French Brigade in Mitroviča were badly mauled by this situation [...] but not to 
have deployed them would have lost north of the Ibar River to Kosovo." 103
99
For example see: The Guardian, Serbia asks UN for partitioning of Kosovo, dated 25 March
2008. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/25/serbia.kosovo [Last
accessed 27 May 2016].
100
In the wake of Kosovo's independence, the Serbian government fell on 8 March 2008. There
was thus a degree inconsistency in what various Ministers were saying, including with regard to
Kosovo and sovereignty. For example see: Balkan Insight, Serb Ministers Deny Kosovo
Partition Talks, dated 24 March 2008. Available from an internet recovery service at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20090112172342/http://www.balkaninsight.com:80/en/main/news/8
857/ [Last accessed 5 June 2016].
101
As at the end of 2015.
102
The Guardian, Wikileaks cables: Kosovo Sliding Towards Partition, Washington Told, dated
9 December 2010. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/09/wikileaks-




Physical threats to security may have lessened since 2008, but they still exist.
During a Kosovo Police (KP) mission to enforce border controls with Serbia in
July 2011, a member of the KP Intervention Unit was shot and killed by a Serb
sniper and a number of other KP officers were wounded. Subsequently a
number of barricades were set up across Northern Kosovo border, as well as on
the River Ibar. KFOR then became involved in dealing with the resultant
security issues and this set the scene for an ebb and flow of the setting up and
subsequent dismantling of barricades, which eventually ground to a halt in
2013104 leaving several barricades in place. Diplomacy was left to take its
course and, after several years of work by the EU through the Integrated Border
Management (IBM) process,105 this eventually led in May 2015 to a joint border
crossing point being opened between Serbia and Kosovo.106
This limited rapprochement between the two governments perhaps best
illustrates the clear linkage between the political and the security situation in
Kosovo. As both sides are conditioned by the EU to normalise relations, then
the security situation has improved. Nonetheless, as Burin Ramadani of the
ethnic Albanian AAK party suggests:
"... a lot of security problems remain and definitely those problems are inter-
connected, and I can connect the north of Kosovo security situation with
organised crime, with corruption, with human trafficking, with Islamic
fundamentalism and all things because mainly people in Kosovo have started to
lose the faith in the system and the State." 107
These concerns, especially with regard to organised crime and corruption within
the state system, were echoed by many interviewees for this research.108 A
104




Independent Balkan News Agency, Agreement Is Reached For Two New Border Crossing
Points Between Kosovo and Serbia, dated 22 May 2015. Available at:
http://www.balkaneu.com/agreement-reached-border-crossing-points-kosovo-




For example, Interviews K3, K6, K9, K13 and K14.
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senior Kosovo police officer offered some understanding of these issues, when
he suggested that part of the problem for Kosovo is that it is still:
"... a young state, a young administration. I think the biggest threat is corruption
for this young country. Still we don’t have, or we are still trying to get proper
mechanisms which will be more effective and efficient in tackling these cases of
corruption and economic crime, but I think this is [...] one of the biggest threats."
109
The December 2015 Kosovo Security Barometer (KCSS 2015:20-22) reports
Kosovo citizens' perceptions of threats within the country and its findings are
entirely consistent with these views.110 Although the November 2015 UN SRSG
report for Kosovo highlighted several inter-ethnic incidents, it stated that the
situation "... remained generally stable." 111 The PDK MP, Ganimete Musliu,
argued that this stability was relatively surprising given the high rate of
unemployment:
"I don’t know which country in the world could hold such a stability with such a big
number of unemployment. The majority of the population is very young and
unemployed." 112
Notwithstanding the threats that are still present, including the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism113 that was mentioned by Ramadani, the security situation has




The survey rates the four highest threats as: unemployment (97%), corruption (95%),
organized crime (92%) and lack of political stability (90%).
111
See: UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo, UN Doc S/2015/833 dated 3 November 2015. Available at:




Similar to all countries in the Region with Muslim minority or majority populations there is a
growing concern about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the links to the fighting in Syria.
For example, see: Balkan Insight, Kosovo ‘Islamic State’ Hacker’s Family ‘is Pro-American’,
dated 16 October 2015. Available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-islamic-
state-hacker-s-family-is-pro-american-1-10-16-2015 [Last accessed 6 June 2016]; and, Balkan
Insight, Kosovo Detains Three on Terrorism Charges, dated 17 November 2015. Available at:
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/three-kosovo-suspects-on-terrorism-under-custody-11-
17-2015 [Last accessed 30 May 2016].
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"Kosovo remains [...] quite secure actually. I would rather walk through the
streets of Pristina at three in the morning than I would my own town."114 Inter-
ethnic violence is much reduced and the threat of destabilisation from Serbia
has also lessened, although it is not entirely absent. It seems clear therefore
that corruption and the political culture of impunity which now exists in Kosovo
pose the most significant threats to security and stability for this young state in
2015 and beyond. This is therefore the political and security context in which
NATO has been supporting the development of Kosovo's security sector. The
next section now analyses that role and begins to establish possible themes
and lessons to carry forward into NATO's future engagements.
NATO SUPPORT TO DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECURITY SECTOR
WITHIN KOSOVO
Background
As alluded to in the introduction to this Chapter, "... a combination of a robust
international presence and a different socio-political environment meant that the
development of the security sector in Kosovo was fundamentally different from
that of other countries in the Western Balkans. Not least this was due to the
need to develop a new security sector." (Qehaja 2013:7) Florian Qehaja
suggested that the:
"... formative context of the security institutions in Kosovo can best be divided
into three phases. The first phase (1999-2005) marked the establishment of
first Kosovo security institutions, notably the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and
civil emergency structures in the form of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC),
where the international community retained an executive role. The second
phase (2005-2008) saw the initial handover of responsibilities from the
international community to the Kosovo Government. The third phase (2008-
2015) marked the creation of a new security sector architecture that reflected
114
Interview K15 and he lived on the south coast of England.
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Kosovo's statehood with the establishment of security structures such as the
Kosovo Security Force (KSF) and Kosovo Intelligence Agency (KIA)."
115
NATO116 has played a role in supporting all three phases of development from
DDR of the KLA in the early years to the creation of the KSF since
independence. This part of the Chapter seeks to identify the detail of that
support and begins the process of understanding the complexities and
meanings to be found in NATO's experience.
From a total of 50,000 troops at the end of 1999, KFOR in 2015 had just over
4,600 troops stationed in the country.117 NATO's mandate throughout this
period has been to maintain a 'safe and secure environment' and ensure
freedom of movement.118 This task was undertaken with relative success apart
from the two notable exceptions that were discussed earlier in the Chapter: the
immediate aftermath of the intervention in 1999 and the riots of March 2004.119
It seems likely that these humbling experiences led, at least in part, to KFOR's
more robust reaction to the seizure of the Mitroviča Court House in 2008.120
The other area where there has been mixed success was in establishing the
rule of law in the early days prior to the arrival of the UNMIK police and the
development of the KPS.121
115
Interview K14. It should be noted that words used in the interview and the words contained
in the two citations are very similar: Qehaja and Vrajolli (2011); Qehaja & Blease (2013:7)
116
A distinction will be drawn between that support provided by the forces based in-country (ie
KFOR) and that support provided by JFC Naples, ACO and HQ NATO Brussels. Where the
term NATO is used then it means a combination of the various levels of the NATO chain of
command.
117
See: NATO, NATO's Role in Kosovo, dated 30 November 2015. Available at:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm [Last accessed 2 May 2016].
118
Information taken from the NATO website: NATO, NATO's Role in Kosovo, dated 30
November 2015. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm [Last
accessed 20 May 2016].
119
Both cases are discussed earlier in this Chapter in 'International Administration [..]:1999-
2005'
120
Discussed in the previous section 'Current Political And Security Situation In Kosovo'.
121
Discussed earlier in this Chapter in 'International Administration [..]:1999-2005'.
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Early Days: 1999-2005
This section analyses the first phase of development of Kosovo's security
institutions. There were a plethora of issues to concern both KFOR and UNMIK
during the early days but one particular issue that was paramount was how to
manage the KLA. UNSCR 1244 was quite clear in its language that acting
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations:
"... the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups [..were to...] end
immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for
demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security presence in
consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General..." (UN
1999)
Clearly, KFOR's prime concern was to neutralise any immediate threat to
security and stability within the country, but, in addition, it needed to create a
degree of force protection for its own troops. Whilst the former US regional
envoy, Ambassador Gelbard, had famously described the KLA as 'terrorists' in
January 1998, the international community, and NATO in particular, had worked
quite closely with the KLA from late 1998 onwards. There was thus a measure
of good will on both sides. Nonetheless, the KLA were in a mood of
triumphalism after the conflict and the narrative that they spread was that:
'NATO had won the Kosovo war in the air; and the KLA had won the war on the
ground.' 122 There was thus little appetite for demilitarisation. In mid-June 1999
the then Brigadier General Çeku, the commander of the KLA, had made this
point quite clearly to Lieutenant General Jackson, COMKFOR. It was at this
stage, however, that General Wes Clark, who was SACEUR, flew to Kosovo
and brokered further talks with both Hashim Thaçi and Brigadier General Çeku.
The details of the discussion are still shrouded in a degree of mystery123 but
122
This was a phrase that was constantly repeated to the researcher when talking to ex-KLA
members, including the then Lieutenant General Agim Çeku in 2006. See also Selimi quote in
Bekaj (2010:25).
123
For example, there is no mention in General Wes Clark's autobiography of these events in
the immediate aftermath of KFOR's entry into Kosovo. See Clark (2002:402-405). It is possible
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what is clear is that on 20 June 1999 Hashim Thaçi, on behalf of the KLA
leadership, signed an 'undertaking' 124 with COMKFOR that the KLA would
demilitarise within ninety days, in accordance with the provisions of UNSCR
1244. This duly occurred peacefully and on schedule, and was the first phase
of DDR in Kosovo after the conflict.
There has always been a degree of speculation as to why the leadership of the
KLA agreed to the 'undertaking' given their rather bullish comments in the
aftermath of the conflict. In 2006 a senior UK official postulated a theory to the
researcher. He suggested that during Clark's visit to Kosovo, immediately after
the intervention, a dinner was held between the senior leadership of the KLA
and senior NATO commanders. At that dinner General Clark suggested a
theoretical way forward for an armed group, that had previously been dubbed a
terrorist organisation, eventually to become a fully fledged Army. It was
suggested that Clark then drew a diagram of this transition onto a napkin. 125
Figure 6.1 below is believed to be a photocopy of the original napkin and, for
clarity, a typed copy of the original is at Figure 6.2.
that Clark felt that he had gone beyond his mandate in the negotiations or perhaps he
considered that there was a residual sensitivity to the discussions.
124
A copy of the undertaking can be found on the NATO website: NATO's Role In Kosovo,
Undertaking of demilitarisation and transformation by the UCK, dated 20 June 1999. Available
at: http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990620a.htm [Last accessed 2 June 2016].
125
This story was related to the researcher in 2006 in order for him to understand better the
context of the formation of the KPC. A photocopy of the napkin was also handed to him. For
obvious reasons the official does not want to be named, although his name has been shared
with the researcher's academic supervisor.
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Transition from Terrorist Group to an Army?
Figure 6.1: Transition From a Terrorist Group to an Army? (1)
(Photocopy of Napkin - June 1999)
















Figure 6.2: Transition From a Terrorist Group to an Army? (2)
(Representation of Diagram on Napkin - June 1999)
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The senior UK official was not at that dinner but the story was told to him by a
person who was. There is no other corroboration for this story, although the
researcher quizzed several people who were involved in the talks.126 The
information is included in this thesis, however, as it shows precisely the path
that has been followed since 1999, and which is due to conclude with the
formation of Kosovo's Army in 2017, some eighteen years after the signing of
the 'undertaking'. In the researcher's considered opinion, the story would
therefore seem to be credible. It also highlights the distinctly political approach
that was needed by a NATO military commander in order to secure a working
agreement on the ground.127 Without such an approach, it is entirely possible
that there might have been armed clashes between KFOR troops and the KLA -
it was a possible outcome that could have had dire consequences for both
sides.
Although the KLA leadership had agreed to the disarmament process, this did
not always translate to a complete willingness to hand over weapons on the
ground. This resulted in several tense moments,128 but ultimately the prospect
of achieving their end goal of independence and their own army was sufficiently
appealing for the KLA to compromise in the short-term. It has been widely
acknowledged that KFOR managed the disarmament process quickly and
efficiently. (Gallagher 2005:151) Political scientist, Krennar Gashi, commented:
"I was astonished at how quickly and rapidly everything moved forward and how
quickly [...] the KLA was disarmed. Having [...studied...] post-conflict society, I’ve
been reading a lot about [...how disarmament is...] one of the crucial political
obstacles in the aftermath of the war." 129
By 20 September 1999 the disarmament process had officially been completed
and the KLA then signed a follow up document with timelines to set up an
126
Interviewees K7 and K18 both merely stressed the positive impact that General Clark had on
resolution of the disarmament issue.
127
The UN's Operational Guide to DDR repeatedly emphasises the political nature of the






unarmed, civilian disaster management organisation, in the form of the KPC.130
In simple terms the role of the KPC was created in order to occupy the
remaining members of the KLA and keep them under IC supervision, whilst
UNMIK took interim responsibility for running the province. It was anticipated
that the future status of Kosovo would be resolved within a three year window
and, with it, the future of the KPC.
Like virtually all guerrilla armies that have agreed to a peace deal, the KLA did
not necessarily hand over all their weapons during the disarmament phase and
it would be naïve to think otherwise. KFOR continued to find weapons caches
throughout Kosovo for several years afterwards and, although former KLA
commanders denied ownership, there seems to be little doubt that such hidden
storage sites were policy. (Heinemann-Grüder & Paes 2001:19-20; Bekaj
2010:28). As former KLA volunteer, Agim Musliu stated simply during an
interview: "Some of them were given back but some of them were hidden." 131
The next two phases of the KLA's programme of DDR (demobilisation and
reintegration) continued in line with the 'undertaking'. UNMIK and KFOR
recognised, however, that they did not necessarily have the skills to conduct
many of the elements of demobilisation and reintegration, so many of these
activities were outsourced to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM).
The first step was to register the KLA combatants. As Carl Jenkin, a former
member of IOM explained, whilst some former combatants preferred not to
register, there were plenty of others who had probably not fought, but felt the
need to register as combatants.132 In the event about 25,000 men and women
registered. The IOM, with KFOR assistance, then designed and conducted a
series of training courses that sought to transform ex-KLA members from
guerrillas to a disciplined but civilian organisation with the right skill set for their
roles.
130
The document was then transformed into a 'law': UNMIK Regulation 1999/8. Available at:




As quoted in Heinemann-Grüber & Paes (2001:25).
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The reintegration into society of the KLA followed the classical lines described
in Chapter 2, except that many of the former combatants merely returned to
their families because, as an ex-KLA member explained, a number: "... of them
were villagers. They turned back [sic] to their villages. [...] I can’t say exactly
how many, but one third of them went back to their villages and [... resumed ...]
village life."133 Some 4,000 KLA veterans were accepted for training as
members of the new KPS and, whilst 18,000 people applied for membership of
the KPC, just 5,000 were selected. The majority were ex-KLA members but the
applicants included civilians and minorities, in line with the desire to have a
multi-ethnic force.
Although the KLA's DDR is an interesting case study in its own right,134 for the
purposes of this case study it is necessary to focus on KFOR's direct
involvement in the process. After the disarmament phase this was initially the
vetting of applicants for the KPC.135 136 Both UNMIK and KFOR then helped set
up the KPC137: UNMIK having overall political responsibility138 and KFOR having
responsibility for the day-to-day direction of the Corps. Initially most of this
direction was conducted by KFOR's Joint Implementation Commission (JIC) but
it was then succeeded in 2003 by the KFOR Inspectorate for the KPC (KIKPC)




A more detailed treatment of the entire DDR process can be found in Heinemann-Grüber &




KFOR drew upon its own intelligence resources, as well as the many National Intelligence
Cells (NICs) present in HQ KFOR in order to conduct the vetting process. This was then an
ongoing task with new members of the KPC and one that was repeated for all potential
candidates for the KSF.
137
NATO, Background Briefing, dated 21 September 1999. Available at:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_27524.htm?selectedLocale=en
138
From September 2002 until the disbandment of the KPC, the UK provided a 2-star general
as the 'KPC Coordinator' responsible for assisting the KPC with its training requirements and
development. He worked closely with COMKFOR and HQ KFOR on these issues. See: UNMIK
Press Release, UNMIK/PR/815, dated 10 September 2002. Available at:
http://www.unmikonline.org/PR/815%20-%20New%20UNMIK-
Coordinator%20for%20the%20Kosovo%20Protection%20Corps%20appointed.doc [Last
accessed 9 June 2016].
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Whilst the KPC hierarchy commanded and organised the Corps, the KIKPC, as
its name implies, then acted as an inspectorate. Its main tasks were to conduct
roll calls and emergency readiness tests, inspect training, and ensure
compliance with the KPC Disciplinary Code.139 140 The relationship between the
KIKPC and the KPC thus became more distant and often somewhat frosty, in
the same way that the UK OFSTED schools inspectors can sometimes have a
difficult relationship with individual schools and teachers. In an informal
conversation with a senior officer in the KPC, it was suggested to the
researcher that this was perhaps exacerbated by the rapid turnover of KIKPC
personnel and the patchy English language skills on both sides.141 He implied
that the relationship had changed from that of 'partnership' during and
immediately after the conflict to one of a 'superior-inferior', somewhat
adversarial relationship. KFOR staff seemed to blissfully unaware of this
nuance, perhaps because their contextual knowledge was woefully thin.142 This
issue will be returned to later in this Chapter as it is an issue for NATO in the
future.
When the KLA leadership agreed for the KPC to be an unarmed, civil
emergency organisation,143 they were clear on the limits being placed on the
number of personnel,144 but did not necessarily understand the extent of the
limitations on their activities. For example, the 200 ceremonial weapons the
KPC were authorised to hold had to be stored in a KFOR armoury, so that
139
List of tasks and responsibilities contained in UN ISSR KPC Report, undated (approximately
10 August 2006). Copy held by researcher (UNOSEK & Final Status/Kosovo/2006 08 10 UN
ISSR KPC Report).
140
See also: KFOR Chronicle, The Kosovo Forces Inspectorate of the KPC (KIKPC), updated 1
April 2006. Available at: http://www.nato.int/kfor/chronicle/2005/chronicle_03/09.htm [Last
accessed 10 June 2016].
141
Senior KPC Officer, 23 February 2006. The comment about English language skills,
particularly at NATO's Brigade level and below, chimes with the researcher's own experience.
142
Discussion with KFOR staff after the conversation with the Senior KPC Officer, 23 February
2006.
143
The document signed by the KLA leadership on 20 September 1999 agreed to the formation
of the KPC as an unarmed, civil emergency organisation. The document was then transformed
into a 'law': UNMIK, UNMIK Regulation 1999/8. Available at:
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/re99_08.pdf [Last accessed 10 June 2016].
144
The manning levels of the KPC were included in 20 September 1999 document and were set
at 3052 active members and 2000 reservists, organised across 6 regional commands with a
central Headquarters in Pristina.
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KFOR controlled access.145 Training was limited to search and rescue,
demining and emergency response and specifically excluded military training.146
Nonetheless, the aspiration remained, backed up by the occasional public
pronouncement, that the KPC would eventually become the future army of
Kosovo.147 (Bekaj 2010:29) This expectation was undoubtedly nurtured, at
least in part, by the wording of the 'undertaking'148 and perhaps in part by the
Albanian version of KPC.149 As the three year window before resolution of
Kosovo's status began to stretch further and further into the future, the growing
uncertainty had a deleterious effect on the KPC. A limiting mandate, dwindling
resources and unfulfilled expectations all began to take their toll on morale.
This was exacerbated by the continuous friction between successive
COMKFORs and COMKPC over the longer-term future of the KPC. For
example, Lieutenant General Fabio Mini wrote to the QUINT Heads of Mission
in Kosovo in April 2003 complaining that both Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi
and COMKPC, Lieutenant General Agim Çeku, had made statements
confirming the 'army-like future' of the KPC in contravention of the 1999
agreement. He also went on to suggest that they may have been encouraged
in these aspirations by members of the international community including the
QUINT.150 He was probably correct in his assertion, as it is a characteristic of
the international community in the Western Balkans that they rarely speak with
145
Interestingly, political scientist Krennar Gashi (Interview K5), voiced his whole-hearted
support for this approach at that stage in history, as a means of reassuring the Kosovo Serbs.
146
Major General (Retired) Ramadan Qehaja (Interview K18) explained to the researcher that
this was a constant source of friction as the KPC wanted to conduct more military-style training,




Para 25 of the Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation by the UCK dated 21 Jun
99: “… give due consideration to … the formation of an Army of Kosovo on the lines of the US
National Guard in due course as part of the political process designed to determine Kosovo’s
future status…”
149
Krennar Gashi (Interview K6) repeated something that Çeku had told the researcher in
earlier meetings that the KPC in Albanian is: Trupat e Mbrojtjes së Kosovës (TMK). The
Albanian word 'Mbrojtjes' is used for both 'Protection' and 'Defence'. Whether this was a
remarkable strategem by the first COMKFOR, Lieutenant General Jackson, to keep everybody
at the negotiating table content, or just a linguistic oversight, is a moot point. It would certainly
seem to most members of the KPC that they were part of the Kosovo Defence Corps.
150
KFOR Unreferenced and Unclassified Letter dated 5 April 2003. Copy held by researcher.
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one voice. In the event, nothing substantive came from Mini's letter and in a
few short months he moved on and was replaced by another COMKFOR.
It is also worth briefly mentioning at this stage one other major concern for
KFOR throughout this period. It was evident that some members of the KPC
were involved in both criminal and terrorist related incidents in the early days of
its formation,151 and several interviewees commented upon this.152 The KPC
chain of command also reflected its regional KLA roots, which one ex-KLA
member suggested merely reinforced clan control, particularly from the Drenica
Region.153
It was therefore right and proper that KFOR should exercise a measure of
control over the KPC, but it was politically naïve of the international community,
and thoroughly frustrating for the Kosovars, not to gradually grow the KPC into
taking on some security-related tasks. Unfortunately KFOR had no room for
manoeuvre as this was a political issue for NATO and the KFOR HQ did not
have the appropriate level of political representation in-country. The
Commander of JFC Naples, Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, explained to the
researcher in 2011 that he would have expected NATO to have installed an
ambassador for these types of mission but, quite the reverse, NATO was cutting
back on any posts that were not military and directly connected to operations.154
It is perhaps an issue that NATO should re-examine.
151
For example, there was an explosion at the Zvecan bridge in northern Kosovo on 15 April
2003 in which two members of the KPC died. After a lengthy investigation, KFOR and UNMIK
announced in December 2003 the suspension and further investigation of 12 KPC members, all
of them ex-KLA, for a variety of alleged crimes. See: Janes, Sentinel Security Report - Balkans,
dated 18 November 2010. Available at: http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Sentinel-
Security-Assessment-The-Balkans/Armed-forces-Kosovo.html [Last accessed 5 May 2011].
152
For example, Interview K6 and Interview K18.
153
The Drenica Valley was the centre of the KLA uprising in the late 1990s and the home
territory of many powerful Kosovars including Hashim Thaçi (former Prime Minister and now
President of Kosovo), Sylejman Selimi (former COMKPC and first COMKSF) and Ramush
Haradinaj (former Prime Minister of Kosovo). This issue and its implications will be discussed
later in this Chapter.
154
Interview N4. It is interesting to note that in Afghanistan, NATO did eventually appoint a
senior diplomat as its Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) in order to tackle these type of
political issues and have a direct link to the Secretary General. For a list of the SCRs see:
NATO, NATO's Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan, dated 9 January 2015. Available
at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50096.htm [Last accessed 9 June 2016].
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Given the political constraints it is not surprising that KFOR's record of success
in supporting the development of the KPC has been somewhat patchy,155
although Ambassador Eide's second report in October 2005 did praise the KPC
for achieving UNMIK's laid down standards.156 Fortunately at the end of 2005
Ahtisaari was appointed to resolve the status issue and there was an
expectation that the role and future of the KPC would also be resolved.
NATO Support to UNOSEK: 2006-2007
This section analyses NATO's role in the second phase of the development of
the nascent Kosovar security sector with a particular focus on the collaboration
with UNOSEK. As discussed earlier in this Chapter,157 the Special Envoy set
up the UNOSEK office in Vienna at the beginning of 2006, and brought together
expertise and liaison officers from a variety of different areas. This included a
Dutch member of the NATO IS (Stefan Elgersma) and a UK Brigadier on a part-
time basis from the NATO operational HQ (JFC Naples) that covered Kosovo
and the Western Balkans (Dennis Blease).158 This section now analyses some
of their work within UNOSEK and its implications. Both individuals had a remit
to liaise closely with DASG Operations in Brussels, Ambassador Jim Pardew159,
but Blease was then under remit to liaise closely also with COMKFOR and




See UN Security Council S/2005/635 letter dated 7 October 2005, Annex: A comprehensive
review of the situation in Kosovo. Available at:
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kos%20S2005%20635.pdf [Last accessed 13 March 2014].
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See section entitled: 'UNOSEK and the Road to Independence: 2006-2008'.
158
Appointment letter from NATO Secretary General to UN Special Envoy, SG(2006)0140,
dated 16 February 2006. Copy held by researcher.
159
Pardew was a former US Ambassador to Bulgaria but had also been involved in various
capacities with the DPA negotiation in 1995, NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and the
Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) in 2001.
160
This was a rather tortuous chain of command but was intended to reassure the senior
military staff (mainly American) that one of their NATO military officers was not bypassing senior
commanders and dealing directly with HQ NATO Brussels. The way this was finessed is that
Elgersma wrote a weekly report for Pardew and his team in Brussels, whilst Blease wrote a
weekly report to COM JFC Naples, which was then copied to COMKFOR and key NATO staff in
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All members of the Contact Group were interested in shaping the security and
justice provisions of any future settlement but, within UNOSEK, the NATO team
was given the lead in producing drafts for the nascent security sector. The
difficulty, as explained earlier,161 was that anything that was not 'status neutral'
could not be discussed with either representatives of Serbia or Kosovo at the
start of the talks. To say that this was a 'Catch 22' situation would be an under-
statement. Nonetheless, there were three factors that allowed the NATO team
to overcome, at least in part, this obstacle. First, Lieutenant General Çeku, the
then COMKPC, had been particularly proactive in setting out a vision for the
future of the KPC and he briefed this to Ambassador Pardew and the NATO
team in Pristina in late February 2006.162 163 Second, a rather helpful UK flag
officer as the KPC Coordinator allowed the NATO team to liaise closely and
sensitise themselves to the underlying issues, but without dealing directly with
the organisation. Third, and most importantly, was the existence of a team in
Kosovo undertaking an 'Internal Security Sector Review' (ISSR).
The idea for the Review originated in the office of a former KPC Coordinator in
2004 and was then taken forward by the UNMIK SRSG.164 The Coordinator
had witnessed the work of the UK's Security Sector Development Advisory
Team (SSDAT) in Sierra Leone and it was to them that he turned to do a
scoping study in early 2005. The SSDAT laid out a methodology for a review
and persuaded the key stakeholders in Kosovo, both local and international,
that such a review would not only help build local ownership but also contribute
to the forthcoming status talks. (Welch 2011:186-188) The ISSR team then
formed up under the leadership of Tony Welch in early 2006.165
Naples and Pristina. The content was obviously carefully coordinated and seemed to satisfy all
concerned. A number of (but not all) of these unclassified reports are held by the researcher.
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See section entitled: 'UNOSEK and the Road to Independence: 2006-2008'.
162
Çeku handed a copy of his presentation to the NATO team. Copy held by researcher.
163
Two weeks after this briefing Çeku resigned from his post as COMKPC and was appointed
Prime Minister.
164
UNMIK Unreferenced Letter dated 1 July 2005. Copy held by researcher.
165
Welch is a former UK Army flag officer with considerable experience in Kosovo having been
the head of DFID in Pristina and more recently the UN Regional Administrator in Mitrovića. 
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The Kosovo ISSR:
"... was to be a consultative process designed to give the leaders and people of
Kosovo an opportunity to consider issues that would provide a definition of
security concerns, interests and the future security architecture in readiness for
the process of determining final status. The ISSR would be structured to
analyse the existing security capabilities, and identify any new institutional
capacities required to address the threats identified through the consultative
processes. In addition, it would identify policymaking development requirements
and the structures necessary to support internal and external security needs
following a determination of Kosovo’s final status." (Welch 2011:167-168)
It quickly became apparent that not only did the NATO team in UNOSEK have a
conundrum in how to seek the views of locals on security matters, but the ISSR
team also had a related conundrum in that there was the potential for delivering
a product which was at cross-purposes with UNOSEK and the outcome of
future status. This latter scenario would have been counter-productive for all
concerned, not least Kosovo.
During a meeting between the NATO team and the ISSR Coordinator in Pristina
at the end of February 2006, it was abundantly clear that there was scope for
both cooperation and coordination of the two organisations.166 Welch was quite
clear, however, that the views of the Special Envoy would need to have
primacy. (Welch 2011:196) There then began a close relationship between the
two organisations over the next eleven months that included the ability of
UNOSEK to feed questions to the ISSR team for them to use in their outreach
programme, both sides to share each others' perspectives on the security
sector in Kosovo and its development, and for the ISSR team to brief the
Special Envoy on their findings as matters evolved.167
166




The synergies accrued between the two organisations benefitted the work of
both and, in particular, enabled UNOSEK's discussions in Vienna on possible
security structures to be more holistic and better grounded than they might
otherwise have been. The NATO team produced a possible security
architecture for Kosovo and used an OECD model for the development of a
potential NSS. This latter work chimed closely with the ISSR's methodology as
recommended by SSDAT (ISSR 2006:3), as well as the process for developing
a security sector outlined in Chapter 2. In April 2006 the NATO team then
tackled probably the most contentious issue within Kosovo's security sector and
produced a discussion paper on the KPC.168 This was initially circulated within
the NATO chain of command, before it was eventually circulated within the
Contact Group.
The paper included a series of options for the future that ranged from full
demilitarisation of the KPC to the creation of a national defence force. The
recommendation was a half-way house, a small self-defence force (named the
Kosovo Defence Force - KDF), with certain limitations that would be removed
over time. It was recognised that the recommendations offered by UNOSEK
could limit the KDF in a variety of ways: equipment, numbers, tasks, financially,
geographically, and over varying periods of time. The intention, however, was
to impose just a few limits for a certain period of time as a regional confidence
building measure, but which would then be removed as the force attained
certain benchmarked targets. The key was that the limits should be used in a
constructive manner and not merely for the sake of emasculating the force.
These ideas then formed the broad framework that was included in the
'Comprehensive Proposals', albeit with some key differences that will be
discussed in more detail later.
The recommendation to form the KDF was both sensitive and likely to be
controversial for Serbia. In parallel to the work of the NATO team in UNOSEK,
the ISSR team had independently come to virtually the same conclusion, but
168
See: 'A Non-Paper: A Future Kosovo Defence Force or "Wither the KPC"?', dated 23 April
2006. Copy held by researcher.
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were asked by UNOSEK not to air their draft recommendation until after a so-
called 'Elephant Round' in Vienna on 24 July 2006.169 In the event, the ICG
published a paper entitled 'An Army for Kosovo' which then proposed a very
similar rationale for a possible self-defence force for Kosovo. (ICG 2006) It was
later discovered that the ISSR Coordinator had shared his thoughts with the
author of the ICG report as a means of socialising the ideas but one that could
not be traced back to UNOSEK. (Welch 2011:196) When the draft security text
was circulated with the QUINT, there was a curious and, at the time,
unexplained insistence on the part of the German delegation to remove the term
KDF and insert KSF. It was only subsequently discovered that the acronym
'KdF' was the same as a pre-war Nazi organisation.170
As the discourse on SSR in Chapter 2 has already stressed, local ownership is
a fundamental plank of the successful development of any security sector. The
NATO team in UNOSEK remained concerned about this element of their
proposals throughout 2006.171 Until the September, the input from the ISSR,
who had reached out to citizens across the country via town hall discussions,
their 'have your say bus', TV debates and a raft of other innovative measures,
would seem to have gone as far as they could in establishing what was practical
for Kosovo and could then be 'owned'. Indeed, several interviewees praised the
scope and scale of this consultative process.172 Also incorporated into the
'Comprehensive Proposals' was a measure for the Kosovo government to
establish a Security Council and for it to develop a full NSS with appropriate
budgetary and oversight provisions.173 This was intended to 'nudge'174 Kosovo
169
The so-called 'Elephant Round' was the first meeting of the Serbian and Kosovar leadership
under the chairmanship of the Special Envoy to air their views on the status issue.
170
It was subsequently explained to the researcher by a German diplomat that there had been
some nervousness in Berlin about the abbreviation for the Kosovo Defence Force - KDF. There
had been a pre-war Nazi organisation called 'Kraft durch Freude' (KdF) or 'Strength through
Joy', which was a state-sponsored leisure organisation that had some 39 million members at its
height. One of the KdF's most ambitious projects was the 'KdF-Wagen', which subsequently
was re-named the Volkswagen Beetle. It is curious that diplomats in Berlin are still concerned
about such linkages being made today. For more details see: Kraft durch Freude. Available at:
http://www.feldgrau.com/KdF.html [Last accessed 12 November 2015].
171
The Special Envoy was very mindful of and frequently drew this factor to his team's attention.
172
For example, Interviews K1 and K5.
173
Article 1.4, Annex VIII of 'Comprehensive Proposals'.
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towards taking ownership of a holistic process which would then give them a
reasonable chance of developing a strategy to match their needs, aspirations
and, hopefully, the availability of funding. Although it was fully appreciated that
Kosovo was effectively being directed to develop the strategy, it was still felt
that by going through the process themselves the Kosovars would be able to
understand better the connectivity of an NSS, take ownership and ultimately
develop a security sector that was democratic, transparent and accountable.
(Qehaja 2013)
From the end of September 2006, however, headwinds began to blow the initial
draft of the UNOSEK status document off-track. On 30 September the Serbian
Parliament agreed a new constitution which, inter alia, included a provision that
'Kosovo Metohija' was an integral part of Serbia. There were also very clear
signs that after the referendum on the new constitution, fresh Parliamentary
elections would be called. (Ker-Lindsay 2012:45-46) These moves would
seem to have been aimed at derailing the timetable for the status process.
Putting to one side Russia's "... increased aggressiveness towards the
settlement process and independence for Kosovo ..."175, which will be analysed
in more detail later,176 there were challenges nearer to home. At a QUINT
Meeting in Berlin on 6 October 2006 it became apparent that the views of
individual countries had begun to diverge on the status timetable as a result of
the political dynamic in Serbia, and this served to complicate an already
complicated situation.
At the meeting the French representative stated that his government would wish
to wait until after the Serbian elections and for a new government to be installed
in Belgrade before presenting Ahtisaari's proposals to both parties. At the same
time Germany, as the amanuensis for the meeting, had inserted language into
174
'Nudge theory' has only come to the attention of academics and, in particular, political
scientists since the setting up of a 'nudge unit' inside the UK's Cabinet Office in 2010. The idea
of pointing people or states in a certain direction without forced compliance has, however, been
an integral part of the SSR process from the start and was certainly integral to Ahtisaari's
approach.
175
NATO Info Memo, OPS(2006)0757 dated 9 October 2006. Copy held by researcher.
176
See: 'Geo-strategic Interests in Kosovo?'
299
the draft security annexes that would have blurred the lines of authority between
the International Military Presence (ie NATO) and the ICR. This has always
been a red line for the US and NATO177 and the attempt was eventually seen off
by the US and UK governments after some forcible diplomacy from
Ambassador Jim Pardew. Germany had also watered down some of the
articles concerning the handover of responsibilities to the new self-defence
force, which would have had the potential effect of keeping KFOR in Kosovo ad
infinitum. This point was made forcibly by the NATO team in UNOSEK to
Pardew in NATO HQ.178 (Welch 2011:212) In the aftermath of the QUINT
meeting Ahtisaari chaired a roundtable in Vienna between the German, EU and
NATO representatives on his team in order to overcome some of these issues.
After a flurry of communication between Vienna, Berlin and Brussels, some
compromises to the wording of the draft security sections were agreed,
although they still weakened the original ownership aspects and increased the
barriers needed to hand over security tasks from NATO to the Kosovars.179
This was a mistake and undoubtedly increased the Kosovars' sense of
frustration with the international community post-independence.
Germany's attempts to dilute local ownership of security issues was also
evident within KFOR. In the first half of 2006 the Italian COMKFOR proved to be
both supportive and helpful to the ISSR team but this approach was reversed
with the arrival of a German COMKFOR in September 2006. Tony Welch
commented:
"I will say that with the change from an Italian KFOR Commander to a German
one we did begin to have resistance to what we were doing, which [...] was in
my opinion, directly related to Germany’s feelings about the Kosovo Protection
Corps as it was, and its evolution from the Kosovo Liberation Army. [...] When
we published our report, we had a message from the Commander of KFOR [...]
177
NATO Info Memo, OPS(2006)0757, op cit.
178
Pardew had been at the meeting in Berlin but the NATO team in UNOSEK had not. E-mail
Blease to Pardew dated 12 October 2006. Copy held by researcher.
179
Notes from meeting held by researcher, dated 19 October 2006.
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that he could not endorse the report or indeed be involved in its launch in any
way."
180
Commanders of multi-national forces will often face a dilemma in providing
unbiased leadership of their organisation and following the diktats of their home
state but this was becoming particularly apparent in Kosovo. As the situation
became more political from 2006 onwards, local commentators reported a
perception that many KFOR officers appeared to be following national lines
rather than NATO ones.181 This view was reinforced by a former senior KFOR
officer when he claimed:
"I think it would be naïve to think that each of the senior representatives of their
nation within KFOR was not loyal first to their nation state and secondly to
KFOR."182
Several members of NATO highlighted the somewhat random nature of the
selection procedure for NATO Commanders or senior NATO positions.183
Lieutenant General Peter Pearson explained that whilst DSACEUR asks for
bids from countries for specific posts, the countries that want the post the most
normally gets it, so in effect, "... NATO doesn’t select any of its Commanders at
all, if you think about it, they’re selected by the nations."184 There is thus little
wonder that, having inserted their person into the post, governments will use
that position to meet their own perceived interests.
After the hiatus caused by the QUINT meeting, the NATO team continued to
add to the draft UNOSEK document and made three significant contributions.
The first was to produce a sequence and detailed timeline of events for the












down of the KPC.185 This was a classic DDR task reminiscent of many post-
conflict countries. The second was setting up a framework for international
actors to tackle the difficult issue of airspace control over Kosovo that had
nominally been under UNMIK authority.186 187 The third key issue was finding a
solution to an on-going border dispute between Kosovo and Macedonia. The
internal borders of Yugoslavia had never been particularly well documented and
it was only when the Federation broke up and the borders became external that
the issue began to pose a problem. An internationally approved team had
accurately defined the FRY/Macedonian border in 2000. The Macedonian
Government had then sought Belgrade's approval to this demarcation in 2001,
not Kosovo or UNMIK, as nominally the landmass of Kosovo was still under the
sovereignty of Belgrade.188 This was then endorsed (mistakenly) during a late
night session of the UN Security Council in February 2001. The NATO team
managed to gain the agreement of both Kosovo and Macedonia to include this
UN-agreed change to the border in the 'Comprehensive Proposals'.189 Although
Kosovo 'lost' a few acres of land, it secured Macedonia's goodwill and
subsequently support for its independence.190 These latter two tasks were not
conventional SSR work but undoubtedly helped improve stability in the Region
and removed potential international obstacles before Kosovo's independence.
In October 2006 the ISSR team began a programme of briefings to explain their
draft findings that took place as far apart as Vienna, Belgrade and Pristina. The
report was due to be published in December 2006 but the German
185
Although this was initially worked out in relationship to the passing of a UNSCR, it was still
used by Kosovo with the declaration of independence as the starting date.
186
'Matrix on Air Space Control and Management', dated 14 December 2006. Copy held by
researcher.
187
Airspace is a sovereignty issue and was covered in Article 7.1, Annex VIII of the
'Comprehensive Proposals'.
188
In accordance with UNSCR 1244. (UN 1999)
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See: MA/UNOSEK report dated 3 February 2007. Copy held by researcher.
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The relevant draft article (Article 3.2, Annex VIII of the 'Comprehensive Proposals') was
shared with Macedonia at the same time as Kosovo and Serbia, which allowed the Macedonian
Prime Minister to support the proposals publicly. See: MIA, Nikola Gruevski: Kosovo Plan of UN
Envoy Acceptable for Macedonia, dated 3 February 2007. Available at: http://www.invest-in-
macedonia.com/politics/1170537540-pm-gruevski-kosovo-plan-of-un-envoy-acceptable-for-
macedonia.html [Last accessed 20 June 2016]. Copy held by researcher.
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COMKFOR191 personally intervened in order to force a delay. Through the
KFOR staff, he gave various reasons for further delay, none of which made
particular sense, as he had already been assured by the NATO team in
UNOSEK that there was nothing in the draft report to concern either the Special
Envoy or NATO. Ultimately, he was unable to delay it further192 and the report
was published in January 2007. (Welch 2011:213-214)193 The report was
described by the OECD as “…one of the most ambitious and holistic efforts at SSR
undertaken in recent years, both in scope and methodology ...” (OECD-DAC 2007:249)
and was broadly welcomed. Unfortunately it did not quite receive the accolades
that it deserved, but this was probably due to the many institutional rivalries
within Kosovo.
Nonetheless, the cooperation between the NATO team in UNOSEK and the
ISSR team had proved to be of immense benefit to both sides in fulfilling their
respective mandates, in what Law (2008:58-59) describes as an 'enhancive'
manner. It is rare that two disparate organisations were able to work in such a
harmonious way but, in developing the structure and detail of Kosovo's security
sector from scratch, it was essential. Thus "... the final ISSR report and the
Ahtisaari 'Comprehensive Proposals' proved to be mutually reinforcing. [... And,
...] whilst it would be true to aver that Ahtisaari's proposals were produced top-
down, it would also be true to suggest that many elements of the proposals
flowed bottom-up via indirect contributions from local society and local actors,
mainly through the ISSR process." (Qehaja et al 2013:9)
191
By dint of his appointment, COMKFOR was automatically a member of the ISSR steering
committee, so had some influence on events.
192
Indirect pressure was brought upon COMKFOR to release the document by the Special
Envoy letting the SRSG and NATO chain of command know that he considered that the Report
provided a roadmap for the PISG for further action. See MA/UNOSEK report dated 15 January
2007. Copy held by researcher.
193
Welch argues that these delays were at the instigation of COMKFOR's home state,
Germany. This would seem to be consistent with Germany's previous actions, although it is
perhaps possible that COMKFOR was merely exercising an overly-rigid interpretation of the
KFOR mandate.
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As explained earlier194 Ahtisaari's draft proposals were shared with both
Belgrade and Pristina on 2 February 2007.195 In Belgrade the Status Envoy met
with President Tadić and his advisors (Prime Minister Koštunica having refused
to meet him), and in Pristina he met with the entire Kosovo Unity Team. Both
meetings were choreographed to an extent, with well-rehearsed positions
merely being reiterated. The one slightly discordant note:
"... came from Prime Minister Çeku, whose body language throughout the
meeting was one of thinly disguised resentment. His unhappiness centred on
the level of international oversight of the security sector and the apparently
casual way that the KPC was to be disbanded." 196
Subsequent media reports also quoted Çeku as expressing his reservations
publicly.197 There had been earlier indications that Çeku, amongst others, might
have some reservations so, as part of his introductory comments, the Status
Envoy offered to send members of his team to Belgrade and Pristina the
following week in order to clarify specific issues. Ambassador Frank Wisner,
the US Special Representative to the Status Talks, therefore met with Çeku on
7 February and the UNOSEK-NATO team met with him the following day. Both
were with the intention of persuading the Prime Minister that the draft proposals
were the best on offer.
For example, the NATO team reaffirmed the Status Envoy's point to Çeku that
the security annex was non-negotiable, being a result of difficult compromises
already made within the Contact Group.198 The team took him through the
security paragraphs with the aim of demonstrating that they met most of his
194
See section: 'UNOSEK and the Road to Independence:2006-2008'.
195
The most interesting point about the draft is that there was no specific mention of what the
final status was to be, although a glance at the text, and specifically at the security sector, could
only suggest some form of independence.
196
MA/UNOSEK report dated 3 February 2006, op cit.
197
Albin Kurti, the leader of the Vetëvendosje movement, was picking up sound-bites from the
PM and was creating a degree on unrest in Kosovo over the proposals.
198
The NATO team in UNOSEK was clear that compromises will always be necessary in these
types of negotiation, but, equally, they felt that Çeku had a point, and that some of the changes
in wording insisted upon by Germany had been over-cautious and deeply unhelpful.
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aspirations and, at the end of the meeting, he seemed to have much better
grasp of the nuances involved. It was clear, however, that the language of the
draft proposals could be softened in order to make it more appealing for local
consumption in the Albanian version.199 Thus phrases like 'disbanding the
KPC' became 'dissolving the KPC' and that the process should be done 'with
dignity'.200 This discussion proved extremely useful to the NATO team, who
then were able to assist his staff in developing some public 'lines to take' in
order to help sell the language and content of the draft proposals.201 A point
that is worth making here, is that English is a particularly rich language, which
can be used skillfully to create fine nuances. The same is not always true with
less complex languages. In recent years it has been commonplace for post-
conflict peace agreements and associated documents to be crafted first in
English and then subsequently translated into other relevant languages. From
this example, it would seem to be a clear lesson for these post-conflict
scenarios that such documents should be translated in both directions202 before
they are agreed in order to ensure that the meaning is as close as possible in
both languages.
During February and March 2007 the NATO team in UNOSEK continued to
support the negotiations with the parties. Progress, however, was patchy not
least because Belgrade "... was bipolar with different nuances from the
President’s man (Kojen) and Prime Minister’s man (Samardžić)."203 At the end
of the negotiations the report back to JFC Naples stated:
"The ten days of talks have seen a significant hardening of positions, particularly
from Belgrade, and the drawing back from previously agreed language. The key
message that could be drawn from this round is that no amount of further time or
199
MA/UNOSEK report dated 10 February 2006. Copy held by researcher.
200
See Annex VIII of the 'Comprehensive Proposals'.
201
Copy of draft 'Lines to Take' held by researcher.
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For clarity, that would be from English to the local language and then back again into
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further engagement is going to bring the two sides closer together. The debate
must now shift to the Security Council in New York."204
The NATO team then supported the final drafting process of the
'Comprehensive Proposals' until they were delivered to the UN Security Council
on 26 March 2007, whilst also continuing to coordinate the various NATO
strands of activity for the security sector. These coordination efforts continued
for both members of the team when they returned to their normal jobs, which
aided continuity. Unfortunately, as explained earlier in the Chapter, the
proposals became stuck in the Security Council.
Towards the end of 2007 it became increasingly apparent that NATO would
need to assume the responsibilities allocated in the 'Comprehensive Proposals'
but without the necessary legal framework from the UN Security Council.
During much of 2007 the planning staffs at JFC Naples and SHAPE were
conducting what is euphemistically termed 'prudent military planning' 205 to
cover the various potential outcomes for Kosovo. It was clear to JFC Naples,
however, that there were severe challenges, both financially and in staffing
terms, if NATO were to develop a demobilisation and reintegration programme
for the KPC and set up the KSF in a timely manner.206 By December 2007
discussion was underway between all the key stakeholders about the timing of
a coordinated declaration of independence by Kosovo, although the Alliance
Foreign Ministers were only able to agree the following at their meeting on 7
December 2007:
"KFOR shall remain in Kosovo on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution
1244, unless the Security Council decides otherwise. [...] NATO stands ready
to play its part in the implementation of future security arrangements. [...]
204
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We will continue to cooperate closely with the population of Kosovo, the UN, the
European Union and other international actors wherever appropriate to help in
the further development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful
Kosovo." (NATO 2007. Emphasis added.)
The key phrase in the communiqué above has been emphasised by the
researcher as it was a signal from Foreign Ministers to allow 'prudent military
planning' to continue. SACEUR therefore provided further guidance, albeit
heavily caveated, to COM JFC Naples and COMKFOR to carry on with planning
for tasks in accordance with Ahtisaari's plan, whilst being sensitive that no
formal mandate had been issued by the NAC.207 The letter was a masterpiece
of circumspection but it allowed detailed work further down the military chain of
command on what were to become known as NATO's 'new tasks'. NATO HQ's
DASG Operations was similarly coordinating the higher level NATO activities
including setting up a civilian team to assist in the civilian oversight of the
KSF.208
On 19 December 2007 there was a closed door meeting of the UN Security
Council to discuss Kosovo, which merely served to confirm that the Council
remained divided. Russia and China called for a resumption of the negotiations
between Serbia and Kosovo, whilst the Western members insisted that the
negotiations were exhausted.209 Given this impasse the European members of
the Security Council, the US and Germany (with the EU Presidency) gave a
joint press statement after the meeting:
"[...] We would have liked the Security Council to play its role. But, as today's
discussions have once again shown, the Council is not in a position to agree on
the way ahead. We regret this, but we are ready to take on our own
207
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responsibilities. We will work within the EU and NATO in a careful and
coordinated manner towards a settlement for Kosovo. [...]" 210
This effectively was the starting pistol for Kosovo's 'coordinated independence'
two months later.211 The role that NATO played during this period is covered
next.
The 'New Tasks': 2008-2015
This section now analyses the role that NATO played in Kosovo in the third
phase of the development of its security sector from 2008 until 2015.212
From the beginning of 2008, and certainly after Kosovo's 'coordinated
independence', it was abundantly clear that NATO's key challenge was the
political sensitivity that accompanied any new institution building and SSR
mandate for KFOR.213 214 In the immediate aftermath of the declaration, the
Alliance was only able to reaffirm that KFOR should remain in Kosovo on the
basis of UNSCR 1244.215 This would include a continuation of the 'safe and
secure environment' task for KFOR, but unlike the stipulations of UNSCR 1244,
the planned 'new tasks' would be in support of the Kosovo institutions. It was
210
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not until 12 June 2008, however, that NATO Defence Ministers were able to
authorise these 'new tasks' in Kosovo,216 some three days before Kosovo's new
constitution came into effect.
"These 'new tasks' were both developmental and advisory in nature (classic
SSR tasks) and included assisting in the 'standing down' (in other words
disbanding) of the KPC, the 'standing up' (establishment) of the KSF and the
establishment of a 'civilian-led body' (a ministry) to oversee the KSF." 217 The
first two tasks were to be overseen by a new organisation within KFOR, entitled
the Military Civilian Advisory Division (MCAD) and the latter by a Ministry
Advisory Team (MAT) that worked directly to DASG Defence Policy and Plans
in NATO HQ Brussels.218 The rationale for this is that the ministry is led by a
minster, it needed NATO civilian oversight, rather than military oversight. As a
senior NATO official explained:
"NATO has never done this before, to actually get down and dirty setting up a
civilian Ministry. It’s slow work but it’s been moderately successful in terms of
recruiting people, training people, mentoring if you like. [...] It’s [...] particularly
unsatisfactory in that people are split between different locations so that makes
life even more difficult…But this is a moderate success story."219
Although the senior NATO official was clearly cautious in his choice of words,
several other interviewees in Kosovo were much more fulsome in their praise of
the role that the MAT (subsequently renamed the NAT) was, and still is,
216
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performing.220 When interviewed Lieutenant General Kastrati was clear that
these advisory roles are crucial in building capacity both within the Ministry and
the KSF.221
Unfortunately the excellent work of the MAT/NAT was not necessarily replicated
within the MCAD, where difficulties with its mandate soon began to emerge. A
workable plan had been produced for both the tasks allocated to the MCAD but
"... the view of certain KFOR-contributing countries was that it should act in a
strictly status neutral manner and its officers and soldiers seemed to be
following national orders, rather than NATO orders. It was a view that seemed
to run counter to the thrust of the 'new tasks' and acted as an obstacle to
progress." (Clewlow 2010a) This was complicated by the failure to fill the posts
in MCAD, or staff them with individuals from the non-recognising states. One
member of the international community in Pristina suggested that there was a
feeling of "... moral outrage in KFOR about [... the setting up of...] the KSF." 222
In the event the KPC was successfully 'stood down' and the KSF was 'stood up',
but it had more to do with the activities of the local stakeholders rather than
KFOR. Whilst it did mean that a degree of local ownership was engendered, it
also allowed certain elements within the Kosovo Government to hijack events
for their own ends and criticise the international community. (Clewlow
2010a:28-30)
A full treatment of events can be found in the two papers by Ade Clewlow, but it
became apparent that KFOR staff had become confused about their mandate
and thus being narrow in their interpretation of their duties.223 It was a situation
that demanded strong leadership within KFOR, which, unfortunately, seemed to
have been lacking as individuals clung to the handcuffs of their mandate without
using them as handrails to achieve the strategic objectives. Notwithstanding
these substantial difficulties inside KFOR, the obstacles were eventually
220
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overcome by a dedicated band of officers rather than KFOR itself. It was not
KFOR's finest hour.
There are many issues that could be drawn from the above experience but for
the sake of brevity only three are analysed in detail below. They are the impact
of the non-recognisers to NATO's approach, strategic communications, and the
appetite for risk within NATO.
First, NATO HQ perhaps took too much account of the opinions of the non-
recognising states, which then created considerable difficulties on the ground.
These were difficulties that KFOR's military personnel were not always able to
overcome. One trivial example is that one of the non-recognising states
objected to the name of the MAT, as they believed it represented an explicit
recognition of Kosovo as an independent state. Thus the team in the Ministry
was rechristened the NATO Advisory Team or NAT, much to the bemusement
of both the local Kosovars as well as the international community in Kosovo.224
Second, a directive from NATO HQ that had more profound implications was
the prohibition of any form of proactive information strategy in support of the
'new tasks'.225 Similarly, the new government of Kosovo had to be described in
a neutral manner as the nascent 'Institutions of Kosovo'.226 KFOR did not have
a particularly strong reputation for getting its message out to the local
community227 but this lack of a strategic communications plan very nearly
derailed both the standing down of the KPC and standing up of the KSF, and
led to serious confusion concerning what NATO/KFOR was attempting to
achieve. It also allowed dissenting voices in the community, such as the KLA
veterans, and the local media to fill the vacuum with their message.228 The
224
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225
Interview K2 and Clewlow (2010a:31) and Clewlow (2010b:29). This direction was also
included in: SHAPE Letter SH/J5 PLANS/7340-074/07-203643, op cit. Copy held by
researcher.
226
Senior NATO Official AB.
227
For example, Interviews K5 and K6. This issue will be analysed further in the next section of
this Chapter.
228
Interview K2 and Clewlow (2010b:30).
311
dissolution of the KPC was always going to be a sensitive issue in Kosovo,
where they were seen as the successor organisation to the KLA. In the
absence of clear information some members of the KPC went on strike and the
whole issue became a domestic political football. Ironically KFOR's refusal to
engage meant that recruitment for a multi-ethnic KSF was harmed and the
process was more difficult than it should have been.229
Third, KFOR became increasingly risk averse and more circumspect in its
dealings with locals. As one member of the international community in Pristina
commented, KFOR had a "... phobia about the use of the terms 'army' or
'military' ..." when referring to the KSF230 and another suggested that as a result
the organisation "... on occasions seemed unwilling to shoulder its new
responsibilities."231 These perceptions chimed with the researcher's own
observations. He was introduced to the German COMKFOR and a group of his
senior officers at a UK reception in the Hotel Emerald on 19 June 2013. Having
explained the purpose of his visit to Kosovo and the nature of his research,
there was a tangible sense of disquiet in the group, and several of the officers
commented 'how sensitive everything was at the moment'. At that moment
COMKSF, Lieutenant General Kastrati, approached the researcher as they had
known each other for a number of years. The KFOR group immediately moved
away with only a brief nod of acknowledgement to Kastrati. The researcher
then had an opportunity to observe the KFOR group on occasions over the next
hour or so. Although there were key individuals from every strata of Kosovo
society at the reception, from politicians to commentators to state officials, as
well the key members of the international community, there seemed to be no
attempt (as far as the researcher could see) by the KFOR group to engage with
anybody, local actors or international community. There was a sense of
isolation and a palpable feeling of unease hung over them. As soon as the UK
Ambassador and the Kosovar President had made their speeches, the group
229
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departed en masse.232 Given that one of KFOR's key tasks was to support the
development of an element of the Kosovo security sector, it would seem to defy
common sense that this senior group of officers should not be engaging with the
local elite, building relationships and trust. The issue of relationships during the
support of a country's SSR will be returned to later in the Chapter but clearly
this attitude would have had an impact on the work of the MCAD.
It was perhaps fortuitous that around this time, the IS in NATO HQ recognised
that there were a series of chronic failures with the work of the MCAD. These
ranged from persistent undermanning, a lack of donations for the NATO trust
funds to assist the KSF, the more systemic issues associated with short tours of
four or six months for the MCAD personnel, and probably (but not admitted
publicly) a high-level of disengagement with the leadership of the KSF. The IS
took the initiative to replace the MCAD with a new organisation, the NATO
Liaison and Advisory Team (NLAT). The new team was based on the NAT
model, was to be collocated with the KSF, and would come under the direct
control of NATO HQ Brussels. The NATO website states:
"In order to continue supporting the KSF, the Alliance established the NATO
Liaison and Advisory Team (NLAT) in July 2013. The NLAT is distinct from KFOR
and consists of approximately 35 military and civilian personnel. Based in
Pristina, this body is charged with providing advice and support to the KSF at
brigade level and above, focusing on staff capacity-building and training." 233
Both Swedish Lieutenant Colonel Curt Jakobsson234 and local security analyst
Florian Qehaja235 suggested that this change also ensured that the non-
recognising countries had less control of the work of NLAT and thus there was
less political interference in the development of the KSF. Lieutenant General
232
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Kastrati, COMKSF, was clearly delighted with the change and not only that the
NLAT was collocated with the KSF, but that the Chief NLAT would be his
personal advisor.236 As a senior member of the NLAT pointed out, this would
ensure that the NAT and the NLAT would be better coordinated and more
coherent in their respective approaches.237 So whilst there were still some
potential pitfalls to overcome, this would seem to have been a most shrewd
move by the IS and more in keeping with the principles of SSR.
Possible Membership of PfP
It would now be appropriate to turn to the issue of possible membership of PfP
for Kosovo. Well before the formation of the NLAT, the Government of Kosovo
was concerned about when they would be invited to join, but also when there
would be the handover of security tasks from KFOR in line with the original
'Comprehensive Proposals'.238 Ahtisaari directed that there should be limits to
the numbers and capabilities of the KSF and these should remain unchanged
until five years after the settlement came into force.239 Effectively this was
accepted as five years after Kosovo's independence and after the completion of
a benchmarked process. 240 This latter process was part political and part
military. On 9 July 2013, some five and a half years after Kosovo's declaration
of independence, the Secretary General of NATO declared that the KSF had
passed that 'benchmarked process' and reached full operational capability
(FOC).241 The expectation within Kosovo was that this would be the signal for
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substantive has happened and, as at 31 December 2015, NATO has still not
offered PfP membership to Kosovo.
Even before the declaration of FOC, Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, NATO's
operational commander for the Balkans, was clear that NATO's biggest
conundrum in the Balkans was: "How do we get an exit strategy in Kosovo?"243
Since FOC, the non-recognising Alliance members have blocked any move to
formally decrease the size of KFOR244 or handover its tasks to the KSF. Two
senior KFOR officers who were interviewed for this research merely pointed to
their current mandate and stated that any decision to change that mandate
would be a political decision in Brussels.245 Thus Fitzgerald's successor would
seem to have the same conundrum with no exit strategy in sight.
The IS still needs to be careful in their handling of the non-recognisers but
perhaps it is time for them to recommend "... an innovative interim step before
PfP is offered. One possible option could be some form of 'Tailored
Cooperation Programme' (TCP) that was previously offered to both BiH and
Serbia before they were accepted for PfP membership. There is thus a
precedent. The TCP would allow access to a number of the highly successful
NATO SSR-related programmes, which would continue the development of the
KSF. Then at a later stage the political symbolism of full PfP membership could
be offered. It would also sit comfortably with NATO's partnership policy that
was endorsed at the Foreign Ministers meeting in Berlin on 15 April 2011.246
Nonetheless, the key to the further development and effectiveness of the
broader security sector in Kosovo would still be membership of PfP, as the
programmes of governance and security management would reach far beyond
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medium-term but the offer of a TCP would enable some progress to be made
towards an exit strategy.
The Kosovo Armed Forces
The discussion above, concerning the handover of tasks to the KSF and
Kosovo's possible membership of PfP, was set in the context of a political
decision within NATO, where Kosovo is merely the supplicant. There are,
however, alternative scenarios, which will now be analysed.
During 2012 the Kosovo Government launched a Strategic Security Sector
Review (SSSR),247 which reported its findings in June 2014. NATO and KFOR
were not directly involved in its deliberations, but the SSSR process and its
findings have had an impact on Kosovo's security sector, so there is a need to
highlight a few points about it. Given the paralysis over Kosovo within NATO,
the US decided to lead the assistance for the SSSR. In Pristina this meant the
US Defence Attaché, who had no experience of policy or SSR related work and
thus was not particularly well-suited to such a coordination role.248 The
Pentagon provided the funding for a private contractor, the Defence Institutional
Reform Initiative (DIRI), to assist in the process. DIRI's core business is
defence institution building and it had little experience in the broader security
sector.249 Thus their approach tended to be focused on the KSF and this was
exacerbated by a decision to have the Minster of the KSF chairing the
committee, which mitigated against a holistic approach.250 251 Florian Qehaja
argued that:
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In attempting to cut back on numbers at meetings, DIRI arbitrarily cut out organisations like
the Ministry of Finance. It had to be pointed out to them that the Ministry of Finance are actually
quite important in the whole process, as they are the ones that allocate resources. (See
Interview K2.)
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"... the lack of institutional expertise, especially in institutions indirectly related to
the security sector within the SSSR [...] and lack of cooperation and efforts of line
ministries, have seriously challenged the SSSR process. Furthermore, this
process has not provided an inclusive and transparent approach, in which civil
society, independent experts and media would be actively involved." (2013:10)
It was therefore another missed opportunity for a holistic NSS review in Kosovo,
which would create security institutions that function as a system. Nonetheless,
the most significant aspect of the DIRI-sponsored SSSR process for NATO was
that it recommend transforming the KSF from a civil defence organisation into
the Kosovo Armed Forces (KAF). The KAF's roles would then include
preserving the territorial integrity of the country, providing military support to
civilian authorities in disaster and participation in peacekeeping operations. In
2016 the Kosovo Government is in the process of implementing this
recommendation. Its plan is laid out in the KSF's 2014 and 2015 Annual
Reports. Its intention is to develop and then put in place the legal and
constitutional changes required in 2014-2016 and make the organisational and
doctrinal changes thereafter. 252 This approach, which was presumably
endorsed internally by the US Government,253 meant that the transformation
began in 2014 without the specific agreement of NATO.254
There are perhaps two technical points worthy of note about the planning
activities contained in the KSF's Annual Reports. First, whilst there is mention
of achieving PfP and NATO standards, these are merely declaratory
statements. There is no timeline to apply formally for PfP or NATO
252
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(UN 2007b)
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membership.255 It is perhaps the opposition of the four non-recognisers within
NATO that have prompted a reticence on the part of Kosovo. This might be
linked to the second technical point. It would seem likely that the Kosovo
Government has been advised by its close international allies (eg the US and
UK) to have a time-pause between the declaration of the formation of the KAF
and its implementation. This might, conceivably, provide sufficient political time
in order to persuade all the NATO allies that the best route to peace and
stability in Kosovo would be to have a continuation of NATO's oversight through
membership of PfP rather than through the deployment of 4600 KFOR troops in
the country. It does raise again, however, the point made by Admiral Fitzgerald
about the lack of direct political input from NATO HQ to the KFOR mission.
There is a final, more strategic point that should be analysed before bringing
this section of the thesis to a close. As mentioned earlier, the decision to
establish the KAF was made without NATO's agreement as set out in
Ahtisaari's plan. This has prompted a legal and political debate concerning the
continuing relevance of the 'Comprehensive Proposals'. Dr Robert Muharremi
(2016) argues cogently that the closure of the ICR mission and the subsequent
changes to both the constitution and primary legislation mean that there is now
no legal or constitutional obstacle to Kosovo deciding for itself what form of self-
defence force it wants, what it is called and how it should be organised. As
Kosovo is not yet a member of the UN, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
has confirmed that Kosovo has no legal requirement to implement Security
Council resolutions, including UNSCR 1244.256 In the same way that Kosovo
invited NATO into the country to maintain a 'safe and secure environment'
during its declaration of independence, it could presumably withdraw that invite
and force KFOR to depart.
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It is highly unlikely that this would be an approach that the Kosovo Government
would take but by 2017 it is now up to NATO, as a serious political Alliance, to
galvanize itself into effective action. Although NATO and KFOR have continued
to support the development of the security sector in Kosovo for a number of
years, there is little doubt that it is currently adopting a holding pattern rather
than encouraging Kosovo towards a situation where it takes on responsibility for
security from KFOR. Offering a TCP and then membership of PfP, combined
with assistance through a new, smaller advisory mission would seem to be a
much more stable option for both Kosovo and the Region than indulging in
sterile inaction.
Notwithstanding this current impasse, there are many lessons that NATO could
learn from its support to the development of Kosovo's security sector, which
could be used in the future. It is now appropriate to discuss and synthesise
some of the issues that have been raised in the previous sections.
DISCUSSION AND SYNTHESIS
The structure of this section follows the analytical framework that was
developed in Chapter 2. The first section focuses on the context of reform.
The Context of Reform
The context of Kosovo is just as complicated as BiH but different and has
helped shape the history of both the country and the region, as well as current
events. In order to understand the complexities and meanings inherent in this
case study, there is one additional, but significant factor, which needs to be
taken into account - and that is the position that Kosovo finds itself on the world
stage.
It is proposed to examine the context in four parts: geo-strategic interests in
Kosovo; historical, drawing upon the overview at the start of this Chapter;
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regional, drawing upon the current political and security environment; and local
attitudes and narratives, drawing mainly upon data collected from interviews.
Geo-strategic Interests in Kosovo
It is perhaps an irony that a new state half the landmass of Wales would be the
subject of geo-strategic interest but this would appear to be the case with
Kosovo, which seems to be on the border of various spheres of interest. There
are four international powers that have a political interest in Kosovo and
continue to wield influence there: they are the US, the EU, NATO and the
Russian Federation. For none of them is that interest particularly major, nor
does that interest now have much of a security dimension. Nonetheless, all four
international powers are still active players in both Kosovo and in the region. It
is now intended to analyse briefly their activities and the reasons for the
continuing interest.
From the historical section of this Chapter it should be clear that the US took an
active role both in creating the political will to remove Serbian security forces
from the province in 1999 and latterly was key in securing Kosovo's
'coordinated independence' within the international community. During the
imbroglio surrounding the constitutional crisis over the election of Kosovo's
President in early 2011,257 the US Ambassador to Kosovo, Christopher Dell,
also took the lead:
"... [T]here was this famous agreement that was reached between the three main
Party leaders: Mr Thaçi, PDK, Mr Mustafa for LDK and Mr Pacolli [...AKR]. And
the agreement was basically to agree on a common candidate for President as
well as [...] to launch a comprehensive electoral reform which the EU had also
asked for after the elections. [... T]his Agreement, which was brokered and
witnessed and signed in fact by the US Ambassador, which was very much
257
There was a constitutional challenge to the election of billionaire businessman, Behgjet
Pacolli. For background see: Balkan Insight, Kosovo Opposition to Appeal Presidential
Election, dated 24 February 2011. Available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-
presidential-vote-was-unconstitutional [Last accessed 6 June 2016].
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considered like the top of the interference into internal domestic politics at that
time. […Dell produced ...] an envelope [...with...] a name and the name contained
was the current President Jahjaga‘s name. She obviously used to be the Deputy
General Director of the Kosovo Police. She had already before, sort of had been
very much supported by the US and she was very much appreciated also in her
previous role and this is how she came at all into the whole picture. [...] So this
was obviously the tip of the iceberg in terms of the interference of the US
Ambassador in internal domestic politics, but there have been many other
occasions and in fact after his departure things have changed quite a lot. It is
very obvious to everyone that his successor has been told very clearly to assume
a low-profile position, which doesn’t mean that the US is less active, I would not
say so necessarily, but it is just a different style you know that is being used. And
there is I think overall a bit more of sort of local ownership…." 258 259
The role of the Pentagon-funded DIRI organisation in formulating the Kosovo
SSSR would not necessarily offer support for that view, although the current US
Ambassador, Greg Delawie, has attempted to be much more emollient in his
approach.260 The key question that still remains, however, is why the US
remains so involved with Kosovo. It would seem in part to be the strong
lobbying power of the Albanians in the US, partly the need to prevent the
continuation of another frozen conflict in Europe by ensuring the normalisation
of Pristina-Belgrade relations, and partly because Kosovo is such an
enthusiastic supporter of the US. There are probably few places in his own
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managed during a visit to Kosovo in May 2009.261 Perhaps the final reason that
Kosovo remains of geo-strategic interest to the US is that (at least in private and
in classified diplomatic traffic) the US believes that the EU is 'out of its depth' in
Kosovo and that strong leadership is still needed from the US.262 This is as true
in 2015 as it was in 2009, albeit that the style may now be much lower-key.
Turning to Russia, it was in 1999 that the first former Warsaw Pact countries
joined NATO. This caused much concern within the Russian Federation but
there was nothing it could do to prevent the eastward expansion of the Alliance.
Not only did Russia perceive itself to be weak, it also perceived that the US and
NATO were capitalising on that weakness. Thus the tone of the 'Fourth Chair',
the unilateral way that the US appeared to lead efforts to subdue Russia's ally,
Milošević, and the way that Russia's power (and veto) in the UN Security 
Council was circumvented, all seemed to highlight that weakness. By adhering
rigidly to UNSCR 1244 since then, Russia has been able to block Ahtisaari's
'Comprehensive Proposals'. It has then been able to constrain the US drive for
Kosovo's independence, as well as tacitly offering some support to their
Orthodox brethren in Belgrade, and thus maintain a level of influence in the
Region.
Whilst it was unable to prevent Kosovo's 'coordinated independence' in 2008, it
has used the Western approach to Kosovo to justify its own actions for invading
Georgia and then subsequently recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Russia's bullish approach, and its restored pride as a country, can best be
summed up in the words of President Medvedev following talks about Georgia
with President Sarkozy of France in September 2008:
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"I have already characterised it as the phantom pains felt by those who are
determined to see the Russian Federation as a new version of the Soviet Union.
Russia is not that, but it is a country that has to be reckoned with." 263
As a consequence of Russia's annexation of Crimea and involvement in
Eastern Ukraine, as well as the subsequent shooting down of MH117 in July
2014, the EU and the US imposed a raft of sanctions on key Russian individuals
and businesses.264 Although Russia has made light of these sanctions, there
has been damage to both its economy and its self-esteem. Russia will
therefore take virtually any opportunity on offer to exact revenge on the US and
EU, and UNSCR 1244 continues to provide that opportunity. That is why
Kosovo is still of geo-strategic interest to Russia.
Jacque Poos' immortal words 'the hour of Europe has come'265 was not just an
acclamation that the EU was taking its place on the world stage but also a
vision for all of Europe to be united within the Union. This was formally
articulated to include the Western Balkans in the EU's Thessaloniki Accords266
of June 2003. Thus both Kosovo and Serbia are included in the EU's political
vision for the future, albeit not necessarily until their standards of rule of law and
governance are at a sufficiently high level. The presence of EULEX with its
emphasis on Chapter 23 (Justice and fundamental human rights) and Chapter
24 (Justice, freedom and security) of the EU's 'acquis communautaire' is
testament to the desire to prepare Kosovo for candidate status.267
There are three significant issues for Kosovo within the EU. First, whilst there
are a number of EU member states that are clearly suffering from enlargement
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fatigue, most still recognise that there is a need to maintain stability and
establish the rule of law within the European landmass. (Ker-Lindsay &
Economides 2012:87) Not least there is real concern about organised crime
originating in Kosovo and permeating through to the EU. Second, according to
FRONTEX, Kosovars are the largest number of refugees, other than from
conflict zones, using the Western Balkan migration route to enter the EU
illegally.268 It is therefore in the EU's interest to stem that uncontrolled
migration. Third, there are five EU member states which do not recognise
Kosovo's independence269 and this severely complicates the EU's actions in the
country.
Finally, the EU-brokered Pristina-Belgrade normalisation process rests upon
both sides accepting a degree of fiction: Pristina that their Serb minority will
accept the primacy of the government of Kosovo; and Belgrade that it won't
have to give up Kosovo. There will come a moment, however, when both these
fictions will need to be confronted. The most likely outcome would seem to be
that those Kosovo Serbs who do not wish to accept the primacy of Pristina will
merely leave for Serbia. For any Serbian government which wishes to become
a member of the EU, there will be a final realisation that this will not be possible
unless they recognise Kosovo and accept that Kosovo has a seat in the UN.
This putative approach from Brussels has less to do with its individual
relationships with Kosovo or Serbia, but everything to do with the extremely
difficult situation that was created when Cyprus was invited to join the Union
with similar territorial problems. Kosovo will therefore continue to be of geo-
strategic interest to the EU.
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As discussed earlier in this chapter, NATO's consensus was severely tested in
the lead up to the Kosovo operation, as was Alliance unity. At this stage
Kosovo was clearly of geo-strategic interest. All the NATO member states, and
many PfP countries, then rallied behind the banner of UNSCR 1244 and by the
end of 1999 NATO had 50,000 troops stationed in Kosovo. Since then KFOR
and its mission has gradually slipped down the priority list at HQ NATO
Brussels. NATO contributions to Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya have all served to
distract resources and political capital.
If Ahtisaari's 'Comprehensive Proposals' had been endorsed by the UN Security
Council, it seems likely that NATO would gradually have reduced the level of
troops in-country to a few hundred and the support to Kosovo might be similar
to that offered to both BiH and Macedonia. The fact that KFOR still operates
under the UNSCR 1244 mandate and that four members of the Alliance do not
recognise Kosovo's independence, means that the mission is politically very
sensitive. It is therefore difficult for NATO to reduce KFOR's numbers to a
sensible level and tailor the support for both the KSF and its ministry in an
appropriate manner. In effect the non-recognisers are holding the KFOR
mission at an artificially high number and there is little sign of the numbers
reducing. At 4,600 troops, KFOR remains NATO's second largest operational
mission. For these reasons, Kosovo and its continuing stability is of geo-
strategic interest to NATO and it would now be appropriate to continue the
analysis of the UNSCR itself.
Historical Context and the Impact of UNSCR 1244
The second part of this section is devoted to the historical context of Kosovo
and especially the impact of UNSCR 1244 on the reform process in the country.
Much of the early part of this Chapter has been vested in discussing the context
but it is worth recalling the degree of autonomy that Kosovo enjoyed until 1989
and the non-violent approach it initially took to the irredentist nationalism of
Milošević.  Many scholars regarded the subsequent increase in violence and 
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the progressively strident demands of the KLA as entirely predictable. (Pond
2006:11; Mazower 2001:140; Weber 2008:14) The wholesale ethnic cleansing
of Kosovo-Albanians in 1998-1999 and the eventual ejection of all Serbian
security forces in the summer of 1999 seemed to herald a new beginning for
Kosovo as an independent state. This was not to be, as the UN had created a
UNSCR that allowed a NATO intervention but did not allow an independent
Kosovo.
UNSCR 1244 is a curious beast and, in its own way, quite unlike other Security
Council resolutions for two fundamental reasons. First, most resolutions that
pertain to the launch of missions, be they by the UN or some other organisation,
have a duration of one year. This means that they have to be formally renewed
annually, which gives an opportunity for changes in circumstances on the
ground to be reflected in the mandate. UNSCR 1244 has no end-date270 and
therefore any proposed termination or modification of the resolution can be
blocked in the Security Council. Effectively this is the situation today with
Russia enjoying the discomfiture of the US, the EU and NATO. The second
reason is that it re-confirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
FRY271 (and now Serbia), notwithstanding that the UN appeared to have been
complicit in the expulsion of all Serbian security forces from Kosovo, under
whose sovereignty it falls. There seems to be a paradox here. The UNSCR
statement on sovereignty then allows, however, for Russia and China to
maintain their long-standing resistance to external interference in the internal
affairs of a country, which has resulted in the international practice of tending "...
to favour territorial unity over the granting of independence." (Weller 2008B:24)
As has been shown earlier, NATO and KFOR continue to be constrained by
UNSCR 1244 in the support that they provide to Kosovo but in some ways it




Weller (2008B:23-24) does point out, however, that it could be argued that the commitment
to Serbia's sovereignty over Kosovo only referred to the 'interim' period under UN
administration, rather than once the final status of Kosovo had been decided upon. This is not
how Russia interprets it and, as it has a controlling vote in the Security Council, the issue would
seem to be academic.
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the IS commented that: "... not very much happens on Kosovo now; not much
attention is given to it here; it just sort of burbles along at its own pace."272 Not
only would this comment seem to indicate that Kosovo is no longer very high on
NATO's priority list but also that there are neither the ideas or political will to
resolve the current impasse. Certainly there are those in Kosovo, like Dr Robert
Muharremi, who also see no rush to change the status quo:
"... it really doesn’t hurt at this stage for NATO to exercise powers under
Resolution 1244 to the extent that NATO doesn’t really interfere with the
internal affairs of Kosovo and Kosovo’s foreign policy, which NATO doesn’t do.
NATO just has a monopoly of [... the ...] use of military force inside Kosovo and
with respect to Kosovo, under its mandate and Resolution 1244." 273
There are far more in Kosovo, however, who are desperately keen to end
international oversight and the level of dependency that it has created, and take
full responsibility for their own affairs.274 There are also practical problems by
still being officially subject to UNSCR 1244. A senior policeman told the
researcher that the Kosovo Police is still not a member of Interpol or Europol,
and any communication to those organisations has to be made via UNMIK or
EULEX.275 This issue was also mentioned by security researcher, Abit Hoxha:
"[If ...] we take a hypothetical case – we arrest a person and we want
information from Europol. We can’t contact them directly, not even an email,
[...] we need to send an e-mail to either EULEX or UNMIK [... and one of them
...] will send it to Europol, and it takes about a week. And by that time, by
Kosovo constitution and international Human Rights Law, you can’t keep the
guy in custody." 276
So whilst there are political as well as practical reasons for drawing UNSCR
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personnel in KFOR, much of which is not required in its current form.277 The
continuation of the UNSCR also hinders the prospect of NATO and EU
membership and thus weakens the potential leverage offered by that
membership. This conditionality is discussed further in the section below.
Regional Context
The third part of this section is a regional context. All of Kosovo's neighbours
are members of PfP, except Montenegro which joined the Alliance in June
2017. NATO also has representation in three of the bordering countries, so it is
well placed to assist in facilitating relationships between all of them. This is
then reinforced by the role of COM JFC Naples, who is the operational
commander for all NATO troops in the Western Balkans and attempts to look at
issues through a regional lens. The difficulty for Kosovo is that it has no formal
relationship with HQ NATO Brussels278 and thus it is unable to take part in PfP
organised training events, which tend to be ideal opportunities to work with
other regional actors. It has to rely mainly on bilateral agreements with
individual neighbours such as through MOUs. As a former UK Defence
Attaché in the region pointed out:
"I think is encouraging is that we’ve seen a growth in the numbers of MOUs and
state to state bilateral and regional activity. Kosovo has MOUs with all its
neighbours except the obvious one." 279 280
The 'obvious one' is of course Serbia. Usually, if Kosovo states its intention to
attend a security forum or event in the region, then Serbia declines the
invitation.281 One forum where this has changed since the Pristina-Belgrade
agreement of 2013 is the US-Adriatic Charter282 meetings, where both countries
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The US-Adriatic Charter was the brainchild of US Secretary of State Colin Powell and
brought together three aspirant members of NATO from the Region: Albania, Croatia and
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are now represented, albeit in observer capacities.283 Unsurprisingly,
Lieutenant General Kastrati, COMKSF, has been very positive about the
Kosovo's relationships with its neighbours:
"They have visited me, I have visited them, so Montenegro, Macedonia,
Albania, Croatia. And I send message to them [sic] that future Kosovo Army will
be good for all neighbours and will be a force for regional stability."
Whilst NATO is not directly involved with the A5, members of the Balkans
headquarters are often invited to attend meetings, and NATO HQ Brussels fully
supports the process.284 The JFC Naples regional approach also includes
regular coordination meetings of NATO commanders in the Western Balkans in
order to establish synergies between the various HQs, including the NLAT in
Kosovo. These meetings seek to identify common areas of best practice in
assisting their respective host nations with their defence reforms.285 The
contexts are all different but there is some similarity in the key themes.
Local Attitudes and Narratives
The fourth part of this section concerns the local attitudes and narratives which
shape the context of reform for Kosovo. In the same way that the constituent
people of BiH view NATO through their own individual Weltanschauung, so do
the people of Kosovo. The Kosovo-Albanian perspective is relatively straight
Macedonia. In time two additional countries joined the group: BiH and Montenegro. The group
became known as the Adriatic 5 or A5. There are two observer countries: Kosovo and Serbia.
For details see: US Department of State, Factsheet on Adriatic Charter, dated 25 August 2011.
Available at: http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/112766.htm [Last accessed 30 June 2016].
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forward.286 The ethnic cleansing of three quarters of a million ethnic-Albanians
by the Milošević regime during the 1998-1999 conflict was regarded as 
grotesque and removed any possibility of a future rapprochement with
Serbia.287 The evidence of extra-judicial killings is still fresh in most Kosovo
Albanian minds. (Judah 2008:88-89)
The other side of this coin is presented by the Kosovo-Serbs. The Serbian
attitude to the 'holy land' of 'Kosovo and Metohija' has already been well
covered. The actions of the Serbian security forces in Kosovo during the period
1998-1999 is only partially acknowledged as 'unfortunate events' and both the
Kosovo Serbs and the political leadership in Belgrade tend to airbrush out any
inconvenient facts from all discussions of Kosovo. (Gowan 2008:6) There is
also a strong belief that the actions against the Albanians were not comparable
to the rampage inflicted on the Serbs (and minorities such as the Gorani and
Roma) by the triumphant Kosovo Albanians in the aftermath of the NATO
intervention. Tens of thousands of Serbs fled to Serbia at that time and very
few of them have returned. Suddenly Kosovo Serbs felt that they were a
minority in their own country and this has led to a sense of disenfranchisement.
Even the Pristina-Belgrade agreement of 2013 has been seen by many Kosovo
Serbs as a betrayal by Belgrade but it has also recognised that it is a means of
extracting further concessions from the Kosovo government. Thus, any
narrative from NATO in Northern Kosovo would have to pass through a strongly
negative filter in order to have an impact.
Political Engagement
A key point for NATO to draw from the discussion above is that progress on
reforms can only be made through political means but, as has been argued in
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Chapter 2,288 every facet of an IGO’s role in a post-conflict country will have a
political dimension. For example, NATO support to border control or
improvement of the security sector north of the River Ibar, requires a high
degree of political sensitivity and understanding of the nuances of the area.
The simple reason for this is that it is the interface of the politics for both Pristina
and Belgrade.289 The research would seem to suggest that KFOR lacks this
highly nuanced type of political awareness,290 which can only be gleaned by
constant political engagement with all actors. Although COM KFOR has a
political advisor, the individual is not normally of the background, experience or
rank of an ambassador, so does not have the gravitas or clout to deal with tricky
issues on the ground nor the sensitivities of the non-recognising countries in
NATO HQ Brussels.
Given the sensitive situation on the ground, it is clear that NATO needs a higher
level of political representation in Kosovo than it currently has. A member of the
international community in Pristina,291 who attended a briefing of the NAC when
they visited Kosovo, suggested that an option of appointing a NATO Senior
Civilian Representative (SCR) was discussed.292 It would seem, however, that
COMKFOR was less than enthusiastic about the possibility and nothing more
has been heard about the idea. This issue will be returned to in the next
Chapter.
KFOR conducts a series of routine meetings with members of the government
of Kosovo, as well as other members of the international community but the
general opinion is that they are mostly formulaic and for show rather than to
coordinate major issues such as reform.293 There would seem to be just a few
exceptions to this. First, there are those senior individuals, such as the Head of
288








There was an SCR reporting directly to HQ NATO Brussels at one stage in Macedonia and
there currently still is in Afghanistan.
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Interview K2 as well as the researcher’s direct observations of the meetings he attended
during his filed trips to Kosovo.
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the NLAT, who work daily with the KSF and its ministry.294 Second, COM
KFOR and some of his political staff quite sensibly reach out to local security
institutions for local feedback. As Shpend Bursani explains:
“NATO Officials pay some visits to our institute in order to brief us and get some
updates and see what we have to say, so these are some regular meetings we
have with KFOR.” (Interview K3)
Given the importance of political engagement to the support of SSR, it is
surprising how little KFOR seems to be doing. As a substantive method of
creating impetus for local ownership, it is clearly an area for improvement.
Local Ownership
The contradictions of local ownership that were discussed for BiH in Chapter 5
are also present in Kosovo. Security was a 'reserved' competency295 to UNMIK
(and also KFOR) until Kosovo became independent, so local security actors
became used to being directed by somebody else. Even since independence
EULEX has retained executive and substitution powers over the justice sector
and KFOR still has responsibility for a 'safe and secure environment'. This is a
situation that has caused Welch to lament:
"[W]e all say local ownership is paramount; it’s never going to work unless there
is local ownership, and then we go down there and we dictate." 296
David Chandler (2006) has been vociferous in his criticism of the international
community's statebuilding agenda in the Western Balkans and its concomitant
lack of accountability. Certainly NATO/KFOR's record in this regard has been
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period immediately after the intervention, Generals Clark and Jackson did
engage directly with the leadership of the KLA in order to secure the DDR that
was required under UNSCR 1244. It could be argued that this was a contractual
relationship which suited both sides and thus both sides 'owned' the result. In
the early years of KFOR's mandate this changed as trust between it and the
KPC eroded,297 as well as the formation of the KIKPC in 2003, which created a
more adversarial relationship than was evident with its predecessor, the JIC.298
The NATO team in UNOSEK paid particular attention to the principle of local
ownership but was constrained by both the political dynamic between Pristina
and Belgrade, as well as individual members of the Contact Group, such as
Germany. The role of the ISSR was pivotal in reaching out to ordinary citizens
within Kosovo and securing their views on a raft of security-related issues, and
these were then reflected in the security annexes of the 'Comprehensive
Proposals'. The key measure in the proposals, however, was the requirement
for the Kosovo government to develop a full NSS, with the avowed intent of
creating local ownership.299 Unfortunately the first attempt to develop one in
2009-2010 was hijacked by some internationals in the ICR300 and "... the
document was quietly dropped from view by the Kosovo authorities and never
implemented." (Qehaja et al 2013:16) The second attempt in 2012-2014 was
better but was US-led, ignored civil society, and unduly focused on the KSF. 301
The lack of transparency and narrowness of the approach meant that it never
really created a sense of ownership within the broader Kosovar community.302
KFOR was not directly involved in this latter process303 but it would seem
reasonable to assume that the NAT, as it was based inside the KSF Ministry,
would probably have been consulted. In summary, the idea to include the
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requirement to conduct an NSS in Ahtisaari's plan would appear to have been
sound but the execution in Kosovo was poor.
In the third phase of the development of Kosovo's security sector, NATO's
decision to adopt the 'new tasks' that were both developmental and advisory
was sound and supported the principle of local ownership. It was the setting up
of both the NAT and the NLAT that demonstrated a change in approach to the
local actors, with the fundamental shift to advising rather than directing, and
collocating the teams with their hosts. With regard to these changes a senior
official in the IS stated that:
"... if you leave aside the PRTs in Afghanistan – this is the clearest example of
Security Sector Reform that NATO is involved in. And it’s not particularly well
known because of course with the sensitivities of some NATO nations vis-à-vis
Kosovo’s independence, and having a government rather than just institutions
in Kosovo, NATO really doesn’t want to make much of a public meal of this.
But it’s there."
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The one aspect of support that NATO has yet to offer, and which would
undoubtedly increase local ownership, is the progression to a TCP and then PfP
membership. This lack of involvement in the decision-making process has
caused frustration within Kosovo and as one member of the KSF Ministry
suggested:
"The whole point is to sit at the table together and discuss our future, rather
than our future being discussed in NATO without us being present there." 305
It is worth remembering, however, that NATO is not the only international actor
interfacing with the security sector in Kosovo. Aside from international






provided assistance and advice. The US has been particularly prominent306
with the 'State Partnership Program [sic]' and the Iowa National Guard.307 308
As the incident of US Ambassador Dell and the suggestion of the presidential
candidate309 would indicate, however, the US assistance borders on meddling
directly in Kosovo's internal affairs but then Kosovo allows this. It not
necessarily a recipe for establishing local ownership.
Other countries have adopted a completely different approach to the US. As
Tony Welch explained:
"There are some nations prominent in Kosovo at the moment who believe that
the international community should actually come hands-off in the security
sector and allow them to get on with it, and [..] as one prominent diplomat there
said to me, we mustn’t do it for them." 310
On that last telling point, it would be appropriate to turn now to the issue of
governance.
Governance
There seemed to be broad agreement amongst the interviewees for this
research that Kosovo had a reasonable governance framework but that it was
not always applied consistently. For example, an official from EULEX
suggested that Kosovo had:
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"... a clear institutional and governance framework that however does not
always work. I think Kosovo has better laws [...] than neighbouring countries
that are far ahead in terms of EU accession but the weak part here is simply
their implementation, and the implementation depends on functioning public
administration, and the public administration is absolutely not working and is
very weak. The capacities are very low." 311
Notwithstanding a concern that some laws had merely been 'cut and pasted'
from other countries and may not be suitable for the context of Kosovo,312 most
interviewees were concerned about circumvention of the laws through
corruption313 and a lack of understanding and knowledge of how to apply the
governance framework within the security sector.314 Without necessarily using
it as an excuse, some interviewees suggested that the youth and inexperience
of the institutions meant that it would take time for the systems and frameworks
to become embedded and for them then to function more effectively and
efficiently.315 Burim Ramadani, who is on the parliamentary oversight
committee for intelligence, suggested that education and training were the key
to overcoming these deficiencies.316
This sounds entirely reasonable but, as Shpend Bursani suggested, there is a
danger that the longer a framework allows itself to be circumvented then:
"... they’re installing also a culture of impunity, a culture where even these good
guys that come out of university, actually this becomes a norm for them and
they just think that being part of the Government and governing is actually
accumulating capital for yourself and your people and your group. It just
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NATO's role in providing support to governance within the Kosovo security
sector has been minimal. KFOR provided support to the KPC with their internal
rules and regulations but since Kosovo's declaration of independence and the
politicisation of the situation, KFOR has been remarkably mute. JFC Naples
provided some assistance to Kosovo in drafting laws and regulations for the
KSF in 2007,317 and the NAT in the Ministry of KSF has provided advice on the
functioning of a ministry in a democracy and the oversight mechanisms.318 A
number of individuals have attended courses at the NATO School
Oberammergau and the BI programme, which have been useful for creating
individual awareness, but less good for creating institutional capacity in
governance. The key to NATO's support in this area would be its contribution
through the PfP programmes and, as has been explained earlier, this has not
yet been authorised. Given the importance of good (or good enough)
governance to the concept of SSR, it is clearly a missed opportunity.
A Holistic Approach and Cooperation
In the early days after the intervention, KFOR worked closely with UNMIK and
the other members of the international community. As UNMIK developed into a
more bureaucratic organisation319 with long-serving individuals in key
appointments, there seemed to be an increasing level of friction as individuals
sought to justify their jobs. As security analyst, Florian Qehaja explained:
"And of course personal interest is very much prevailing because you have the
cases when part of the international community in Kosovo profits from the
income that they have by being present in Kosovo. So you have people that
really want to stay here because they can get more income than they would get
in their country where they come from." 320
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Perhaps the high point of cooperation for both NATO and the international
community in Kosovo, however, was the period of the status talks. Not only
was NATO actively engaged within UNOSEK's team in Vienna but so were the
EU, former UNMIK officials and representatives from the Contact Group. In
Kosovo NATO had persuaded the Deputy SRSG to chair a Future
Arrangements Security Working Group (FASWG) based in Pristina to deal with
transitional issues such as vetting for the new security institutions, airspace
control, customs and border management.321 Individuals such as Major
General Chris Steirn322 (KPC Coordinator), Jared Rigg from UNMIK's Advisory
Support Unit (AUS),323 Tony Welch (ISSR Coordinator), J5 planning staffs from
JFC Naples and KFOR, and the NATO team from UNOSEK all attended these
meetings and contributed significantly to a holistic approach to the development
of Kosovo's security sector.324 Of particular note is the cooperation between the
ISSR team and UNOSEK that has been highlighted earlier.325 With the arrival
of members of the ICO in March 2007 the FASWG was dissolved and a new
'Working Group on Security' (WGS) was set up and formally included members
of the PISG.326
The WGS continued its work until Kosovo's declaration of independence but
KFOR's contribution became progressively shrunken under political pressure
from the non-recognising countries in NATO. As time wore on KFOR then
became increasingly inward looking and seemed to engage less and less with
both the local actors and the international community. 327 Those relationships
that existed appeared to be fairly superficial and in the opinion of many
Kosovars, KFOR officers and soldiers distrusted the local population.328 This is
clearly not a scenario for close cooperation and engagement. To make matters
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worse, several interviewees commented that individual elements of KFOR
appeared to be espousing national views rather than NATO views, leading to an
incoherent narrative.329
After independence the newly established Kosovo Security Council (KSC)
became responsible for adopting a holistic approach to the security sector.
Unfortunately a combination of internal wrangles within the Kosovo government
and a lack of security expertise in the KSC staff has led to a rather dysfunctional
approach. As security analyst, Florian Qehaja, suggested:
"[W]e cannot say that the Sector and the Security institutions, in general from a
holistic point of view, are well coordinated. The Security Council, which is
supposed to be a coordination body, in addition to an advisory body, is not
performing its tasks - as to why, I don’t know. It is very weak in the sense that it
does not manage to convene regularly. It does not coordinate properly the
efforts of the security institutions and broader overflow actors in order to show
that there is regular exchange of information." 330
This lack of institutional capacity in the KSC was brought into sharp relief during
the DIRI-led SSSR process in 2012-2014,331 when the Council was effectively
sidelined. The Prime Minster appointed the then Minister for the KSF, Agim
Çeku, as chairman of the SSSR oversight committee. As a former Commander
of the KLA and then KPC, as well as a former Prime Minister, he clearly had
plenty of experience in the security field but his priority was establishing an
army for Kosovo, not tending to the issues of the wider security sector.332 This
was a key factor that militated against a holistic approach.
As Burim Ramadani quite correctly pointed out, the SSSR should have
included:
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"... institutions, even if they are not security sector institutions, but they need to
be involved [...] like Ministry of Foreign Affairs [...] because they [...] have a role
in the National Security architecture. [As well as...] civil society and experts [[...]
like academics or others." 333
Welch neatly summarised the situation when he stated:
"So, we have ended up with a process that is meant to be holistic, which was
designed to be holistic, with Ministers and Deputy Ministers from a number of
departments across the Government of Kosovo actually being excluded from
the process because it has become totally focused on the future of the KSF." 334
Although NATO and KFOR were not directly involved in this SSSR process,335
the genesis of the approach to develop an NSS came from the NATO team in
UNOSEK. It therefore seems a missed opportunity that NATO, as the world's









Technical Issues and Skills
Having stressed the political nature of NATO and KFOR's assistance to the
reform effort in Kosovo, it is now proposed to look at the technical issues and
skills, which supported that reform. In the early period immediately after the
intervention, most of KFOR was involved in the first phase of DDR in Kosovo:
the disarming of the KLA. KFOR was also responsible for creating a secure
environment on the ground, which consumed most of its resources. It was then
rather less involved in the second and third phases of DDR: the demobilisation
and reintegration of the KLA. Much of the detailed work was managed by the
IOM. Only the JIC within KFOR, and then latterly the KIKPC, were directly in
support of the nascent security institutions and, in reality, they were focused on
the proto-military organisation, the KPC, not the wider security sector. Some
training assistance was given to the new KPS, but this support was led by the
OSCE, and any such assistance that was given by KFOR was generally thought
to be outside its mandate. There was also little direct support from NATO HQ
Brussels, except from the operations branch of the IS, which was more
concerned about managing the mission rather than any capacity building.
It was only during the second and third phases336 of the development of
Kosovo's security institutions that NATO became more directly involved with the
creation of a new security sector architecture and capacity building. NATO's
support to UNOSEK would seem to have been a positive contribution337 but it
was the creation of the NAT338 and the MCAD, which was replaced by the
NLAT, when direct support began to be provided on the ground in Kosovo.
DPP from NATO HQ Brussels also contributed to the overall support,
particularly in the political arena and with assistance to the KSF ministry.339 As
discussed in earlier parts of this Chapter340 the lack of access to PfP
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programmes still limits the support to the wider parts of the security sector and
to the improvement of overall governance.
As the NAT and the NLAT now have specific mandates of assisting and
advising their hosts341 and are collocated with them, it creates the appropriate
conditions for success. Nonetheless, there has still been some polite but direct
criticism of the lack of continuity and expertise in the teams. For example,
Lieutenant General Kastrati suggested that:
"[W]hen countries [...] provide officers for NLAT Team and when they send just
for six months it is a problem. I don’t see any so much benefit because [... of the
...] short time. If they come they need one or two months just to adapt, one
month before they leave they need to prepare themselves and so on. I asked
General Wagner if he will have influence to ask countries firstly to send minimum
one year." 342
A senior member of the NLAT seemed to be more relaxed about tour lengths
and suggested that he was "[n]ot sure that it is a big issue ..." and that "... fresh
guys come with fresh minds." 343 This lack of concern about continuity seems to
run counter to most informed opinion344 and might suggest that the officer does
not have a sufficiently good grasp of the nature of advisory work and the time
that it takes to build the trust necessary to be a successful advisor.
Kastrati went on to suggest that:
"[W]e don't need just [... a warm body ...] we need experts, real experts [...] to
build doctrines, we have to build concept, we have to build for planning for the
future and we need experts to work on that." 345
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It is a view that is completely shared by the Deputy Commander of JFC Naples,
Lieutenant General Peter Pearson, who stated:
"There are, obviously, a huge amount of skill sets [... required ...] but people
need to be – subject matter experts [...] on whatever bit they’re going there to
be the advisor and mentor upon." 346
Notwithstanding these criticisms, there seems to be general agreement
amongst the interviewees for this research that the concept of the advisory
teams was both sensible and worked reasonably well.347 The fact that the IS
was tasked with directing the activities of both these teams, rather than KFOR,
reflects both upon the political nature of the role as well as the political
sensitivities in Kosovo and HQ NATO Brussels.
The changing and improved security situation in Kosovo has been commented
upon earlier in the Chapter and there is a general perception that "... [t]he
presence of NATO in Kosovo right now has a huge symbolic importance and
not really an operational importance." 348 Although the prospect of a posting to
Kosovo in 1999 was not necessarily relished,349 life there in 2015 is both
civilised and comfortable. As one analyst commented:
"I know from KFOR there was still more willingness to stay in Kosovo as an
officer rather than to go in Afghanistan or in Iraq because of the security situation
which is far more favourable." 350
This seems to chime with Bryan Watters' remarks earlier in this Chapter351
about KFOR becoming more of a 'garrison organisation'. As argued earlier in












See section entitled: 'Current Political and Security Situation Within Kosovo'. Also the
discussion about the situation in KFOR during the 2004 riots at: 'International Administration
[...]:1999-2005'.
343
current numbers or its current mandate.352 As Swedish Lieutenant Colonel Curt
Jakobssen firmly stated:
"[T]he military presence here has to be changed to an SSR presence, more an
SSR presence, in the near future, and I don’t say that because Sweden is doing
that this year already, because we are going to withdraw all the military troops
and only have SSR Advisers down here. And that should be a plan as well for
other nations to follow because that is the best thing to build up [... Kosovo's ...]
society and their own ownership of the situation and all nations who can be
advisers to more than KSF, the other Ministries as well. [...] And sometime they
have to live without KFOR in future, and then they should be prepared as much
as possible. And I think that’s just one possibility for them and that is to change
mindset for different nations from military to SSR impact." 353
Jacobssen's views are entirely consistent with NATO's approach in both BiH
and Macedonia, where there has been a natural transformation from the original
tactical operation to a mission that provides advice on defence reform and SSR
to their respective host nations. It may be that some form of tactical reserve will
be required on the ground in the future but the rationale for KFOR needs to
change to an SSR presence in line with the security situation and Kosovo's
status as an independent state recognised by over 112 countries.
Having examined some of the technical issues, it would be appropriate to
examine capacity building in more detail.
Capacity Building Through Norm Setting and Conditionality
Whilst the key mechanism for NATO’s support to capacity building in BiH was
through the range of PfP programmes, this is not on offer to Kosovo. The
difficulty for both NATO and KFOR is that they are still constrained by UNSCR
1244 and the four members of the NATO Alliance, which did not recognise
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Kosovo as a state. This has led to a politically sensitive impasse that has been
in place since 2008, and which shows no signs of being resolved. It has frozen
the support on offer to Kosovo and the number of KFOR troops on the ground,
although it is clear to many of those individuals interviewed for this research that
these need to adapt according the changing circumstances on the ground.354
There has been no progress on the offer of PfP membership and thus the full
range of PfP programmes that could assist the wider security sector in Kosovo
is not available. Nonetheless, a TCP could be offered without PfP membership,
but this would probably need to be linked to a more robust political presence
from NATO within the country in order to finesse the more challenging and
sensitive obstacles to progress. Nonetheless, the ‘new tasks’ of 2008 gave
NATO a role in developing and advising the KSF and its ministry (both classic
SSR roles), whilst also tackling some governance issues.355
What seemed clear to the researcher was the way the norm setting agenda had
been welcomed by the KSF and thus the NATO norms would seem to have
been fully internalised.356 Furthermore, most people interviewed for this
research were very positive about the conditionality of possible PfP membership
in improving standards within the Kosovo security sector, but they also linked
that conditionality with EU membership.357 Lieutenant General Kastrati, the
Commander of the KSF, also highlighted the link between this conditionality and
cooperation within the region:
"Here the role of the mechanisms of NATO and the EU to promote cooperation
among the forces and the Western Balkan countries remains irreplaceable." 358
Whilst this seems to be the prevailing view, two of the interviewees359 pointed
out that currently there is little incentive for Kosovo to pursue membership of
either the EU or NATO too actively, as they already receive many of the
354
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benefits without any of the obligations. As Dr Robert Muharremi argues: "In
terms of rational choice why should I assume more burden when I get the
service already for free?" 360 This cost benefit analysis is undoubtedly the most
rational way to approach the issue, although several interviewees understood
that all the while there are non-recognisers in both NATO and the EU then
there:
"... is a problem with the leverage [... as ...] it has a questionable impact as it
currently stands [... because of ...] the non-recognisers. I think we are ready
operationally to actually sign a PfP Agreement with NATO, be part of the PfP
programme but we cannot be part of the PfP because of the political issue,
because of the non-recognisers. And yes, it’s good to reform for our own
interests, but in terms of waving this carrot, the carrot is very illusional [sic], it’s
not there. You see but you cannot grab." 361
The picture on conditionality is therefore mixed in Kosovo. NATO could easily
improve the situation, however, and that is through some form of TCP362 or full
membership of PfP. Until now most of NATO and KFOR's support has been in a
narrow area of the security sector (ie the KLA, KPC and KSF) but NATO's
partnership programmes cover much more of the security sector including the
Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Finance,363 and focus on governance
across the spectrum of government. By allowing the whole of the Kosovo
security sector to engage in these programmes, it would not only be of practical
benefit to the country, but it could also help build better local ownership.
The offer of PfP membership would probably need to follow on from the change
of KFOR’s mission to an advisory one. Once the non-recognisers have
accepted that change, it would only be logical to offer Kosovo PfP membership
as has happened to every other country in the Western Balkans. Nonetheless,
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political pressure from countries such as the US, UK, France and Germany on
the non-recognisers.
Another area where NATO has a unique selling point is its reputation. In its
regional approach NATO always seeks to lever its reputation to best effect.
Since the successful intervention in BiH in 1995 and then again in Kosovo in
1999, NATO had good credibility in delivering hard security. As political analyst,
Krennar Gashi, stated about KFOR:
"Well one thing they’ve done completely and utterly right, and successfully so,
was provide the feeling of safety and security, and I remember in 1999 [...] there
was an absolute trust from the Albanian community towards NATO and NATO
Forces at the time. The trust was also there from other non-Albanian
communities because with over forty thousand troops deployed in Kosovo, [...]
the whole hard security parts [sic] were maintained by NATO, and that had built
this credible image of KFOR in Kosovo." 364
For a number of years KFOR was regarded as the most trusted security
institution by citizens in Kosovo with around an 85% approval rating.365 This
has slipped somewhat in recent years to second place behind the KSF366 with
around a 65% rating,367 but it is still a respectable figure. One could easily
argue that perhaps as the ordinary citizens no longer interface very much with
KFOR then their perspective of the organisation is a post-1999 'rose tinted' one.
Nonetheless, this should provide a degree of soft power for the Alliance within
the country but, in reality, the situation is a little more ambiguous.
The political party Vetëvendosje has been vociferous in its condemnation of all
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form of international oversight, including from KFOR. Albin Kurti, its leader, has
been quite cautious in his criticisms of KFOR, however, except with regard to a
perceived lack of security for Kosovo Albanians who live north of the River
Ibar.368 Several interviewees, who were generally supportive of NATO and
KFOR, were extremely critical of KFOR's lack of contextual awareness and its
clumsy attempts at outreach.
Some, like Florian Qehaja, argued that many internationals have their own
reasons for ignoring the current context:
"[T]here are some nations, part of the KFOR and some international
organisations which are well aware that there are significant changes on the
ground but they don’t want to see, they don’t want to admit changes on the
ground because they want to keep their presence here, be it for the personal
interest, be it for the interest of the particular country. So by claiming that there
are still security problems, there is still lack of trust towards locals, they would
retain their presence here and they would maintain their interest on the
ground."369
Others, like Shpend Bursani, suggested that it is just inherently difficult for an
IGO like KFOR, to gain a detailed contextual understanding. He stressed that
this was especially difficult in the security sector with regard to issues like
vetting. Without that understanding and knowledge, he claimed that there
would inevitably be failures.370
In the same way that NATO's outreach would appear to have been poorly
directed and clumsy in its narrative in BiH, so it would seem to have been in
Kosovo. From the interview with Krennar Gashi, it was clear that he supported
NATO and its role in Kosovo, but:
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"I was shocked [… as to …] how could this superior, supreme power, the
greatest Alliance on this planet, rely on incompetent people to convey their
messages in Kosovo. This was really a huge surprise for me. At the time, after
a year or two these messages continued to be so ridiculous that there were
Facebook pages saying that 'KFOR ads insult my intelligence', because this
was really messages that you don’t tell to a kid who is older than four years.
[...] One of them was women’s rights and human rights, or ridiculous TV ads
where a Serb and an Albanian would be having tea or coffee together and they
would talk about inter-ethnic tolerance. Despite the conflict, tolerance between
ethnicities was never an issue. I mean the tolerance between neighbours was
never an issue, and I think that [... the advertisements ...] actually just had a
counter-effect among the population." 371 372
Gashi's views on these advertisements were echoed by both Abit Hoxha373 and
Florian Qehaja.374 This issue will be returned to in the next Chapter as it is
clearly a lacuna that NATO needs to address if it is to harness fully its 'soft
power'.
SUMMARY
NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999 confirmed its credibility in dealing with
hard security issues. As one local security analyst commented "... in my opinion
Kosovo has been one of the first international interventions that actually
worked." 375 Certainly the success of General Clark's initiative to secure the
disarmament of the KLA was founded on a distinctly political and transactional
approach by a NATO military commander in order to secure a working
agreement on the ground. The security situation in Kosovo after the
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critical political obstacles to DDR in any post-conflict situation, the impact of its
success should not be underestimated.
NATO's role in assisting Kosovo in the softer security areas, in particular with
development of its security sector, was more difficult to finesse. KFOR's
oversight of the KPC brought with it a range of frictions, as well as a growing
sense of frustration within both the KPC and the PISG. After the riots of 2004
and Ambassador Eide's two reports, the scene was set for the appointment of
President Ahtisaari to tackle the thorny issue of status. NATO's role in assisting
the UNOSEK work, and its close relationship with the ISSR team, were pivotal
in creating the security architecture and conditions for a new security sector in
Kosovo.
The creation of the NAT and NLAT after the declaration of independence saw a
shift in NATO's approach towards direct support to the Kosovo security sector.
The 'new tasks' of 2008 gave NATO a role in developing and advising the KSF
and its ministry (both classic SSR roles), whilst also tackling some governance
issues. The difficulty for both NATO and KFOR, however, was that they were
still constrained by UNSCR 1244 and the four members of the NATO Alliance,
which did not recognise Kosovo as a state. This has led to a politically sensitive
impasse that has been in place since 2008, and which shows no signs of being
resolved. It has frozen the support on offer to Kosovo and the number of KFOR
troops on the ground, although it is clear to many of those individuals
interviewed for this research that these need to adapt according the changing
circumstances on the ground.376 There has been no progress on the offer of
PfP membership and thus the full range of PfP programmes that could assist
the wider security sector in Kosovo are not available. Nonetheless, a TCP
could be offered as a first step to PfP membership.
The NATO chain of command and KFOR's engagements in the development of
Kosovo's security sector would still seem to lack subtlety in a number of areas.
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Many of those involved have a relatively poor contextual understanding of
Kosovo, its history and its peoples. This has led to rather clumsy attempts at
outreach. Furthermore, whilst the creation of the NAT and the NLAT have been
welcomed, there has still been some polite but direct criticism of the lack of
continuity and expertise in the teams. All of these issues could, and should, be
addressed by NATO.
In a similar vein to BiH, the reforms that NATO has supported in Kosovo have
been good in parts and this has been due to a combination of the post-conflict
context as well as the political sensitivities surrounding the country’s
independence. The latter point has made political engagement difficult with
tight political control from Brussels. Institutional analysis would suggest that in
this case that the main actors were the four non-recognising states and that
their domestic concerns drove NATO’s approach to Kosovo. It was a
complicating factor that the non-recognising states’ agenda bore a marked
similarity to that of Russia and Serbia. NATO’s role in this example is therefore
an ‘instrumental’ one with little flexibility on the part of NATO staff. This
situation has been exacerbated by the low level of political representation within
KFOR. A NATO senior civilian representative of the rank of Ambassador would
seem to be an obvious solution, although that might create different sensitivities
within the military chain of command.
Instilling local ownership in a country that is transitioning from neo-trusteeship is
always going to be difficult. This has been the case through all three stages of
the development of Kosovo’s security sector, and was demonstrated by events
surrounding the development of the country’s NSS. Arnstein’s ladder of
participation (1969:217) would seem to indicate that ownership has mainly
ranged between ‘manipulation’ and ‘informing’, and only occasionally to
‘consultation’ and ‘partnership’. ‘Citizen control’ would still seem some way off.
Within the security sector the governance frameworks were in place but were
not always followed. Thus, according to Fox’s typology (2007:669), there is a
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degree of ‘soft accountability’ and relatively ‘clear’ transparency. NATO’s role in
this area has been minimal and would seem to be a missed opportunity. It is
only when Kosovo undertakes PfP programmes will their involvement deepen
and become more noticeable. KFOR has cooperated with UNMIK and various
other international organisations since 1999. The high point of cooperation was
during the status talks and in the aftermath of independence. Since then
KFOR’s role would seem to have waned. NATO staff within the NAT have
proved themselves to be technically competent and have been an aid to
capacity building, particularly within the ministry for the KSF. The NLAT, which
provides more of the support to the KSF, has gradually been improving its
performance, but it suffers from familiar problems of rapid rotation of staff and
gaps in its understanding of SSR that has been referred to earlier in this
section. Nonetheless, there has been an apparent internalisation of NATO’s
norms within the KSF and an acceptance of the leverage of conditionality. This
is less obvious in the remainder of the security sector.
In summary, NATO's role in creating the conditions for the disarmament of the
KLA was particularly noteworthy, as was NATO's contribution to the work of
UNOSEK and the creation of advisory teams answerable to NATO HQ
Brussels. Some of its other support has been less effective but a review of its
current mandate and a move towards an SSR field mission would create the
conditions for a more successful approach than currently. It is now the moment
to consider the issues raised in both the BiH and this case study in a
comparative analysis at Chapter 7 in order to ascertain whether these
experiences could inform NATO's future engagements.
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CHAPTER 7
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES
"A British anthropologist, E. R. Leach, has urged his colleagues to
seek generalizations by abstracting a number of variables from their
wider context; but he has simultaneously warned them to understand
the phenomena in their context before abstracting them"
A New Dictionary of the Social Sciences - G Duncan Mitchell1
INTRODUCTION
During the analysis of the two case studies in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, it was
inevitable that some degree of implicit comparison would already have
occurred. This Chapter, however, sets out to compare them explicitly. The
aim of this Chapter is therefore to conduct a comparative analysis of the cross-
case data collected on NATO’s role in supporting SSR within the Western
Balkans in order to gain an understanding of the patterns and characteristics of
the interventions, as well as the variations. The researcher then identifies how
this experience could be used to inform its future engagements by creating a
framework of generalised factors for NATO to draw upon. This is the second
stage of the main analysis in this study.
It was apparent from the two case studies that there was a myriad of issues that
could be analysed in order to produce generalised factors. The intention,
therefore, is to follow the broad analytical framework that was developed in
Chapter 2 with just some slight changes in emphasis in their respective titles.
Thus, the issue of context is discussed first.
1
G Duncan Mitchell (2008:34).
353
UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXT
In both BiH and Kosovo there were clear examples where NATO troops created
completely the opposite effect than they were trying to achieve due to a lack of
contextual understanding. It is, however, more than just a need for an
understanding of the country, it is also about understanding any post-conflict
and post-authoritarian factors that may be present, as well as the individual
needs of the country.
In this section it is intended to draw out some of the contextual factors that
NATO might consider when preparing for a new engagement, or modifying an
existing one. The people, the country and its neighbours seemed a good point
to start. For example, the ethnic composition of the constituent people in BiH
has allowed the RS to block progress in the security sector since 2006.
Similarly, the predominance of ethnic Serbs in the Northern part of Kosovo,
which has a land border with Serbia, has meant that the area has been a
source of insecurity and friction which the Kosovo government has been unable
to resolve on its own. Local narratives and local attitudes need to be
understood both in NATO HQ Brussels, as well as within the field missions. A
significant aid to understanding these Weltanschauung is continuity of service in
theatre. It was established in both case studies that continuity was lacking, but,
in BiH, it was ameliorated where civilian staff had been employed for longer
periods of time rather than military staff on six month tours of duty. The issue of
continuity and suggested lengths of tours will be returned to later in this
Chapter.2
It is perhaps axiomatic to say that both the DPA and UNSCR 1244 shaped the
nature of NATO's missions and the ability of NATO to carry them out. Although
the DPA was successful in ending the conflict in BiH, it set up structures that
embedded the seeds for future discontent and it created an absence of
2
See the section in this Chapter entitled: ' NATO's CAPACITY AND STRUCTURE FOR SSR
ENGAGEMENTS'.
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'positive peace'. This then allowed the RS to block progress towards much-
needed reform in the security sector and the advance towards NATO
membership. Similarly, the lack of an end date for UNSCR 1244 has effectively
created a barrier to adapting the mission according to the circumstances on the
ground. The domestic interests of the Russian Federation, and the four
members of NATO which have not recognised Kosovo's independence, have
aligned and created a political impasse. NATO has thus been unable to re-
configure its 'safe and secure environment' mission to one that is more in
support of the development of Kosovo's security sector. There is a fundamental
lesson here for NATO and the international community in ensuring that peace
agreements or UNSCRs that are intended to lead to liberal statebuilding do not
either produce a 'negative peace' or generate the conditions whereby an
international intervention can be held to ransom by a dissenting country. It is
undoubtedly easier to say this than do it, but awareness of the issue could
prevent the circumstances which have been created in both BiH and Kosovo.
One alternative is that which occurred in Macedonia in 2001, where the
Macedonian President invited NATO to provide assistance. As long as there is
no coercion on the host country, this latter approach has the immense benefit of
creating local ownership from the start.
In post-conflict countries it is inevitable that there will be a degree of insecurity.
It is therefore incumbent upon any intervening force to help stabilise the
situation and assist in upholding the rule of law. In both BiH and Kosovo the
NATO missions were prepared for a peacekeeping role but not for enforcing the
rule of law, which many in the Alliance regarded as 'mission creep'. Whether
NATO would be expected to contribute directly to the rule of law in any future
SSR engagements would depend on the circumstances. Nonetheless, it is likely
that at the very least it would be required to assist in creating governance
frameworks. It is also likely that another organisation, such as the EU or OSCE,
would be assisting with reform of the justice sector, as has been the case in
both BiH and Kosovo. It would then be incumbent upon NATO to coordinate
closely with those organisations and have a common approach to the issue of
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corruption and subsequent impunity. Where the EU has a civilian SSR mission,
as it does in the Ukraine, then NATO needs to dovetail its role with that of the
EU.
One could reasonably argue that neither the RS nor Northern Kosovo are under
the full control of their respective central governments. For the former it is as a
result of the DPA and for the latter it has been more to do with the interference
of Belgrade. Nonetheless, both cases illustrate the difficulty for a NATO mission
when there are territorial or constitutional disputes. NATO already has Liaison
Offices in both Ukraine and Georgia but, were the Alliance to consider
enhanced SSR missions as part of the DCB initiative, it would need to take into
account the dilemmas imposed by such territorial problems. Furthermore, given
the starkly different contexts between the Western Balkans and the countries of
the Caucasus, there would seem to be merit in comparing NATO’s experience
in supporting SSR in both regions.
Both in BiH and Kosovo there has been a plethora of donors and international
organisations on the ground. Much has been made in the case studies about
the need to cooperate with others and adopt a holistic approach. The difficulty
lies in that many organisations do not wish to coordinate their approaches and,
in the case of both BiH and Kosovo, there is often a reluctance on the part of
the host nation to demand that cooperation. This is another factor to consider in
any future engagement for NATO and will be analysed in more detail later in
this Chapter.3
The case studies in Chapters 5 and 6 have demonstrated that it is not always
possible to draw a distinct line between the past and the present. The history of
the conflicts in both examples have had a direct bearing on the countries'
security sectors and thus the role that NATO and other international
organisations have had in supporting the reform process. These legacies of
conflict need to be understood and taken into account when planning support.
3
See the section in this Chapter entitled: 'COOPERATION AND A HOLISTIC APPROACH'.
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General Clark's sensitivity to the long-term aspiration of the Kosovar Albanians
to have their own army allowed him to finesse the disarming of the KLA. What
NATO was not able to do, however, was remove the legacy of impunity that has
surrounded certain senior ex-KLA members since the conflict. The influence of
the Drenica group and the organ scandal4 still shape the public image of the
Kosovo government both inside and outside the country. Similarly, the general
contempt that most people in BiH seem to hold politicians has its roots in the
constitutional structure imposed by the DPA which has created a self-serving
political elite. This situation has been exacerbated by the contested nature of
the unitary state. Some of these legacy issues, both internal and external, need
to be seen through the narrative and attitudes of the local population. For an
external organisation like NATO, this can only be gleaned through detailed
analysis of the context and talking directly to the local actors. NATO's
preparation for future engagements should ideally analyse these sorts of issues
in detail before agreeing the nature of a possible engagement. It is understood,
however, that the political dynamics might not allow for this to occur.
The governance frameworks in the two case studies were generally viewed as
being acceptable. NATO had assisted both governments in framing laws and
oversight mechanisms for the security sector. The recurrent theme from both
primary and secondary research, however, was that the frameworks were not
being enforced. This reflected both the failure of leadership in the countries, as
well as a degree of apathy on the part of the population to hold politicians to
account. The issue of governance (or good enough governance) is central to a
functioning democracy and will be discussed in further depth later in this
Chapter.5
4
It is not intended to go into detail with regard to the organ scandal surrounding the Drenica
group. Suffice it to say that a number of ex-KLA members have been convicted of harvesting
internal organs for sale during the conflict in Kosovo, including Sylejman Selimi, a former COM
KPC and the first COM KSF. See: Balkans Transitional Justice, The Troubled Trial of Kosovo’s
‘Drenica Group’, dated 27 May 2015. Available at:
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-awaits-kla-guerilla-verdict [Last accessed 20
June 2016].
5
See the section in this Chapter entitled: 'NATO's ROLE IN IMPROVING GOVERNANCE'.
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Inevitably there are gaps in capacity in any post-conflict or post-authoritarian
country. These will be both at the individual and institutional levels. NATO has
done much in both countries to build that capacity through the presence of their
teams embedded in ministries and, in the case of BiH, through some of the PfP
programmes. There is, however, still a lacuna in NATO's approach to Kosovo,
which could be easily ameliorated by the introduction of a TCP. Notwithstanding
the position of the non-recognisers, the Alliance should do more to assist
Kosovo and thus improve stability and further its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Any
future SSR engagement needs to clearly identify where the capacity gaps are in
a target country and thus what assistance is required. NATO then needs to be
able to draw upon the full panoply of PfP programmes including PARP, PAP-
DIB and BI. As a first step, and where appropriate, a TCP should be put in
place.
The final factor to emphasise in this section is a need to build 'political will' for
successful reform within a host country. It was clear from the analysis of BiH
that its politicians lacked that 'political will' to enforce the framework for reform
and thus no amount of conditionality would further the process. Whilst NATO
(and others in the international community) could be credited with much
success in supporting reform in the defence arena, its ability to influence
matters has a limit. In Kosovo, the 'political will' for development of the security
sector has been in place, but NATO's response has been sub-optimal due to
the political limitations on its mandate by UNSCR 1244 and the non-recognising
countries in the Alliance. The ICO and then the US provided assistance to the
Kosovo government in developing an NSS, but the basic principle of local
ownership was contravened on both occasions and the results were
disappointing in both practical and political terms. The analysis demonstrated
the truism that ultimately change can only be home-grown and not imposed by
external actors. This issue will be returned to later in the section on local
ownership.
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The importance of context was emphasised in the quotation at the beginning of
this Chapter. Looking back to the literature in Chapter 2, Paris and Sisk
stressed the need to conduct detailed, multi-disciplinary analyses of context in
order to expose knowledge gaps and to establish "... the deeply engrained
continuities in the political, social and economic life of a society [...]."
(2009:310-311)6 In addition Nathan also drew attention to a range of contextual
factors and highlighted in particular: the nature of the political situation in a
target country, its "... capacity to design, manage and implement reform" and
the 'political will' to pursue those reforms. (2007:12)
In summary, a set of contextual factors are listed below that NATO should
consider when preparing for a new engagement, or modifying an existing one:
 Understanding the people, the country and its neighbours;
 Using a peace agreement or accord to create a 'positive peace';
 Analysing general insecurity, such as abuses by security actors or political
elite and the resultant impunity;
 Is part of the territory not under control of central government;
 Number of donors and international organisations on the ground;
 What are the legacy issues, both internally and externally;
 Viability of governance framework;
 What are the gaps in institutional capacity; and,
6
The quote goes on to discuss post-conflict societies, although the same could be said of post-
authoritarian societies as well.
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 Is there the political will to enact reform?
On this last point, the analysis turns now to the political nature of NATO's SSR
engagements.
THE POLITICAL NATURE OF NATO's SSR ENGAGEMENTS
It was stressed in the literature review, and throughout this study, that assisting
a country with reform of its security sector is a deeply political process, which
cuts to the heart of a state's sovereignty. It is not just a technical or
programmatic exercise, although they have a role to play. It is therefore
surprising that neither BiH nor Kosovo have a NATO official of ambassadorial
rank and concomitant political influence acting as a bridge between NATO HQ
Brussels, the local NATO HQ and the countries' governments. It was a point
well made by the Commander of JFC Naples.7 Furthermore, Ole Hammer in
BiH8 commented on (in his view) the inappropriateness of using an ordinary
military chain of command for these types of political missions. Finally, a
member of the international community9 in Pristina recounted a discussion with
the NAC during one of their regular visits to Kosovo regarding the need for an
SCR, which was then quickly scotched by COMKFOR. Whatever the prevailing
views, it is an issue that NATO should probably reflect upon when planning a
new engagement.
In addition, the role of external actors in an internal process such as SSR
always stands the danger of overriding local ownership. For example, the DRC
processes in BiH only occurred because of the external pressure created by
both the OHR and NATO. Nonetheless, the analysis in Chapter 5 suggested
that as the majority of the commission members were local actors, and the hard
compromises and decisions were made by local politicians, there was a degree








transparent about an organisation's activities in order to create trust rather than
suspicion and thus maximize NATO's soft power. Nye (2004:111) emphasises
that:
"... soft power means getting others to want the same outcomes as you want,
and that requires understanding how they are hearing your messages, and fine-
tuning it accordingly. It is crucial to understand your target audience."
In both BiH and Kosovo there were examples where attempts to produce a
NATO narrative and influence public opinion were either non-existent or went
badly wrong. On several occasions where it did go wrong, it was due to a lack
of contextual understanding on the part of NATO and at other times a lack of
political sensitivity. Either way a carefully crafted narrative and a sound strategic
communications plan should have created the desired effect. These two issues,
however, require political expertise that was not available to the NATO field
missions in either BiH or Kosovo.
There is an additional argument to be adduced here and that concerns the
political nature of the in-theatre NATO commander's role. As explained in
Chapter 6, the military chain of command (essentially SACEUR) was
particularly sensitive about the researcher's role in UNOSEK10 and the potential
for direct communications between a military officer from one of their HQs to
NATO HQ Brussels. This continuing sensitivity over adhering to the military
chain of command was clearly evident in both interviews with senior KFOR
officers.11 The officers shied away from any political comment and refused to
accept that their roles had any political connotation. Nonetheless, senior NATO
officers in a theatre like Kosovo, be they the commander or head of an
NAT/NLAT, are change agents and thus inevitably have a political dimension to
their role. Dr Ben Lovelock, a former Royal Marine officer, was clear on the
political nature of a commander's role, especially in ambiguous circumstances,
when he stated:
10
See section entitled: 'NATO's Support to UNOSEK: 2006-2007'.
11
Interviews K23-N and K24-N.
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"... the contemporary Theatre Commander is definitely a political actor who can
deliver political effects in theatre and at home. [...]This [... is ...] necessary
because they were deployed in difficult political and military circumstances and
they alone had the power to produce a result amid ambiguity. Attempting to
escape this reality or removing the military from the political debate would only
tend to delay political progress and, to take up Rupert Smith‘s argument, reduce
the utility of the forces deployed." (2011:219)
It was a view that General Clark clearly took to heart when he managed to
persuade the KLA to disarm in 1999.12 The word 'persuade' is used here
deliberately as it cuts to the essence of both leadership and power in the
political arena, and has resonance for SSR engagements. The use of threats
and punishments, as well as promises and rewards, have their place in the
power spectrum, but true soft power seeks to persuade a country (or an
individual) to take a course of action, because it is in their best interests. In
effect it is the course of 'enlightened self-interest'. In Clark's case this was an
example of transformational, rather than transactional, leadership.
In order to bring these issues together, a set of political factors are listed below
that NATO should consider when preparing for a new engagement, or modifying
an existing one:
 SSR is deeply political and not just technical or programmatic and needs to
be recognised as such;
 NATO might consider an SCR as the link to NATO HQ Brussels for these
types of engagements;
 In the absence of an SCR, the in-theatre military commander should
probably have a mandate that explicitly reflects the political nature of SSR;
and,
12
See section entitled: 'Early Days: 1999-2005' in Chapter 6.
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 External pressure on internal actors can easily cause a loss of local
ownership, so a carefully crafted narrative and strategic communications
plan is needed in order that both NATO and the host country can create the
political conditions for successful reform.
THE CRITICALITY OF LOCAL OWNERSHIP
Another condition for successful reform is creating local ownership, but it is a
vexed issue for any organisation or donor that assists countries with their
development or reform process. Results have tended to be mixed due to short-
term expediency, a lack of local capacity or an international agenda which
ignores the country's needs. Nonetheless, there is a need to recognise that it
is a cross-cutting subject that should permeate every facet of assistance.
Unfortunately, the all-embracing nature of the international community's
involvement in both BiH and Kosovo has militated against local ownership. As
discussed in the section above, the setting up of the two DRCs in BiH were at
the instigation of the High Representative and NATO, but the format of the
commissions allowed NATO HQ Brussels and NHQSa the opportunity to help
build local capacity and allow local actors to absorb the reforms in a coherent
manner. The PfP tools have also been successful in building capacity and thus
creating local ownership. Since the political impasse in 2006, however, NATO's
ability to encourage ownership has been limited by a lack of domestic
consensus and thus political will to make the reforms happen. The fact that
NATO's strategic narrative was rather incoherent has only served to exacerbate
the difficulties.
UNSCR 1244 has proved over time to be a barrier to progress rather than a
roadmap for the future, not least due to the contested nature of Kosovo's
independence. As explained by a senior KPC officer, the creation of the KIKPC
changed the relationship between the KPC and KFOR from one of partnership
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to a more distant, adversarial relationship. This clearly did not assist with the
development of local ownership. The NATO team inside UNOSEK was always
concerned about the issue of local ownership but were constrained in their
efforts by both the political dynamic between Pristina and Belgrade, as well as
the views of the Contact Group. The key measure in the 'Comprehensive
Proposals' for the Kosovo government to develop a full NSS, which should have
helped create a significant degree of local ownership in the security sector, was
severely hampered on two occasions by the international community.
It should also be remembered that NATO is not the only international actor
interfacing with the security sectors in BiH and Kosovo. Aside from the large
international organisations like EULEX and OSCE, there are also many bilateral
embassies which provided advice and assistance. The US has been particularly
active with their National Guard programmes but in Kosovo the overweening
influence of the US, both politically and in the security sector, has tended to
create dependency rather than local ownership.
On that rather sombre note, it is now time to assess how this experience could
be used to inform NATO's future engagements. As explained in Chapter 2,
local ownership lies at the heart of sustainable development and thus SSR.
Scholars like Nathan (2007), Donais (2008a), as well as a library of OECD
documents13 have all sought to capture the "... hard-won lessons through
constant reference to experience from the field." (Qehaja et al 2013:3)
Nonetheless, depending upon the context there is a more nuanced
understanding of 'ownership' and that particularly in a post-conflict environment
"... there is a dilemma between establishing stability in the short-term and
creating sustainability over the longer-term." (Qehaja et al 2013:5) For both BiH
and Kosovo, it has been a case of building capacity and encouraging local
ownership from the start, but accepting that ownership and commitment were
only really present once there was sufficient capacity. It is therefore
recommended that drawing upon the four bullet points in the previous section
13
For example, OECD (2005b), OECD (2008f) and OECD (2011).
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on the political nature of SSR would be a good starting point to encourage local
ownership but more is needed.
After completing the research interviews for BiH and Kosovo, the researcher
took the opportunity to produce some ideas on how to improve local ownership
during an SSR intervention and these were shared at an academic conference
with participants from the Western Balkans in September 2014. The basic
premise was to embed the concept of local ownership at every stage of an
engagement. These suggestions were well received and are therefore drawn
upon in the list below. It is therefore recommended that when NATO discusses
any future assistance with a host nation, both sides should attempt to:
 Establish a shared and common understanding of the situation on the
ground, perhaps drawing upon a full NSS or review conducted by local
actors;
 Define a shared and common objective for the assistance;
 Produce a joint plan with clearly identified areas of risk;
 Agree joint measures of effectiveness and benchmarks;
 Implement with the recipient community firmly in the lead;
 Carefully and jointly monitor the pace and sequence of implementation;
 Jointly evaluate at key decision points;
 The key, however, is to "... [b]uild capacity and capability leading to
independence [...] without engendering alienation or dependency." (Watters
2011:33);
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 And, finally, throughout the life of the intervention or engagement, keep
talking to each another.14
NATO's ROLE IN IMPROVING GOVERNANCE
There is always a danger when discussing governance to view it through a
Westphalian lens and to demand standards of governance in a post-conflict
country that have taken countries like the UK 800 years to achieve.15 There is
thus a need for NATO planners to remember the context and to be modest in
their expectations. Ingrained attitudes that the security sector is there to protect
the political elite rather than the people take time to overcome. The discussion
below therefore focuses on 'good enough' governance.
In Chapter 5 a member of the IS was quoted as suggesting that PfP
programmes were essentially about governance but were not dressed up as
such.16 BiH was therefore able to improve its governance by drawing upon
NATO programmes like IPAP and PARP. These helped ensure that
improvements were made to such areas as transparency and accountability in
the defence and security sectors. NHQSa was also able to offer advice in the
drafting of appropriate laws for oversight of the security sector, which clearly
proved helpful. Although the full range of PfP programmes were designed to
tackle issues across the whole of government, little has been achieved outside
the defence arena. The impasse over the start of the MAP programme has
been particularly damaging in this regard. A combination of a political elite that
was more concerned with preserving its own privileges and the contested
nature of the unitary state, has frozen governance reforms since 2006.
14
The Austrian Defence Academy, who were the organisers of the conference mentioned
above, drew liberally from the researcher's ideas (with his permission) in their conference
report. See Austrian Defence Academy (2014:3-4)
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NATO's role in providing support to governance within the Kosovo has been
confined to the defence sector. Nonetheless, as several interviewees
remarked, developing a governance framework from scratch has ensured that
Kosovo's laws are generally better than most of its neighbours. The difficulty,
as with BiH, is the implementation of those laws and regulations.17 NATO's BI
programme and the presence of the NAT in the Ministry of KSF have
strengthened policy development, management and oversight mechanisms for
both the Ministry and the KSF itself. The lacuna, however, is access to all the
PfP programmes or even a TCP in order to spread the good practice across
other government ministries.
If the characteristics of 'good enough' governance listed in Chapter 2 are
compared to the situation in both BiH and Kosovo, there would seem to be at
least three additional areas where NATO could offer additional support. First,
more attention could be focused on supporting key leaders who have executive
or oversight functions in the security sector. Such people, whether they are
politicians or officials, need the skills and motivation to be able to drive forward
an internal governance agenda. The BI programme has been helpful in this
regard but perhaps personal mentoring at the highest level is also needed.
Second, civil society has a major role to play in holding politicians and officials
to account. The examples in both case studies of political apathy and
indifference to corruption need to be confronted if the countries are to stem
arbitrary policy-making and abuse of executive power. Civil society should be
encouraged to recognise its role and engage in the process. And finally the
third area is that of education. The Kosovar MP Burim Ramadani18 quite
correctly pointed to the need for more education and training in order for
officials and politicians to understand where and how to apply the governance
framework within the security sector. ISSAT have run such courses in BiH but
not in Kosovo. It could reasonably be argued that organisations like NATO and
17
The spread of data for both countries was problematic, but this is the researcher's




the EU should be coordinating their activities with ISSAT,19 or a similar
organisation, in order to help build capacity at mid-level officials as well as
representatives from civil society.
In bringing this section to a close, it would be helpful for NATO to have a
governance line of operation when planning any future engagement in the same
way that it might have a line for logistics. Drawing upon this point and the
analysis above, discuss the issues below with the host nation when planning a
new engagement:
 Check whether there is an appropriate governance framework in place and
whether it is being implemented;
 Identify interaction between the formal governance framework and the local,
informal rules;
 Identify whether existing PfP programmes assist the governance agenda or
whether they need to be tailored further for the context;
 Identify incentives for politicians and the political elite to pursue a
governance agenda (somewhat sensitive);
 Establish how the country's leadership can be supported such that they own
and drive the governance agenda;
 Identify ways that civil society can be persuaded to engage in the
governance agenda; and,
 Identify opportunities to educate and train actors in both the security sector,
as well as civil society.
19
And by extension its parent organisation, DCAF.
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A strand running through all the issues above is the need to change behaviour
in many of the key actors. This could be through the leverage of the
conditionality of NATO (or EU) membership or some other form of non-coercive
incentive. It could also be through regional methods of cooperation, which then
leads to the need for a holistic approach by both NATO and the host nation.
A HOLISTIC APPROACH AND COOPERATION
As discussed in Chapter 4, NATO first began to address the issue of how to
achieve better cooperation and coordination in 2004. The Riga Summit then
declared a need to coordinate with specific organisations, especially “... the
activities of the UN, EU and the OSCE to build governance and support reform.”
(NATO 2006)20 It was not until early 2010, however, when NATO's SCR in
Afghanistan21 complained that there was both a lack of clarity concerning who
was responsible for what, and there had been no articulation of what the
Alliance was attempting to achieve in its support to governance and
development in Afghanistan. His remarks prompted allies to achieve
consensus on achieving a 'Comprehensive Approach', which was enshrined in
NATO's Strategic Concept at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010. (NATO
2010b)
There was no real evidence to suggest that the NATO missions in either BiH or
Kosovo were following the diktats of the 'Comprehensive Approach'. Clearly
there are a multiplicity of stakeholders dealing with the security sector in both
countries, both internal and external, which should ideally work together in a
holistic manner. Unfortunately that has not always been the case.22 The DRCs
proved to be extremely helpful in drawing together the threads of the BiH
defence sector in a holistic manner, but their mandates meant that they were
less successful incorporating elements of the justice and correction centres into
20
The term 'Comprehensive Approach' was first mentioned in the Riga Summit Declaration
(NATO 2006:Paragraph 10).
21
NATO DSG(2010)0510 dated 5 August 2010:1-10. Copy held by researcher.
22
A particularly telling indictment of the competition and confusion between international
organisations in Kosovo can be found in Welch (2011).
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the overall security picture. Given the underlying requirement to meet the
security and justice needs of the people, this has limited the efficacy of these
interventions. The political structure in the country, along with the contested
nature of the state, has prevented the adoption of a countrywide NSS.
Furthermore, the refusal of the RS government to subordinate the judicial
structures in the RS to the central government in Sarajevo has been one of the
major constitutional blocks to a more holistic approach in BiH. Whilst NATO
has attempted to coordinate with bilateral actors and the EU on the political
agenda, there are understandable difficulties for a small in-country HQ like
NHQSa when performing this political role. It is likely that a SCR figure would
have had more chance of finessing this particular issue.
In a similar fashion to BiH, NATO's engagement in Kosovo has tended to focus
on the defence sector rather than contributing to the broader security sector. In
part this has been because of the lack of its ability to use the range of PfP
programmes and in part this has been due to the risk averse approach adopted
by a succession of NATO commanders. Nonetheless, the work of the NATO
team in UNOSEK and the FASWG and WGS in Pristina contributed significantly
to a holistic approach to the development of the post-independent Kosovo
security sector. This could have been capitalised upon subsequently with the
development of an NSS but the two opportunities to create such a holistic
approach were squandered.
Both BiH and Kosovo have recognised the importance of engagement with their
neighbours and they have been encouraged in this by both NATO and the EU.
It has helped that both in-country NATO HQs report to JFC Naples and thus
there is a measure of similarity in how the key themes are dealt with, albeit the
contexts are clearly very different. It is neither expected nor possible for NATO
to become involved with all aspects of the security sector but, as both case
studies have shown, there is clearly more scope for strengthening coordination
among the various stakeholders. There is a danger, however, that other
organisations (both international and national) might consider NATO was
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pursuing a securitisation agenda, so it would be important that the Alliance
deferred to others which had core competency in thematic areas such as police
and judicial reform. As discussed in Chapter 2, the WGA23 should be taken
forward both within the host nation, as well as within NATO and others
supporting reforms in the security sector. This should help prevent duplication
and in managing the various interdependencies between the stakeholders and
within the sector itself.
When planning for a new engagement, NATO should always attempt to take a
holistic view of the security sector in a country and be clear who are the internal
and external stakeholders. This does not mean that it should try to tackle every
aspect of the sector, nor should it imply that it takes the lead in all areas. It
should, however, endeavour to gain an awareness of all the various
interdependencies. To that end, it is recommended that NATO should probably:
 Conduct a stakeholder analysis of the target country and its
interdependencies.
 Adopt a WGA and encourage others to do the same.
 Identify programmes that would meet the security and justice needs of the
people.
 Be prepared to coordinate SSR activities and be coordinated by others,
where appropriate.
TECHNICAL ISSUES - SKILLS AND STRUCTURE
The analysis of both BiH and Kosovo has pointed to the need for specific
capacity and structures within the in-country missions. So whilst the preceding
23
The WGA is understood by most IGOs and donors, so is the preferred term to the NATO-
centric 'Comprehensive Approach'. In practical terms the essential idea is the same.
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sections have tended to focus on thematic areas, there is also a clear need to
identify the structural lessons from NATO's deployments in the Western
Balkans. The aim of this section is to examine these issues and identify those
that could inform NATO's future engagements.
Both case studies appeared to indicate that there were difficulties with the
military chain of command overseeing these types of engagement. In BiH this
was overcome in part by maintaining a small politico-military team, which had
direct access to the IS in Brussels. In Kosovo the NLAT and NAT came directly
under the authority of the IS and, although they liaised with KFOR, they only
used the in-country HQ for administration. JFC Naples did briefly have
expertise in SSR but this was soon lost during one of the perennial cuts in
military staffing levels. The first structural issue would therefore seem to be that
NATO HQ Brussels should have a direct interface with the field mission of any
future SSR engagement. The political nature of SSR demands a close
relationship between Brussels and an advisory mission. Whether that means
direct oversight, as in the case of the NLAT, or for the field mission to remain
within the military chain of command but be able to access the IS directly, such
as in the case of the politico-military team in NHQSa, is perhaps a moot point.
Nonetheless, it is an issue that needs to be considered carefully.
The second issue is the perceived lack of continuity of the military personnel in
NATO advisory teams assisting with the reform process in the Western
Balkans. In BiH this was ameliorated to a large extent by the long-term
presence of civilian staff in the politico-military team. Notwithstanding this
continuity, there was still a degree of concern from the Deputy Commander of
NHQSa24 about the six-month rotation of his military advisers. In Kosovo
Lieutenant General Kastrati25 also highlighted the length of time it takes to
orientate military advisers who only begin to add value as they end their six-
month tours. Although a senior KFOR officer in the NLAT indicated that he did






counter to most informed opinion. As the advisors are in effect change agents,
they need to be in post for sufficient time to understand the context, build
relationships and trust, as well as delivering a consistency of approach to the
person or organisation being advised. The evidence from the field research
would seem to indicate that tours should be a minimum of one year and
preferably two or three. This would have financial implications for NATO and
the nations, as some personnel would undoubtedly want to deploy with their
families, but it is a cost that would need to be borne.
The third issue that emerged from the analysis was the importance of
collocating NATO advisors with the individuals they were advising. In BiH the
migration of civilian and military staff to the MoD occurred in 2005 with its
formation. In Kosovo the NAT were always based in the Ministry for KSF, but
the MCAD were based in HQ KFOR in Film City. It was only with the formation
of the NLAT in 2013 that collocation occurred. It would seem that a
combination of longer tour lengths and collocation allowed closer relations to be
established and a better degree of trust between the NATO staff and their
partners.
Having stressed the primacy of the political dimension in SSR over the technical
aspects, it is still worth pointing out the inherent technical complexity of such
engagements and the need for certain key skill sets. For example, it was
stressed in both case studies that NATO advisers had to have the appropriate
skills to be credible to their host nation counterparts. NATO's Deputy
Commander for the Western Balkans, Lieutenant General Pearson, and the
KSF Commander, Lieutenant General Kastrati, both dew attention to this as an
important issue. Unfortunately, evidence suggested that this was not always
given the priority it deserved. NATO needs to be robust in demanding high
standards from the troop contributing nations, or the Alliance will lose credibility
and the potential soft power that it has on offer. Continuity and a clarity about
the skills required for such advisers will be analysed further in the next section
but it seems clear that technical expertise is a pre-requisite for such posts.
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Furthermore, whilst it is inevitable that some of the military staff will not
necessarily have the previous knowledge or understanding of the finer points of
SSR or NATO's PfP programmes, NATO needs to provide appropriate training
and education as part of the preparation of staff for the field mission. In certain
specific areas, like outreach, NATO needs to provide experts in strategic
communications, so that NATO's narrative reinforces the mission rather than
undermining it, as happened in both BiH and Kosovo.
The final issue to be drawn from the case studies is that NATO needs to ensure
that the structure of the field mission is designed to meet the needs of the
country that the Alliance is supporting. This should be axiomatic but empirical
evidence from Kosovo, where KFOR is still structured for a peacekeeping
mission rather than an advisory one, would suggest otherwise. The advisory
teams in both BiH and Kosovo have evolved into combined civilian and military
teams and this seems to be optimal for these types of engagement. It reflects
the political nature of SSR, as well as the diversity of skills required in advisory
teams: many of these skills such as governance and development are not
readily available in military staff.
In summary, a set of technical and structural factors are listed below that should
be considered when designing a field mission to conduct an SSR engagement:
 Whether the field mission needs a direct interface with the IS;
 Specify that the tour lengths of staff should be a minimum of one year and
preferably two or three years;
 Where possible collocate Advisors with the individuals they are advising;
 Ensure that Advisors are subject matter experts in their field;
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 Plan to provide appropriate training and education as part of the preparation
of staff for an SSR field mission; and,
 Depending upon the skillsets required, ensure that there is a balance of
both civilian and military personnel in the Advisory teams.
CAPACITY BUILDING THROUGH NORM SETTING AND CONDITIONALITY
In this section it is proposed first to provide an institutional backdrop to norm
setting and conditionality in order to sharpen the perspective, before then
comparing the NATO support to capacity building in the two case studies.
As explained in Chapter 4, NATO has adapted from a ‘threat-based’ alliance at
the end of the Cold War to a ‘security management institution’. Looking through
the lens of sociological institutionalism, “… NATO is designed to defend and
expand an international community of (liberal democratic) states and to uphold
and disseminate the constitutive values and norms.” (Schimmelfennig 2015:93)
This strengthening of countries though shared values and norms takes place
due to a combination of political dialogue and engagement, as well as through
the rationalisation and socialisation of norms. As Aybet and Bieber suggest:
“Rationalisation refers to the cost–benefit analysis of the elites in the target 
state, who see that acquiring these norms will benefit their own political goals. 
Socialisation refers to the internalisation of the institution’s norms by local elites;
in a way the external norms become ‘their’ norms.” (2011:1911)
The main practical mechanism that NATO uses to create this acceptance of
norms is through the range of PfP programmes. These have been both powerful
and successful drivers of reform. They are not, however, always available for
some partners, either because they are not members of PfP or are not
institutionally ready for more advanced reforms. Before BiH joined PfP, and
became eligible for its programmes, it followed a Tailored Cooperation Plan
(TCP) that assisted in its development and prepared it for the next step. There
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then followed a progression of new programmes that it was offered when it was
ready. It is not proposed to go through these meticulously but a list of them is at
Appendix 11 and the progression is illustrated at Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4. BiH
has been offered the final programme, the MAP, but the condition that it must
complete on entity immovable property, has yet to be fulfilled. This
conditionality has fallen prey to political manoeuvring by the RS and is
symptomatic of domestic institutional wrangling in post-conflict countries.
(Keohane & Nye 2012:248)
NATO support to capacity building in Kosovo has also experienced post-conflict
obstacles. In the first instance, the continuation of UNSCR 1244 seems unduly
intrusive for a country that has been recognised by some 112 other states. The
NAT and NLAT still have a limited range of tasks they can perform, because of
political barriers erected by the four non-recognising NATO members. This has
led to a brake on progress to PfP and thus access to the full range of PfP
programmes. Members of the KSF and its ministry seem ready to progress
further and accept the norms implicit in those programmes. If NATO could offer
a TCP or perhaps access to the DCB initiative, then further progress could be
made.
It is perhaps worth using Schroeder’s typology when considering the process of
adopting norms and accepting conditionality. The discussion in the case
studies focused on two different levels. Within the AFBiH and the KSF the
adoption of NATO norms seemed to have come both with operational benefits,
as well as governance benefits. In the wider security sectors and wider
societies, there appeared to be many more ‘normative shells’ or ‘ceremonial
structures’. This would seem to indicate that NATO has achieved a degree of
‘soft power’ when it supports SSR. Given its experience in places like
Afghanistan, where support has been ‘train and equip’ operational assistance,
without a governance element, then progress with reform has been much more
haphazard. (Pertusot 2009:37-38; Jackson 2010:1818-1820) Powell and
DiMaggio (1991:199-200) warn that replicating practices from one socio-political
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context to another holds dangers. Cultural differences as well as different
interpretations of legitimacy can result in unforeseen outcomes, including hybrid
acceptance of norms and thus incomplete or weak institutionalisation. Either
way normative support can erode quickly. This might well be a lesson for
NATO to ponder: does it continue to support capacity building with a
governance element or is it content to forgo the governance aspect. The former
is SSR and the latter is not.
A set of capacity building factors are listed below and should probably be
considered when designing a field mission to conduct an SSR engagement:
 Have a clear understanding of the capacity gaps to be addressed
(preferably using a framework of analysis, such as the development of an
NSS);
 Identify and support country-owned sources of change and link to entry
points for support though norm setting and conditionality;
 Assess whether a current NATO programme will address the need or
whether collaboration with another IGO would meet the requirement, or
whether a bespoke solution needs to be designed;
 Ensure that there is a match between capacity building at the
environmental, organisational and individual level;
 Draw upon the four key programme enablers at Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 at
the programmatic phase; and,
 Identify how and when M&E will occur, along with opportunities for the
sharing of lessons and experiences.
The broad framework of factors for NATO to consider in future NATO SSR
engagements would suggest that there has been much to learn from its
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experience of supporting SSR in the Western Balkans. These are summarised
again at Appendix 12. It is important to stress, however, that care needs to be
taken in replicating practices from one socio-economic area to another. The
key is therefore to use the factors as a model to be adjusted according to
circumstances, and not applied rigidly as a template.
SUMMARY
This Chapter sought to conduct a comparative analysis of the cross-case data
presented in the two Western Balkans case studies. The results would suggest
that NATO's experience in supporting SSR in the Western Balkans has been
successful, albeit some key limitations have been identified in its approach.
Several of these limitations could be overcome if NATO was able to develop its
own SSR policy and framework, which could then be used by policy and
decision makers in Brussels, as well as in member states. In addition, further
detailed operational guidance could then be provided for practitioners in the
field on such areas as advising and mentoring, as well as guidelines for various
aspects of SSR along the lines of those provided by ISSAT’s OGNs. In
combination these would not only offer clarity internally about what is and what
is not SSR within the Alliance, but they would also offer clarity externally to
other IGOs and partners. Furthermore, they would provide a consistency of
approach to SSR with measurable standards of achievement.
There proved to be a considerable degree of commonality in the patterns and
characteristics of the seven top-level areas that were analysed in the cross-
case comparison but with some obvious contextual differences. It allowed the
researcher to draw together a framework of generalised factors for each area of
the analytical framework developed in Chapter 2 that point to lessons that could
be used by NATO planning staff when considering potential SSR engagements.
These are summarised at Appendix 12. Inevitably not all the lessons will be
learnt, as domestic national agendas will continue to shape Alliance
engagements and, ultimately, political circumstances will dictate the art of the
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possible. Nonetheless, none of these points should undermine the validity of the
lessons.
Having completed this second stage of analysis, the study now turns to the final
chapter which contains the conclusions, policy recommendations and areas






"Institutional adaptation underpins NATO's political and military adaptation.
The objective is an Alliance adaptable by design, where the capacity to
anticipate, and react to, change is integral to how we operate."
NATO Communiqué - Warsaw, 9 July 20161
INTRODUCTION
This thesis has considered the theoretical and practical underpinning of SSR
and NATO's role in its application within two countries of the Western Balkans:
BiH and Kosovo. Unlike other security related IGOs, NATO does not have a
formal policy for SSR, so the research generated an original analytical
framework in order to analyse the Alliance’s support to SSR in the Western
Balkans. Through a combination of both primary and secondary research the
study has established that, notwithstanding the lack of such a policy, NATO still
managed to add considerable value to SSR processes in these countries and
has the potential for doing so in the future elsewhere. This concluding chapter
presents a summary of the research undertaken. This is followed by the
conclusions drawn from the research and these lead in turn to
recommendations for policy action and further research.
RESEARCH SUMMARY
The aim of the research was to undertake an analytical review of NATO’s
experience of supporting SSR in the Western Balkans (1995-2015) in order to
inform its approaches to future and current SSR engagements. The
underpinning objectives were then to: [1] examine critically the modalities and




to analyse critically the role NATO has played in supporting SSR in the Western
Balkans (Chapters 2-7); [3] understand where these engagements have worked
and to identify the limitations of NATO’s approach using a framework of SSR
good practice (Chapters 5, 6 and 7); and [4] draw lessons from the experience
of these interventions, which could be used to inform NATO’s approach to
current and future SSR engagements (Chapter 5, 6 and 7).
The study of NATO's experience in supporting SSR did not sit easily within
current scholarly discourse and academic disciplines. The researcher’s
analysis, however, suggested that the study was broadly situated within the
social sciences, primarily within political science, and more specifically within
the sub-sets of IR and public policy. It also drew upon several inter-disciplinary
fields but specifically the field of security studies. This then defined the core
focus of the subsequent literature critique.
This critique in Chapter 2 followed the dominant theme of human security in the
late 1990s and the recognition that insecurity was one of the root causes of
poverty. This acceptance of a nexus between security and development
allowed the two disciplines to become aligned more closely, both in practical
and intellectual terms. It also unlocked thinking on improving governance,
which became a central pillar of the nascent SSR concept. The vagueness of
the early concept raised more questions than answers and that meant its path
to full international acceptance was uneven. It was the pioneering work by the
OECD that eventually brought coherence to the early definitional debate. Over
time the EU, UN and OSCE all developed their own frameworks for SSR
drawing upon the OECD for similar principles, similar definitions of the security
sector, and similar characteristics of SSR.
NATO made one attempt to develop an SSR policy in the mid-2000s, but
opposition from France, which argued then that SSR was within the EU’s
competence not NATO’s, led to the draft policy being dropped. In the absence
of such a policy the researcher therefore drew upon the definitions and
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principles of the other SSR-relevant IGOs and constructed an analytical
framework, which was then used throughout the thesis to analyse NATO’s
support to SSR. The framework contained seven key characteristics of SSR,
which were analysed in depth in Chapter 2. These were as follows: the context
of reform; political engagement; local ownership; governance; a holistic
approach and cooperation; technical issues and skills; and capacity building
through norm setting and conditionality.
Chapter 3 explained the methodological choices for the conduct of the research
and the underpinning rationale for the choices that had been made. The
position taken in this study was that SSR was a phenomenon. The ontological
position was that it was socially constructed and was viewed in broadly
subjective terms, which changed with time and context. The epistemological
position was that SSR had subjective meanings, but it was reality within the
individual contexts that provided acceptable knowledge, and thus able to inform
NATO's future policy and future engagements. To that end the study followed a
broadly interpretivist philosophy and an interpretive paradigm, through an
inductive approach. A case study design was selected as the dominant method
but with several sources of evidence in a multi-method manner. Two individual
case studies (BiH and Kosovo) were selected with interviews being the main
data gathering sub-method and document research and direct observation
being the secondary sub-methods. A general research model based on the
theory of institutionalism was used to analyse the data. Additional theories,
typologies, and models, including the hermeneutic tradition, were used to gain
additional insights.
An overview of NATO’s evolution was presented in Chapter 4. This included a
view through an institutional lens in order to understand why adopting an SSR
framework was not welcomed by NATO as a common-sense policy response to
the challenge of insecurity in partner countries. There was no clear elucidation
to this paradox. What was clear, however, was that NATO had proved itself to
be a highly institutionalised and adaptive actor on the world stage, with
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considerable normative and mimetic appeal. At the heart of this appeal were
the shared and common values espoused in the Preamble to the Washington
Treaty. Several of the Alliance’s current operations and missions had evolved
into some form of security cooperation and, in many cases, support to SSR.
NATO’s success had often been founded on supporting PfP programmes in
regions such as the CEE, and the research suggested that a clear SSR
framework and policy would further assist NATO in managing risks both within
and at the boundaries of the Euro-Atlantic area in future SSR engagements.
The first stage of the main analysis in this thesis was conducted in the two case
studies. Chapter 5 showed that the historical context and the legacy of the
conflict in BiH continue to be powerful shapers of the country and its security
sector. Although there was general agreement that the DPA had been
successful in bringing an end to the physical conflict, at the same time it
imposed significant barriers to BiH becoming a fully functioning state. NATO
played a major role in the stabilisation of the country at the end of the war, but it
was the arrival of Lord Ashdown and the formation of the DRCs that forged
initial progress in reform of the security sector. Since then, defence and SSR
had been core elements of the cooperation between NATO and BiH. These had
been conducted through a range of PfP programmes which had been both
powerful and successful drivers of reform. NHQSa had a small civilian political-
military team, which advised mainly on the conceptual and wider reforms
necessary to implement the PfP programmes including PARP. Although the
tools of PfP had a set framework, they were individually tailored to BiH, and
allowed the MoD and AFBiH to continue progressing at a pace dictated by the
needs and desires of local actors.
Since 2006 this pace had slowed considerably due to a lack of a domestic
consensus over BiH statehood. Interviews with both local and international
actors suggested that whilst there had been continuing progress with elements
of governance, there were still too many examples of ‘ceremonial structures’
and ‘soft accountability’. The technical support provided by NATO was
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considered sound, although it was clear that the expertise in SSR and the local
knowledge evident in the civilian political-military team was far superior to that
of the military staff, who were mainly on short tours of duty and did not
necessarily have an appropriate level of training and understanding of SSR.
Strategic communications had also proved a challenge for NATO. There had
been some clumsy attempts at 'selling' the Alliance within BiH that lacked both
contextual sensitivity as well as skill in delivering a coherent narrative.
Furthermore, it was clear that engagement in such a highly political issue as
SSR needed more active engagement from the Alliance as well as more
attention paid to the training of its personnel.
The analysis of Kosovo in Chapter 6 followed the same broad structure as that
for BiH. It was established that NATO’s role in hard security issues, from
disarming the KLA to stabilising the country, was considered successful by all
interviewees and nearly all scholarly references. It was less successful,
however, over the passage of time as its emphasis moved to softer security
issues. A combination of the lack of an agreed ‘final status’ for Kosovo, a
UNSCR that had no end date, and an inherent climate of insecurity led to
institutional and political stalemate. It was only with UNOSEK’s attempt to
resolve the impasse over ‘final status’ that the Alliance became more actively
seized with helping design a new security sector for Kosovo and a force to
replace the KPC. Although UNOSEK’s ‘Comprehensive Proposals for Kosovo’
document was blocked in the UN Security Council, NATO was still able to assist
Kosovo through a set of ‘new tasks’ when the country unilaterally declared
independence in 2008. After that date, however, SSR support had been
hampered by the four members of NATO which had not recognised the
country’s independence for their own internal political reasons.
A review of NATO documents showed that the current KFOR mission was still
constrained to a peacekeeping mission. Research indicated that this mission
had little relevance to the SSR support that was the main aim of the ‘new tasks’
and that KFOR would be better served by a new SSR-focused advisory
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mission. Not only would this allow its numbers to be reduced to a more
sustainable level but it could also allow the Alliance to offer Kosovo the full
range of PfP programmes with its attendant support to governance and capacity
building across the security sector. Interpretation of some measured criticism of
KFOR, as well as evidence from the analytical framework, supported the idea of
better training and longer tour lengths for advisors if KFOR was to provide the
requisite expertise and contextual understanding to optimise the leverage of its
role in norm setting and capacity building. Similarly, institutional analysis
suggested that a risk averse approach by successive KFOR Commanders
could be mitigated by greater political engagement from NATO HQ Brussels
and this could include the appointment of an in-country SCR.
The comparative analysis of the two case studies was presented in Chapter 7
and sought to compare cross-case data collected in the previous two chapters
in an explicit manner. This was the second stage of the main analysis and used
the same broad analytical framework developed in Chapter 2, albeit with slight
changes in emphasis in their respective titles. Notwithstanding some obvious
contextual differences, there proved to be a considerable degree of
commonality in the patterns and characteristics of the seven top-level areas of
the analytical framework. This allowed the researcher to draw together a list of
generalised factors for each area of the framework that could be used by NATO
planning staff to inform their thinking when considering potential SSR
engagements. These are summarised at Appendix 12 and point to the lessons
identified by the research.
CONCLUSIONS
The overarching conclusion drawn from the research is that NATO added
considerable value to the reform processes in the security sectors of the two
countries studied, and in addition the analytical framework highlighted lessons
that could be drawn to inform its approaches to current and future SSR
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engagements. In so doing, the research met both the research aim and the
underpinning objectives.
More generally, the research has reinforced the reality that different actors with
different agendas will inevitably complicate and often limit NATO’s approach in
the challenging contexts of post-conflict and post-authoritarian countries. It also
became evident that national agendas within the North Atlantic Council
influenced the Alliance's ability to support SSR in the two countries studied.
This now leads to ten more focussed conclusions with attendant policy
recommendations and suggestions for further research.
Conclusion 1: NATO has proved itself to be a highly institutionalised and
adaptive actor on the world stage, with considerable normative and
mimetic appeal.
Notwithstanding the predictions of NATO's imminent demise over the years
from both the media and particularly the theorists of the realist tradition at the
end of the Cold War, NATO has proved itself to be a resilient and adaptive
institution. It has survived longer than any previous such treaty and is still
regarded as the world's leading security Alliance. (p174) It has also
transformed from a ‘threat-based’ alliance to a ‘security management institution’
that is designed to defend and expand an international community of
democratic states and to uphold and disseminate the values and norms. (p149,
p375) This was particularly evident during the reforms in CEE of the late 1990s
(pp174-175), as well as to a lesser extent in the case study countries. (p248,
p345) A desire for partnership with NATO has been highly influential in setting
democratic norms of behaviour and structure for countries to meet, as well as
the explicit political conditionality that is on offer through membership of the
Alliance. (p175)
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Conclusion 2: The success of NATO’s assistance to SSR in the post-
authoritarian countries of the CEE has not been replicated to the same
extent in the two post-conflict case studies.
The success of the reforms in CEE occurred through a combination of intensive
political dialogue and engagement by NATO, as well as through the
rationalisation and socialisation of democratic norms. (p98) This political
engagement was an essential pre-cursor for the latter and was not always
evident in either BiH (pp227-230) or Kosovo. (pp331-332) Furthermore, the
internalisation of democratic norms by both the political elite and the people in
CEE occurred because there was a consensus that both wanted membership of
NATO. (p98) This has not been the case in BiH where there is a lack of internal
consensus over a unitary state. (pp243-244) Whilst Kosovo has a consensus
over NATO membership, the residual uncertainties created by UNSCR 1244
and the lack of access to PfP programmes have led to many ‘normative shells’
and ‘ceremonial structures’ in its governance frameworks. (pp376-377)
Conclusion 3: NATO’s PfP programmes have been powerful and
successful drivers of reform.
Both scholarly discourse (pp157-158, pp160-166) and the research conducted
in BiH (p231, p241) have clearly demonstrated the inherent value of PfP and
the range of PfP programmes in driving the reform process. Even in Kosovo
where the lack of PfP membership has limited access to set programmes and
thus progress in reform (p337, pp341-342, p376), NATO HQ Brussels has
drawn upon elements of SSR good practice to move from directing security
institutions to advising them. (p334) Ultimately, however, it has been the
governance aspect of the PfP programmes that has been the key to their
efficacy in supporting SSR. (pp366-368)
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Conclusion 4: NATO’s experience in supporting reform in conflict affected
countries has tended to be ‘train and equip’ programmes, which have
included little or no governance elements.
As Conclusion 3 has already suggested, governance is a key element of
effective SSR. (pp366-368) Results from the conflicted affected countries, such
as Afghanistan for example, have demonstrated that the focus proved to be on
the ‘hardware’ of security and improving the operational effectiveness of armed
forces and police, rather than on the drivers of conflict or the quality of
governance and accountability. (pp100-101) Much of the assistance could fall
under the rubric of SSR but, without a NATO policy or framework for SSR, there
is little clarity about what it would entail and what it would not. (p153) It is in the
hands of NATO member states to make decisions on what type of assistance to
offer partner countries, but they should be clear that ‘train and equip’
programmes at the expense of governance are not SSR and thus outcomes are
likely to be much more uncertain. (p377)
Conclusion 5: NATO’s experience of supporting SSR in the Western
Balkans was successful but could have been improved if it had developed
its own SSR policy and framework.
The research suggested that although NATO's experience in supporting SSR in
the Western Balkans was successful, not least due to specific PfP programmes,
there were some key limitations. Several of these limitations could be
overcome, however, if NATO was able to develop its own SSR policy and
framework, which could then be used by policy and decision makers in
Brussels, as well as in member states. In addition, further detailed operational
guidance could then be provided for practitioners in the field on such areas as
advising and mentoring, as well as guidelines for various aspects of SSR along
the lines of those provided by ISSAT’s OGNs. In combination these would not
only offer clarity internally within the Alliance about what is and what is not SSR,
but they would also offer clarity externally to other IGOs and partners.
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Furthermore, they would provide a consistency of approach to SSR with
measurable standards of achievement. (p378, also pp92-94, pp175-176)
Conclusion 6: NATO’s political engagement in the Western Balkans has
been weak during the latter part of the period under study.
The importance of politics and political engagement to the implementation of
SSR is well recognised. (p75) Inevitably NATO’s political involvement in the
Western Balkans was intense during its various military interventions but this
waned over time, with attention focused on other missions such as Iraq and
Afghanistan. (p325) Research showed that during the latter part of the period
under study political engagement in BiH and Kosovo has lacked sensitivity and
nuance, as well as engagement at an appropriately high level. (pp229-231,
pp361-362) Efforts were further undermined by both poor strategic
communications (pp244-245, pp311-312) and a lack of recognition by in-theatre
military commanders of the political dimension to their roles. (p361) The
appointment of a NATO Senior Civilian Representative with Ambassadorial rank
to either the Western Balkans region or to individual countries would seem to be
a possible solution to this issue, although it has to be acknowledged that this
might create different sensitivities within the military chain of command. (p331,
p351)
Conclusion 7: KFOR’s current peacekeeping mission is out-of-date and no
longer matches the demands of the 2008 ‘new tasks’ or the needs of an
independent Kosovo.
NATO should ensure that the structure of a field mission is designed to meet its
own needs as well as the needs of the country that the Alliance is supporting.
This should be axiomatic but empirical evidence from Kosovo, where KFOR is
still structured for a peacekeeping mission rather than an advisory one, would
suggest otherwise. (p319, pp334-335, p374) A change to an advisory mission
would not only better match the spirit of the ‘new tasks’ but it would be entirely
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consistent with NATO's approach in both BiH and Macedonia, where there has
been a natural transformation from the original tactical operation to a mission
that provides advice on defence reform and SSR to their respective host
nations. (pp343-344)
Conclusion 8: The SSR support that NATO HQ Brussels and KFOR can
offer Kosovo would appear to be at its limit and could only be improved
by the offer of a TCP or, better still, PfP membership and thus access to
the full range of PfP programmes.
HQ NATO Brussels and KFOR have supported the development of a narrow
area of the security sector in Kosovo for a number of years, but there is little
doubt that NATO is currently adopting a holding pattern rather than encouraging
Kosovo towards a situation where it takes on more responsibility for security.
(p319) NATO's partnership programmes cover much more of the security
sector, including the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Finance, and focuses
on governance across the spectrum of government. By allowing the whole of
the Kosovo security sector to engage in these programmes, it would not only be
of practical benefit to the country, but it could also help build better local
ownership. (p346) Thus offering a TCP to Kosovo, and then membership of
PfP, combined with assistance through a new, smaller advisory mission would
seem to be a much more stable option for both Kosovo and the Region. (p319,
p358, p367, p376)
Conclusion 9: NATO SSR advisors are important change agents and
therefore require contextual experience, knowledge about SSR and a
high-level of interpersonal skills if they are to achieve a measure of
success.
SSR advisors are change agents and thus they require a broad-range of multi-
disciplinary skills from political to technical. As ever, the precise skills will
depend upon need and circumstance and should normally be ascertained
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through a rigorous analysis prior to an SSR intervention. (p92) Advisors should
also be in post for sufficient time to understand the context, build relationships
and trust, as well as to deliver a consistency of approach to the person or
organisation being advised. The evidence from the research would seem to
indicate that tours should be a minimum of one year and preferably two or
three. (pp373-374, also pp342-343) The advisory teams in both BiH and
Kosovo have evolved into combined civilian and military teams and this seems
to be optimal for these types of engagement. It reflects the political nature of
SSR, as well as the diversity of skills required in advisory teams: many of these
skills such as governance and development are not readily available in military
staff. In addition, NATO should provide appropriate training and education as
part of the preparation of staff for field missions. (pp373-374, also pp94-95,
pp239-241) Finally, a NATO SSR policy and framework would also greatly
assist in shaping training standards for advisors as well as providing them with
a vade mecum. (p248)
Conclusion 10: The analysis of NATO’s experience in supporting SSR in
the Western Balkans has allowed the researcher to develop a ‘Framework
of Generalised Factors’ that could be used by NATO to inform its
approach to current and future SSR engagements.
Analysing where NATO’s approach to supporting SSR has worked and where it
has not in the Western Balkans has provided a much clearer understanding of
the reform issues. This has allowed the researcher to draw together a list of
generalised factors for each area of the sections of the analytical framework
that could then be used by NATO planning staff to inform their thinking when
considering current and future SSR engagements. These are summarised at
Appendix 12 and point to the lessons identified by the research. It is important
to stress that these factors are not a training manual directing how to support
SSR but a series of issues that should be considered in the appropriate
contextual setting and which require reasoned judgement. Cultural differences
as well as different interpretations of legitimacy can result in different outcomes,
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including hybrid acceptance of norms and thus incomplete or weak
institutionalisation. Even when beneficiary states ostensibly accept normative
values, they are likely to be ‘normative shells’ or ‘ceremonial structures’ at best.
Either way normative support can erode quickly, and the sustainability of
reforms can then become questionable. The key is therefore to use the factors
as a model to be adjusted according to circumstances, and not applied rigidly
as a template. (pp377-378)
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The policy recommendations are derived from the principal conclusions above
and include some additional explanation on their policy relevance and value.
They are as follows:
Recommendation 1: It is recommended that both NATO and individual
member states always consider governance issues when deciding upon
assistance for partner countries.
As explicated in Conclusions 3 and 4 the inclusion of governance is a key
element of effective SSR. ‘Train and equip’ assistance programmes that have
little or no governance strands are not SSR and their outcomes are therefore
more uncertain. It may be that such operational assistance is acceptable to
NATO and Alliance members for certain contextual or operational reasons, but
the decision to proceed down this path should be made explicitly and not by
default.
Recommendation 2: It is recommended that NATO develop its own
strategic level SSR policy and framework, and complement them with
detailed operational guidelines on SSR for use in the field.
Conclusion 3 showed that NATO’s range of PfP programmes has proved
invaluable in supporting SSR, but research has indicated that its success in the
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Western Balkans has come with some key limitations. Conclusion 6 then
explained that these limitations could be overcome if NATO were to develop its
own SSR policy and framework, which would offer clarity on NATO’s approach
internally within the Alliance, as well as externally to other SSR-related IGOs
and partner countries.
Recommendation 3: It is recommended that NATO strengthen its political
engagement in the Western Balkans through a combination of higher-level
political representation and improved strategic communications.
In line with Conclusion 6, there would seem to be three broad options open to
NATO for strengthening its political engagement in the Western Balkans. First,
it could adopt a regional approach and nominate one of its DASGs to undertake
an overarching link role between NATO HQ Brussels and both in-theatre
military commanders and respective host nations. Second, it could appoint an
ambassadorial level SCR to individual countries in the Western Balkans, where
such appointments would add value, such as BiH and Kosovo. Third, it could
make the in-theatre’s role explicitly more political and include a direct link to
NATO HQ Brussels. The latter two options might create sensitivities within the
military chain of command, although there have been precedents for such
arrangements. All three options should create a deeper sense of political
engagement between NATO and the host countries’ governments, which would
need to be reinforced by a pro-active and nuanced strategic communications
strategy.
Recommendation 4: It is recommended that KFOR’s mission is changed
from peacekeeping to advisory support with SSR as its core.
The 1999 peacekeeping mandate of UNSCR 1244 has no end date and there
seems little chance of it being overhauled whilst the Russian Federation has a
seat in the UNSC. The detail of KFOR’s mission is, however, in the hands of
the NATO members. The four non-recognisers of Kosovo’s independence
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agreed to the establishment of KFOR’s ‘new tasks’ in 2008 but no further
changes. This political impasse needs to be resolved soon if Kosovo is to make
further progress with its reforms. As Conclusion 7 explained, a change to an
advisory mission would better match the spirit of the ‘new tasks’ and allow the
mission to be restructured to a smaller, more appropriate number of troops. It
would also be entirely consistent with NATO's approach in both BiH and
Macedonia, where there has been a natural transformation from the original
tactical operation to a mission that provides advice on defence reform and SSR
to their respective host nations. The key, however, would be for NATO and its
more powerful members to bring political pressure to bear on the non-
recognising countries to agree the change.
Recommendation 5: It is recommended that NATO offer Kosovo a TCP
immediately and then PfP membership as soon as it can be agreed in the
NAC.
As Conclusion 8 explained, NATO HQ Brussels and KFOR’s current SSR
support to Kosovo would appear to have reached its limit and could only be
improved through a TCP and then the full range of PfP programmes. The
political ramifications of offering a TCP would be relatively small and could be
agreed by NATO members without any loss of political capital by the four non-
recognising countries. The PfP membership and access to the full range of PfP
programmes would have a much more significant impact on reforms across the
spectrum of the Kosovo government, so it is the more important step. The offer
of PfP membership would therefore probably need to follow on from the change
of KFOR’s mission to an advisory one (Recommendation 4). Once the non-
recognisers have accepted that change, it would only be logical to offer Kosovo
PfP membership as has happened to every other country in the Western
Balkans. Nonetheless, research has indicated that such a step would require
active lobbying and political pressure from countries such as the US, UK,
France and Germany on the non-recognisers.
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Recommendation 6: It is recommended that NATO select, train, educate
and employ specialist SSR advisors in order to ensure that its support to
SSR has the best chance of success.
The SSR role is unlike any other within NATO. Research has shown that
NATO’s SSR advisors are in effect change agents, which dictates that they
possess a broad range of skillsets. Conclusion 9 argues that they need to be in
post for sufficient time to understand the country context, build personal
relationships and trust, as well as delivering a consistency of approach to the
person or organisation being advised. Advisory teams in both BiH and Kosovo
have evolved into combined civilian and military teams and this seems to be
optimal for these types of engagement. It reflects the political nature of SSR, as
well as the diversity of skills required in advisory teams: many of these skills
such as governance and development are not readily available in military staff,
so civilian staff will often need to fill these types of posts. Some interviewees for
the research were quite critical about the lack of expertise of some military
advisors. NATO should therefore be robust with troop contributing nations in
demanding high-quality individuals and then provide appropriate training and
education as part of the preparation of staff for field missions and thus capitalise
on the ‘soft power’ it has on offer.
Recommendation 7: It is recommended that NATO adopt the ‘Framework
of Generalised Factors’ at Appendix 12 and use it as a planning tool when
considering current and future SSR engagements.
The generalised factors point to the lessons identified by the research and have
been produced to be a framework for guided thinking and to ensure that all key
issues are at least considered. It does not absolve planners from thinking or
using their judgement. Conclusion 10 highlights the requirement to use the
factors as a model to be adjusted according to circumstances, in the same way
that surgeons and pilots use such checklists as models and not as templates.
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In due course the generalised factors could be incorporated into NATO’s SSR
policy and framework.
PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This section addresses recommendations for further research. As a
practitioner, as well as an academic analyst, the researcher feels justified in
offering a series of recommendations which emerge explicitly from the evidence
gathered. It is recommended that further research be conducted in three
related areas.
Research Proposal 1: To what extent can NATO's experience of
supporting SSR in the Western Balkans be compared with that in Ukraine
and Georgia?
This study considered just two case studies in one geographical area. An
inductive approach could always withstand the study of more cases and a
broader geographical spread. Whilst the empirical evidence would suggest that
generalisable conclusions can be drawn from the two case studies, more
research is needed in countries such as Georgia and Ukraine, which have a
starkly different historical and political context. Both countries are already being
prepared for the MAP programme, but their geographical location, in what the
Russians call their 'near abroad', presents an entirely different set of
circumstances to either BiH or Kosovo. The product of this suggested research
would allow the research in this field to be more 'complete' and potentially
reinforce and improve the richness of the findings of this thesis. (p123, p125,
p356)
Research Proposal 2: To what extent can the orthodox model of SSR
described in the OECD SSR Handbook be successful whilst a conflict is
still underway?
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The literature suggests that providing support to a country's SSR in relatively
benign environments is an entirely different proposition to supporting SSR
'under fire'. This study has concentrated on countries in the Euro-Atlantic
region, where there is a realistic prospect of membership of the NATO alliance.
A review of the literature surrounding interventions by NTM-I and NTM-A
suggests a completely different and more hostile context, which in turn created
a multiplicity of processes and a different level of complexity. (pp101-102)
Research Proposal 3: To what extent can the orthodox model of SSR
described in the OECD SSR Handbook be successful in a culture and
context outside the Euro-Atlantic region?
The literature suggests that replicating practices from one socio-political context
to another holds uncertainty. Scholars reinforce this point when they pose the
key question of how effective can an OECD model be in a culture and context
that is so far removed from the “OECD-world”? This subject would seem a
fertile ground for further research. (p16, p99, pp101-102, pp124-125, p155)
The quotation at the start of this Chapter provides a vision for NATO as an
adaptive organisation by design. As the Alliance becomes more deeply involved
in projecting stability through SSR support after a decade of war fighting, these
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